Injunctive relief in US patent practice

Legal context. Injunctive relief is available in civil actionsin the United States. Patent litigation is no exception andthe US patent statute explicitly permits it. Because it is aneffective remedy, injunctive relief is commonly sought togetherwith the monetary (legal) remedies which are available to patentowners when enforcing patent rights. Key points. On 15 May 2006 the US Supreme Court in eBay, Incet al v MercExchange, LLC altered the prevailing practice sayingthat ‘the decision whether to grant or deny injunctiverelief rests within the equitable discretion of the districtcourts, and that such discretion must be exercised consistentwith traditional principles of equity, in patent disputes noless than in other cases governed by such standards’. Practical significance. This article will focus on the availabilityof permanent injunctions in patent infringement actions in lightof the Supreme Court's recent ruling in eBay, Inc et al v MercExchange,LLC.     

Pepper v Hart: A Footnote to Professor Vogenauer's Reply to Lord Steyn

This Note is intended to stand as a short supplement to thecompelling article by Stefan Vogenauer entitled, ‘A Retreatfrom Pepper v Hart? A Reply to Lord Steyn’ published inthe Journal at the end of 2005.¹ In his article, Professor Vogenauercalls in question the argument advanced by Lord Steyn in hisarticle in the Journal, entitled ‘Pepper v Hart: A Re-examination’.²In that article, Lord Steyn called for a retreat from the decisionof the House of Lords in Pepper v Hart³ concerning the circumstancesin which reference may be made to Hansard as an aid to statutoryconstruction and for a reinterpretation of the decision in linewith a theory that a Minister speaking in Parliament who givesan explanation of the meaning or effect of a clause in a Billshould be taken to create a binding legitimate expectation thatthe executive will apply the provision, once enacted, in thatsense. In this Note, I express my agreement with Professor Vogenauer’sargument, and seek to support it with some additional pointsunder three heads: (1) the proper interpretation of Pepper vHart and its status as authority; (2) the basis in principlefor adhering to that interpretation; and (3) conceptual difficultiesattached to Lord Steyn’s legitimate expectation thesis.     

The Bosphorus Ruling of the European Court of Human Rights: Fundamental Rights and Blurred Boundaries in Europe

The recent case of Bosphorus Airlines v Ireland provided theEuropean Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) with an opportunity torefine further its relationship with the EU. In particular,the ECtHR was called upon to clarify when States could be heldresponsible for actions taken under the banner of the EU. Thisarticle examines the status quo prior to the Bosphorus judgment,and then scrutinises the judgment itself, focusing particularlyon the use and scope of the doctrine of ‘equivalent protection’to determine State responsibility. The doctrine as outlinedin Bosphorus is applied to some likely scenarios involving EUaction and its relative merits and disadvantages are discussed.The article also briefly addresses the further global implicationsof the judgment, namely for the legal accountability of theUN Security Council and the ongoing issue of responsibilityof international organisations under international law.     

Trade mark use in transit: EU-phony or cacophony?

Legal context The present article discusses the opinion of Advocate-GeneralJacobs in Case C-405/05 Class International BV v Unilever NVand others, according to which trade mark owners cannot opposethe entry into the European Union of grey market non-Communitygoods placed in external transit, on the grounds of Article5(1) of the Trade Mark Directive, or any equivalent provision,as such entry does not constitute trade mark use. Key points We examine the consistency of this approach withprior case law of the European Court of Justice, namely in theCommission v France, Rioglass, The Polo/Lauren and Rolex casesand draw a parallelism with Council Regulation (EC) 1383/2003. Practical significance We conclude that trade mark owners shouldbe allowed to prohibit the placing in transit of goods whichwould infringe an intellectual property right under the lawof the transit country, unless the owner or consignor of thelitigious goods can undeniably prove that the goods are notdestined for the internal market. Stop press. At the end of the article the authors provide abrief analysis of the European Court of Justice's decision of18th October 2005 in this case.     

Regarding/Disregarding: The Judicial Rhetoric of President Barak and the International Court of Justice's Wall Advisory Opinion

In Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Israel (September 2005), Israel'sHigh Court addressed the effect which it should give to theInternational Court's Legal consequences of the constructionof a wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory advisory opinion.This had declared the wall illegal but, while affirming thatit shared the International Court of Justice's normative rulings,the High Court reiterated that it thought the wall a lawfulsecurity measure. Rather than dissect the substantive treatmentof the issues involved, this article examines the structureand rhetorical techniques employed by President Barak in hisleading judgment in Mara'abe. He effected a skilful practicaldisregard of the International Court's normative findings throughan elision of argument by relying on the doctrine of res judicata—aconcept that has no relevance whatsoever to advisory opinions.     

Comparative advertising and celebrity photographs--fair dealing under the CDPA 1988

Legal context. Legal context. This article reviews the conceptof ‘fair dealing’ under Copyright Designs and PatentsAct 1988, section 30. It does so in the context of to recentcases concerning the fair dealing defence, IPC Media Ltd v NewsGroup Newspapers Ltd and Fraser Woodward Ltd v BBC are considered. Key points. The traditional approach of courts to ‘fairdealing’ is based upon a number of ‘factors’considered relevant in determining whether a use of a copyrightwork is fair. The article argues that there are a number ofproblems with this approach. In particular, it claims that theapproach is unsystematic and rests upon a number of questionableassumptions. It suggests that the decision of Hart J in IPCMedia Ltd demonstrates these problems to a very significantdegree. In contrast, that of Mann J in Fraser Woodward Ltd provideswelcome guidance on the application of the concept of fairnessin certain cases. Practical significance. The criticisms made in this articlehighlight a number of discrepancies in the existing case lawand suggest a need for closer consideration and greater disciplinein decision-making in this area.     

Overcoming the challenges posted by technology to traditional copyright law: from Betamax to Grokster

Legal context: Dual use technology, or technology which can be used for bothinfringing and non-infringing uses, raises interesting issuesin the area of copyright law. This note analyses inter aliathe two US Supreme Court decisions on dual use technology, separatedby a gap of over 20 years—Sony v Universal Studios (1984)and MGM v Grokster (2005). Key points: Sony lays down the famous ‘Betamax’ defence—ifthe technology is ‘capable of substantial non-infringinguses’, then it cannot be challenged as infringing. Thistest had stood the test of time, and it is only recently inGrokster that there arose an occasion to reconsider its application.The Court in Grokster, borrowing from the jurisprudence developedin Patent law, recognized a novel test of liability—basedon the active ‘inducement’ to infringe. The flawin Grokster is that despite its attempt to develop new standardsfor a digital age, the ruling leaves areas of uncertainty. Practical significance: Dual use technology has become ubiquitous in this age—fromthe iPod to YouTube to P2P software, all are capable of beingused in lawful as well as unlawful ways. Legal pronouncementshave the potential to impact not just the development of law,but also innovation in technology. Some believe that the ‘brightline’ of Sony has been muddled thereby threatening technologicalinnovation. Others, me included, believe that Sony is inapplicablein the face of new technology, and hail the decision in Groksteras a positive step forward in what it actually decides. However,in what it does not decide, Grokster still represents a lostopportunity by the Court to clear up the muddled waters.     

The rise and fall of cross-border jurisdiction and remedies in IP disputes

Legal context. Companies which have seen their IP rights infringedacross Europe have, in recent years, been keen to obtain cross-borderrelief from infringement through bringing a single action inthe court of just one EU Member State. This approach has time,cost and tactical advantages for claimants, but raises complexjurisdictional questions. Key points. This article provides an in-depth explanation ofthe framework for litigating IP rights in the European Union.It describes the various interpretations to which the BrusselsRegulation on Jurisdiction has been subjected and how they affectthe availability of cross-border relief. This explanation providesa foundation for analysing the recent ECJ decisions in Gat vLuk and Roche v Primus. Practical significance. Cross-border jurisdiction and reliefis, in practice, no longer available in respect of registeredrights.     

State Immunity for Torture

The House of Lords’ ruling in Jones v Ministry of InteriorAl-Mamlaka Al-Arabiya AS Saudiya (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)and others sets an important precedent in the field of internationalcivil claims for torture. It was also the first to address indetail the ratio of the seminal judgment in Pinochet No. 3,a ruling that has given rise to much speculation as to the relationshipbetween State immunity, jus cogens norms and human rights. Thisarticle explores the significance of the Jones case, and, inthe light of that ruling, comments more generally upon the widerissue of the extent to which State immunity acts as a barrierto international legal actions for torture brought in domesticcourts in both the civil and criminal spheres.     

Civilized Squatting

This article seeks to trace the origins of the requirement thata squatter must have an intention to possess (animus possidendi)in order to establish title by adverse possession. The requirementhas been confirmed by the House of Lords in the recent caseof Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419. Its origins canreadily be traced back to the decision of the Court of Appealin Littledale v Liverpool College [1900] 1 Ch 19, but thereis little evidence of any need for intention before that case,and no convincing authority is cited for it. Possible explanationsfor the source of this requirement are considered by the article(for instance cases on re-entry by landlords and the so-called‘found chattel’ cases), but these are ultimatelyrejected. The article goes on to suggest that the reason forthis is that the intention requirement was ‘imported’into English law from German Pandectist writers of the nineteenthcentury. It suggests that Littledale was the case in which thishappened. It seeks to support this hypothesis by reference tobiographical details of Lindley MR, who gave the leading judgmentin Littledale, and who not only trained in part in Germany butalso took an active interest in German scholarship of the time.A brief survey of the relevant German sources is undertaken,focusing primarily on the work of Savigny, but also consideringthe rival theory of Jhering. Finally, it tracks the developmentand refinement of the content of animus possidendi, first by19th century legal scholars and then by 20th century judges,to make it ‘fit’ with English property law. It seeksto address the question of whether the animus possidendi requirementis a free-standing element (the ‘strong’ will theory),or whether it is simply implied from the acts of the squatter(the ‘weak’ will theory), and suggests a solutionby reference to the German sources and later English cases.Finally, it considers how the House of Lords decision in Pyereflects the logical culmination of the acceptance of this ‘legaltransplant’ into the common law.     

Who controls the Naomi Campbell information flow? A practical analysis of the law of privacy

Legal context. The House of Lords held that the medical privacyof the glamorous supermodel Naomi Campbell was violated by publicationof details of her drug addiction treatment and a paparazzi picture.English law is developing under the influence of Article 8 (theright of privacy) and Article 10 (the right of freedom of expression)of the European Convention of Human Rights. The court explainedhow the action for breach of confidence protects privacy. So,who controls the Naomi Campbell information flow? Key points. Primarily, the courts control the flow of privateinformation. They do so through the cause of action of breachof confidence and remedies. In deciding liability, the courtsshould ask whether the benefit of publication is proportionateto the harm done by the invasion of privacy. To answer the question,they must balance the public interest in the right of privacyagainst the public interest in the right of freedom of expression.They may settle on a Reynolds type test by considering a numberof non-exhaustive factors. The article examines seven suggestedfactors and the remedies which can be deployed by the courts.Judgments from the English courts and the European Court ofHuman Rights are considered, including Campbell v MGN (HL),Douglas v Hello! (CA), McKennitt v Ash (HC), Peck v UK (ECtHR),Édition Plon v France (ECtHR), and Von Hannover v Germany(ECtHR). Practical significance. There are an increasing number of privacyclaims against the media. The article includes a checklist ofseven factors to help determine where the balance lies betweenprivacy and freedom of expression.     

The no-conflict rule: the acceptance of traditional equitable values?

Boardman v Phipps is a leading authority on the no-conflictrule. The House of Lords maintained the strict rule that historicallyequity has imposed on a fiduciary. This article explores howthe dissenting judgment of Lord Upjohn in Boardman v Phippshas been preferred by the lower courts and why the courts haveadopted such a position. This has fuelled a more general debateas to whether the no-conflict rule should be harsh or more flexible.Recent cases including Bhullar v Bhullar are discussed to illustratethe present approach of the courts to the recurring issues surroundingpossible applications of the no-conflict rule.     

The ongoing design duty in Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd Casting the scope of copyright infringement even wider

The Australian Federal Court case of Universal Music AustraliaPty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd (‘Sharman’)¹is the latest in a series of peer-to-peer (P2P) filesharingcases from various jurisdictions that has found the softwaredistributor/technology provider liable for copyright infringement.² Sharman followed a few months after the groundbreaking US SupremeCourt case of MGM Studios v Grokster Ltd ³ (‘Grokster’)that had acknowledged the Sony safe harbour for technology providersbut also introduced an inducement of infringement doctrine todeal with reprehensible conduct of infringers. While both cases involved similar technology and shared a numberof similarities on the facts and legal principles⁴, a closerexamination of Sharman shows that the net of copyright infringementin P2P filesharing is cast wider than that in Grokster. The effect of Sharman is an increased burden on the technologyprovider and the potentially tremendous consequences on innovationdue to the lack of a clear safe harbour as well as the wideningof the design obligation.     

'Trade mark use' in Europe: revisiting Arsenal in the light of Opel and Picasso

Legal context: The European Court of Justice (ECJ) decision in the case ofArsenal Football Club v. Reed led to uncertainty regarding thepractical scope of a trade mark proprietor's property rights. Key points: The uncertainty resulted from a failure of the ECJ to addressclearly the issue of what constitutes infringing trade markuse. The ECJ ignored the question of the High Court as to whetheruse of a trade mark as an indication of origin is necessaryfor establishing infringement. They instead established an ambiguousstandard for what constitutes infringing trade mark use, suggestingthat only use that jeopardises the essential function of a trademark is an infringing use. This ambiguity has had problematicimplications for subsequent interpretations of trade mark law,particularly in the Court of Appeal in Arsenal and the Houseof Lords in R v Johnstone. Two relatively new ECJ cases may help clarify the issue. InOPEL, the ECJ suggested that infringing use of a trade markmust be use that is perceived by the relevant public as a designationof origin. The Picasso decision limits the effect of the Arsenaldecision on the relevance of confusion in non-sale situationsto the facts of Arsenal. In particular, it stresses the pointthat when assessing likelihood of confusion in the context ofan opposition to an application for registration the court shouldfocus on the perception of the relevant public at the pointof sale. Practical significance: The benefit of these two cases is that they create some clarityfor legal practitioners and the Courts when addressing the questionof what constitutes infringing trade mark use.     

Helsinki Court of Appeals prohibits the screening and distribution of the motion picture 'Man Exposed' (Riisuttu mies)

In Kirjoituksia Ruudun Takaa Oy v Lasihelmi Filmi Oy, Case S06/2018 the Helsinki Court of Appeals held that a producer hadinfringed a screenwriter's copyrights; the screening and distributionof the film Man Exposed (Riisuttu mies) was thus prohibitedunder threat of a EUR 100,000 fine.     

Evaluating the Role of Brown v. Board of Education in School Equalization, Desegregation, and the Income of African Americans

The public profile of the Brown v. Board of Education decisiontends to overshadow the well-established fact that racial disparitiesin school resources in the South began narrowing 20 years beforethe Brown decision and that school desegregation did not beginon a large scale in the Deep South until ten years after theBrown decision. We instead view Brown as a highly visible markerof public policy’s mid-century reversal on matters ofrace. When we examine the labor market outcomes of male workersin 1990, we find that southern-born blacks who would have finishedtheir schooling just before effective desegregation occurredin the South fared poorly compared to southern-born blacks whofollowed behind them in school by just a few years, relativeto northern-born blacks in same age cohorts.     

'The erosion of property law principles in cohabitation disputes--a step too far?': Stack V Dowder [2007] 1 All ER 929, HL

Cohabitation of unmarried couples is becoming ever so popularin the society. Accordingly the number of property disputesbetween such couples is on the rise. Until now the law in thisarea was marred with conflicting dictums. In Stack v Dowdenthe House of Lords tried to resolve these conflicts by layingdown a simple rule that if there is a joint legal ownershipthe presumption would be of joint beneficial ownership. Thisarticle argues that the framework suggested by the majorityof House of Lords in Stack v Dowden cannot be rationalized bythe long standing law of property.     

Gaining confidence in the law of confidence

Legal context. The recent case of EPI v Symphony has left theUK law of confidentiality in an uncertain state: the extentto which recipients of confidential information may be permittedto ‘use’ mixtures of such information with publiclyavailable material remains unclear. The Court of Appeal in EPIfelt that it was hard to reconcile the principle that any claimin confidence must fail if the material in question is in thepublic domain with the ‘springboard’ doctrine; butis the distinction illusory? Key points. Issues raised in this case include considerationof what precisely is ‘use’ of confidential information,when mixed with public information, and whether a confider shoulddo more than rely on confidentiality obligations to protectthe fruits of his/her disclosures. This article asks how confidentialityobligations may be aligned with the control of statutory intellectualproperty rights. It considers whether the Court of Appeal inMarkem v Zipher has confused the issue and speculates as tohow far the general law of contract can assist the confider. Practical significance. Finally, this article discusses whichlegal tools will best assist the confider seeking to protectits intellectual property.     

Can We Protect How We Do What We Do? A Consideration of Business Method Patents in Australia and Europe

In the long history of monopolies, business method patents area novel and recent edition. In the Digital Age, where time ismoney and speed is everything, innovative methods for undertakingbusiness are as important to a business as the products or servicesit provides to its clients. In recent years several reviews,conducted in both Australia and internationally,⁴ have questionedthe appropriateness of patenting business methods. This paperreviews the availability of business method patents in Australiain light of the 2006 decision of the Full Court of the FederalCourt in Grant v Commissioner of Patents,⁵ which confirmed theneed in Australia for a ‘useful product’ to issuefrom the working of a method (business or otherwise) in orderfor the method to be patentable. This paper will review argumentsboth criticising and defending business method patents and considerwhether business methods warrant special treatment.