A benefit of one's own: older women's entitlement to Social Security retirement.

This article explores differences in Social Security eligibility and benefit levels for older men and women using survey data from the Health and Retirement Study combined with administrative records on actual work histories and Social Security rules. We are able to determine the fully insured status of those persons, how close they are to meeting eligibility criteria when they are not fully insured, and their prospects for benefits. Around three-quarters of older women nearing retirement today will be fully insured for Social Security old-age benefits on the basis of their own accounts, but the rest would need substantial extra employment to rise above the eligibility threshold. Further, two-thirds of older married women who are fully insured have sufficient lifetime earnings to translate into an age-65 primary insurance amount worth at least half their husband's, but the other one-third can expect no additional retirement benefit from contributing to Social Security late in life. Finally, most wives will not be able to improve their benefits by working more under current rules. These results have mixed implications regarding the potential impact of women's rising labor force attachment on eventual retirement benefits. Working more years could increase women's chances of becoming eligible for Social Security benefits, but that effect is likely to be small. Furthermore, even when women do become fully insured according to the rules, not many wives will receive a higher benefit at the margin. The reason is that married women still receive higher Social Security benefits as a spouse than they do on the basis of their own work record. In fact, the net benefit from Social Security due to additional work is negative once one takes into account the Social Security contributions the women paid while employed. Benefits paid to widows are even more likely to be based on the spouse's work history rather than on the woman's. Hence, the rising labor market attachment of women in the future may increase their eligibility for benefits but will produce only modest (and often negative) impacts on their old-age Social Security benefits under current rules.     

Lifetime distributional effects of Social Security retirement benefits

This article presents three measures of the distribution of actual and projected net benefits (benefits minus payroll taxes) from Social Security's Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) for people born between 1931 and 1960. The results are based on simulations with the Social Security Administration's Model of Income in the Near Term (MINT), which projects retirement income through 2020. The base sample for MINT is the U.S. Census Bureau's Survey of Income and Program Participation panels for 1990 to 1993, matched with Social Security administrative records. The study population is grouped into 5-year birth cohorts and then ranked by economic status in three ways. First, the population is divided into five groups on the basis of individual lifetime covered earnings, and their lifetime present values of OASI benefits received and payroll taxes paid are calculated. By this measure, OASI provides much higher benefits to the lowest quintile of earners than to other groups, but it becomes less redistributive toward lower earners in more recent birth cohorts. Second, people are ranked by shared lifetime covered earnings, and the values of shared benefits received and payroll taxes paid are computed. Individuals are assumed to split covered earnings, benefits, and payroll taxes with their spouses in the years they are married. By the shared covered earnings measure, OASI is still much more favorable to persons in the lower income quintiles, although to a lesser degree than when people are ranked by individual covered earnings. OASI becomes more progressive among recent cohorts, even as net lifetime benefits decline for the entire population. Finally, individuals are ranked on the basis of their shared permanent income from age 62, when they become eligible for early retirement benefits, until death. Their annual Social Security benefits are compared with the benefits they would have received if they had saved their payroll taxes in individual accounts and used the proceeds to buy either of two annuities that provide level payments from age 62 until death: a unisex annuity that is based on the average life expectancy of the birth cohort or an age-adjusted annuity that is based on the worker's own life expectancy. On the permanent income measure, OASI is generally more favorable to people in higher income quintiles. Moreover, it is particularly unfavorable to those in the lowest quintile. Because people in the lowest quintile have a shorter life expectancy, they receive OASI benefits for a shorter period. This group would receive greater benefits in retirement if they invested their payroll taxes in the age-adjusted annuity. OASI is more favorable to them than the unisex annuity, however, OASI is becoming more progressive in that the net benefits it provides drop more rapidly among higher income quintiles than lower ones. This article also examines how OASI affects individuals by educational attainment, race, and sex. On both the lifetime covered earnings and the permanent income measures, OASI is more favorable to workers with less education and more favorable to women. The results by race and ethnicity are mixed. When people are ranked by the present value of their shared lifetime covered earnings, OASI appears more favorable to non-Hispanic blacks and Hispanics than to non-Hispanic whites. When people are ranked by shared permanent income in retirement, however, OASI produces negative returns for both non-Hispanic blacks and non-Hispanic whites in the most recent birth cohorts, with non-Hispanic blacks faring relatively worse. The changes across cohorts occur partly because of changes in tax rates and benefits, but more importantly because of changing demographics and earnings patterns of the workforce. Of particular importance is the increasing share of beneficiaries who receive worker benefits instead of auxiliary benefits as wives or widows. OASI benefits are based on the lifetime covered earnings of current or former married couples, as well as on earned retirement benefits of individuals. The reduced importance of auxiliary benefits (due to the higher lifetime covered earnings of women) and the increased proportion of divorced retirees make OASI more progressive--even as net benefits decline--for current and future cohorts than for cohorts who retired in the 1990s. Analysis of these findings suggests that simulations of policy changes in Social Security must take into account the decreasing importance of auxiliary benefits across birth cohorts and the complex changes in individuals' marital histories.     

Using data for couples to project the distributional effects of changes in Social Security policy

Under Social Security program rules, the aged receive Social Security benefits either as retired workers, spouses, divorced spouses, or widow(er)s. Retired-worker benefits are paid to workers who have 40 quarters of coverage over their lives. Auxiliary benefits are paid to spouses, divorced spouses, and widow(er)s of retired workers. Spouse benefits are computed using the earnings history of the current spouse for individuals who are married when they apply for benefits. Divorced spouse and widow(er) benefits are computed using the earnings history of the ex-spouse or deceased spouse with the highest PIA. A large number of retired women are entitled to auxiliary benefits. Some women receive only auxiliary benefits, while the majority of women have their retired-worker benefit supplemented by auxiliary benefits. Because the level of Social Security benefits can reflect the relative lifetime earnings of both spouses, as a couple, using individual data to estimate Social Security benefits will tend to underestimate actual benefits, particularly for women. However, detailed data for couples are often difficult to obtain. There is currently no known single data source that includes both marital and earnings history information. As a result, many researchers resort to estimating Social Security benefits using individual data or aggregate data, such as the average earnings of men and women. The Social Security Administration's Office of Research, Evaluation, and Statistics, with substantial assistance from the Brookings Institution, the Urban Institute, and the RAND Corporation, is developing a model that overcomes this problem by using the marital and earnings histories of both marital partners to estimate Social Security benefits. The Modeling Income in the Near Term (MINT) model projects retirement income (Social Security benefits, pension income, asset income, and earnings of working beneficiaries) from 1997 through 2031 for current and future Social Security beneficiaries using a unique data source--the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)--matched to Social Security Administration records. Using MINT data, this article establishes the importance of using data for couples rather than individuals by examining the impact of changing Social Security benefits to reflect 40 years of lifetime earnings rather than the 35 years required under current law. We compare the effect of this policy change on married women by estimating their benefits with data for couples and with individual data. Results indicate that: Using individual data overestimates the projected reduction in retirement benefits brought about by the policy change and makes the effects on women look more severe than they actually are. Because older birth cohorts are more likely than younger cohorts to receive auxiliary benefits based on their husbands' average lifetime earnings, the bias created by using individual data is projected to be much larger for older cohorts than for younger cohorts. This article emphasizes the importance of using data for couples to estimate Social Security benefits, particularly for women. Although our focus is on married women, using data for couples is just as important for calculating the retirement benefits of divorced and widowed individuals. For individuals who are divorced or widowed at retirement, their Social Security benefits are based on their own earnings history, as well as the earnings histories of each of their previous spouses.     

Projecting retirement income of future retirees with panel data: results from the modeling income in the near-term (MINT) project

Cross-sectional data capture only a point in time and miss individual changes in earnings, labor force participation, marriage, fertility, and health. Because panel data follow individuals over time, they do not have this problem. The problems or concerns with cross-sectional data may be compounded when these data are used to make projections. Iams and Sandell (1997) found that using panel data on earnings explained much more variation in future earnings than using cross-sectional survey data. Panel data are also needed to estimate Social Security benefits, especially for women. Because of auxiliary benefits paid to spouses, ex-spouses, and widow(er)s of entitled workers, an individual's Social Security retirement benefit depends not only on his or her earnings history, but also on his or her marital history and the earnings histories of current and previous spouses. When we compare projected unreduced Social Security benefits with what they would be if we didn't have marital history or earnings history data for men, we find that: Benefits computed using only earnings histories are not very different from benefits computed using both earnings and marital histories. Benefits computed using only current earnings and marital histories underestimate benefits for those in earlier birth cohorts and overestimate benefits for those in the most recent birth cohort. Benefits computed without either marital or earnings histories underestimate benefits for all birth cohorts, but by much more for earlier cohorts than for more recent cohorts. For women we find that benefits computed without marital or earnings histories underestimate benefits in all birth cohorts. The largest differences are for women in earlier birth cohorts. Using both marital and earnings histories to estimate unreduced Social Security benefits, we find that men are projected to continue receiving higher benefits than women, although the gap is expected to narrow as the baby boomers near retirement age. We also look at the composition of projected total income available at retirement for those with incomes in the 45th-55th percentiles of the income distribution and find that: Total income at retirement is projected to be larger for men than for women in every birth cohort. Women are projected to receive the largest share of their total income from Social Security benefits. Men are projected to receive the largest share of their total income from other income sources, although this share declines as the baby boomers near retirement age.     

Divorced women at retirement: projections of economic well-being in the near future.

The Modeling Income in the Near Term (MINT) data system projects retirement income for persons retiring in the 1990s through 2020. Using those data, we examine the economic well-being of divorced women at retirement. The MINT data system improves upon previous estimates of Social Security benefits by: Measuring and projecting years of marriage to determine if the 10-year requirement has been met, Projecting lifetime earnings until retirement and eligibility for Social Security retirement benefits, and Estimating lifetime earnings of former spouses. MINT also makes independent projections of each retiree's income from pensions, assets, and earnings (for working beneficiaries). As a result of changes in marital patterns, MINT projects that the proportion of women who are divorced will increase. At the same time, the proportion of those women who are eligible for auxiliary benefits is projected to decrease, for two main reasons. First, changes in women's earnings and work patterns result in more women receiving retired-worker benefits based on their own earnings. Second, an increased number of divorced women will not meet the 10-year marriage requirement for auxiliary benefits. Despite the projected decrease over time in eligibility rates for auxiliary benefits, the level of Social Security benefits is projected to change little between the older and younger birth cohorts of divorced women entering retirement. According to the MINT data, the most vulnerable of divorced women will be those who have not met the 10-year marriage requirement. Poverty rates will be higher for them than for all other divorced women. This group of divorced women is projected to grow as more and more women divorce from shorter marriages. With more women divorcing and with fewer divorced women meeting the 10-year marriage requirement, the proportion of economically vulnerable aged women will increase when the baby boom retires. Further research is warranted on this long neglected subject. Analyses of divorced women's economic well-being by major socioeconomic characteristics such as race and ethnicity and education are of particular interest. Such analyses can be supported by the MINT data system.     

The role of earnings and financial risk in distributional analyses of Social Security reform measures

The Social Security Trustees project that the Social Security program faces longterm financing difficulties. Several proposals that have been offered to shore‐up the finances of the Social Security program would create individual retirement accounts funded with part of the payroll tax. The authors of many of these proposals claim that future beneficiaries will be better off under their new system than under the current system. This study examines the consequences of differing earnings patterns and year‐to‐year differences in asset returns have for Social Security retired worker benefits in three Social Security reform proposals. Incorporating both actual earnings histories and variation in asset returns shows that none of the three individual account plans can always deliver benefits that are higher than payable current‐law benefits. © 2006 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

Evaluating the initial impact of eliminating the retirement earnings test

Under the retirement earnings test, Social Security benefits are reduced if earnings exceed specified amounts, although the benefit reduction is partly offset by future benefit increases. By imposing a tax on the earnings of beneficiaries, the earnings test provided a disincentive for them to supplement retirement income by working. The Senior Citizens Freedom to Work Act of 2000 eliminated the earnings test for Social Security beneficiaries who have reached the full retirement age. This article presents the first study of labor force activity (earnings and employment) among individuals aged 65-69 before and immediately after this sudden rule change. Drawing on Social Security administrative data, the author examines three widely expected reactions: increased return to work, increased hours worked, and accelerated applications for old-age benefits. The analysis finds that removing the retirement earnings test: Encouraged some workers to increase their earnings. The increases in earnings are large and significant among higher earners but are not statistically significant among lower earners. Had little effect on employment. Removing the earnings test appears to have had no immediate, significant effect on the employment rate of older workers. Employment of older people may be affected in the longer run, however. Slightly increased the pace of applications for benefits. Applications rose about 2 percent in the 65-69 age group in 2000. The overall acceleration will probably be small, however, because most individuals in this age group apply for benefits before reaching the full retirement age. Although the current analysis captures the effects of retaining older workers in the labor force, these initial results may not capture all the effects of eliminating the retirement earnings test, however, for two reasons. First, the analysis covers only a single year--the year the earnings test was eliminated. Since eliminating the earnings test may have had little effect on people who had already retired, its full effect may not be apparent for several years. Second, the analysis applies only to workers aged 65-69. Eliminating the earnings test for people above the full retirement age may also encourage younger workers to delay retirement and therefore increase their labor supply. Further analysis will therefore be required to determine the longer-run impact of eliminating the retirement earnings test.     

How common is "parking" among Social Security Disability Insurance beneficiaries? Evidence from the 1999 change in the earnings level of substantial gainful activity

Fewer Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) beneficiaries have their earnings suspended or terminated because of work than those who are actually working, partly because beneficiaries "park" earnings at a level below substantial gainful activity (SGA) to retain benefits. We assess the extent of parking by exploiting the 1999 change in the SGA earnings level from $500 to $700 monthly for nonblind beneficiaries using a difference-indifference analysis that compares two annual cohorts of beneficiaries who completed their trial work period, one that was affected by the SGA change and one that was not. Our impact estimates, along with results from other sources, suggest that from 0.2 to 0.4 percent of all DI beneficiaries were parked below the SGA level in the typical month from 2002 through 2006. The SGA change did not yield any difference in mean earnings, although it did result in a small reduction in months spent off of the rolls because of work.     

Projections of economic well-being for Social Security beneficiaries in 2022 and 2062

Policymakers considering potential changes to the Social Security program need to be able to assess how such changes would affect the economic well-being of future retirees. The first step to understanding these effects is to determine the well-being of future retirees under the current Social Security system. To this end, this article projects the retiree populations aged 62 or older in 2022 and 2062 using the Social Security Administration's MINT (Modeling Income in the Near Term) model and assesses their well-being. Because no one measure can fully capture whether future retirees will have adequate resources to meet their needs, we employ several indicators to assess retirement prospects. In addition, because current-law Social Security promises cannot be financed from current-law taxes, we project an alternative 2062 baseline that adjusts Social Security benefits downward to reflect the amounts that current-law taxes can support. Our results illustrate the importance of using several measures when assessing the well-being of future Social Security beneficiaries. When using absolute measures, retirement well-being will improve for Social Security beneficiaries in 2062 compared with those in 2022. Median per capita income of Social Security beneficiaries is projected to increase by a third (in real terms) between 2022 and 2062, with a corresponding decline in projected poverty rates. In addition, median financial wealth will increase between 2022 and 2062. Relative measures of well-being, however, suggest a decline in well-being between Social Security beneficiaries in 2022 and those in 2062. The share of beneficiaries who have low income relative to their peers, measured as the share whose income-to-needs ratio is less than half of the median ratio, will increase over time. In addition, income replacement rates are projected to fall between 2022 and 2062, indicating a decline in how well-being during retirement compares with that during the working years. And although median financial wealth will increase between 2022 and 2062, it will actually fall relative to economy-wide average wages. Projected improvements over time would lessen, and declines would be exacerbated, if instead of assuming the payment of currently scheduled Social Security benefits we assumed that benefits would be reduced according to what is payable under current-law taxes. Regardless of which measure of well-being is used, certain groups fare worse than others, including beneficiaries who never married, nonwhites, beneficiaries without a high school degree, and those with fewer years of labor force experience and low lifetime earnings. These vulnerable groups are likely to be more dependent on Social Security benefits for their retirement income. As a result, they fare particularly poorly under the assumption that Social Security benefits are reduced to reflect what is payable under current-law taxes.     

Social Security's special minimum benefit

Social Security's special minimum primary insurance amount (PIA) provision was enacted in 1972 to increase the adequacy of benefits for regular long-term, low-earning covered workers and their dependents or survivors. At the time, Social Security also had a regular minimum benefit provision for persons with low lifetime average earnings and their families. Concerns were rising that the low lifetime average earnings of many regular minimum beneficiaries resulted from sporadic attachment to the covered workforce rather than from low wages. The special minimum benefit was seen as a way to reward regular, low-earning workers without providing the windfalls that would have resulted from raising the regular minimum benefit to a much higher level. The regular minimum benefit was subsequently eliminated for workers reaching age 62, becoming disabled, or dying after 1981. Under current law, the special minimum benefit will phase out over time, although it is not clear from the legislative history that this was Congress's explicit intent. The phaseout results from two factors: (1) special minimum benefits are paid only if they are higher than benefits payable under the regular PIA formula, and (2) the value of the regular PIA formula, which is indexed to wages before benefit eligibility, has increased faster than that of the special minimum PIA, which is indexed to inflation. Under the Social Security Trustees' 2000 intermediate assumptions, the special minimum benefit will cease to be payable to retired workers attaining eligibility in 2013 and later. Their benefits will always be larger under the regular benefit formula. As policymakers consider Social Security solvency initiatives--particularly proposals that would reduce benefits or introduce investment risk--interest may increase in restoring some type of special minimum benefit as a targeted protection for long-term low earners. Two of the three reform proposals offered by the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security would modify and strengthen the current-law special minimum benefit. Interest in the special minimum benefit may also increase because of labor force participation and marital trends that suggest that enhancing workers' benefits may be a more effective means of reducing older women's poverty rates than enhancing spousal or widow's benefits. By understanding the Social Security program's experience with the special minimum benefit, policymakers will be able to better anticipate the effectiveness of other initiatives to enhance benefits for long-term low earners. This article presents the most recent and comprehensive information available about the special minimum benefit in order to help policymakers make informed decisions about the provision's future. Highlights of the current special minimum benefit include the following: Very few persons receive the special minimum benefit. As of December 2001, about 134,000 workers and their dependents and survivors were entitled to a benefit based on the special minimum. Of those, only about 79,000 received a higher total benefit because of the special minimum; the other 55,000 were dually entitled. (In effect, when persons are eligible for more than one type of benefit--that is, they are dually eligible--the highest benefit payable determines total benefits. If the special minimum benefit is not the highest benefit payable, it does not increase total benefits paid.) As of February 2000, retired workers who were special minimum beneficiaries with unreduced benefits and were not dually entitled were receiving, on average, a monthly benefit of $510 per month. That amount is approximately $2,000 less than the annual poverty threshold for an aged individual. Special minimum benefits provide small increases in total benefits. For special minimum beneficiaries who were not dually entitled as of December 2001, the average special minimum monthly PIA was just $39 higher than the regular PIA. Most special minimum beneficiaries are female retired workers. About 90 percent of special minimum beneficiaries are retired workers, and 77 percent of those retired workers are women. The special minimum benefit has never provided poverty-level benefits. Maximum payable special minimum benefits (unreduced for early retirement) equal 85 percent of the poverty level for aged persons, down from 96 percent at the provision's inception. Major public policy considerations raised by this analysis include the following: Social Security benefits alone do not protect all long-term low earners from poverty. Low earners with 30 years of earnings equal to the annual full-time minimum wage who retired in selected years from 1982 to 2000 received benefits that were 3.9 percent to 20.1 percent below the poverty threshold, depending on the year they retired. For 40-year earners, the range was 3.9 percent to 15.3 percent below poverty. Furthermore, in 1993, 29.2 percent of retired-worker beneficiaries who were poor had 30 or more years of coverage. The size of the universe of persistently low earners with significant attachment to the covered workforce is unknown. Available research that examines two 28-month periods suggests that only 4 percent to 6 percent of full-time, full-period earners had below-minimum wages for more than 12 consecutive months. Targeting enhanced benefits only toward long-term, regular workers who are low earners is difficult under the current Social Security program. All else being equal, if total wage-indexed lifetime covered earnings are the same for both a full-career low earner and for a high earner who has worked only occasionally, then their Social Security benefits will be identical. Social Security has no information on number of hours worked, hourly wages, or other information that could distinguish between two such persons.     

The growth in Social Security benefits among the retirement-age population from increases in the cap on covered earnings

Analysts have proposed raising the maximum level of earnings subject to the Social Security payroll tax (the "tax max") to improve long-term Social Security Trust Fund solvency. This article investigates how raising the tax max leads to the "leakage" of portions of the additional revenue into higher benefit payments. Using Health and Retirement Study data matched to Social Security earnings records, we compare historical payroll tax payments and benefit amounts for Early Boomers (born 1948-1953) with tax and benefit simulations had they been subject to the tax max (adjusted for wage growth) faced by cohorts 12 and 24 years older. We find that 43.2 percent of the additional payroll tax revenue attributable to tax max increases affecting Early Boomers relative to taxes paid by the cohort 12 years older leaked into higher benefits. For Early Boomers relative to those 24 years older, we find 53.5 percent leakage.     

Social Security: a financial appraisal for the median voter

Several explanations have been proposed for why voters continue to support unfunded social security systems. Browning (1975) suggests that the extremely large unfunded pension systems of most democracies depend on the existence of a voting majority composed of middle-aged and older people who fail to fully internalize the cost of financing the system. In fact, when voting, economically rational workers consider only their current and future contributions to the system and their expected pension benefits--not their past contributions, which they regard as sunk costs. If, for a majority of voters, the expected continuation return from social security exceeds the return from alternative assets, an unfunded social security system is politically sustainable. This article explores the validity of Browning's proposition by quantifying the returns that U.S. voters in presidential elections from 1964 to 1996 have obtained, or expect to obtain, from Social Security. Did "investments" in Social Security outperform alternative forms of investment, such as mutual funds or pension funds, for a majority of the voters? What can be expected for the future? The U.S. Social Security system redistributes income within age cohorts on the basis of sex, income, and marital status. To account for some of these features, the median voter is represented by a family unit whose members--a husband who accounts for 70 percent of household earnings and a wife who accounts for 30 percent--make joint economic and voting decisions. Thus, retirement and survival benefits paid out to the spouse of an insured worker can be included in the calculation of Social Security returns. Interval estimates of voters' family incomes from the U.S. Census Bureau were used to obtain the median voter's household earnings. The median voter's age is derived from the ages of those who voted in presidential elections, not from the ages of the entire electorate. The median voter's contributions to Social Security are the product of the joint employer/employee Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) tax rate and employee earnings. Data on actual contributions are available for median voters in the 1964 to 1976 elections; Social Security Administration (SSA) estimates are used for future tax rates and average wage growth rates. Data on actual old-age, retirement, and survivor benefits, as well as estimates of future benefits, are also available from SSA. Analysis of ex-post returns from "investing" in Social Security and from a buy-and-hold strategy applied to three alternative assets--the Standard & Poor's Composite Index (S&P), the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), and U.S. government bonds--shows surprising results. In 1964 and 1968, Social Security largely outperformed the other three assets. In 1972, Social Security and the stock market performed almost equally. In 1976, however, the median voter would have been better off in the stock market. The expected returns for median voters in later elections cannot be directly compared with realized returns from alternative assets. However, estimates range from 5.7 percent in 1984 to 7.0 percent in 1996 and thus compare favorably with average returns of 5.6 percent for S&P, 5.3 percent for DJIA, and 2.1 percent for government bonds over the 1964-1996 period. Although these findings must be taken with caution since they compare ex-post returns, they show that, despite a continuous reduction in profitability, Social Security still represents a safe, high-return asset for a majority of families.     

Who is "62 enough"? Identifying respondents eligible for Social Security early retirement benefits in the Health and Retirement Study

Workers are not instantly eligible for Social Security retirement benefits on their 62nd birthdays, nor can they receive benefits in the month they turn 62. This note discusses how well researchers can do using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to identify respondents old enough to receive and report early Social Security retirement benefits. It shows that only some workers aged 62 at the time of an HRS interview will be "62 enough" to have received a Social Security benefit and reported it in the survey. In general, workers become eligible for a retirement benefit the month after they turn 62, and they may receive their first payment the month after that. Until recently, payments were received very early in the month, but in mid-1997 and later, the Social Security Administration (SSA) staggered benefit payments over the course of a month. Therefore, many beneficiaries will not be able to report the receipt of their first benefit payment until the third month after their birthday in more recent HRS interviews. This note describes the best approach for approximating the pool of HRS respondents who are old enough to have reported the receipt of their first retirement benefit. It then applies the procedure to an analysis by Burkhauser, Couch, and Phillips, who used the 1994 HRS data to distinguish between those who took early retirement benefits upon turning 62 and those who postponed the receipt of benefits. Because these authors did not provide for respondents who were not "62 enough" to receive a benefit at the time of the interview, they understated the proportion of respondents who took retirement benefits at age 62.     

The retirement prospects of divorced women

For decades, policymakers have discussed how to remedy the high poverty rates of older widows. Yet older divorced women are more likely to be poor than older widows, and historical divorce and remarriage trends suggest that in the future a larger share of retired women will be divorced. This article uses the Social Security Administration's Modeling Income in the Near Term (version 6) to project the retirement resources and wellbeing of divorced women. We find that Social Security benefits and retirement incomes are projected to increase for divorced women and that their poverty rates are projected to decline, due in large part to women's increasing lifetime earnings. However, not all divorced women will be equally well off economic well-being in retirement varies by Social Security benefit type.     

Effect on benefits of earnings at ages 65 or older, 1995.

A major policy issue for the Social Security program is the treatment of earnings of persons who have attained retirement age. This article discusses the retirement test and recomputation of benefit provisions, and provides statistical data for 1995. In 1995, about 806,000 persons aged 65-70 had significant earnings resulting in the withholding of benefits by the retirement test. About 1,659,000 persons aged 65 or older realized an increase in their benefit amount because of their earnings.     

Income of retirement-aged persons in the United States

This article reviews the composition and level of retirement income in the United States and how this has changed over time, focusing on two overlapping but distinct groups--the entire population aged 65 or older, and recent retirees. Changes in the composition of income of the aged over the past 20-30 years, including greatly expanded Social Security and pension coverage and an increasing number of persons with retirement savings, have improved the economic status of the aged not only in comparison with the aged in earlier years, but also in comparison with younger adults who derive most of their income from earnings. New retired workers are better off than the total aged population in several respects. The younger cohorts now in the labor force will spend more of their working lives in the more favorable conditions now present than was true of past new beneficiaries or the aged as a whole. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to expect that today's workers will enjoy more and larger pensions and increased income from savings to supplement their Social Security benefits when they retire.     

Women, marriage, and Social Security benefits

The majority of women Social Security beneficiaries receive at least part of their benefit based on their status as the wives or widows of entitled workers. This article discusses the impact of past and present marital status of women as a factor in establishing eligibility for monthly benefits and the amount of the benefit payment. The data are drawn from the 1980 and 1985 June Marital History Supplements to the Current Population Survey. Whether or not they are currently receiving auxiliary benefits, most older women are potentially eligible for them based on their current marital status or past marital duration.     

Trends in the economic status of the elderly, 1976-2000

The economic well-being of elderly Americans (aged 65 or older) improved between 1976 and 2000. Overall, poverty rates fell during this period, median real income rose, and median income relative to the working-age population was relatively stable. Most population subgroups shared in the reduced poverty rates; however, the economic status of elderly Hispanics did not improve. This article attempts to explain those economic trends by identifying changes in five sources of income for the elderly and analyzing the changes in the context of demographic changes in the elderly populations over the past 25 years. As a result of increased longevity, for example, larger proportions of elderly men and women are now 80 or older, and smaller proportions are 65 to 69. Hispanics and Asian Americans make up a larger share of the elderly population and whites a smaller share. The fraction of women who are married has increased, the fraction who are widowed has fallen, and the fraction who are divorced has grown. Such demographic changes can greatly affect the economic status of subgroups as well as the overall elderly population. Of the five sources of income for the elderly, Social Security remains the most prevalent and important. While both the rate of receipt and the share of aggregate income from Social Security benefits stayed relatively steady over the past 25 years, the average real Social Security benefit increased because of rising wages. Income from assets, the second most important source of income for the elderly, fluctuated. Because the elderly are more likely to hold interest-bearing assets such as bonds rather than stocks, their asset income is responsive to changes in nominal interest rates and bond yields. Receipt of pension income increased during this period, although it leveled off during the 1990s. Factors contributing to this pattern include enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, which increased protections of pension benefits for spouses, and improved labor market opportunities for blacks and women. In recent years, defined contribution pension plans have become more prevalent than defined benefit plans, but the full effect of this change on pension income may not yet be apparent. After decades of decline, labor force participation rates of older men leveled out in the mid-1980s and then increased. For older women, the trend before the mid-1980s was flat, but since then rates have risen substantially. The increased use of part-time jobs or self-employment to ease the transition into retirement, the economic expansion of the 1990s, and the liberalization of the Social Security earnings test may all have contributed to those trends. Although the percentage of elderly people with earnings has increased only modestly in the past few years, the share of income from earnings has grown substantially--from 16 percent of income in 1984 to 23 percent in 2000. Finally, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits are indexed for inflation but not for growth in real wages. As real incomes of the elderly rose, therefore, fewer elderly persons were eligible to receive SSI or, for those receiving SSI, were eligible for smaller benefits. The proportion of elderly persons receiving public assistance, primarily SSI, declined from 11 percent in 1976 to 5 percent in 2000.     

Comparing replacement rates under private and federal retirement systems

One measure of the adequacy of retirement income is replacement rate - the percentage of pre-retirement salary that is available to a worker in retirement. This article compares salary replacement rates for private-sector employees of medium and large private establishments with those for federal employees under the Civil Service Retirement System and the Federal Employees Retirement System. Because there is no standard benefit formula to represent the variety of formulas available in the private sector, a composite defined benefit formula was developed using the characteristics of plans summarized in the Bureau of Labor Statistics Medium and Large Employer Plan Survey. The resulting "typical" private-sector defined benefit plan, with an accompanying defined contribution plan, was then compared with the two federal systems. The Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) is a stand-alone defined benefit plan whose participants are not covered by Social Security. Until passage of the 1983 Amendments to Social Security Act, it was the only retirement plan for most federal civilian employees. Provisions of the 1983 Amendments were designed to restore long-term financial stability to the Social Security trust funds. One provision created the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS), which covers federal employees hired after 1983. It was one of the provisions designed to restore long-term financial stability to the Social Security trust funds. FERS employees contribute to and are covered by Social Security. FERS, which is a defined benefit plan, also includes a basic benefit and a 401(k)-type plan known as the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP). To compare how retirees would fare under the three different retirement systems, benefits of employees retiring at age 65 with 35 years of service were calculated using hypothetical workers with steady earnings. Workers were classified according to a percentage of the average wage in the economy: low earners (45 percent), average earners (100 percent) high earners (160 percent), and maximum earners (earnings at the taxable maximum amount). Overall, this analysis found that: Excluding Social Security benefits and TSP and defined contribution annuities, CSRS retirees have a higher pre-retirement salary replacement rate than either FERS or private-sector retirees. Private-sector retirees, however, have higher replacement rate than their FERS counterparts. Including Social Security benefits but not TSP and defined contribution plan annuities, CSRS retirees who are maximum earners have a higher pre-retirement salary replacement rate (despite receiving no Social Security benefits) than FERS retirees with the same earnings. Private-sector retirees in all earnings categories have a higher replacement rate than federal retirees with the same earnings. Including Social Security and TSP and defined contribution plan annuities, private-sector retirees in all earnings categories have a higher replacement rate than federal retirees, but their rate is close to that of FERS retirees. The rate is higher for FERS retirees than for CSRS retirees in all earnings categories. This analysis shows that replacement creates could exceed 100 percent for FERS employees who contribute who contribute 6 percent of earnings to the TSP over full working career. Private-sector replacement rates were quite similar for those with both a defined benefit and a defined contribution pension plan. Social Security replacement rates make up the highest proportion of benefits for th private sector's lowest income quartile group. The replacement rate for 401(k) plans and the TSP account for a higher proportion of benefits than does Social Security for all other income groups, assuming the absence of a defined benefit plan.     

The net effects of the Project NetWork return-to-work case management experiment on participant earnings, benefit receipt, and other outcomes

The Social Security Administration (SSA) initiated Project NetWork in 1991 to test case management as a means of promoting employment among persons with disabilities. The demonstration, which targeted Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) beneficiaries and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) applicants and recipients, offered intensive outreach, work-incentive waivers, and case management/referral services. Participation in Project NetWork was voluntary. Volunteers were randomly assigned to the "treatment" group or the "control" group. Those assigned to the treatment group met individually with a case or referral manager who arranged for rehabilitation and employment services, helped clients develop an individual employment plan, and provided direct employment counseling services. Volunteers assigned to the control group could not receive services from Project NetWork but remained eligible for any employment assistance already available in their communities. For both treatment and control groups, the demonstration waived specific DI and SSI program rules considered to be work disincentives. The experimental impact study thus measures the incremental effects of case and referral management services. The eight demonstration sites were successful in implementing the experimental design roughly as planned. Project NetWork staff were able to recruit large numbers of participants and to provide rehabilitation and employment services on a substantial scale. Most of the sites easily reached their enrollment targets and were able to attract volunteers with demographic characteristics similar to those of the entire SSI and DI caseload and a broad range of moderate and severe disabilities. However, by many measures, volunteers were generally more "work-ready" than project eligible in the demonstration areas who did not volunteer to receive NetWork services. Project NetWork case management increased average annual earnings by $220 per year over the first 2 years following random assignment. This statistically significant impact, an approximate 11-percent increase in earnings, is based on administrative data on earnings. For about 70 percent of sample members, a third year of followup data was available. For this limited sample, the estimated effect of Project NetWork on annual earnings declined to roughly zero in the third followup year. The findings suggest that the increase in earnings may have been short-lived and may have disappeared by the time Project NetWork services ended. Project NetWork did not reduce reliance on SSI or DI benefits by statistically significant amounts over the 30-42 month followup period. The services provided by Project NetWork thus did not reduce overall SSI and DI caseloads or benefits by substantial amounts, especially given that only about 5 percent of the eligible caseload volunteered to participate in Project NetWork. Project NetWork produced modest net benefits to persons with disabilities and net costs to taxpayers. Persons with disabilities gained mainly because the increases in their earnings easily outweighed the small (if any) reduction in average SSI and DI benefits. For SSA and the federal government as a whole, the costs of Project NetWork were not sufficiently offset by increases in tax receipts resulting from increased earnings or reductions in average SSI and DI benefits. The modest net benefits of Project NetWork to persons with disabilities are encouraging. How such benefits of an experimental intervention should be weighed against costs of taxpayers depends on value judgments of policymakers. Because different case management projects involve different kinds of services, these results cannot be directly generalized to other case management interventions. They are nevertheless instructive for planning new initiatives. Combining case and referral management services with various other interventions, such as longer term financial support for work or altered provider incentives, could produc