The Emergence of a Commercial Heavy-Weight: The Kennedy Round Negotiations and the European Community of the 1960s

The Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations between 1963 and 1967 saw the debut on the international commercial stage of the EEC negotiating as a single entity. The Round thus represents a valuable opportunity to assess the impact of the EEC on the international trading system, the compatibility of regional integration with global trade liberalization, and the effectiveness of the Community system in allowing “Europe” to speak internationally with one voice. Its judgement is largely positive, noting in particular the strong connection between the EEC's emergence and both the original American decision to launch the Round and the main negotiating method employed—that of across-the-board tariff cuts. The Kennedy Round, in other words, constituted both a direct response to the Community's growing economic stature and an imitation at global level of the approach to tariff reduction that it had pioneered. The episode also provides a chance to examine the interplay between the EEC's two largest states, France and West Germany, and to suggest that the contrast between their respective approaches to the Kennedy Round was less profound than is normally suggested.     

Gradualism and uncertainty in international union formation: The European Community’s first enlargement

This paper introduces a new theoretical framework of international unions qua coalitions of countries adopting a common policy and common supranational institutions. I make use of a three-country spatial bargaining game of coalition formation, in order to examine the endogenous strategic considerations in the creation and enlargement of international unions. Why would we observe a gradualist approach in the formation of the grand coalition even if the latter is assumed to be weakly efficient? I propose asymmetric information about the benefits of integration as a mechanism that can generate gradual union formation in equilibrium. As it turns out, it may well be in the ‘core’ countries’ interest to delay the accession of a third, ‘peripheral’ country in order to (1) stack the institutional make-up of the initial union in their favor and (2) signal their high resolve to wait out the expansion of their bilateral subunion. A related case from the European experience provides an interesting illustration.     

The European Union, the Doha Round, and Asia

Agriculture has been the most contentious issue in the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, and the European Union (EU) intervenes substantially in agricultural markets. This paper reviews these interventions in light of the EU’s participation in the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations with specific attention to Asia. It concludes that the offers made by the EU were designed precisely to avoid any real liberalization in its agricultural markets and have undermined the development aspirations of the round.

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20世纪60-70年代澳大利亚与印度尼西亚关系的调整

长期担任孟席斯内阁部长、后出任澳大利亚驻美大使的霍华德·比尔指出：“印度尼西亚是我们第一关注的国家。澳大利亚政府没有在公开场合更多谈论对这个新独立国家感兴趣的程度，但是，在我们考虑问题和制定外交政策时，从来没有把印尼的问题搁在次要位置。”     

The Euro and the European Demos: Money and Community beyond the Nation-state

Money represents a form of trust among the members of a community. They share a belief that certain symbolic tokens constitute real value. Sceptics frequently point out that the euro area does not have the characteristics of a community. In particular they view the euro as money without a demos. According to this sceptical view, then, the euro is backed by an insufficient level of solidarity and suffers from a deficit of legitimacy. This article identifies the main flaws and contradictions of the no-demos theory. Most importantly, no-demos theory suffers from the fundamental misconception that political community and democracy are possible only in the nation-state. This conceptualisation of community represents a zero-sum understanding of community that cannot capture the dynamic interaction of multiple communities as well as complex and overlapping identities. In addition, no-demos theory is trapped in an internal contradiction. In order for democracy to be possible among the members of a community, that membership in the community is given and rests on pre-democratic criteria. I argue in this article that we need to accept the notion of disaggregated communities and should drop the concept of a unified and fully sovereign demos altogether. Moreover, under conditions in which the gap between sovereignty and authority continues to grow, European Monetary Union is actually a more democratic form of governance than the pre-Maastricht monetary regime in Europe.     

The Paradox of Weakness in European Trade Policy: Contestation and Resilience in CETA and TTIP Negotiations

Over the last decade, trade negotiations with Canada and the United States met with considerable resistance from non-governmental organisations (NGO). Moreover, the negotiation mandates given to the European Commission were so broad as to include topics falling under so-called mixed competence of the EU and the member states, necessitating not only ratification by the EU Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, but also member states’ parliaments. At some point, these two factors almost seemed to paralyze the EU as a trade negotiator. In the end, however, the EU concluded an agreement with Canada, renegotiated its agreement with Mexico (while also concluding agreements with Singapore and Japan amongst others), while negotiations with the US were suspended. Three factors can account for this puzzling combination of apparent incapacity and blockage and surprising resilience of EU trade policymaking. First, the NGO contestation campaigns did not muster pan‐European but rather only varying degrees of support. Second, in addition to scrutiny by the European Parliament, consensus decision-making in the Council fosters accommodation of the demands of all member states. This leads to a low degree of negotiating autonomy on the part of the European Commission, yet large bargaining power for the European Union, as long as the other side wants agreement. Finally, a recent ruling by the Court of the EU facilitated the decoupling of agreements on portfolio investment and investment arbitration (one of the most difficult hurdles), from all other matters of trade and regulatory cooperation, making it easier to reach agreement.     

The Curse of the Smartphone: Electronic Multitasking in Negotiations

In this study, we have explored the use of mobile phones during negotiations. Specifically, we examined the effects that multitasking — reading messages on a mobile phone while negotiating face to face — had on the outcome achieved in a negotiation, as well as on perceptions of professionalism, trustworthiness, and satisfaction. Using an experimental design in a face‐to‐face dyadic negotiation, we found that multitasking negotiators achieved lower payoffs and were perceived as less professional and less trustworthy by their partners.     

缅甸华人穆斯林研究——曼德勒“潘泰”社群的形成

前殖民时代,“潘泰”是活跃在华南和东南亚北部的出色马帮商人,他们实际控制了整个云南的马帮贸易。从贡榜王朝晚期开始,“潘泰”开始在曼德勒定居。1868年,华人清真寺的建成标志着“潘泰”在曼德勒形成了一个独特的群体。1873年,云南杜文秀起义失败后,大批云南穆斯林逃亡到缅甸,曼德勒“潘泰”的数量逐渐增加。虽然第一代“潘泰”的数量还不多,但是他们保持下来,标志着曼德勒第一批华人穆斯林会众历史的开端。     

The Iranian Nuclear Negotiations as a Two-Level Game: The Importance of Domestic Politics

In July 2015, after more than a decade of negotiations, the international community and Iran finally reached agreement over Iran’s nuclear programme. All of the work that produced the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [JCPOA] was nearly undone, however, by the United States Congress, which came close to killing the agreement. This episode emphasises the fact that international negotiations are “two-level games” in which policy-makers must take into account not only their own objectives and those of their interlocutors but also the interests of domestic constituencies if they are to secure the “ratification” of an agreement. In many cases, securing the consent of those constituencies is unproblematic, whether because the matter at hand is uncontroversial, domestic interests are disengaged, or policy-makers have sufficient autonomy from them to ignore their objections. In other cases, however, the domestic game can play a huge part in determining the eventual outcome of the negotiating process. As the intensity of the debate within the United States in 2015 and the narrowness of the margin by which the JCPOA survived suggest, the American–Iranian dimension of the nuclear negotiations falls into the latter category.     

欧洲煤钢联营及其对东北亚经济一体化的启示

在欧洲一体化的进程中 ,欧洲煤钢联营是最具有决定性意义的一步。从某种意义上说 ,欧洲一体化是以政治和军事需要开始的产业部门的联合 ,进而在其经验的基础上发展起来的全面联合。这一过程中 ,在机构、制度建设上 ,欧洲联邦主义人士的积极推动都起到了积极作用。展望东北亚区域经济合作 ,我们认为 ,为实现东北亚经济的一体化 ,在推进总体经济一体化的进程中 ,应同时考虑探索产业部门领域的联合。另外 ,为了东北亚经济一体化不致失败且长期发展 ,还应该建立超越各国利害关系的跨国性制度和机构 ,更重要的是还需要有一批为东北亚经济一体化而献身的人才。     

The Kennedy Administration and the Battle over Foreign Aid: The Untold Story of the Clay Committee

President John Kennedy made foreign aid a key component of his Cold War strategy, introducing it with much fanfare in 1961. He increased funding for aid projects and created several agencies aimed at modernising the under-developed world. A year later, aid was under pressure from elements in Congress that doubted both its value and accomplishments. In late 1962, Kennedy commissioned General Lucius Clay to assemble a committee to review the aims and management of America’s foreign aid programme. Reflecting the president’s desire to ensure optimal value and neutralise opponents, it also indicated Administration belief that the rhetoric of modernisation had overshadowed the relationship between aid and national security. Never intending Clay to assemble a mere rubber stamp Committee, Kennedy specifically tasked the members with investigating aid’s role in supporting the “Free World.” The effort failed. Scholars traditionally assume that it did so because Clay opposed Kennedy’s programme; however, he was supportive of the president’s efforts. Instead, its demise came at the hands of an unusual Congressional coalition that enthusiastically cut the president’s budget.     

满刺加的陷落与中葡交涉

14世纪初,在明朝的支持下,满剌加取得独立,并迅速发展成为东南亚国际贸易的中心。然而,16世纪初葡萄牙殖民者侵入东南亚,占领了满剌加,导致东南亚国际形势发生剧变,从根本上动摇了以“朝贡”制度为基础的“华夷秩序”。面对这一空前的变局,明朝最高统治者愚昧无知,不了解世界大势,做出不合时宜的反应与决策;加之明朝国力式微,缺乏坚强的实力作后盾,在对葡交涉中软弱无力,其结果只能是坐视满剌加的灭亡,从此我国丧失了在东南亚原有的地位,东南亚逐步沦为西方的势力范围。     

Vernacular Legal Discourse: Revisiting the Public Acceptance of the 'Right to Privacy' in the 1960s

This article provides an analysis of the legal and public discourse concerning the ''right of privacy'' in the 1960s. During that period the legal community had ambivalent feelings about recognizing the right of privacy, and scholars split on the question of whether legal formalism or legal realism should dominate American jurisprudence. This ambivalence created a situation where a wide range of public rhetors articulated a common appeal for expanding the right to privacy. When Justice Douglas and the rest of the United States Supreme Court eventually recognized the privacy right in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), many legal scholars worried that this was an exercise in judicial activism. Yet, the legal arguments that were used in defending the establishment of the ''right of privacy'' mirrored the public defenses of that right that appeared in the broader rhetorical culture.     

The Pacifism of Andrew Carnegie and Edwin Ginn: The Emergence of a Philanthropic Internationalism

This study analyses the pacifism of Andrew Carnegie and Edwin Ginn against the backdrop of the emergence of new philanthropic practices. Scientific philanthropy and the institutional model of the philanthropic foundation provided the means for new approaches to the peace cause. The study thus argues that Ginn and Carnegie personified a shift from a non-institutional pacifism to an institutional internationalism. Despite noteworthy similarities in Ginn and Carnegie's approach to peace, however, their two philanthropic foundations—the World Peace Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace—differed in strategies. This study suggests that the leadership of these institutions shaped these different approaches to conflict.     

The evolution of the European Union’s failed approach to Afghanistan

ABSTRACT

This article provides a genealogical account of European actorness in Afghanistan. It argues that European agreement towards facilitating modernisation and development in Afghanistan was initiated with aid and trade, evolving into humanitarianism in the 1990s, and reconstruction and democratisation in the 2000s. The European Union has had a positive impact on Afghanistan, focusing on humanitarianism, but its multilateral and programme level approach to reconstruction and democratisation has failed to meet the EU’s stated objectives. By promoting the flawed “Bonn Model”, the EU is proportionally culpable for failed international attempts to reconstruct Afghanistan; even though the United States has been the primary international actor. Drawing a series of broader lessons, such as tensions between Atlantic solidarity and European integration, and the limitations of the European crisis management, the article demonstrates how European policy has been shaped by crises inside Afghanistan and the larger geopolitical crises these have generated. These have contemporary importance as history suggests that as the US withdraws its commitment to Afghanistan, the EU will have a very significant role in attempting to fill a humanitarian vacuum.     

苏联的东欧政策与苏联软实力的兴衰(20世纪40-60年代)

外交政策是凸显一个国家软实力的重要资源要素之一，外交政策是否合理、明智和有效直接关系到国家软实力的发挥。20世纪40-60年代苏联对东欧的政策经历了一个从友好援助到强硬控制的变化过程，与此相伴的是苏东关系的渐趋紧张和苏联软实力的由盛转衰。