The Middle East has undergone significant changes in the past two decades. Most significantly, the region has experienced the dissolution of the post-1991 America-centric regional security complex as the United States reduces its forces and retools its center of effort toward the Indo-Pacific, and the creation of a new gas-centered sub-regional security complex in the Eastern Mediterranean. These changes have impacted Israel’s stature in its region and have led to significant changes in Israel’s foreign and national security policy. While in the past, Israel viewed itself as a “villa in the jungle”—not as an integral part of the region—it now sees itself as part of its surroundings and is pursuing a much more regional-centric policy. This change is clear in issue-specific alliances and collective security arrangements, as well as in long-range economic relationships. This article analyzes the regional changes and their impact in Israeli strategic thinking and policy. 相似文献
The principal hypothesis of this paper is that the utility of arms transfers as an instrument of supplier influence is highly dependent upon two sets of variables over which the supplier has little control. This is partly because the recipeints’ demand for arms rests largely on forces outside the major power suppliers’ control. The relative impact of arms transfers is evaluated in conjunction with 1) the arms transfers to the recipients's principal local adversary; 2) the intensity of the recipient's conflict involvement; 3) the amount of political support it receives from its major power supplier/patron; and 4) the identity of the supplier country itself. Recipient countries are Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Supplier countries are France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States for the years 1947–1973. Combat aircraft weighted by their performance characteristics and treated as the dominant weapon system are used as the “arms transfers” variable. Conflict, cooperation and political support variables include both verbal and non‐verbal actions weighted for their relative intensity by a 13 point interval scale. Multiple regression using standardized (beta) coefficients is used in a time series analysis to determine the relative impact of arms transfers and other salient influences on the intensity of recipient cooperation to its principal major power supplier. The findings in general support the main hypothesis. They suggest that arms transfers may be one useful instrument for extracting additional increments of cooperation from Egypt and Israel, (particularly in the context of Egyptian‐Israeli peace negotiations) but not for any of the other recipients in the study. However, this inference is valid only so long as those two countries continue to be engaged in an arms race with each other, heavily involved in conflict with their neighbors, and economically dependent upon outside powers. Cooperation of the Arab states with their respective major power suppliers is more strongly affected by the quantity of arms transferred to their respective regional adversaries and the intensity of political support from their suppliers than by their own arms transfers. Given the differential impact that the identity of the supplier had on cooperation intensity one conclusion is that the major power suppliers may not be equally successful in using arms as an instrument of political influence. Another is that the development of a “special relationship” between supplier and recipient in conjunction with supplier support for the recipient is probably a prerequisite for effectively using arms transfers as an instrument of supplier influence or coercion. 相似文献
The exchanges between China and the Middle East are profound. In 500 B. C, the world-famous Silk Road was built. In 700 B. C, there were two great empires on the Asian Continent. 相似文献
Tensions have long been a feature of the international relations of the Middle East. After the 2011 Arab uprisings, regional instability is being driven by a confluence of three interrelated developments. First, the weakening role of the United States as a power balancer in the Middle East, combined with the larger global context, has provided assumptions about threats and new opportunities for local and other actors to pursue strategic and foreign policy objectives that have deepened tensions and regional competition. Second, there has been a juxtaposing of power multipolarity with ideological multipolarity, itself a source of increased instability, with two of the regional powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, fanning opposing sectarian flames to further their respective strategic objectives. Third, this strategic competition is being played out in several newly weakened or collapsing states such as Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Similarly, the regional powers’ competition in previously weakened states, such as Lebanon and Iraq, has intensified due to the acquisition of new, sectarian dimensions. These developments are likely to perpetuate instability and tensions in the Middle East for the foreseeable future.
