“The Chinese Dream” and Chinese Foreign and Security Policies—Rosy Rhetoric versus Harsh Realities

The “China Dream” announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping’ in 2012 paints a very rosy picture of China under his seemingly undisputed leadership: China's economic and political rise will be beneficial to China and indeed the international community putting Beijing on top of the list of “peace-loving” countries. Reality, however, as it turned out over the last four years, is distinctively different as a number of countries in China's neighborhood and beyond can surely confirm. Indeed, Beijing unilaterally claiming and building civilian and military facilities on disputed islands in the South China Sea are arguably the very opposite of a peaceful contribution to world politics and security facilitated by the rhetorical hype of Xi's “Chinese Dream.” While outside observers can be excused for concluding that the “Chinese Dream” mantra is directed at the Chinese domestic audience to distract from the very many economic, environment and social problems within China, the consequences of Beijing's “dreaming” of re-gaining its former undisputed “Middle Kingdom” status in Asia are very much felt abroad. This, it is argued, could be the time when “dreams” turn into “nightmares” for those at the receiving end of Beijing's dream.     

China,globalisation and the World Trade Organisation

This article claims that membership of the WTO will help industrialisation, rather than make China more dependent. Hedley Bull's realist paradigm helps to understand why China joined this organisation, any counter arguments are wishful thinking. Friedrich List's ideas for self-reliant industrialisation were used successfully by Mao Zedong, but globalisation has changed development strategy. Globalisation, if handled wrongly can make China jobless, voiceless, rootless, ruthless and futureless. If handled right, it can strengthen independence, sovereignty and self-reliance. The Chinese government needs stable external, as well as internal economic conditions. There are benefits for the vast majority of Chinese, but there are also possible disadvantages. David Ricardo's “comparative advantage” has not really helped Less Developed Countries, on the other hand, China should not become a crumbled “Somalia,” this means that China has to engage with globalisation, and this means also the WTO. After all, agency does exist and globalisation is a “two-edged sword.”     

A Middle Power's Roles in Shaping East Asian Security Order: Analysis of Japan's Engagement from a Normative Perspective

East Asia is currently in a transitional period. Recognizing the challenges presented by China's rise to the current regional order, existing literature analyses the security situation in Asia by focusing on the material aspects of power distribution between the US and China. Few works substantively discuss the roles played by middle powers such as Japan in shaping the regional order and how they can deal with the challenges of great power competition and threats to the global rules‐based order. By employing Japan's involvement in the South China Sea issues as a case study, this article examines how a middle power attempts to shape or underpin the regional security order and if such attempts are effective. The investigation of Japan's engagement illustrates that a middle power's practical support can indirectly and gradually contribute to sustaining and defending the regional “rules‐based order”.     

Review essay: Recent books on Indonesia's occupation of East Timor and the East Timorese struggle for self-determination

Abstract

East Timor is the site of one of the great genocides since World War II. Out of a population of about 700,000 at the time of East Timor's brief independence, about 200,000 people have died as a result of the Indonesian invasion and the ensuing war, politically created famine, and the ongoing occupation. From the time of the Indonesian invasion on 7 December 1975 until January 1989 Jakarta kept East Timor closed. Apart from official foreign delegations, some international aid workers, and a limited number of journalists, few were able to enter the territory. On 27 December 1988 the Indonesian authorities accorded East Timor open-territory status following a one-day visit in November to the territory by Indonesian president Suharto. Jakarta was keen on encouraging foreign and “domestic” (Indonesian) investment in its “twenty-seventh province” as well as presenting an image to the outside world of normalcy in East Timor. On both accounts, Jakarta has largely failed in its objectives. The ongoing resistance by the East Timorese people to Indonesian hegemony and the concomitant political instability in East Timor as well as the relative poverty and isolation of the territory have prevented the influx of private capital. In terms of international opinion, the “opening up” of East Timor has not helped to suppress the image of the brutal nature of Indonesia's illegal occupation of the territory.     

Yasuhiro Nakasone Proposal on Maritime Security in East Asia

Maritime security in East Asia is essential to the peace and prosperity of the world. Today, serious problems in this domain have arisen in the region. Resolving these problems is a pressing issue that impacts not just the region, but also the preservation of the peace and prosperity of the entire globe. Despite this urgent need, cooperative frameworks for preventing problems from arising in the first place—as opposed to mere security regimes for deterring conflicts—have yet to be organized. To preserve a maritime security order in East Asia that is based on laws and rules, mechanisms based on mutual trust must be arranged for deterring and preventing conflict.

Based on the foregoing, the Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS) has been engaged in research on problems of maritime security in East Asia. In December 2015, IIPS held the High-Level Conference on Maritime Security in East Asia and unveiled the “Yasuhiro Nakasone Proposal on Maritime Security in East Asia” (the “Nakasone Proposal”). This paper will discuss the “Nakasone Proposal” and the background to its formulation, as well as the institute's future endeavors.     

America's Rebalance to Asia and its Implications for Japan-US-Australia Security Cooperation

How does America's greater focus on Asia impact the security policies of Japan and Australia? How does it change the nature of the Japan-US-Australia security partnership? This paper attempts to answer these questions by looking at Japanese and Australian responses to the Obama Administration's new security policy toward Asia called “rebalancing.” After examining them, it argues that the regional allied response to America's new security posture has generated greater momentum for both allies to collaborate in wider areas in a more timely and effective way than before. It concludes asserting that, in the era of rebalance, Japan, the United States, and Australia have not only deepened their existing cooperation, but also have expanded potential areas of cooperation toward a more “dynamic” partnership.     

冷战初期日本南海政策及东南亚战略取向

冷战使日本在美国的全球战略中作用提升,成为反共"防波堤",其具有政治目的性的东南亚"经济外交"呈现出明显的海洋战略取向,且影响至今。因地缘利益、东南亚战略,日本南海政策的基本出发点自冷战开始后始终没变,即追随美国遏制中国政策,对南海诸岛归属问题上采取模糊态度和立场,这为后来南海周边某些国家侵占南海岛礁留下所谓借口。此时日本还曾插足于南海诸岛,由于海峡两岸对南海权益的维护使其非法行为无法为继,但随着经济的发展,日本越来越依赖南海航道和加大南海石油资源的开发,这决定其"关心"南海问题就是势所必然了。     

Obama’s Pivot to Asia and Its Failed Japan-South Korea Historical Reconciliation

Since the 1980s, Japan’s war memory has strained its relations with South Korea and China, to a less degree, the USA. Two of the thorniest issues are the comfort women and the US atomic bombing of Japan. Before the Obama administration announced its policy pivot to Asia in 2011, both Japanese and American leaders were reluctant to make amends for the past acts of their countries. However, in 2015, the Japanese conservative Prime Minister Abe reached an agreement with South Korea that “finally and irreversibly” resolved the comfort women issue, thus achieving a historic reconciliation between the two countries. In 2016, then President Obama visited Hiroshima to commemorate the atomic bomb victims. Then, in December 2016, the comfort women issue resurfaced in Japan and South Korea relations, indicating a failure of the reconciliation. Why did the USA change its policy on historical issues involving Japan? Why did Abe and the South Korean President Park Geun-hye settle the comfort women issue? Why did Obama visit Hiroshima? Why did the reconciliation fail? In this article, I propose a rational choice theory to answer these questions. Applying the proposed theory and relying on available evidence, I argue that the settlement of the comfort women issue and Obama’s visit to Hiroshima are important components of Obama’s pivot to Asia to balance China’s rise. The reconciliation failed mainly because it did not resolve the historical justice issue promoted by the human rights norms. I discuss some implications for reconciliation in Northeast Asia.     

The United States in a world of rising regional powers: farewell Lilliput,hello Shanghai

Regional powers such as China, India, Russia, and to a lesser degree Brazil and South Africa, now occupy a significant role on the world stage. The United States, while still enjoying superpower status, has taken note. At the same time, the transnational nature of the challenges facing the world will require multilateral and bilateral co-operation perhaps unprecedented in modern history. How will the United States respond to these new requisites within the context of this changed world? While it is too early to assess the Obama administration's foreign policy substantively, it looks to be adopting an approach emphasising the building of consensus and multilateralism in its international engagement. Moreover, there is reason to expect that it will actively seek a more constructive set of relationships with regional powers. United States domestic political constraints may yet hamper Obama in this new approach, as might the type of response the new administration receives from old and new powers to its overtures. Whether the changes are more in tone than substance remains to be seen.     

The Pivot between Containment,Engagement, and Restraint: President Obama’s Conflicted Grand Strategy in Asia

This article examines the formulation and implementation of American grand strategy under the Obama administration, and how the “pivot to Asia” functions within this strategic context. It argues that President Obama attempts to secure continued American hegemony through a combination of cooperative engagement and restraint. This exposes a fundamental dilemma at the heart of America’s rebalancing: increased engagement with US allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific is fueling political, economic, and military competition with China. Sequestration and questions over American strategic coherence and consistency are simultaneously undermining the credibility of the pivot, both at home and abroad. The article concludes that this dilemma makes it unlikely for the pivot to succeed in its stated aims, unless the United States re-emphasizes cooperative engagement with China.     

Reflections on Japan's past

Fifty years after the devastation of World War II, Japan's remarkable long‐term, export‐driven economic success is known as the East Asian development model and East Asian economies have become the engine for the world's economic growth. Yet the collapse of Japan's 1980s over‐inflated “bubble economy” has created apathy and pessimism, says former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. In May 1995, on the occasion of his seventy‐seventh birthday, after more than 45 years in the Diet, IIPS Chairman Nakasone reflects on Japan's modern history and issues a call for renewal in the following speech. Above all, he says, “Japan does have a few mavericks” and “people with true convictions [should] come forward . . . the Japanese are waiting for genuine leadership.”     

Russia's “turn to the east”: a study in policy making

Russia's recent reorientation “to the East” has gained increased urgency given events in Ukraine. Here the policymaking process surrounding the “turn to the East” is examined. The focus is on the economic dimension – the economic development of the Russian Far East and engagement with the Asia-Pacific region – rather than geostrategic and security issues. Policymaking is evaluated in terms of general approach and process, with the implications of the evaluation for Russian policymaking more generally then being explored. “Turn to the East” policymaking exhibits a strong commitment to strategic planning that is characteristic of Putin, and which in this case struggles not only with process issues but also with contradictions within the strategy and the challenging realities of the region. Regarding process, a far more institutionalized policy process than the currently dominant personalist view would lead us to expect is found, with relevant bureaucratic and non-state actors well represented in an elaborate and relatively formal process. However a considerable weakening of sign-off procedures is noted, which has lead to policy inconsistency and indeed “policy irresponsibility” among participants. The author attributes the weakening of sign-off procedures to Putin's frustration with the gridlock tendencies of strict sign-off regimes, rather than a desire to create a personalist regime of hands-on management. This suggests that improvement of the Russian policy process requires structural and procedural change, rather than simply leadership change.     

India's “Grand Strategy” for the Indian Ocean: Mahanian Visions

This article considers how India sees the Indian Ocean, and in particular its drive to make the Indian Ocean, “India's Ocean.” Various comparisons and links are made. Firstly there is the role and application of Mahanian tenets of “sea-power,” in particular naval projection, control of sea-routes and access to bases. Second is the contrast between the earlier maritime visions of Kavalam Panikkar (1945) and Keshav Vaidya (1949) and the continental mindset evident under Nehru and his successors which saw neglect of India's maritime power. Third is the strategic vision evident since 1998 with the BJP government and maintained by the Congress administration since 2004. This has underpinned India's Naval Chief of Staff Arun Prakash's current eloquence on the possibilities opening up for India in and around the Indian Ocean. Questions of intent (strategic doctrine) and the application of “state power” (spending, bases, ships and equipment, geographical reach) are woven together.     

Development of the Mekong Region as Part of Japan's Diplomatic Strategy for East Asia

Japan's active engagement in the development of the Mekong region since the 1990s needs to be understood not only from an economic but also from a diplomatic perspective. Japan seeks to collaborate with ASEAN in facilitating multilateral “political dialogue” in the Asia-Pacific region and building an East Asian order based on “universal values” such as democracy and the rule of law, and the Mekong region could be the “weakest link” of ASEAN. After outlining Japan's twenty-year undertaking to cultivate Mekong-Japan cooperation, the author suggests that it is time to broaden the scope of the cooperation and accelerate Japan's “proactive contribution to peace” policy to cope with the changing security environment.     

孟加拉国泰戈尔研究的历史与现实意义

亚洲第一位诺贝尔文学奖得主罗宾德拉纳特?泰戈尔(Rabindranath Tagore,1861～1941年)是世界级文学天才和思想巨匠.一百多年来,泰戈尔的作品在世界各地一再被翻译出版,关于他的研究成果也层出不穷.世界的泰戈尔研究成果中最丰富、最全面、最深入的当属泰戈尔的母语地区——孟加拉语地区的泰戈尔研究.从东孟加拉到东巴基斯坦再到独立后的孟加拉国,泰戈尔的研究也由于政治、文化、宗教等原因经历了很多的跌宕起伏.泰戈尔曾被认为是"印度文化的继承者"而被巴基斯坦禁止.印巴分治十几年间,泰戈尔研究主要都局限在"少数开明的文学家和数量庞大的宗派主义者"之间的"泰戈尔论争"中.1961年围绕泰戈尔的百年诞辰,东巴基斯坦的整个文化阶层和政府对立.泰戈尔也逐渐成为孟加拉文化的旗帜,激励了东巴基斯坦孟加拉人的语言和文化政治运动,成为激励孟加拉国独立的精神源泉.孟加拉国独立后,关于泰戈尔的相关性的争议又起,开始了对泰戈尔重新发现和研究的过程.梳理孟加拉国的泰戈尔接受史对于我国的泰戈尔研究,对于加强中孟、中印文化交流与互鉴,构建"亚洲命运共同体"具有重要的意义.     

浅析奥巴马政府的对朝政策

在应对处理朝鲜半岛危机中,美国一直扮演着一个关键的角色。奥巴马上台后,朝鲜半岛危机出现了急剧的变化,这也让人们对奥巴马政府的对朝政策更加关注。实际上,在2009年春美国国务卿希拉里访问亚洲后,奥巴马政府的对朝政策就产生了很大的变化。朝鲜半岛不断升级的紧张局势,使得美国有机会重振其世界领袖的雄风,重新确立美日韩在东亚的铁三角同盟关系,并通过不断的联合军事演习对朝鲜施加了除军事动武以外的巨大压力,同时也侧面敲击和缓解了中国力量在亚太地区伸展的势头。奥巴马的外交理念是做一个实际的理想主义者和一个有理想的现实主义者,其对朝政策的核心策略就是软的更软,硬的更硬,以硬逼软。     

DIALOGUE WITH THE WEST

Abstract

This portrayal of China by one of the most respected intellectuals ever to emerge from the shadowy labyrinth of the American diplomatic establishment mirrors twenty years of concentrated work by American China scholars. Not every China expert would accept all of Kennan's assumptions or express them in such strident form. Yet over the last two decades the China profession has evolved a style of thought, a mode of asking questions, which has largely substantiated such views in both the public and scholarly worlds. The majority of China watchers have pleaded for “tolerance” and “patience” towards the People's Republic as she gradually learns, aided by a flexible American containment policy, to “adjust” to the “international community of nations” and the “rationalizing” qualities implicit in the “modernization” process. While protesting against certain aspects of America's foreign policy toward China, however, their thought and work has reinforced, at times deepened, the ideological justifications that support America's role in Asia and her attitudes towards China.     

The European Union (EU) in Asian Security: Actor with a Punch or Distant Bystander?

The EU calls itself a “soft power,” making “soft power” contributions to Asian security. That is undoubtedly what the EU is and does in Asia and the track record of European contributions to Asian peace and stability through economic and financial as well as development aid and technical assistance over the decades is not unimpressive. As will be shown below, over recent years Brussels and the Union's individual member states have sought to increase their involvement and role in Asian “hard security,” attempting to get rid of its reputation of being security a “free-rider” enjoying but not sharing the burden of US regional security guarantees. While the EU will continue to be a “hard security” actor in Asian security within limits, it is advised to concentrate its security cooperation with like-minded partners such as Japan and the US as opposed to hoping that talking to Beijing on regional or global security issues produces tangible results. As will be shown below, it clearly does not as Beijing continues to conduct very assertive and at times aggressive regional foreign and security policies insisting on the “principle of non-interference” in Chinese domestic and foreign policies. Consequently, EU influence on Chinese foreign and security policies in general and its increasingly aggressive policies related to territorial claims in the East China and South China Seas will continue to exist on paper and paper only.     

The Second-Term Obama Administration and Japan

The controversy in the Unites States on how to deal with the “fiscal cliff” revealed not just a deep ideological difference between the Democratic Party and the Republican Party but also a new sign of a possible crack of the conservative Republican ranks between those Republicans close to the Tea Party and those who favored the tax hike for the wealthy in order to save the tax cut for the rest of the people.

The planned deep cuts in the defense expenditure will have important implications for national security of Japan, which recently experiences increasing tension with China over the Senkaku Islands. The Obama Administration adopted a tough stance with China over the territorial issues in the South China Sea in July 2010. Rebalance to Asia could be understood, at least in part, to be a response to the rise of China, in a financial situation with fewer resources available for the national defense in the US.

The logical conclusion for Japan and the US would be for both of them to deepen security cooperation. Shinzo Abe, the new Prime Minister of Japan, should further clarify his foreign and national security policy priority and concentrate his efforts on strengthening the alliance with the US and building up the capabilities to defend Japan's territory, while exerting caution in jumping into “history” issues with China and South Korea so that Japan's message on the Senkaku Islands issue is crystal clear and focused: that it is against the established international norm to try to change the status quo by force or intimidation; this message should have universal appeal to a wider international community.     

Water Margins: Competing Paradigms in China

A global water crisis is widely predicted to occur in this century. China is both water-poor – in per capita terms one of the world's twelve most deprived (and increasingly water-polluted) countries – and, at the same time, also water-rich. This “blue gold” wealth makes China a potential water-power of “Saudi-Arabia” dimensions. While China's potential remains largely undeveloped, the country faces growing water pressures: highly uneven distribution between North and South, urbanization, population increase, degradation of the environment, and rapidly rising demands for energy, irrigation, and town water. The Three Gorges Dam project is the largest hydro-development project in the world and possibly the largest civil engineering project in history. This paper looks at less well-known development projects for the major rivers of China's South and Southwest including the Lancang (Mekong) and the Upper Yangzi. It also discusses the plans for a “Cascade” of dams on the Lancang, which will have a significant impact on Southeast Mekong riparian countries, plans to “transfer” water from the Yangzi to the North China plain, and the idea of a global “super dam” in the Tibetan Himalayas. The paper argues that the Chinese government favors the “modern” paradigm of water engineering at a time when that paradigm is being abandoned in the developed world in favor of safer, more economical, and more sustainable options.