JFK's ambassadors and the cold war

The importance of sound representation abroad was plain to President J.F. Kennedy. This survey of Kennedy's diplomats is selective, confined to the three most telling cases in the Cold War drama: Moscow, New Delhi, London. The countries corresponding with these capitals shaped America's world, as chief rival, preeminent neutral and pluckiest ally. Ambassadors in distinctive posts do not constitute the whole of JFK's foreign policy, but this account do shed light on significant achievements, thereby challenging those critics who have attributed every manner of blunder to Kennedy. His diplomatic record may not have been as brilliant as court historians suggested. Yet, to JFK's credit, the practical effect of his ambassadors in three major countries was to advance US security and prestige.     

To Prevent a Revolution: John F. Kennedy and the Promotion of Democracy in Iran

John F. Kennedy came to power in 1961 with Iran on the verge of revolution against the Shah's unpopular policies. To stabilise the situation, his Administration attempted to promote democracy through a development plan based on the precepts of modernisation theory. Backed by academic theorists who argued that promoting democracy was the best way to secure victory in the Cold War, Kennedy developed an ambitious plan to transform Iran. This policy was seen as essential to replace the inevitable uncontrollable revolution and subsequent loss of Iran, with one controlled and directed by Washington. This analysis provides the first comprehensive examination of this plan and its foundations that has heretofore been overlooked. Kennedy's policy towards Iran illuminates the role that external powers can have in manufacturing, supporting, and encouraging a country's transition to democracy. Its failure, and the absence of any replacement plan to ensure political reform, made inevitable the uncontrollable revolution which eventually came in 1978.     

The Emergence of a Commercial Heavy-Weight: The Kennedy Round Negotiations and the European Community of the 1960s 1

The Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations between 1963 and 1967 saw the debut on the international commercial stage of the EEC negotiating as a single entity. The Round thus represents a valuable opportunity to assess the impact of the EEC on the international trading system, the compatibility of regional integration with global trade liberalization, and the effectiveness of the Community system in allowing “Europe” to speak internationally with one voice. Its judgement is largely positive, noting in particular the strong connection between the EEC's emergence and both the original American decision to launch the Round and the main negotiating method employed—that of across-the-board tariff cuts. The Kennedy Round, in other words, constituted both a direct response to the Community's growing economic stature and an imitation at global level of the approach to tariff reduction that it had pioneered. The episode also provides a chance to examine the interplay between the EEC's two largest states, France and West Germany, and to suggest that the contrast between their respective approaches to the Kennedy Round was less profound than is normally suggested.     

The return of the empire? Russia's counteraction to transatlantic democracy promotion in its near abroad

Russia's recent actions in its neighbourhood have not only upset Western policies but have also reinvigorated arguments that Russia may be promoting autocracy to counteract democracy promotion by the European Union and the United States. They have also underlined a broader problem: that of how illiberal powers may react to democracy promotion, especially when their strategic interests are at stake. This article investigates these issues by studying Russia's interactions with the countries in its neighbourhood and democracy promoters. First, the article argues that even if Russia has contributed to the stagnation of democratization and ineffectiveness of democracy promotion in its neighbourhood, its actions do not constitute autocracy promotion and largely lack ideological underpinnings. Second, Russia's counteraction to democracy promotion stems from its ambitions of restoring its great power status, maintaining its regional influence, and perceiving Western policies as a threat to its interests. Third, when it considers its strategic interests undermined, Russia employs economic and military threats (sometimes incentives) against its neighbourhood countries to make the compliance with Western policies less preferable.     

驯服印尼激进民族主义——肯尼迪政府对印尼的政策（1961—1963年）

肯尼迪政府上台后调整了对印尼政策,在促成西伊利安争端和平解决之后,在印尼发起了新的一轮外交攻势,试图抓住当前美印(尼)关系的转机,通过经济手段加强印尼与西方联系的纽带,把印尼注意力由国际事务转向解决国内问题,以促进改造印尼民族主义,影响印尼政治构成和国内外政策的长远目标。这一时期,美国改造印尼民族主义的政策,英国维持在东南亚的势力与影响的目标,以及苏加诺在地区内部消除一切殖民主义残余的努力之间产生了错综复杂、难以调和的矛盾。印尼苏加诺政权对于来自美国的压力也不会轻易就范。肯尼迪政府的对印尼政策不免于以失望告终。     

International development and the European Union's external policies: changing contexts,problematic nexuses,contested partnerships

This special section explores and explains how the European Union's (EU's) overall approach to international development has evolved since the beginning of the twenty-first century. At the international level, the rise of a group of emerging economies has not only provided developing countries with greater choices, but has also further enhanced their agency, thus questioning the EU's leadership and even relevance in international development. At the European level, the various (paradigmatic) shifts in each of the three key external policies—trade, security and foreign policy—and the EU's aspiration to project a coherent external action have collided with the EU's commitment to international development. Numerous tensions characterize the various nexuses in EU external relations, which ultimately challenge the EU's international legitimacy and (self-proclaimed) identity as a champion of the interests of the developing world. Nevertheless, the EU has made more progress than is generally acknowledged in making its external policies more coherent with its development policy. Moreover, the EU's relationship with developing countries has gradually become less asymmetrical, though not because of the EU's emphasis on partnership and ownership but more because of the increased agency of developing countries.     

Aid for arms: The impact of superpower economic assistance on military spending in Sub‐Saharan Africa

This study examines the relationship between superpower economic assistance and military allocations in 25 countries of Sub‐Saharan Africa during the period 1977–1984. Using pooled time‐series regression analysis, we find that African recipients do not treat U.S. aid as fungible. Soviet economic aid, however, is found to have a positive effect on the recipient's military spending.     

失败的国家建设方针——肯尼迪政府与越战初期的南越“战略村计划”(1961-1963)

肯尼迪执政时期,随着冷战战场向第三世界的转移,美国政府越来越致力于通过"国家建设"(Nation Building)①方针应对欠发达国家不断出现的"叛乱"问题,意图通过引导落后地区以发展现代化来消除共产主义"滋生的根源"。越南战争时期南越的"战略村计划"是肯尼迪政府在第三世界展开的第一次完全意义上的"国家建设"行动。本文旨在通过对"战略村计划"从出台到实施再到失败这一过程的历史考察,分析肯尼迪政府对第三世界的"国家建设"方针存在的两点困境:一个是美国自身在"国家建设"中的定位问题,一个是文化冲突问题。     

Kennedy and Touré: A Success in Personal Diplomacy

Entering the White House at the crest of the African independence movement, John F. Kennedy and many of his advisors believed that Africa had surpassed Asia as the most permeable battlefield in the East–West Cold War struggle. While the battle lines of the Cold War had already been clearly drawn in Europe and in much of Asia, newly independent Africa was wide open for superpower competition. The central component of Kennedy's approach to dealing with Africa was his use of personal diplomacy with the leaders of that continent. This article is a case study of Kennedy's first successful use of personal diplomacy with an African head of State—Guinea's Sékou Touré.     

War Powers and the Atlantic Divide

As within the United States debates have arisen over how much unilateral power the President has to deploy force, so too debates are being raised across Europe. Depending on each country's history, system of government, and economic status, various historic positions are shifting. Public, as well as elite, voices are shaping the debate. Another point of tension is NATO's changing role as countries develop autonomous war caveats. Extended analysis of how Great Britain and Germany are grappling with these concerns has great import for U.S. policy. Learning to skillfully persuade its European allies will gain the United States better cooperation from those who do not share the U.S. war powers model.     

China's Naval Rise and the South China Sea: An Operational Assessment

Over the last fifteen years, the steady rise of China's naval capabilities has received a level of attention unmatched since the Soviet navy's expansion following the Cuban Missile Crisis. Yet much of that attention has focused on what that rise has meant for Taiwan's security or a possible contest with the United States.¹ But Beijing's seaward territorial concerns also reach far into the South China Sea. And it is there that the military balance has most swiftly swung in China's favor as a result of its modernization program. This article will examine not only how the military balance has shifted, but also what Southeast Asian countries, particularly Vietnam and the Philippines, could do to best preserve their territorial interests in response to that shift.     

EU's Fight Against Terrorist Finances: Internal Shortcomings and Unsuitable External Models

This article offers an analysis of the European Union's (EU) efforts in the fight against terrorist finances. Following the 9/11 attacks, the EU has adopted the relevant United Nations counterterrorism resolutions as well as the special recommendations of Financial Action Task Force. In addition, the EU has developed its own measures spanning across all of its three pillars. There is, however, a cause for concern that some of these measures have not been properly implemented, while others have been criticized on legal, transparency, legitimacy, and efficiency grounds. These shortcomings are not only due to EU's own internal obstacles, but also result from the EU's uncritical adoption of the prevailing smart sanctions and money-laundering regimes, which are based on a number of unwarranted assumptions that do not reflect the nature of contemporary terrorist threats in Europe.     

The politics of food aid: John F. Kennedy and famine in China

The horrific famine China experienced during the early 1960s not only highlighted the failures of Communist Parry policies, but also sparked a debate within the administration of John F. Kennedy over possible US reactions. Several of Kennedys closest advisors argued for sending American surplus food, while others were adamant that no change should be made in US policy. The final decision to ignore pleas for assistance from the United Nations and other sources was influenced by many issues, including China's relationship to the UN, its aggression toward India and offshore islands, and its role in Southeast Asia.     

Holding Out for Concession: The Quest for Gain in the Negotiation of International Agreements

This study examines partition's success in ending old and preventing new ethnic conflicts. Opponents of partition often claim that partition only invites (further) conflict by its inability to divide existing multiethnic countries in ways satisfying to all concerned ethnic groups. In contrast, proponents of partition argue that partition is the only ethnic conflict solution that provides ethnic separation, an element that is key if conflict prevention is of concern. By separating the belligerent groups, partition provides safety and a decrease in the need for interaction between groups that do not get along. When domestic and international violence is considered, partition's consequences largely depend on the timing of partition. In cases of partitions resulting from ethnic secessionist conflicts, there is a widespread continuation of serious domestic conflict but its frequency does decrease significantly, to a level that can be considered "normal." Internationally, dyads made up of violently partitioned countries avoid militarized conflict in more than one-third of the cases. In cases of peaceful (i.e., preventative) ethnic partitions, domestic conflict starts up in about half of the cases, but despite the significant increase in its frequency, the frequency remains "normal." Internationally, dyads made up of peacefully partitioned countries avoid militarized conflict almost completely. Accordingly, peaceful ethnic partitions produce dyads that are significantly less likely to engage in militarized conflicts and wars than dyads emerging from violent ethnic partitions. Contrary to some expectations, partitions do not create overwhelmingly nondemocratic countries; however, in cases of violent ethnic secessions, democratic institutions do not exhibit significant pacifying effect on subsequent domestic conflict. Important caveats notwithstanding, the overall results indicate that peaceful ethnic partitions have conflict management potential.     

Nonviolent revolutions: civil resistance in the late 20th century

Why do young Africans participate less in elections than their older counterparts? Given Africa's growing youth bulge, this constituency represents a numerically important voting bloc, and their lower participation in elections could undermine the legitimacy of the region's democratic trajectory. We address this question through a multi-level model that relies on individual-level data from the Afrobarometer surveys and country-level data for 19 of the region's more democratic countries. We classify Africa's youth as belonging to two categories, those aged 18–24 and those aged 25–35. We find that key determinants of the youth's voting behaviour include their access to political knowledge and information as well as their perceptions of the electoral context and party system. In the latter regard, the efficacy and fairness of elections and the degree of partisanship increase the youth's decision to vote, while the length of party incumbency is a deterrent to turnout. These findings hold important implications by highlighting that Africa's youth not only need to be exposed to greater fora for learning about the political process and party options but also that political parties in the region need to become more relevant to this constituency.     

“A Slight but Salutary Case of the Jitters”: The Kennedy Administration and the Alliance for Progress in Paraguay

In its Cold War struggle against communism in Latin America, the John F. Kennedy Administration faced a dilemma. How could it maintain the support of anticommunist yet authoritarian regimes whilst concurrently promoting the political liberalisation of those regimes, as Kennedy's core policy toward Latin America—the Alliance for Progress—seemingly mandated? In Paraguay, the Stroessner regime provided Kennedy officials with a clear test of its ability to craft a policy that appropriately balanced both considerations. This case study explores how bureaucratic politics decisively shaped the implementation of that policy, ultimately leading to a continuation in the broader pattern of maintaining support for authoritarian regimes that embraced US leadership in the Cold War.     

State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State

Neorealist theory holds that the international system compels states to adopt similar adaptive strategies—namely, balancing and emulation—or risk elimination as independent entities. Yet states do not always emulate the successful practices of the system's leading states in a timely and uniform fashion. Explaining this requires a theory that integrates systemic-level and unit-level variables: a “resource-extraction” model of the state in neoclassical realism. External vulnerability provides incentives for states to emulate the practices of the system's leading states or to counter such practices through innovation. Neoclassical realism, however, suggests that state power—the relative ability of the state to extract and mobilize resources from domestic society—shapes the types of internal balancing strategies that countries are likely to pursue. State power, in turn, is a function of the institutions of the state, as well as of nationalism and ideology. The experiences of six rising or declining great powers over the past three hundred years—China, France, Great Britain, Japan, Prussia (later Germany), and the United States—illustrate the plausibility of these hypotheses.     

Democratization and Women's Legislative Representation in Sub-Saharan Africa

The recent transition toward democracy in the third world and the former communist states has reopened the debate on the effect of democratization on women's parliamentary representation. While some researchers envisioned unprecedented opportunities for women's entry into national parliaments, others showed that democratization actually decreased women's representation in parliaments. Although the bulk of literature praises the recent political change toward democracy in Africa and analyses the internal and the external factors of this change, very little attention has been given to the effect of this change on women, in specific, women's legislative representation. The purpose of this study, therefore, is to examine the effect of the recent democratization on women's legislative representation in Africa. Cases are sub-Saharan African countries that have experienced multiparty legislative elections between 1990 and 1999. The study found that democratization overall has decreased women's representation in parliament. The countries that have proportional representation systems tend to have higher women's representation in parliament than the countries with majority or plurality systems. Gender quotas appear to improve women's legislative representation, but are practiced only by a small number of countries.     

Troubled Waters: China's Claims and the South China Sea

Among China's unresolved frontier questions, the South China Sea has become the most complex and troubled, and arguably the most significant and disconcerting. The economic and security stakes are high and the stake-holding states numerous and diverse. The claims that China (and others) make about the region reflect such interests but they are, ultimately, legal claims. Beijing's assertions of rights to the disputed areas have rested on three conceptually distinct grounds. Each presents a different mix of challenge and accommodation to international legal norms and the interests of other states, including China's neighbors, near-neighbors and the United States.while China's behavior (as well as that of other interested states) has been more and less assertive at various times, China's three basic arguments claiming rights to the region have been comparatively stable. Both China's pattern of multiple legal arguments and fluctuating actions and rhetoric do little to resolve the debate over whether a rising China will be deeply disruptive of the regional and international order or whether it can—with sufficient skill and tolerable adjustments—be accommodated and integrated. Although China's stance on rights in the South China Sea may be partly the accidental product of conflicting agendas and shifting assessments, Beijing's embrace of three distinct lines of legal argument arguably constitutes a strategy that serves China's interests given the factual, legal and strategic environment that China faces.