“Public goods”: An exercise in calibration

This paper considers a measure of the “publicness” of goods and services implicit in responses that individuals make when asked about public sector spending. At the limit, all consumers consume equal amounts of a public good. Thus any differences between an individual's self-interest preferences and public-interest preferences cannot be based on differential provision, but only on differences in the individual's public- and self-interest utility functions. If we rule out the latter, self-interest and public-interest preferences for a pure public good are identical. Using sample survey data it is possible to calibrate the public good content of different public goods.     

What Do Bureaucrats Like Doing? Bureaucratic Preferences in Response to Institutional Reform

How do bureaucrats respond to administrative reform in relation to their overall administrative goals? The authors test the bureau‐shaping thesis, which holds that bureaucrats’ preferences for certain kinds of roles and tasks motivate their support for bureau reform. Drawing on attitudinal and behavioral data from a survey of English local government officials, the findings underscore how bureaucrats with different interests and motivations sort themselves into job types. Their preferences drive support for reform, which, in turn, strengthens the executive structure of English local government. Drawing on the literature on bureaucratic responses to institutional reform, the authors offer a more nuanced portrayal of bureaucratic preferences in line with the bureau‐shaping model. A key conclusion: political principals need improved empirical awareness of bureaucratic preferences when undertaking public institutional reforms.     

Voting for government coalitions in Ireland under single transferable vote

This paper addresses the issue of whether voters indicate a preference for a government rather than, or in addition to a preference for a party, when they cast a ballot under the system of the single transferable vote (STV). It thus contributes to the existing literature on strategic coalition voting by examining whether coalition preferences matter where electors are given the option to rank the parties in order of preference. The question then becomes: does this ranking reflect or signal a coalition preference? Using survey data from two Irish elections, this paper finds that whereas first preferences are closely aligned with coalition choices, Irish voters do not systematically use second preferences to express a view on their preferred coalition formation.     

Shaping Local Councillor Preferences: Party Politics,Committee Structure and Social Background1

The preferences of politicians are crucial in a representative democracy. In order to change policy, voters must elect politicians who prefer to do so. Party affiliation may signal preferences to voters, but preferences are also shaped by institutional factors, such as committee membership and social background. This article assesses whether political, institutional or social background explanations best explain spending preferences, based on a survey of 1,200 Danish municipal councillors. Simulations of the relative effect of such variables show that party membership is the most important explanation of spending preferences. Social background, including age, gender, occupation and education, has limited impact, but female, young and better-educated politicians are likely to prefer higher spending. The committee structure is more important. Standing committee membership and seniority have a substantial positive effect on preferences. Although spending advocacy does exist, guardians are harder to find. Even though the members of the economic committee are responsible for the overall economic situation, spending preferences among these politicians are not systematically different.     

Partisan Gaps in Political Information and Information‐Seeking Behavior: Motivated Reasoning or Cheerleading?

Do partisan disagreements over politically relevant facts, and preferences for the information sources from which to obtain them, represent genuine differences of opinion or insincere cheerleading? The answer to this question is crucial for understanding the scope of partisan polarization. We test between these alternatives with experiments that offer incentives for correct survey responses and allow respondents to search for information before answering each question. We find that partisan cheerleading inflates divides in factual information, but only modestly. Incentives have no impact on partisan divides in information search; these divides are no different from those that occur outside the survey context when we examine web‐browsing data from the same respondents. Overall, our findings support the motivated reasoning interpretation of misinformation; partisans seek out information with congenial slant and sincerely adopt inaccurate beliefs that cast their party in a favorable light.     

Spending Preferences of Public Sector Officials: Survey Evidence from Finland

We examine the determinants that shape the spending preferences of public sector officials on several budgetary appropriations. Following Niskanen's budget‐maximizing theory, we test whether these officials prefer larger budgetary appropriations rather than less. We measure their preferences to increase their own bureau's appropriations and compare those against their preferences for other bureaus' appropriations. The empirical evidence is gathered via a mail survey targeting high‐level officials from different ministries in Finland. The analysis of the responses suggests that Niskanen's theory is in part supported.     

Left-right perceptions,partisan preferences,electoral participation,and partisan choice in France

An analysis based on survey data shows that electoral participation at the second ballot in France can be accounted for by partisan preferences but not by left-right perceptions of party locations. This finding runs counter to the work of Rosenthal and Sen (1973), who validated a spatial model of participation at the second ballot employing left-right perceptions and partisan preferences interchangeably. Because they use aggregate data, Rosenthal and Sen (1973) are restricted in two ways that, operating interactively, lead them to an unwarranted conclusion concerning the power of left-right perceptions. Later work by Rosenthal and Sen (1977) indicating that left-right perceptions can account for shifts in partisan choice between the two ballots by voters who have decided to participate is confirmed, but partisan preferences account even better for second-ballot choices. Left-right perceptions and partisan sympathies are related, but discrete partisan attitudes are a more powerful factor than left-right perceptions in French second-ballot electoral behavior.     

Saying versus doing: a new donation method for measuring ideal points

Scaling methods pioneered by Poole and Rosenthal (Am J Polit Sci 29(2):357–384, 1985) redefined how scholars think about and estimate the ideologies of representatives seated in the US Congress. Those methods also have been used to estimate citizens’ ideologies. Whereas studies evaluating Congress typically use a behavioral measure, roll call votes, to estimate where representatives stand on the left-right ideological spectrum, those of the public most often have relied on survey data of stated, rather than revealed, preferences. However, measures of individuals’ preferences and, accordingly, estimates of their ideal points, may differ in important ways based on how preferences are elicited. In this paper, we elicit the same individuals’ preferences on the same 10 issues using two different methods: standard survey responses measured on a Likert scale and a donation exercise wherein individuals are forced to divide $1.50 between interest groups with diametrically opposed policy preferences. Importantly, expressing extreme views is costless under the former, but not the latter, method. We find that the type of elicitation method used is a significant predictor of individuals’ ideal points, and that the elicitation effect is driven primarily by Democratic respondents. Under the donation method, the ideal points of Democrats in the aggregate shift left, particularly for those Democrats who are politically engaged. In contrast, wealthy Democrats’ ideal points shift to the right. We also document effects for Republicans and Independents and find that overall polarization is similar under both elicitation methods. We conclude with a discussion of our results, and the consequences and tradeoffs of each elicitation method.     

On the Meaning of Survey Reports of Roll‐Call “Votes”

Contemporary efforts to evaluate representation often compare survey measures of how citizens say they would vote on legislation to what elected officials do in office. These comparisons generally suggest poor representation. We argue here that this common design is unlikely to effectively evaluate representation because responses to survey questions differ in important aspects from voting in legislatures. Measurement error and construct validity undermine the comparison. Three survey experiments show that providing partisan and nonpartisan information readily available to legislators materially changes respondents' expressed preferences on roll‐call votes. With information, expressed policy positions are both less centrist and more closely matched to legislator behavior in their preferred party. Respondents also appear aware of their own lack of knowledge in evaluating roll‐call policy votes. The treatment effect of information decreases in confidence judging policy in that area. We show similar patterns for respondent opinions on Supreme Court decisions.     

Blind spots in the party system: Spatial voting and issue salience if voters face scarce choices

Drawing on spatial models of political competition, this research investigates whether decision weights vary across groups of voters defined by their policy positioning in a two-dimensional space. Our analyses of electoral survey data from England, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland reveal that the economic and cultural dimensions of electoral competition are salient for the vote choice of most groups of voters. However, those voters who hold economically right and culturally libertarian preferences weigh their preferences on the economic dimension more and discount parties’ position on cultural issues when no party represents their configuration of preferences. Consequently, left parties are less able to attain votes of economically right but culturally libertarian voters for cultural policy reasons, when electoral choices are scarce, while right parties are successful in attaining votes based on both dimensions. As a result, significant representation gaps can occur.     

Ideological representation in clientelistic democracies: The Indonesian case

Do parties represent the ideological preferences of voters in clientelistic political systems? We answer this question by studying the case of Indonesia, whose politics analysts usually describe as being based on patronage. We reassess this proposition using an original survey of over 500 Indonesian legislators. We show that, while party positions are similar on economic policy, they are differentiated on religious issues. To explore the implications of this cleavage, we develop a new measure of policy preferences about state-Islam relations, and match survey responses from legislators and citizens. Our analysis shows a high degree of congruence in party dyads of voters and politicians, which indicates that ideology is more salient than existing research suggests. We further suggest that clientelistic networks may have been pivotal in ensuring the survival of this religious-based ideological cleavage through decades of authoritarianism and democratic politics characterized by ideological moderation.     

Public Preferences for Program Tradeoffs: Community Values for Budget Priorities

A growing literature concerns techniques to improve community-based reforms and citizen-centered governance in order to reinforce the trust in democratic government. We analyze a contingent choice technique that systematically collects information about individual citizens' relative values of a set of state public programs. Individual citizens are asked to allocate a fixed increment of public funds. Individuals reveal their marginal willingness to trade off (MWTTO) additions in one program for additions in another. MWTTO values provide program rankings and information concerning the relative strength of citizen preferences. An example of a contingent choice survey is described.     

Partisanship, Political Control, and Economic Assessments

Previous research shows that partisans rate the economy more favorably when their party holds power. There are several explanations for this association, including use of different evaluative criteria, selective perception, selective exposure to information, correlations between economic experiences and partisanship, and partisan bias in survey responses. We use a panel survey around the November 2006 election to measure changes in economic expectations and behavioral intentions after an unanticipated shift in political power. Using this design, we can observe whether the association between partisanship and economic assessments holds when some leading mechanisms thought to bring it about are excluded. We find that there are large and statistically significant partisan differences in how economic assessments and behavioral intentions are revised immediately following the Democratic takeover of Congress. We conclude that this pattern of partisan response suggests partisan differences in perceptions of the economic competence of the parties, rather than alternative mechanisms.     

Heat Waves,Droughts, and Preferences for Environmental Policy

Using data from a new household survey on environmental attitudes, behaviors, and policy preferences, we find that current weather conditions affect preferences for environmental regulation. Individuals who have recently experienced extreme weather (heat waves or droughts) are more likely to support laws to protect the environment. We find evidence that the channel through which weather conditions affect policy preference is via perceptions of the importance of the issue of global warming. Furthermore, environmentalists and individuals who consult more sources of news are less likely to have their attitudes toward global warming changed by current weather conditions. These findings suggest that communication and education emphasizing consequences of climate change salient to the individual's circumstances may be the most effective in changing attitudes of those least likely to support proenvironment policy. In addition, the timing of policy introduction could influence its success.     

The Political Consequences of External Economic Shocks: Evidence from Poland

How do external economic shocks influence domestic politics? We argue that those materially exposed to the shock will display systematic differences in policy preferences and voting behavior compared to the unexposed, and political parties can exploit these circumstances. Empirically, we take advantage of the 2015 surprise revaluation of the Swiss franc to identify the Polish citizens with direct economic exposure to this exogenous event. Using an original survey fielded prior to the 2015 elections and an embedded survey experiment, we show that exposed individuals were more likely to demand government support and more likely to desert the government and vote for the largest opposition party, which was able to use the shock to expand its electoral coalition without alienating its core voters. Our article clarifies the connection between international shocks, voters’ policy preferences, partisan policy responses, and, ultimately, voting decisions.     

Do politicians’ preferences correspond to those of the voters? An investigation of political representation

This paper investigates political representation by exploring the relationship between citizens' preferences and the preferences of their elected representatives. Using Swedish survey data, the empirical analysis shows that voters and politicians have significantly different preferences for local welfare services, implying that voters do not elect representatives with the same preferences as their own. The results show that when comparing a politician of a certain age, gender, educational level and marital status, with a voter with identical characteristics, the politician still has preferences for a significantly higher level of spending on the locally provided services. Hence, our results indicate that the representation of different socio-economic groups does not necessarily lead to a larger degree of representation of these groups' agendas. Moreover, we find the observed difference to be largest for the least salient expenditure item. We do, however, not find any evidence for differences in preferences between the two groups being associated with a decline in trust for politicians among voters.     

Cultivating Clients: Reputation,Responsiveness, and Ethnic Indifference in India's Slums

Studies of clientelism overwhelmingly focus on how brokers target voters with top-down benefits during elections. Yet brokers also receive requests from voters for assistance between elections, initiating the processes through which they cultivate clients. Why are brokers responsive to the requests of some voters and not others? We provide the first study of broker preferences when evaluating client appeals. Theories emphasizing brokers as vote monitors anticipate they will prefer co-partisans and coethnics, whose reciprocity they can best verify. Theories emphasizing brokers as vote mobilizers anticipate they will prefer residents who will maximize their reputations for efficacy. We test these expectations through a conjoint experiment with 629 Indian slum leaders, ethnographic fieldwork, and a survey of 2,199 slum residents. We find evidence of reputational considerations shaping broker responsiveness. We find mixed support for monitoring concerns, highlighted by an absence of the strong ethnic favoritism assumed to dominate distributive politics in many developing countries.     

Changing classes,changing preferences: how social class mobility affects economic preferences

Abstract

While many studies have identified an association between social class and economic preferences, we know little about the implications of changes in class location for these preferences. This article assesses how social class and intra-generational class mobility affect economic preferences drawing on longitudinal data from the British Household Panel Survey. In doing so, the article adopts a post-industrial perspective that considers horizontal and vertical class divisions. Even when time-invariant characteristics of individuals are kept constant (through fixed-effects estimation), it is found that both vertical and horizontal class location explain economic preferences. Thus, these estimations suggest that social class moulds preferences, even when accounting for factors that can lead to selection into classes. Moreover, people who change classes hold different economic preferences than their peers in the class of origin, but do not completely assimilate into their class of destination. This implies that growing intra-generational class mobility could undermine the class basis of political conflict.     

Preferences,Knowledge, and Citizen Probability Assessments of the Terrorism Risk of Nuclear Power

How does the American public assess risk when it comes to national security issues? This paper addresses this question by analyzing variation in citizen probability assessments of the terrorism risk of nuclear power plants. Drawing on the literature on how motivated reasoning, selective information processing, and domain‐specific knowledge influence public opinion, we argue that heterogeneous issue preferences and knowledge of nuclear energy and homeland security have important explanatory power. Using original data from a unique 2009 national survey in the United States, we show that Americans are divided in their probability assessments of the terrorism risk of nuclear power plants. Consistent with our theoretical expectations, individuals who support using nuclear power to meet rising energy demands, who are generally less concerned with terrorism, or who are more knowledgeable about terrorism and nuclear security tend to provide lower assessments of the likelihood that nuclear power plants increase terrorist attacks, and vice versa. The findings have implications for the literature on public opinion, risk assessment, energy policy and planning, and homeland security.