Introduction: Appeasement: Rethinking the Policy and the Policy-Makers

The “Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine of 1904/05” constitutes a landmark in United States foreign policy. However, the 1902/03 Venezuela Crisis—in particular, the arbitration process between the South American country and Germany, Great Britain, and Italy that settled the crisis—led to President Theodore Roosevelt's decision to amend the Monroe Doctrine. The arbitrational award was an important impetus for the corollary because its decision appeared to encourage future European interventions in the western hemisphere. The Roosevelt Corollary was needed to prevent a situation similar to the 1902/03 Venezuela Crisis from occurring again. Strategically speaking, Roosevelt felt the corollary was necessary to uphold the Monroe Doctrine under new circumstances.     

阿根廷经济危机前后的外国直接投资

如同拉美大多数国家一样,阿根廷的国内储蓄严重不足,经济发展严重依赖外国资本,其中外国直接投资对阿根廷经济的发展具有重大影响,阿根廷历史上曾出现过3次外国直接投资浪潮。但2001年年底阿根廷爆发的严重经济危机,影响了外国对阿根廷的直接投资。本文探讨和分析了阿根廷经济危机前外国对阿根廷的直接投资和应对经济危机的政策对外国直接投资造成或可能造成的影响。     

Appeasement in the Late Third Republic

This article considers whether a specifically French ‘appeasement’ developed among policymakers of the inter-war years and, if so, how various appeasement strategies changed over time. It does so firstly, by attempting to define this French version of appeasement partly by reference to the historiography of French inter-war foreign policy and strategic planning. The article then considers the various impersonal forces that led to changes of course in foreign policy. These include domestic social and political pressures, economic conditions, and the changing strategic balance of power in Europe. The article suggests that French appeasement was neither a constant feature of France's international strategy in the 1930s nor simply a mirror image of its British counterpart. The foundations of French diplomacy, military thinking and strategic outlook were altogether different. By the late 1930s the limitations of actual allies, the recalcitrance of some potential friends, the elusiveness of others, had all provided a powerful fillip to proponents of appeasement, although substantial minorities continued to oppose it. Ultimately, France without a great power ally was a nation compelled to appease.     

Revisionism and Its Variants: Understanding State Reactions to Foreign Policy Failure

States respond to failure in different ways. In light of the phenomenon of revisionist states, it is particularly important to understand why some revisionist states revert to status quo pursuits in the face of policy failure, while others pursue revisionism even in the face of external developments that we might expect would push them toward moderation. Domestic structure, domestic politics, and elite ideology each contribute to an explanation of how revisionist states respond to policy failure, but none of these variables alone tells the full story. As is illustrated through case studies of Iranian, Israeli, and Iraqi foreign policy in the 1980s, domestic structure plays the launching role in the analysis of how a revisionist state will behave. Regime type structures the incentives facing leaders and determines whether domestic politics or elite ideology is determinative in predicting a revisionist state's reactions to failure.     

马来西亚公立高校招生政策变更前后的效应分析

为提高土著受教育的机会及缩小族群间的收入差距,马来西亚政府于20世纪70年代初期严格执行了高校固打制(配额制)招生政策。该政策的运行虽然成功的缩小了族群间在教育与收入上的不平等,但却推高了非土著子女的留学浪潮,加重了他们的教育支出。私立高校的扩张和市场化在政府监管制度的缺失下进一步引发了教育质量问题。2002年,固打制(配额制)被绩效制取代,然而在过去的10年中,其公平性依旧受到非土著的质疑。     

Dangerous Revisionism: On the Founders, ‘Neocons’ and the Importance of History

Debates regarding the Bush Administration's grand strategy began long before the forty-third president left office. A group of distinguished historians and political scientists have argued over the course of the last few years that the Administration's grand strategy did not represent a major break with historical precedent, as is sometimes argued, but continued the evangelical support for liberty that has always made the United States a “dangerous nation” to tyrants. Along the way, this revisionism creates straw men, and co-opts or redefines terms that are central to the traditional understanding of U.S. foreign policy. It also seems to misunderstand grand strategy itself, focusing almost entirely on continuity of ends while ignoring the rather glaring discontinuities in the ways that generations of U.S. presidents have chosen to pursue them. Overall, the revisionist project fails in both of its tasks, which are: To make the case that the Bush administration took actions of which the Founding Fathers would have understood and approved; and by implication, to justify the unnecessary, tragic war in Iraq.     

Essence of Negotiation: Understanding Appeasement and “The Great Munich Stereotype”

The relative merits of rational choice and behavioral approaches to the study of negotiation continue to be hotly debated. This article tests qualitative postdictions (assertions or deductions about something in the past) from these paradigms as well as the alternative approach of new institutional theory against the extensive record of negotiation process, contractual form, and contract implementation from the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. I find the incomplete relational form of the peace treaty to be consistent with the behavioral and new institutional concepts and find that only behavioral theory can explain how unilateral German moves unraveled the treaty during the 1930s. But the historical record further reveals that the close fit between the behavioral paradigm and these events is more than coincidence. I also discuss the role of conference participants, particularly John Maynard Keynes and Walter Lippmann, in establishing the basis for modern behavioral science. The behavioral paradigm emerged from efforts to understand and fix serious policy mistakes such as those made in the peace negotiations. The study of human error was intended to serve as the basis for broad‐based organizational solutions. Finally, I discuss the impact of “the Munich stereotype” on such recent events as the planning for the American invasion and reconstruction of Iraq; such examples suggest continued imperfections in the system of organized intelligence that has actually evolved in the United States.     

Sir Eric Phipps, the British Government, and the Appeasement of Germany, 1933-1937

This article argues that Sir Eric Phipps' reputation as an “anti-appeaser” of Germany during his Berlin embassy 1933-1937 is not accurate. While Phipps was not in favor of placating Hitler by making territorial concessions, he had much in common with those who had sought a rapprochement with Germany in the 1920s through a policy of inclusion and reconciliation. Particular importance is placed on Phipps' attitude towards the League of Nations, with detailed consideration also being accorded to his relationship with the British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Office officials of the period, as well as his views on the Entente Cordiale.     

移交主权后的伊拉克

6月 2 8日 ,美国领导下的联军当局向伊拉克提前移交主权 ,但伊拉克并未收回完整主权 ,联军的军事占领也没有结束。伊临时过渡政府对多国部队的军事行动只享有发言权 ,无否决权 ,联军享有治外法权。伊政治结构三分天下 ,什叶派占据了主要权力 ,逊尼派得到了名誉权。联合国第 1 5 4 6号决议授权美国领导下的多国部队继续在伊拉克驻留 ,多国部队有了联合国的合法外衣。伊拉克收回的仅仅是有限主权 ,包括有限立法权、有限司法权、有限安全权、有限国防权、有限石油资源权等。目前主宰伊拉克命运的是美伊双重领导机构 ,美伊两个权力中心并存     

After Sarajevo: Explaining the Blank Check

This paper uses an incomplete information game model to describe and explain the so-called blank check issued to Austria by Germany in early July 1914. It asks why Germany would cede control of an important aspect of its foreign policy to another lesser power. The derived explanation is consistent not only with the actual beliefs of German and Austrian leaders but also with an equilibrium prediction of the game model. The issue of whether unconditional German support of Austria constituted either a necessary or a sufficient condition for the outbreak of major power war the next month is also addressed.