Seeing the Lexus for the Olive Trees? Public Opinion,Economic Interdependence,and Interstate Conflict

Many scholars argue that economic interdependence and more extensive economic ties between countries decreases the risk of violent conflict between them. However, despite considerable research on the “capitalist peace” at the macro or dyadic level, there has been less attention to its possible individual-level microfoundations or underpinnings. We argue that public perceptions about economic ties with other states and the costs of conflict should influence the expected constraints on the use of force for leaders. Actual high interdependence and potential economic costs may not suffice to create political constraints on the use of force if people are unaware of the degree of interdependence or fail to understand the benefits of trade and the likely economic costs of disruptive conflict. We examine the linkages between individual perceptions about economic interdependence and their views on conflict and peace through a survey experiment, where we ask respondents in Japan about approval for belligerent actions in a territorial dispute with China and varying information about economic ties. Our findings indicate that greater knowledge and information about economic interdependence affects attitudes about territorial disputes and increases support for peaceful solutions with China.     

Saving the league: V.K. Wellington Koo,the league of nations and Sino‐Japanese conflict, 1931–39

In 1919, VK. Wellington Koo, the most famous Chinese diplomat of the early twentieth century, participated in the creation of the League of Nations at the Paris Peace Conference. Little over a decade later, as Japanese forces expanded into Manchuria and North China, Koo struggled to save the League he had helped found. He argued that inability or refusal to brand Japan as an aggressor would sound the League's death knell. In vain, Koo tried to convince European statesmen that the Far Eastern Crisis was a litmus test of the League's viability as a collective security organization. From 1936 on, League inaction in the face of Japanese, German and Italian expansion left Koo thoroughly disillusioned. The lessons of the League were not forgotten during World War II, when Koo argued that a more effective collective security organization, in the form of the United Nations, be created on a basis similar to Franklin D. Roosevelt's Four Policemen concept.     

High and Low Tide: Sino–American Relations and Summit Diplomacy in the Second World War

Studies of Chinese involvement in Allied relations during the Second World War tend to focus on the Cairo Conference of November 1943 and see it as the high point for China’s wartime diplomacy. This analysis argues that the Moscow Foreign Ministers’ Conference, held just prior to Cairo in late October–early November, was more important for the achievement of China’s longer-term interests. The participation at Moscow of Cordell Hull, the American secretary of state, was unique as the State Department was absent from almost all the Allied wartime summits. President Franklin Roosevelt liked to conduct his diplomacy personally. In Moscow, however, Hull represented the United States, and his patience and persistence led to the inclusion of China in the Four Nation Declaration that resulted from the meeting. That, in turn, meant that China was eventually included as a permanent member of the eventual United Nations Security Council and seen as a post-war Great Power. It was a more significant outcome than those resulting from the Cairo Conference.     

Powerless and Frustrated: Britain's Relationship With China During the Opening Years of the Second Sino–Japanese War, 1937–1939

Foreign policy is multi-faceted. It was not only diplomatic, political, socio-cultural, economic, Imperial, and strategic factors that structured—and limited—Britain's foreign policy during the interwar period; so, too, did those of other countries. Given the number and variety of Britain's—and the interconnected other Powers'—interests in China, Britain's relationship with China during the opening years of the Second Sino–Japanese War provides a useful insight which has wider implications on Britain's road to war narrative. Given the topic's neglect, one can be forgiven for inferring that events in Europe entirely eclipsed those of East Asia. This article demonstrates the contrary. As awareness of Chinese suffering spread and as Japanese aggrandisement threatened British interests, sinophilism became vogue once again. However, the often insurmountable obstacles that the interwar period presented to Britain and others—particularly the United States—limited Britain's ability to aid China. It was not for want of fortitude.     

A. Johnstone,Dilemmas of Internationalism: The American Association for the United Nations and US Foreign Policy, 1941–1948

Middle Powers are generally understood to perform diplomatic functions of constructive engagement and consensus-building to facilitate agreement in international negotiations. Middle Powers may, however, adopt more confrontational roles, especially when their accommodative functions become deficient. Whilst theoretical perspectives on Middle Powers account for such roles, limited empirical evidence has been provided to explore the conditions under which they revert to combative diplomacy. This article contributes to this area by examining the role of South Africa in the 2003 Cancun Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organisation. During this period, South Africa shifted to a more confrontational approach epitomised by the heightening of its public diplomacy against developed countries and its co-leadership of the G-20 coalition of developing countries. The Cancun Ministerial collapse reflected both the possibilities and limitations of combative diplomacy as South Africa enhanced its international prestige but failed to extract any meaningful concessions, whilst triggering the threat of diplomatic retaliation by the major trading powers.     

The Welcome Asians: the Japanese in Mexico, 1897–1910

This article focuses on the development of diplomatic relations between Japan and Mexico in the second half of the nineteenth century, culminating in the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the two nations in 1888, and the subsequent effect the positive relationship between the two nations had on Japanese immigration to Mexico. Based on a spirit of reciprocity and equal status, the treaty resulted in a favourable opinion regarding Japan and the Japanese in Mexico that had a direct influence on the way in which Japanese immigrants to Mexico were viewed and treated, which stands in sharp contrast to the experiences of other Japanese migrant communities in the Americas. Viewed as agents of modernization, Japanese immigrants were welcomed or viewed neutrally by Mexican government officials and average citizens. The article also explains why, despite this positive relationship, Mexico never became a large-scale destination for Japanese immigration.     

The virtues of specialization: British and American diplomatic reporting on Russia, 1921–39

While important changes were made to the organization of the British diplomatic establishment in the years after 1918, most senior officials remained committed to the ethos of the ‘generalist’. In the United States, by contrast, significant efforts were made to inculcate the virtues of professionalism and specialization among members of the Foreign Service. This paper examines the way in which members of the American and British diplomatic establishments monitored developments in the USSR during the interwar years. It concludes that US diplomats were no better than their British counterparts at interpreting developments in Soviet Russia, despite the fact that they were generally better trained to carry out their duties.     

The Deep-seated Influence of the Financial Crisis on the World Economic, Political and Security Structures

当前这场金融危机具有深刻的经济性和政治性根源合成、并发的特征,其影响将更为持久、广泛而深远.金融危机将全面启动新一轮国际金融乃至全球经济体系的改革进程,表现为全球金融体系朝着更加均衡、公平和综合方向改革的步伐加快,但全球金融/经济体系改革和过渡仍是一个长期而渐进的过程.金融危机推动了世界政治、安全格局的深度演变和改变国际政治议程的优先程序,对中国的对外关系提供了更多的战略机遇和挑战.     

Management and Mismanagement of Diversity: The Case of Ethnic Conflict and State‐Building in the Arab World

The European Union has a unique opportunity to develop a positive strategy towards Ukraine. A pro-EU government is now in power in Kyiv, there is a revived civil society pressing for democratic reforms and the actions by Russia have both reinforced Ukraine’s pro-West line and led to the priority given Moscow being questioned by some member states. It is therefore essential to grant Ukraine a membership perspective to strengthen this trend and encourage Kyiv to confront and overcome the basic problems that face the country.     

Faris,H. (2013). The Failure of the Two-State Solution: The Prospects of One State in the Israel–Palestine Conflict.

M.B. Hayne, The French Foreign Office and the Origins of the First World War 1898–1914 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) £35. ISBN 019–820270–9.

Keith Hamilton, Bertie of Thame: Edwardian Ambassador (Woodbridge/Suffolk: Boydell Press 1990 (= Royal Historical Society Studies in History, No. 60)), ix + 436 pp. ISBN 0–86193–217X. £35.

Anita Inder Singh, The Limits of British Influence: South Asia and the Anglo‐American Relationship, 1947–56 (Pinter, 1993) pp. 309. £45.

Robert H. Ferrell (ed.), Truman in the White House: The Diary of Eben A. Ayers (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1991) $37.50. ISBN 0–8262–0790–1.

Robert Pearce (ed.), Patrick Gordon Walker: Political Diaries 1932–1971 (London: The Historians Press, 1991) £20. ISBN 1–872273–05 X.

Richard J. Aldrich (ed.), British Strategy and the Cold War, 1945–51 (London: Routledge, 1992) £40. ISBN 0–415–07851–2.

Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe's Name. Germany and the Divided Continent (London: Jonathan Cape, 1993) £25. ISBN 0–224–02054–4.     

Beyond the American Century: Walter Lippmann and American Grand Strategy, 1943–1950

As the United States became a world Power, journalist and intellectual Walter Lippmann feared that it would become its own worst enemy. During and after the Second World War, he tried to steer the country towards coherent statecraft, to define the national interest and the limits of power, and give geopolitical expression to the role of the United States as the core of an Atlantic strategic system. But in response to world war, the Truman Doctrine, and the Korean War, he became pessimistic about the country's ability to conduct strategy effectively. In the prophetic tradition, he believed that a fatal symbiosis between America's growing strength and domestic politics led it towards crisis. Though at times ahistorical, Lippmann's concept of strategy deserves attention for its dialogue between power and identity, for its questioning of “ends” as well as means, and for its focus on the danger of self-defeating behaviour.     

The impact of the Iraqi Crisis on the transatlantic link. A summary of views on the US–EU and US–NATO relationship

Lithuania's security orientation has evolved significantly since 1991. It has moved from prioritising Baltic and, then, Nordic, cooperation to focusing on partnership with Poland, and seeking NATO and European Union membership. Initially re‐buffed by both, Lithuania has gradually sought to strengthen its de facto ties with NATO and WEU, and to build up its economic ties with the EU and its member states, in the belief that this provided a form of ‘soft’ security, and prepared the way for eventual membership of NATO and the EU.     

“The Most Sophisticated Intervention We Have Seen”: The Carter Administration and the Nicaraguan Crisis, 1978–1979

In May 1977, in a public forum, President Jimmy Carter laid out the foundations of a distinctive foreign policy programme for the United States. He offered a striking shift away from the Cold War realpolitik of previous American administrations. Human rights, he declared, would be a central component of United States foreign policy. The growing instability in Central America, especially in Nicaragua, during Carter's term of office provided a major test of his Administration's new programme. And its ultimate response to Nicaraguan instability thus provides key insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the thirty-ninth President's attempt to move beyond traditional, hard-line Cold War diplomacy.     

German–American Intelligence Relations, 1945–1956: New Evidence on the Origins of the BND

Under the 1998 Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released a certain amount of documents relating to a German–American intelligence co-operation that began almost immediately after the German surrender of May 1945; it lasted until 1956 when the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) was founded, today's German foreign and military intelligence service. The Americans assembled, supervised, and largely financed what is often referred to as the “Gehlen organisation,” named after its leader, former Wehrmacht general, Reinhard Gehlen, who was chief of the BND until his retirement in 1968. Whilst the existence of this co-operation had been known since the 1940s, largely due to Soviet subversion and propaganda, very little reliable information and virtually no original source material was available before the release of this, somewhat redacted, material in 2002 and 2007. This article provides a sketch of how former Wehrmacht officers, and even a number with an ominous SS past, who might well have been war criminals, came to work, first for United States military intelligence and, from 1949, for the CIA. It looks at some of their operations during those turbulent post-war years, which include the Berlin airlift and German rearmament in response to the Korean War. The potential of those newly declassified documents, unfortunately, cannot be corroborated from other sources as long as German and Russian archives remain closed. Despite its manifold limitations, this material provides an exciting window into transatlantic intelligence history.