British Foreign Policy,the Financial Elite,and the Nationalisation of the Constantinople Quays Company, 1934–1945

The analysis examines the role of British financial institutions, namely the Bank of England and the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders [CFB], in the making of British policy towards Turkey. The nationalisation of the Constantinople Quays Company, a port operator purchased in 1907 by the British and French governments, serves as a case study through which business–state relations, the role of finance in the conduct of international relations, and the impact of perceptions on policy decisions are explored. In this case, the financial elite’s role was minimal during most of the period considered, becoming more important in the final war years in a framework of the Anglo–Turkish debt restructuring negotiations of 1944. Significantly, the CFB, rather than the Bank, represented the British government in the negotiations. There exists an abundance of evidence of the divergent views between Whitehall and the financial elite about Turkey’s trustworthiness as a debtor and a signatory to treaties. The British government’s perceptions were much more positive than those of the financial elite. This difference stemmed from the different interests involved: Whitehall sought to secure Turkey’s collaboration in the increasingly unstable global security environment while the Bank and the CFB were more concerned with investor and bondholder interests and attempted to avoid further financial losses.     

J.W. Young,Twentieth Century Diplomacy,A Case Study of British Practice, 1963–1976

This article explores the influence of the Cold War on the formulation and application of US narcotic foreign policy at the UN. Examination of Washington's approach toward drug control in South East Asia and the Middle East reveals how the ideologically rich and longstanding US international crusade against narcotics was often subordinated to the containment of communist expansionism. The article demonstrates how both individual and systemic factors combined to deflect US attention away from the sources of illegal narcotics. This produced a confused and contradictory policy despite increasing fears during the 1950s that drugs from abroad posed a real threat to the American way of life.     

The Rhetoric of Appeasement: Hitler's Legitimation and British Foreign Policy, 1938–39

Few grand strategies have been more scrutinized than Britain's decision to appease Nazi Germany. From 1933 to 1938, Britain eschewed confrontation and attempted to settle German demands. However in the five months following the negotiations at Munich, the British abandoned appeasement and embraced a policy of confronting the German state. The roots of both appeasement and confrontation can be found in Germany's legitimation strategies. Until the Munich crisis, Adolf Hitler justified Germany's aims with appeals to collective security, equality, and self-determination—norms central to the European system established by the Treaty of Versailles. After Munich, in contrast, German politicians abandoned these legitimation strategies, arguing instead that expansion was justified as a matter of German might, and not international rights. As Britain came to see German demands as illegitimate, so too did they decide this revisionist state was insatiable, impervious to negotiation, and responsive only to the language of force.     

Negotiating Verification: International Diplomacy and the Evolution of Nuclear Safeguards, 1945–1972

Nuclear safeguards have been an essential part of the global order since the beginnings of the nuclear age. The International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], an international bureaucracy that is supposed to be a non-political, technical institution administers this global nuclear safeguards regime. Even though safeguards have always been controversial, they have turned out to be the most enduring item in the international community’s toolbox to prevent or slow down the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. This analysis shows that nuclear safeguards, whilst they survived the fall of the Iron Curtain, were a genuine invention of the Cold War. At the beginning of the nuclear age, there was an overall understanding that safeguards were not strong enough to prevent the global spread of nuclear weapons. It was only over the course of the late 1950s and 1960s that safeguards moved from the margins to the centre of diplomatic negotiations about global nuclear order. Newly declassified records from the IAEA Archives in Vienna offer insights into the evolution of early nuclear safeguards and suggest that negotiation patterns, proceedings, and settings affected the outcome of this nuclear diplomacy.     

W. Borodziej,S. Dębski, (Eds.), Polish Documents on Foreign Policy, 24 October 1938–30 September 1939

In 1927 in the Benedictine Abbey of St Andrew in Bruges a group of postulants was admitted as novices to the Order of Saint Benedict. Among the guests were the Chinese Ambassadors to Belgium, France and Portugal, the Belgian Ambassador to Switzerland, the Chinese chargé d'affaires at The Hague and various other dignitaries. They were there to witness their former colleague and fellow countryman, Lu Zhengxiang, enter the Benedictine Order and take the name of Frater Pierre Célestin. He had had a glittering diplomatic career in the service of China and had held the highest posts, including those of Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.