Austen Chamberlain and the continental balance of power: strategy, stability, and the league of nations, 1924-29

As foreign secretary from November 1924 to June 1929, Austen Chamberlain dominated British foreign policy. Central to his diplomatic strategy was the maintenance of the European balance of power and, in this circumstance, pursuit of a leadership role for Britain within the League of Nations. The foundation upon which Chamberlain based his European strategy lay with his determination to have Britain play the vital role of stabilizing relations between France and Germany, whose mutual antipathy after the Great War, compounded by the severity of the Treaty of Versailles, threatened continental security. By October 1925, his work bore fruit with the conclusion of the Locarno agreements. For the remainder of his tenure at the Foreign Office, Chamberlain used Locarno - and Germany's membership in the League that was part of that settlement - as the diplomatic mechanism to underwrite his strategic conception of the balance of power. This article addresses the neglected issue of the strategic base of Chamberlain's European policy and addresses three criticisms of his record as foreign secretary.     

Austen Chamberlain and Britain's Relations with France, 1924-1929

Several historians have suggested that Austen Chamberlain's Francophile tendencies during his period as foreign secretary between 1924 and 1929 were the defining features of his European diplomatic strategy. By examining four key events: the rejection of the Geneva Protocol, the conclusion of the Treaty of Locarno, the Anglo-French Compromise on disarmament and the negotiation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, this article argues that Chamberlain's relationship with the French was not entirely harmonious. After the high point of Locarno, Britain's relations with France became increasingly tense because of Chamberlain's growing disillusionment with Briand's willingness to pursue a diplomatic agenda that did not have at its heart a reinvigorated Entente Cordiale.     

Saving the league: V.K. Wellington Koo, the league of nations and Sino-Japanese conflict, 1931-39

In 1919, VK. Wellington Koo, the most famous Chinese diplomat of the early twentieth century, participated in the creation of the League of Nations at the Paris Peace Conference. Little over a decade later, as Japanese forces expanded into Manchuria and North China, Koo struggled to save the League he had helped found. He argued that inability or refusal to brand Japan as an aggressor would sound the League's death knell. In vain, Koo tried to convince European statesmen that the Far Eastern Crisis was a litmus test of the League's viability as a collective security organization. From 1936 on, League inaction in the face of Japanese, German and Italian expansion left Koo thoroughly disillusioned. The lessons of the League were not forgotten during World War II, when Koo argued that a more effective collective security organization, in the form of the United Nations, be created on a basis similar to Franklin D. Roosevelt's Four Policemen concept.     

'Real securities against new wars': Official British thinking and the origins of the league of nations, 1914-19

The historiography of the origins of the League of Nations has usually placed collective security at the centre of the debate during the First World War. This is anachronistic and misleading. The British government considered a guarantee of peace to be essential for any league. This was not contentious. The new proposals of 1917-18, associated especially with Philip Kerr and The Round Table, were intended not as alternatives to a guarantee, but as establishing the preconditions for it to become effective. Only after December 1918 did some persons of influence begin to argue against commitment to a guarantee system. The historiography should now move on to consider the economic questions which were more contentious at the time.     

British power and stability: the historical record

This article provides an overview of British foreign policy and the European balance of power from the late nineteenth century to the early Cold War. British attitudes towards the Continent, like those of the continental Powers toward Britain, are bound to remain ambivalent. When looking back to the history of these complex relations, two main readings stand out. The first is that Britain's attempts to underwrite European stability from Waterloo to the present day left the country exhausted and stripped of its Empire. The other reading perceives in these costly efforts a successful preservation of British integrity and independence. What allowed, for many years, the country to have the luxury of choices with regard to its relations with Europe was the underlying security of the home islands and the existence of a vast Empire overseas. Examining in broad brush strokes the idea and practice of the balance as Britain's international position altered in the half century or so before 1950, the case is made that whatever the reading of these complex relations, the British were always 'reluctant Europeans'.     

'Almost a law of nature'? Sir Edward Grey, the foreign office, and the balance of power in Europe, 1905-12

This article considers the concept of the balance of power as it was applied by the British Foreign Office before the First World War, focusing on 1905-12. The place of the balance of power in British thinking is discussed, focusing on the ideas of the small number of individuals that shaped British foreign policy in this period. The balance of power in the years before the war was a product of more than the military balance sheet but also of the diplomatic dynamics.     

Between balance of power and community: the future of multilateral security co-operation in the Asia-Pacific

This paper explores the logic behind US and Japanese approachesto regional security and the prospects for a more comprehensiveco-operative security order in the Asia-Pacific. The currentsecurity order in the region bears the marks of long-establishedand distinctive American and Japanese approaches. These approachesdo hold out some hope in building a more inclusive and co-operativeorder, but for years to come the Asia-Pacific will be a regionthat will exist somewhere between a balance of power and a community-basedsecurity order.     

China's changing images of Japan, 1989-2001: the struggle to balance partnership and rivalry

Chinese views of Japan, both official and popular, grew morenegative after the end of the cold war. From 1989 to 1993 theJapanese side bears much of the blame for failing to overcomethe distrust of the Chinese people. When the major deteriorationin Japan's image occurred from 1994 to 1998, however, it wasChina's leadership that was chiefly responsible, arousing nationalistemotions. When China's leaders sought to reverse this processfrom 1999 to 2001 they were unsuccessful both because of theintensity of public emotions and the lack of reassurance fromthe Japanese leadership and public. Divisions inside China revealthe hesitation of leaders to foster a realistic image of Japan.By tracing the content of changing Chinese perceptions, we canobserve the effects of overconfidence and insensitivity in eachstate and recognize the difficulty at times of uncertain nationalidentity of finding a coordinated strategy for expanding mutualtrust.     

Betwixt balance and community: America, ASEAN, and the security of Southeast Asia

Realist scholars have long claimed, not incorrectly, that aUS-led balance of power is fundamental to the security and prosperityof Southeast Asia. Yet the Southeast Asian experience has alsobeen one where multilateral security dialogue and regional communityformation figure prominently. In contrast to views which exaggeratethe importance of US preponderance in Southeast Asia whilstdismissing regional multilateral efforts, we offer seven argumentsagainst any undue overstatement of the US contribution to regionalpeace and stability. If anything, a historically ambivalentUS presence contributed to ASEAN's emergence as a mechanismof regional diplomacy. Such ambivalence is no longer feasiblesince 9/11. However, Washington's current engagement in SoutheastAsia should focus on revitalizing regional multilateralism.Our claim is not that the region's security is due to ASEANregionalism rather than US strategic dominance. We argue insteadthat absent the region's fluency with ‘soft’ multilateralism,Southeast Asia's security would probably have been far worse.

SoutheastAsians are more acutely aware of the uncertainties of U.S. policiesthan other regions of the world. They remember the Americanretrenchment in the 1970s followed by a decade of self-doubt.Hence ASEAN countries drew towards each other to seek greaterstrength in self-reliance. They found that together in ASEAN,they could better overcome their problems; but they still needthe United States to balance the strength of the Soviet shipsand aircraft. The renewal of self-confidence in America hasreassured us that America will help maintain the peace and stabilityof the region. It is this balance of power which has enabledthe free market economies to thrive. – Lee Kuan Yew¹