Making a Cold War in the Near East: Turkey and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945–1947

During the post-war negotiations in the years of 1945 and 1946, the Soviets launched a bitter war of nerves against Turkey in order to establish a military base in Istanbul and share control of the Straits. It was crucial for Britain that the USSR be prevented from gaining any influence in Turkey. However, as Britain was in no position to support Turkey financially, American authorities encouraged by London and Ankara took over the responsibility for Turkey. This articles examines the Great Powers rivalry over Turkey and Turkey’s response to it. It argues that regional factors other than US–Soviet confrontation, such as Turkey’s security search against the Soviets, also played a crucial part in starting the Cold War in the Near East.     

Third world neutralism and British Cold War strategy, 1960–62

European decolonization appeared to the Western powers to open up fresh areas of the globe to Cold War competition. Concerned by the coincidence of Afro-Asian and Sovier pressure on the European colonial powers, and preoccupied with the redefinition of Britain's global role in the wake of decolonization, the British Foreign Office was convinced, despite much evidence to the contrary, that the West needed to champion ‘neutralism’ in order to prevent the Afro-Asian states from orienting towards the Soviet sphere. This article argues that this policy was determined more by their anxieties about Anglo-American relations in the wake of decolonization than by a deeply held conviction of the imminence of the extension of the communist world.     

Anglo–American Relations and the Cold War in 1950

1950 was a crisis year in the Cold War and saw a growing rift between the United Kingdom and the United States over how best to wage it. It was in the Far East that the most dangerous crisis occurred. Britain recognised the People's Republic of China, not only because the Communist regime clearly controlled the mainland, but also because it was felt that it was not irretrievably linked to the Soviet Union. The United States, on the other hand, regarded China as a Soviet satellite and displayed a consistently hostile attitude towards it. The situation worsened with the outbreak of the Korean War in June. Although the United States and Britain agreed that the invasion of South Korea must be repelled, the British were anxious not to broaden the conflict, whilst the Americans used it as a stick to beat the Chinese. The war also prompted accelerated rearmament and the Americans favoured the rearmament of West Germany. Things came to a head in November, with the large-scale Chinese intervention in Korea, followed in early December by a visit to Washington by the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee. The British believed that the United States had already concluded that a global war was inevitable, whereas they wished to avoid it if possible. As this article shows, the events of 1950 amply demonstrated the subordinate position of Britain in the “special relationship.”     

From the Cold War to the 21st Century Towards a New Era in the Asia-Pacific

ＦｒｏｍｔｈｅＣｏｌｄＷａｒｔｏｔｈｅ２１ｓｔＣｅｎｔｕｒｙＴｏｗａｒｄｓａＮｅｗＥｒａｉｎＴｈｅＡｓｉａ－ＰａｃｉｆｉｃＦｒｏｍｔｈｅＣｏｌｄＷａｒｔｏｔｈｅ２１ｓｔＣｅｎｔｕｒｙＴｏｗａｒｄｓａＮｅｗＥｒａｉｎｔｈｅＡｓｉａ－Ｐａｃｉｆｉｃ￥Ｂｉ...     

The dragon in the room: the China factor in the development of US–India ties in the Cold War

ABSTRACT

In recent years, as China has continued to rise as an economic, political and military power, there has been increasing consideration of its role in shaping US–India relations over the last two decades. However, this article, considering the period 1949–1979, shows that American and Indian perceptions of and policy toward China shaped the US–India relationship even during the Cold War. In doing so, the article seeks not just to bring China back into the story of past US–India relations, but also shed light on the China–India–US triangle of today and of tomorrow.     

Change and Stability in Eastern Asia: Nationalism,Communism, and British Policy, 1948–1955

British policy in Eastern Asia, 1948–55, aimed to combine the attainment of change leading to stability, to be secured through cooperating with nationalism against the growing threat from communism. After initial errors, ministers and officials revealed realism and flexibility, as shown in policies towards Burma, Malaya, and China. As regards Japan, the United States dominated decisionmaking and British views were rather negative towards the viability of political reform in the longer term and towards economic revival. The collapse of French authority in Indo-China pushed Anthony Eden towards compromise with the communist powers at the Geneva conference in 1954: Britain diverged from the US in supporting a strictly defensive alliance (SEATO), which was linked with an ambivalent approach to the future of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.     

The Radical Crescent: The United States,the Palestine Liberation Organisation,and the Lebanese Civil War, 1973–1978

This analysis examines the efforts by the Palestine Liberation Organisation [PLO] to formalise relations with the United States before and after the October 1973 Arab–Israeli War. It details the public and private attempts by PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat to present the organisation as a legitimate partner for negotiations with Israel. However, the American secretary of state and national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, hindered the PLO’s diplomatic initiatives during the Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford administrations. Kissinger viewed the PLO as an impediment to his efforts to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict through separate peace agreements, rather than a comprehensive solution. Despite Washington’s objections to the PLO, the organisation had regional and international legitimacy, its stature aided by its political and ideological allies. Yet these ties also contributed to the PLO’s involvement in the Lebanese civil war. Kissinger encouraged Syria’s June 1976 invasion of Lebanon to weaken, if not destroy, the PLO as an independent actor. Although the PLO survived Syria’s intervention, Kissinger’s actions and agreements limited the diplomatic initiatives of the Jimmy Carter Administration.     

“Trade with the Devil”: Rubber,Cold War Embargo,and US–Indonesian Relations, 1951–1956

This article examines the issue of rubber in US–Indonesian relations in the 1950s. Indonesia, attempting to promote its economic development, sought to sell natural rubber to the Communist People's Republic of China. In so doing, it risked alienating the United States, which for its part led anti-PRC trade embargo efforts while at that same time attempting to woo Third World neutrals such as Indonesia. The article explores the course and complexities of this issue on both sides, and concludes that, in the end, Washington decided that enforcing an increasingly questionable rubber embargo was not worth a rupture in relations with Jakarta. It also finds that President Eisenhower, although keenly aware of the issues at stake, did not provide the decisive leadership that would allow Washington to take the initiative, rather than react to circumstances, regarding the sale of rubber to the People's Republic of China.     

Britain and Kashmir, 1948: “The Arena of the UN”

The Jammu and Kashmir dispute of 1947–1949 between India and Pakistan became the first inter-state conflict to be discussed at the United Nations Security Council. This analysis looks at the views of the government and the delegation of Great Britain, one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, on Kashmir through the year of 1948. It argues that the British attitude was determined more by Imperial and Commonwealth strategic and ideological imperatives in South and Central Asia and the Middle East and less by the merits of the cases of the disputants. Operating within the twin backdrop of decolonisation and the Cold War, the British official mind juggled Kashmir's accession to India, India's complaint of aggression against Pakistan, and Pakistan's demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir with an eye to their own hopes and fears in a region that it understood as the key vantage on Communism and Islam.     

From “War-in-Sight” to Nearly War: Anglo–French Relations in the Age of High Imperialism, 1875–1898

The 1904 entente has cast a long shadow across the twentieth century. As a political “myth,” the notion of an entente cordiale between the two longstanding European enemies and overseas rivals France and Britain has overtaken the event itself, in so far as its historical importance is concerned. In this way, the notion of the entente has tended to obscure important aspects of a more complex and ambiguous history of cross-Channel relations. Using a range of British and French diplomatic, naval and private papers, this chapter examines the tensions in Anglo-French relations, caused by balance-of-power considerations in Europe and overseas imperial competition, between the “War-in-Sight” crisis of 1875 and the 1898 Fashoda stand-off.     

A Review of: “William Sheehan. British Voices: From the Irish War of Independence 1918–1921.”

This article has been retracted.