A. Johnstone,Dilemmas of Internationalism: The American Association for the United Nations and US Foreign Policy, 1941–1948

Middle Powers are generally understood to perform diplomatic functions of constructive engagement and consensus-building to facilitate agreement in international negotiations. Middle Powers may, however, adopt more confrontational roles, especially when their accommodative functions become deficient. Whilst theoretical perspectives on Middle Powers account for such roles, limited empirical evidence has been provided to explore the conditions under which they revert to combative diplomacy. This article contributes to this area by examining the role of South Africa in the 2003 Cancun Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organisation. During this period, South Africa shifted to a more confrontational approach epitomised by the heightening of its public diplomacy against developed countries and its co-leadership of the G-20 coalition of developing countries. The Cancun Ministerial collapse reflected both the possibilities and limitations of combative diplomacy as South Africa enhanced its international prestige but failed to extract any meaningful concessions, whilst triggering the threat of diplomatic retaliation by the major trading powers.     

The U. S. Policy toward DPRK: Opportunities and Constraints

布什政府上台以来,始终未能阻止朝鲜拥核步伐.朝核试后,美对朝政策有了新的调整,六方会谈得以复会.但美朝双方受各自国家利益和政策目标的限制,在朝鲜半岛无核化问题上的尖锐分歧难以解决,朝核危机仍存在再度升级的可能.     

Prospects for U.S. Foreign Policy and Sino-U.S. Relations Following Obama’s Re-election

The focus of Obama’s second term diplomacy will continue to be the acceleration of the U.S. global strategic shift eastward to Asia. With increasing competition and more competitive factors emerging over the next four years, the existing competitive and cooperative political structure in Sino-U.S. relations should continue to help keep bilateral political relations stable.     

U.S.,Europe and China in Russia''''s Foreign Policy

Regardingitsmilitarystrengthespeciallythenu-cleararsenalRussiaisstillmoreorlessaglobalpowercomparedwiththeU.S.Howeverintermsofthecomprehensivenationalstrengthitisatmostaregionalpowerrankingahead.ThreeyearsagoRussiawascalleda″second-classcountry″byPutin.AlthoughRussiapaysattentiontobothglobalandregionalissuesitconcernsmoreaboutthosehavingdirectbearingonitsnationalinterests.U.S.EuropeandChinaarevalueddifferentlyinRussia'sforeignaffairs.Nomatterwhatkindofroleeachofthemplaysleadingindispens…     

The Rhetoric of Appeasement: Hitler's Legitimation and British Foreign Policy, 1938–39

Few grand strategies have been more scrutinized than Britain's decision to appease Nazi Germany. From 1933 to 1938, Britain eschewed confrontation and attempted to settle German demands. However in the five months following the negotiations at Munich, the British abandoned appeasement and embraced a policy of confronting the German state. The roots of both appeasement and confrontation can be found in Germany's legitimation strategies. Until the Munich crisis, Adolf Hitler justified Germany's aims with appeals to collective security, equality, and self-determination—norms central to the European system established by the Treaty of Versailles. After Munich, in contrast, German politicians abandoned these legitimation strategies, arguing instead that expansion was justified as a matter of German might, and not international rights. As Britain came to see German demands as illegitimate, so too did they decide this revisionist state was insatiable, impervious to negotiation, and responsive only to the language of force.     

The Changes of the U. S. and the Constraints It Facing

The war in Iraq is coming to an end, and the military actions are giving place to the reconstructions of that country's political, economic and social systems. This war marks a major event in international rela     

The Future and Influence of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy

AftertheColdWarespeciallyafter″9·11″incidenttheinternationalsituationhasprofoundlychangedandthepoliticalturbulencehasintensified.Securi-tyissuesaresoprominentthatithasbecomeoneofthetopicsfordiscussionworldwidearousinggreatattentionfromallcountriesespeciallythebigpow-ers.InthisregardtheEUhasbeenmakingagreatefforttoworkoutitscommonforeignandsecuritypolicyandcarrieditforwardasthefocalpointintheconstructionofintegration.IwillputforwardthreepointsinregardtotheprospectsofEUcom-monforeignandsecu…     

The EU and the Bosnian Civil War 1992–95: The Capabilities–Expectations Gap at the Heart of EU Foreign Policy

Abstract

Using the empirically driven case study of the European Union's response to the Bosnian civil war 1992–95 this article assesses the effectiveness of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), through Christopher Hill's ‘capabilities–expectations gap framework’. In assessing effectiveness it explores both the expectations placed on the EU and the capabilities the Union was able to deploy. Moreover, this research suggests that the EU was ineffective in responding to the Bosnian crisis. The EU pursued a rigid strategy of diplomatic and economic foreign policy, failing to generate the political will to attempt alternative approaches. This research argues that the capabilities–expectations gap framework is a useful tool for conceptualising the EU's effectiveness but that it under-specifies the importance of the end result of the policy.     

U. S. Domestic & Foreign Policy Trend after the 2004 Election(Ⅱ)

The U.S.presidential election result finally turned out at zeroo'clock sharp on November4,2004.The winner is the presentPresident George W.Bush.The election attracted worldwideattention,not only because of its only superpower status and stressedelection situation,but also because of the many hot issues in the worldthat America is deeply involved in.In order to have a good command ofthe trend of U.S.policies,both internal and external,the Expert Forumof Contemporary International Relation…     

U. S. Domestic & Foreign Policy Trend after the 2004 Election (Ⅰ)

The U. S. presidential election result finally turned out at zero o'clock sharp on November 4, 2004. The winner is the presentPresident George W. Bush. The election attracted worldwideattention, not only because of its only superpower status and stressed election situation, but also because of the many hot issues in the world that America is deeply involved in. In order to have a good command of the trend of U. S. policies, both internal and external, the Export Forum of Contemporary Int…     

Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Wilson and the Greek Dictators, 1967–1970

The military coup of 21 April 1967 brought to power a repressive dictatorship in Greece. It proceeded to deprive Greeks of their human rights and civil liberties, outraged international public opinion and strained transatlantic relations during the Cold War. The “Greek case” culminated in the withdrawal of Greece from the Council of Europe and calls for its expulsion from NATO. This article will analyse the foreign policy considerations that determined British policy towards the Greek junta during 1967—such as Cold War realities, alliance dynamics, economic and commercial imperatives, regional instability in the Mediterranean and domestic pressures. It will look at how these factors coalesced into shaping British policy towards the Greek junta into one in which human rights had little bearing. The article will also consider the impact of the “Greek case” on the image and credibility of the Labour government of 1966–1970 and explain why vociferous anti-junta activities in London were to create such policy difficulties for the British government.     

The Influence of Jewish Americans on U. S. Middle East Policy

Ever since the establishment of Israeli statehood in 1948, the United States has been its staunch supporter. This is because of their common beliefs in values, political system and ideology, and America's interests in the Middle East. However one important factor cannot be ignored., the influence of Jewish Americans' political forces on U. S. Middle East policy. Since few articles deal with such a topic systematically in China, this essay tries to make a preliminary study on it.     

The Geography of U.S. Terrorist Incidents, 1970–2004

This paper describes the spatio-temporal trends in terrorist incidents in the United States, from 1970 through 2004. Utilizing the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and ancillary data, we examine both the frequency of incidents and their characteristics: location, target type, attack type, weapon type, and perpetrator group. While the frequency of terrorist incidents has declined since the 1970s, there still is significant activity nationwide. Instead of urban-rural or West Coast-East Coast divisions, the pattern is a more complex mosaic based on group identity, target, and weapon type. We conclude that there is an explicit geography of terrorism, one that is quite decentralized and highly localized.     

The arms race noninteraction puzzle: The effects of concept choice and measurement error on the estimation of the U.S.‐U.S.S.R. arms race

The continuing failure to find interaction in the U.S.‐U.S.S.R. arms race remains a puzzle. In this analysis the effects of concept choice and measurement error on the estimation of a Richardson‐type model of the U.S.‐U.S.S.R. arms race is examined. Employing a multiple indictor model, it is demonstrated that significant random and systematic measurement error exists. The use of military expenditures as an indicator of economic burden is shown to generate severe statistical problems. Lastly, it is demonstrated that the lack of fit of typical single indicator models is more a measurement error problem than a model specification problem.     

“Ultimate Destiny” Delayed: The Liberals,the Organization of American States,and Canadian Foreign Policy, 1963–1968

Until Canada joined in 1990, the issue of its membership in the Organisation of American States bedevilled Canadian foreign policy, which many observers saw as a decisive test of Ottawa’s interest in Latin America. Under the Liberal government of Lester Pearson, prime minister from 1963 to 1968, and the stewardship of his secretary of state for External Affairs, Paul Martin, Canada seemed poised to join OAS. But a mixture of foreign and domestic factors—including American intervention in the Dominican Republic, Cuba’s isolation within the hemisphere, and growing Canadian nationalism—ruined this initiative. Using the Pearson government’s policy toward the OAS as a lens through which to explore the direction of Canadian foreign relations in the 1960s, this analysis also examines competing views of Canada’s place in the world.     

Turkey's New Foreign Policy and the Future of Turkey–EU Relations

When European Muslim citizens are involved in social conflicts or when they contest the place that is given them in Europe, these political claims are often seen as radical and inspired by external influences. If an attempt is made to understand what part the influences of the so-called Muslim “countries of origin” play in the way Muslims contest European models of society and integration, it turns out that the roots of radicalisation are often purely European. The idea that it is the Islamic and communitarian nature of the European Muslim way of life which is at the base of their failing integration has to be challenged. Indeed, the initiatives of religious actors have failed to channel the radicalisation of European Muslims’ political demands. The role of the religious variable is of much less importance in political radicalisation than the lack of an institutional response to the demands for greater social and economic integration.     

A Silver-Lining: President Johnson and the U.N. Peacekeeping Budget Crisis of 1964–1965 1

Despite the revival of UN peacekeeping after the Cold War, many questions regarding peacekeeping operations remain unanswered. Some of the most complex questions involve the extent to which peacekeeping should be applied, who should pay, and with what privileges, if any. These questions are not new, but also surfaced during the 1960 UN budget crisis ever peacekeeping between the United States and the Soviet Union. President Johnson decided to uphold Kennedy’s promise to apply Article 19 and deprive a state of its General Assembly vote if it did not pay its assessed peacekeeping dues. In the end, however, Johnson retreated on Article 19 in the face of Soviet refusal to pay anything toward peacekeeping. The crisis subsided along with a missed opportunity to deal more conclusively with some of the questions surrounding peacekeeping.