South Africa: The Order of Good Hope

Past South African governments already felt the need for honours as instruments of diplomacy in the 1930s, but only instituted the Order of Good Hope in 1973. Inherited British attitudes to honours, the cessation in 1925 of the award of honours bearing titles, and long periods in which civilian honours were not awarded contributed to its frugal use. Wishing to recognize foreign assistance to the liberation movements, from 1994 President Mandela frequently put the Order to use, freely awarding leaders of foreign governments. However, restraint returned after the initial surge. Since instituting new orders in 2003, President Mbeki has emphasised substantial merit as the key to admission.

“Yes, I should have given more praise.” The Duke of Wellington, who defeated Napoleon, became Commander-in-Chief and later Prime Minister of Great Britain, when asked whether there was anything in his life that he could have done better.

     

Italian foreign policy in the post-cold war period: a neoclassical realist approach

Abstract

Drawing on a neoclassical realist approach, this article analyses the foreign policy conduct of different Italian governments from 1994 to 2008. Pressured by the post-cold war international system, these governments have been compelled to raise Italy's profile within the international system. However, the way in which successive governments have responded has differed markedly. By looking at variables located at the domestic level – elite perceptions of the distribution of power and government instability – it is possible to explain these differences. Neo-classical realism is seen as an advance on Waltzian neo-realism precisely because it allows room for domestic as well as international (or systemic) variables, and because it has a very specific focus on foreign policy as such.     

Mixing Grand Strategies: Trump and International Security

ABSTRACT

When a new President is elected in the United States, the first thing analysts do is define that President’s grand strategy; yet, naming Donald Trump’s grand strategy was a difficult task as his pre-election speeches often contradicted traditional US foreign policy norms. Trump’s ambiguous grand strategy combines two US foreign policy strategies: nationalism in the sense that his preference is for unilateral policies prioritising American interests, and a traditional foreign policy approach, as seen in the moves taken against China and Iran. Surprisingly, this grand strategy unintentionally contributes to cooperation in Eurasia, as actors like Russia, China, Turkey, India and the European Union continue to try to balance the threat from the United States instead of competing with each other, while smaller countries are reluctant to challenge the regional powers due to mistrust towards Trump.     

“The Most Sophisticated Intervention We Have Seen”: The Carter Administration and the Nicaraguan Crisis, 1978–1979

In May 1977, in a public forum, President Jimmy Carter laid out the foundations of a distinctive foreign policy programme for the United States. He offered a striking shift away from the Cold War realpolitik of previous American administrations. Human rights, he declared, would be a central component of United States foreign policy. The growing instability in Central America, especially in Nicaragua, during Carter's term of office provided a major test of his Administration's new programme. And its ultimate response to Nicaraguan instability thus provides key insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the thirty-ninth President's attempt to move beyond traditional, hard-line Cold War diplomacy.     

The “sleep-walking giant” awakes: resetting German foreign and security policy

A quarter of a century after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the role of the Bundesrepublik in Europe is once again the focus of international scrutiny and academic debate. Having long been seen as a “reflexive multilateralist” and “tamed power”, with a “leadership avoidance reflex” and a “civilian power” strategic culture, the Eurozone crisis has pushed the Berlin Republic into the role of “reluctant hegemon”. At the same time, however, Germany has been widely criticized by its EU and NATO partners for its half-hearted commitment to the Afghan war and its failure to support its allies in the Libyan intervention. Prompted by a call by Federal President Joachim Gauck in 2013 for Germany to live up to its international responsibilities, new themes in foreign and security policy have recently emerged. At the Munich Security Conference in February 2014, a more active and engaged approach was outlined by both the Foreign and Defence Ministers. This paper will examine recent shifts in the discourse of German foreign and security policy, and considers the extent to which these have been accompanied by significant shifts in policy outcome and implementation – particularly in the light of the Ukrainian crisis.     

The crisis of the state in Russia

President Dmitry Medvedev is neither a “liberal” nor a “puppet” of his mentor, Vladimir Putin. He is a capable politician, who appears genuinely to believe in the rule of law. Yet his formative policy experience has been overwhelmingly dirigiste, the approach that is unlikely to change fundamentally under his presidency. Medvedev's personal preferences in foreign policy are largely in line with the policies initiated by Putin, although his rhetoric and style will likely be more conciliatory. He will inherit a plethora of problems created by Russia's assertive policy, both in its near and far abroad. Moreover, the institutional constraints and informal rules within which Medvedev will have to operate make policy continuity more likely than policy reversal.     

Presidential Leadership on Foreign Policy,Opinion Polling,and the Possible Limits of “Crafted Talk”

The strategy of “crafted talk” (or framing) suggests that a politician uses public opinion to anticipate the most alluring, language to convince the public to follow a politician's own preferred policy (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000 Jacobs, L. R. and Shaprio, R. Y. 2000. Politicians don't pander: Political manipulation and the loss of democratic responsiveness, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  [Google Scholar]). This manipulatory behavior by presidents has important consequences in the realm of constructing foreign policy, especially if the policy involves military service personnel, international prestige, or foreign conflict. However, no scholar has investigated White House archival data to examine the theoretical nuances of presidential “crafting” talk when constructing arguments for foreign policy. This article examines three case studies using internal polling memoranda and focus group results concerning the Vietnam War under President Johnson, the signing of the INF Treaty with the Soviet Union under President Reagan, and the Gulf War under President Bush. In each of the three cases, public opinion places serious constraints on presidential framing of foreign policy. Implications for the effectiveness of political framing and the limits of presidential persuasion are discussed.     

Domestic political conflict,issue areas,and some dimensions of foreign policy behavior other than conflict∗

This paper examines the seemingly complex linkage between domestic political conflict and external behavior by broadening our consideration of foreign policy behavior. Underlying this analysis is a view that there are elements of both assertiveness and caution in the political use of foreign policy by domestically threatened leaders. They act assertively to divert attention away from domestic issues and enhance the image of their regime, but at the same time they are likely to show some restraint in order to avoid costly military and economic reactions by foreign actors. It is hypothesized that domestic conflict affects the degree of independence, commitment, and intensity in a nation's foreign policy behavior, but no so much its foreign conflict. Supplementing this, the mediating role of another foreign policy property, substantive issue area, is examined as a means of identifying conditions under which the impact of internal unrest would be greatest. The results of the analysis are mixed, but they do lend credibility to the idea that domestic conflict is related to multiple dimensions of foreign policy. More broadly, they suggest that governments employ different foreign policy strategies in coping with different types of domestic political conflict.     

Dynamics Without Drama: New Options and Old Compromises in Egypt's Foreign Policy

Western policymakers have come to take Egypt's foreign policy orientation for granted in recent decades. After President Anwar Sadat's dramatic split from the Soviet bloc and embrace of peace with Israel in the 1970s, Egypt became a reliable but rarely exciting diplomatic partner. Little appreciated has been the centrality of foreign policy to Egypt's internal interests as well as its external ones, and the extent to which changes in either the domestic or international environment could trigger the Egyptians to reassess their stance. The present article examines the interests that Egyptian foreign policy serves, and it analyses factors that could prompt a future Egyptian government to adopt different policies in order to serve those interests more effectively.     

Through the Looking Glass: The Helsinki Final Act and the 1976 Election for President

The controversy surrounding the 1975 Helsinki Final Act made it an enduring issue in the 1976 campaign, and the political backlash against President Gerald R. Ford damaged his electoral chances. Ford's signature of the agreement, his continuation of détente, and his foreign policy more broadly may not have been decisive issues in his contests with Ronald Reagan and then Jimmy Carter, but they certainly were prominent throughout the election. Examining the influence of the Final Act on Ford's election campaign illuminates the extent to which a number of candidates sought to use popular opposition to the agreement to their advantage. Furthermore, it reveals how the 1976 presidential candidates, and Ford in particular, struggled to address growing questions about détente, human rights, and morality in foreign policy. Ford's failure to defend his signature of the Final Act adequately raised concerns about his foreign policy and personal leadership with the electorate.     

International Relations Theory and Minimum Deterrence

ABSTRACT

India’s government under Narendra Modi represents a return to single party rule. This paper investigates whether and why single party governments in India differ in their extremity of foreign policies from coalition governments. It particularly focuses on how different forms of government influence the saliency, contestation, and enactment of national conceptions about India’s global role. First, I situate India within the academic debate regarding coalitional governments and foreign policy. I suggest that one reason why India challenges scholars‘ assumption is the missing link between partisan conceptions of India’s global role and their institutional representation. Second, I propose a role theoretical approach and argue that the process of self-identification, consisting of ego and anticipated alter expectations, conditions a state’s role set and extreme foreign policy. It is hypothesized that the nature of contestation of national role conceptions varies between factions and fractions because of the nature of India’s party system, as well as the relative significance of external others for India’s identity. Third, I examine instances of role-taking in the field of nuclearization and Sino-Indian relations. Findings suggest that contested role conceptions during single-party rule caused more extreme variances in international role-taking, while coalition governments proved to induce more complementary role-taking processes.     

Think globally,buy locally: International agreements and government procurement

Do international treaties constrain national governments? The answer appears to be “yes” when it comes to the use of traditional barriers to trade, such as tariffs. Yet, while many governments have cut tariffs to comply with international agreements, they have often raised non-tariff barriers in their place. One increasingly prominent non-tariff barrier is discrimination in public procurement. Governments frequently discriminate against foreign suppliers in favor of domestic ones when buying goods and services. In an attempt to reduce procurement discrimination, international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization, have devoted ever more attention to members’ procurement practices. Additionally, a growing number of preferential trade agreements seek to regulate public procurement. It remains unclear, however, whether international rules are effective in changing governments’ purchasing behavior. Using original data, we find that neither multilateral nor preferential procurement agreements substantially reduce governments’ propensity to “buy national.” These results illustrate the difficulty of regulating non-transparent policy areas via international treaties.     

Uganda and U.S. Foreign Policy

Washington's relationships with the “leveraged allies” preferred by realists—those countries that have little choice but to follow America's lead—have long been considered more reliable than in its relationships with the “natural allies” favored by idealists: prosperous, democratic nations that share the goals and interests of the United States. President Bush's foreign policy requires these natural allies, but many U.S. government officials are more wary. Uganda under President Museveni is a model “natural ally” candidate, with its relatively humane and democratic internal policies, but its greater capacity to act without American leverage, approval, or supervision is likely to worry realist career diplomats.     

Beijing's March West: Opportunities and Challenges for China's Eurasian Pivot

China's Eurasian frontiers have emerged as a major factor in Beijing's foreign policy through President Xi Jinping's “One Belt, One Road” strategy. The article argues that this strategy has been given impetus by the shifting geopolitical landscape in Central Asia resulting from the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, Russia's relative decline, and Beijing's quest for stability in its restive province of Xinjiang.     

Paradiplomacy of India’s chief ministers

ABSTRACT

Since the mid-1990s, state governments within India’s federal system have taken a greater interest in foreign relations. They have sought indirect influence by lobbying the central government to take account of their preferences and direct influence by seeking investment and making links with international organizations and other national and subnational governments. This article considers how chief ministers engage in parallel diplomacy noting how they draw on regional cultural resources and make connections with a regionally defined diaspora. The article finds that some chief ministers have embraced the role of “chief diplomat,” while others take a more discreet approach to international activity. Comparing the cases of Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu reveals the political logic for expanding, de-emphasizing, or avoiding international engagement.     

Dual engagement: France and the Persian Gulf

With the end of the Cold War international relations began anew without the bipolar constraints of two ideologically opposed superpowers. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 represented the first challenge to the nascent post‐Cold War Persian Gulf security environment. Within the region, France is once again increasingly active in the economic, political and military fields. The re‐evaluation of Washington's ability to remain engaged at its current levels within the Gulf may be attributed in large part to a growing sensitivity in Riyadh and other Arab capitals to the visible US presence coupled with an American foreign policy which is, at times, inconsistent. The net future effect of contemporary trends may be one in which the Gulf Sheikhdoms welcome French ascendancy and US decline. France has experienced its own foreign policy transformation marked by the leadership of President Chirac. Where President Mitterrand sought the role of power broker in regional affairs, President Chirac seeks increased influence and importance.     

South Korea's Faustian Attitude: The Republic of Korea's Decision to Send Troops to Iraq Revisited

South Korea sent troops to Iraq not because of any perceived threat from an Iraqi nuclear programme, but to seek influence over American foreign policy towards North Korea. At no point did the general public support the American invasion and war in Iraq; most South Koreans also opposed sending troops to Iraq. However, the government chose to send first non-combat and later combat troops to Iraq, and the public approved of the former choice and support was growing for the latter. The liberal President Roh Moo-Hyun had to persuade the public on this issue, even in opposition to his core supporters, risking political isolation. What the public and the President aimed at was a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and business opportunities. The national interest that South Korea pursued in sending troops to Iraq was policy influence over the US guarantee not to use military power against North Korea.     

The securitisation of NGOs post-9/11

This article argues that the securitisation of an issue can involve not only negative, exclusionary and repressive extraordinary measures but also more positive, inclusionary and productive strategies of engagement. It also argues that such bifurcated strategies of security can evoke a spectrum of responses that sets limits on the process of securitisation. It examines these two arguments through the lens of the securitisation of development NGOs post-9/11. Development NGOs have become associated as a potential ‘second-order’ security issue related to the macro-securitisation of the War on Terror. After the launch of President Bush's War on Terror, US and allied governments shifted their approach to development NGOs from one of enthusiastically courting them as co-producers of development and security to an approach that cast greater suspicion on their activities. Aware that development NGOs still had a positive role to play in development and security, Western governments adopted a bifurcated strategy of containment and engagement towards development NGOs. State attempts to restrict development NGOs have evoked a spectrum of responses, ranging from ready compliance to outright resistance that has led to only partial success in securitising development NGOs.     

Foreign aid and political conditionality: Issues of effectiveness and consistency

This article examines the implementation of political conditionality by four official aid donors in the 1990s. It explores the aid sanctions taken globally to leverage improvements in respect of human rights and democratic principles, and assesses donor policy practice along two lines of investigation ‐ effectiveness and consistency. A main finding is the ineffectiveness of aid restrictions in contributing to political reforms in recipient countries. This is accounted for more by the weakness of measures imposed than by the strength of recipient governments, questioning the seriousness of donor intent in many cases. Regarding consistency, a pattern of selective and inconsistent policy application is revealed. The increased rhetorical support for democracy and human rights by northern governments post‐cold war has not led to a corresponding change towards the fair and equal treatment of all nations. The continued subordination of human rights and democracy to other foreign policy concerns, notably economic self‐interest, not only undermines policy credibility and legitimacy, but also limits impact and effectiveness. Donors themselves have introduced a normative dimension to aid policy. Yet if their own commitment to the principles of human rights and democracy is at best partial, they can hardly require development partners to abide by them in a manner that commands respect.     

Interview with Nathalie Tocci on the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy

The Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy, “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe”, presented at the European Council on 24 June 2016 by Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the Commission, was drafted by Nathalie Tocci, Deputy Director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and co-editor of The International Spectator. 

Given the importance of the document, we asked Nathalie for an interview and 18 foreign policy experts from around the world to comment on it.