Transparency, Democratic Accountability, and the Economic Consequences of Monetary Institutions

Debates about the appropriate mix between autonomy and accountability of bureaucrats are relevant to numerous areas of government action. I examine whether there is evidence of a tradeoff between transparency, democratic accountability, and the gains from monetary delegation. I begin by presenting a simple theoretical model which suggests that central banks that are transparent, in the sense of publishing their macroeconomic forecasts, will find it easier to acquire a reputation. Despite making central banks more subject to outside scrutiny then, monetary transparency can lead to improved economic outcomes. I also consider arguments about the effect of accountability provisions involving parliamentary oversight and control over central bankers. The article then uses a new data set to examine these issues empirically, focusing on a natural experiment involving disinflation costs under different central banking institutions during the 1990s. Results suggest that countries with more transparent central banks face lower costs of disinflation while accountability provisions have no clear effect on disinflation costs. My results also concord with earlier findings that the effect of monetary institutions is conditional on other features of the political environment.     

Democratic accountability and central bank independence: Historical and contemporary,national and European perspectives

Recently there has been a general move towards greater central bank independence in Europe. Countries such as Belgium, Britain, France and Spain have all increased the autonomy of their respective central banks. In this context, some people have argued that the prospects for democratic, representative government have been weakened. In these countries, democratically elected governments can no longer control the process of monetary policy making. By constructing an index of central banks’ independence, this article shows that the recent moves towards central bank independence in Britain and France have not challenged the basic foundations of indirect political accountability. However, it also shows that the proposed institutional architecture of the European Central Bank is a departure from the norms of political accountability and that, in this case, there is a distinct ‘democratic deficit’ which needs to be addressed.     

The European Central Bank: Independence, accountability and strategy: A review

This paper reviews research on central banking and monetary policy, with special emphasis on the position of the future European Central Bank. Nowadays, it is often thought that an independent central bank with an explicit mandate to aim for price stability constitutes an important institutional device to assure price stability. Indeed, the ECB will be one of the most independent central banks as follows from the codings of various indicators measuring legal independence. Still, it does not follow straightforwardly from the literature that the Statute of the ECB is optimal. It is also argued that the accountability of the ECB is poorly arranged for in comparison with that of several national central banks. Finally, the discussion about the monetary strategy of the ECB is reviewed.     

Partisanship in the setting and coordination of fiscal and monetary policies

Abstract. The principal concerns of this paper are with the roles partisan politics have played in the making of fiscal and monetary policies within OECD countries as well as the extent to which these policies have complemented each other. It is argued that parties of the left pursue fiscal policies that are distinctly different from those pursued by the right. The critical difference is in the way these parties use fiscal policy as a corrective mechanism for dealing with macroeconomic problems: leftist parties adopt counter–cyclical fiscal policies while rightwing parties adhere to pro–cyclical fiscal stances. The paper also examines two arguments regarding monetary policy and how partisan politics affect this policy area. The first and most conventional argument sees the formal independence of the central bank from government as a means of negating partisan influences on monetary policy; the second advances the proposition that, regardless of central bank independence, monetary authorities are not politically neutral but instead share views similar to those of parties on the right–hand side of the political spectrum. Empirical analysis, using a pooled cross–section time–series design with data from 14 countries between 1961 and 1994, produces evidence in favor of the argument concerning the role of partisanship in fiscal policy; it also shows little support for the view that central bank independence inhibits partisan influences while at the same time provides support for the thesis that central banks are politically non–neutral. Thus, coordination between fiscal and monetary policies is far less likely to occur when left–wing parties are in power.     

Partisanship in the setting and coordination of fiscal and monetary policies

The principal concerns of this paper are with the roles partisan politics have played in the making of fiscal and monetary policies within OECD countries as well as the extent to which these policies have complemented each other. It is argued that parties of the left pursue fiscal policies that are distinctly different from those pursued by the right. The critical difference is in the way these parties use fiscal policy as a corrective mechanism for dealing with macroeconomic problems: leftist parties adopt counter–cyclical fiscal policies while rightwing parties adhere to pro–cyclical fiscal stances. The paper also examines two arguments regarding monetary policy and how partisan politics affect this policy area. The first and most conventional argument sees the formal independence of the central bank from government as a means of negating partisan influences on monetary policy; the second advances the proposition that, regardless of central bank independence, monetary authorities are not politically neutral but instead share views similar to those of parties on the right–hand side of the political spectrum. Empirical analysis, using a pooled cross–section time–series design with data from 14 countries between 1961 and 1994, produces evidence in favor of the argument concerning the role of partisanship in fiscal policy; it also shows little support for the view that central bank independence inhibits partisan influences while at the same time provides support for the thesis that central banks are politically non–neutral. Thus, coordination between fiscal and monetary policies is far less likely to occur when left–wing parties are in power.     

Unconventional monetary policy spillovers: Evidence from India

Many of the studies on the unconventional monetary policy spillover effects concentrated primarily on the policy announcements of the U.S. Federal Reserve. Using a time series approach, with dummies in the event study framework, this study estimates the monetary policy spillover effects of the unconventional monetary policy announcements of the central banks of four major economic regions: the United States, the United Kingdom, European Central bank, and Japan on the asset prices in India. In addition to that, this study estimates the asymmetry in the responses to positive and negative surprise announcements. The study reveals that unconventional monetary surprises do not have any significant impact on the asset prices in India in a narrow time window.     

Central bank independence in Latin America: Politicization and de-delegation

In the last three decades, legal delegation of monetary policy to independent central banks (CBI) has achieved the status of a global norm of good governance. The recent backlash against this independence is an important but understudied trend. Our article analyzes the potential for delegation reversals with a focus on Latin America where CBI was effective in maintaining price stability, but placed important policy constraints on governments. We theorize that, in the shadow of the global norm for CBI, the increasing distance in preferences between the government and the central bank, and the procedural hurdles to change the status quo, explain the intensity of challenges to the delegation contract or the delegated agent. An analysis of the frequency of irregular central bank leadership replacements, and instances of politicization and de-delegation show the plausibility of our argument. We also show that, in Latin America, reforms de-delegating monetary policy have been small, balancing the needs that justified delegation in the first place, but rolling back the most stringent constraints placed on financing the government.     

Multiple Hands on the Wheel: Empirically Modeling Partial Delegation and Shared Policy Control in the Open and Institutionalized Economy

The causal arguments of modern, positive political science oftenimply complex interactions among multiple explanatory factors.In one example from comparative and international politicaleconomy (C&IPE), sharing of monetary-policymaking controlbetween partially autonomous central banks and politically responsivegovernments yields inflation as a convex combination of therates that would have held under full-government and full-central-bankpolicy control. The anti-inflationary effect of central bankindependence (autonomy plus conservatism: CBA) therefore dependson all political–economic variables to which central banksand governments respond differently, and, vice versa, CBA mutesthe inflation effects of all such factors. Extending that logicof shared policy control to open political economies: insofaras domestic monetary authorities fix exchange rates, they effectivelydelegate inflation control to foreign (peg-currency) authorities,and policymakers in small and financially exposed economiesmust match domestic inflation to foreign (global) rates to avoidmassive exchange-rate pressures. Thus, analogously, the domestic-inflationeffects of fixed exchange rates and of monetary exposure dependon each other and on many other institutional and structuralaspects of the domestic and foreign political economies, and,vice versa, the effects of all domestic and foreign political–economicconditions depend on degrees of exchange-rate fixity and financialopenness at home and abroad. This article shows how to modelsuch complexly interactive hypotheses empirically compactlyand substantively meaningfully, and demonstrates the postwarinflation records of 21 developed democracies to favor suchspecifications decidedly over standard linear-additive or linear-interactivealternatives. The concluding sections discuss specific resultsand implications and then suggest several more potential applicationsof this general approach to further instances of shared policycontrol and other substantive contexts that induce the multiple,complex interactions characteristic of modern, positive politicalscience in general and C&IPE especially.     

Lessons from NPAs crisis in Indian banks

Nonperforming assets (NPAs) crisis in Indian public sector banks is one of the biggest challenges before the current government in 2017. The finance ministry, Government of India, and the central bank, the Reserve Bank of India, are worried about the surging NPAs in Indian public sector banks because of their huge macroeconomic impact and systemic risk to the financial system. If not paid timely attention, it can hamper the economic and financial stability of the nation. Rising NPAs in Indian public sector banks are a result of bank specific, macroeconomic, and political factors. In order to control the surging NPAs in Indian public sector banks, the government and the Reserve Bank of India have implemented new crisis management framework which however is not immune to several challenges. This paper looks at NPAs crisis from the lens of crisis management, stakeholder's engagement, government relations, and issue management. Harris and Fleisher ( 2016 ) identify crisis management, stakeholder engagement, government relations, and issues management as important organizational activities that constitute part of public affairs. This paper follows a tripartite structure where it first investigates the causes of NPAs in Indian public sector banks. Second, it examines the crisis management framework developed by the policy makers and highlights the key challenges. Third, in light of these challenges, it makes recommendations to tackle the NPAs crisis in Indian public sector banks.     

Governing the future: the European Central Bank’s expectation management during the Great Moderation

Abstract

The experience of the global financial crisis has sparked renewed interest in the role of futurity in the capitalist economy in general and in the formation and coordination of expectations under uncertainty in particular. Economic sociologists have carefully studied the ‘defuturizing’ technologies devised by private actors, but have tended to neglect the increasingly pivotal part played by central banks. Political economists have had more to say on central banks, but have focused on institutional issues rather than on the concrete practices of central banking. Making an original contribution to both literatures, this paper traces the construction and subsequent evolution, up to 2007, of the European Central Bank’s communicative apparatus. Drawing on official documents and on interviews with both ECB staff and market participants, the paper shows how this apparatus created the conditions for the formation and coordination of private sector expectations. The insights from this empirical analysis into the performative dimensions of ‘credibility’ and ‘knowledge’ in monetary governance contribute directly to ongoing debates about the recent extension of the ECB’s communicative apparatus through forward guidance and quantitative easing.     

Party politics and the survival of central bank governors

Legally independent central banks leave elected politicians with little direct control over monetary policy. The most important indirect channel of influence for governments thus consists in appointing ‘responsive’ central bank officials and removing ‘hostile’ ones. This premise is tested by examining the effect of partisan ties between central bank governors and governments or presidents in 30 European democracies between 1945 and 2012. Drawing on an original dataset containing information on the party affiliations of 195 governors, event history models are employed to show that affiliation with a party represented in the executive (the government or the presidency) has a large and significant positive effect on governor survival. However, affiliation with an opposition party only increases governors' hazards during the first four years of their term, suggesting that the impact of the party label may be overridden as more reliable information about a governor becomes available.     

Independent central banks, regime type, and fiscal performance: the case of post-communist countries

This article analyzes the effect of central bank independence on fiscal deficits. Previous literature finds a negative relationship between bank independence and deficits in OECD countries. No such relationship is found for developing countries. We argue that independent and conservative central bankers prefer budget discipline due to the long run connection between deficits and inflation and can enforce their preference through interest rate hikes and refusal to lend to the government. The claim, however, is that the legislated independent status of the central bank is cheap talk in the absence of democratic institutions. We test empirically the conditional effect of central bank independence on a sample of 23 democratic and undemocratic post-communist countries from 1990 to 2002. Results show that independent central banks restrain budget deficits only in democracies. Also, democracies that have not granted independence to their central banks have the worst fiscal discipline.     

Monetary Sovereignty: Nature,Implementation, and Implications

Monetary sovereignty is a central concept of Modern Money Theory (MMT). The paper explores the characteristics of monetary sovereignty, the means used to implement it, and some of its theoretical and policy implications. Herein, it is shown that monetary sovereignty involves a high degree of coordination between the central bank and the national treasury. The paper also argues that monetary sovereignty is not special to the United States, does not require direct monetary financing of the treasury, does not tell us anything about the optimal size of the fiscal balance, and is not dependent on the willingness of foreigners to hold the domestic currency.     

Capital mobility,perspectives and central bank independence: Exchange rate policy since 1945

Hegemonic stability theory has been the traditional explanation in International Political Economy for the trend from fixed to floating exchange rates which was brought about by the collapse of Bretton Woods. This approach is found to be problematic. A more powerful explanation is the postwar rise in capital mobility, which produces a trade-off between exchange rate stability and policy autonomy. Preferences for these two policies have been a function of perspectives on economic policy and the degree of central bank independence. Independent central banks prefer domestic policy autonomy to exchange rate management, as they have no socio-political incentives to produce competitive, stable exchange rates. Their interests are predominantly in achieving low domestic inflation. In addition, current perspectives hold that the best way of securing international exchange rate stability is to pursue stable macroeconomic policies at home, resulting in the predominance of floating exchange rate policies. This trend will continue into the near future despite opportunities for international cooperation presented by the rationalization of world monetary politics into a G3 following the introduction of the euro. This may have adverse effects on the global economy for three reasons. First, there is a long-term danger that triad regionalization will result in a revival of neo-mercantilist policies, in which the exchange rate could play a part. Second, a high proportion of world trade and finance will be denominated in dollars and euros, rendering the stability of the dollar/euro exchange rate a global public good. Third, dollar/euro exchange rate misalignments which harm either the U.S. or EMU will be harmful to the global economy because of the high percentage of world GDP accounted for by these two areas.     

Variation in central bank independence across countries: Some provisional empirical evidence

In this paper seven hypotheses to explain variation in central bank independence across countries are tested. The predictions based upon the theory that delegation of authority by politicians to the central bank is used as a commitment device are not supported: central bank independence is not higher the larger the employment motivated inflationary bias, the higher political instability or the larger the government debt. Central bank independence is positively related to historical inflation experience and negatively with political instability. We do only find limited support for the view that countries with a universal banking system and countries whose central banks do not regulate financial institutions have more independent central banks.     

Policy decisiveness and responses to speculative attacks in developed countries

Why are some countries able to defend their currencies when there are speculative attacks, while others fail to do so and devalue their currencies? This article suggests that intragovernment factors as well as government‐legislature relations should be considered because many of the policy responses to speculative attacks do not require legislative acquiescence, so that intragovernment attributes will have more substantial effects on the policy responses than those of government‐legislature relations. This article suggests that cleavages within government and its instability have a negative effect on decisiveness. Data regarding speculative attacks in developed countries from the 1970s to the 1990s and the Heckman selection model show that governments with many veto players and with less durability have had difficulty in defending their currencies in the face of speculative attacks. The article also finds that governmental institutional effects can be constrained by central bank independence. The effects become substantially smaller and statistically insignificant when central banks are very independent. The overall results imply that policy indecisiveness induced by some political factors makes governments less able to adopt a new policy equilibrium that is necessary to respond to an exogenous shock such as speculative attack.     

Post-Keynesian Public Budgeting & Finance: Assessing Contributions From Modern Monetary Theory

While Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) offers contributions that are worthy of serious consideration, some additional theory-building and synthesis with existing theory may be in order to tie MMT into the established budgeting literature. MMT focuses primarily on monetarily sovereign governments. These are governments that face extremely “soft” budget constraints insofar as they: issue and regulate the value of their own currencies, possess central banks that function as the fiscal agents of their government treasuries, are able to issue sovereign debt denominated in their domestic currency, and operate in a system of freely-floating currency exchange rates, with a minimum of currency and capital controls. National governments that are sovereign according to these criteria are able to make all debt service payments as they come due, virtually without regard to their level of outstanding debt; they cannot be forced to default against their will. They are also macroeconomically-autonomous. It is the collective position of the symposium papers that these conditions describe, in precise terms, the fiscal position of the U.S. federal government. As such, the existence of an ultra-soft U.S. government budget constraint is grounded in the extremely favorable conditions of money and credit that the federal government is subject to, and which in fact it has created and nurtured for itself since the Second World War. An important implication is that the federal level budgeting literature cannot ignore the macroeconomics and the administration of a sovereign currency regime, nor the monetary economics that ungirds it, without sustaining charges of unrealism.     

China’s consumer credit sector expansion and monetary transmission mechanism: What should China’s central bank do?

In this paper, we argue that as China’s consumer credit sector is expanding, the central bank’s role in smoothing economic fluctuation and promoting economic growth becomes more important. We build a general equilibrium model with durable and nondurable goods to analyze how the consumer credit sector affects the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. The model finds that an expanding consumer credit sector improves the efficiency of the monetary transmission mechanism. Two policy implications derived suggest China’s central bank should encourage the development of the consumer credit sector and liberalize market-based monetary policy tools such as interest rate tools. Her fields of interest are international economics, monetary policies and economic growth. Guofeng Sun is the deputy director of open market operation office of monetary policy department at People’s Bank of China. His research focus is the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. The authors thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. The views in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the People’s Bank of China.     

Controlling money during socialist economic reform: the Chinese experience

Contrary to the easy job that some conservative economists imagine, the task faced by the socialist monetary authority in controlling the money supply during economic reform is a daunting one, as recent experience in China indicates. It is difficult to estimate the demand for money in the mixed system that has emerged from the reform process, with all its structural disequilibria. Given prevailing economic and political interferences, keeping the money supply within targets is also beset with problems. Monetary issues have not received much attention in the conventional discourse about socialist economics, before or during reform. Hence the Chinese central bank often has to take uninformed action on events that it cannot effectively control. The results could be very serious, even tragic. In any case, it seems that the bank should not shoulder the main blame.     

Markets beyond politics? The state and the internationalisation of financial markets

Abstract. The role of politics is particularly difficult to discern in the domain of international financial markets, where the state's capacity to control or direct capital flows, without incurring considerable opportunity (and political) costs, appears so limited. In addressing this question, this paper argues that the process of internationalisation is first and foremost the consequence of political decision-making (to create open markets) and that many domestic interests linked to the international market have promoted internationalisation both through their policy preferences and economic activity. The paper will then go on to argue that the threat of financial instability and crisis, a consequence of the increased volatility of relatively unregulated capital flows, has prompted political demands for more concerted inter-state co-operation to maintain stability. Much of this takes place through transnational agreements among state agencies, such as the central banks, and much through 'reregulation' in the guise of 'harmonisation' of regulatory and prudential supervisory policies.
Some of this process has received considerable publicity, such as the harmonisation of EEC regulations to facilitate freer trade in banking and financial services as part of the preparation for the Single European Market in 1992. Likewise, the current Uruguay Round of GATT trade talks has the liberalisation of trade in financial services on its agenda. Other aspects of the process have been carried on quietly, far from public view, in such forums as the Bank for International Settlements. Such is the case of a recent agreement to harmonise minimum capital adequacy requirements for banks operating in international markets. The paper uses these three cases to support the argument about the role of politics and the state in international finance.