Anglo–American Relations and the Cold War in 1950

1950 was a crisis year in the Cold War and saw a growing rift between the United Kingdom and the United States over how best to wage it. It was in the Far East that the most dangerous crisis occurred. Britain recognised the People's Republic of China, not only because the Communist regime clearly controlled the mainland, but also because it was felt that it was not irretrievably linked to the Soviet Union. The United States, on the other hand, regarded China as a Soviet satellite and displayed a consistently hostile attitude towards it. The situation worsened with the outbreak of the Korean War in June. Although the United States and Britain agreed that the invasion of South Korea must be repelled, the British were anxious not to broaden the conflict, whilst the Americans used it as a stick to beat the Chinese. The war also prompted accelerated rearmament and the Americans favoured the rearmament of West Germany. Things came to a head in November, with the large-scale Chinese intervention in Korea, followed in early December by a visit to Washington by the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee. The British believed that the United States had already concluded that a global war was inevitable, whereas they wished to avoid it if possible. As this article shows, the events of 1950 amply demonstrated the subordinate position of Britain in the “special relationship.”     

Beyond the American Century: Walter Lippmann and American Grand Strategy, 1943–1950

As the United States became a world Power, journalist and intellectual Walter Lippmann feared that it would become its own worst enemy. During and after the Second World War, he tried to steer the country towards coherent statecraft, to define the national interest and the limits of power, and give geopolitical expression to the role of the United States as the core of an Atlantic strategic system. But in response to world war, the Truman Doctrine, and the Korean War, he became pessimistic about the country's ability to conduct strategy effectively. In the prophetic tradition, he believed that a fatal symbiosis between America's growing strength and domestic politics led it towards crisis. Though at times ahistorical, Lippmann's concept of strategy deserves attention for its dialogue between power and identity, for its questioning of “ends” as well as means, and for its focus on the danger of self-defeating behaviour.     

Lord Home and Anglo–American Relations, 1961–1963

This article focuses on the role of Lord Home, the British Foreign Secretary, in the conduct of Anglo–American relations between 1961 and 1963. It studies three controversial policy areas: the newly independent states of Laos and the Congo, along with the debate over the decolonization of British Guiana; the key Cold War issues of Berlin and Cuba; and a variety of nuclear weapons–related matters. It is argued that Home, in constantly striving to maintain the alliance, was more pro-American than Macmillan. He exercised an important restraining and calming influence on the Prime Minister, preventing him from pursuing potentially damaging initiatives. However, the relationship between the two men was strong. Home’s diplomacy usually complimented Macmillan’s interventions and they often worked together.     

Oleaginous Diplomacy: Oil,Anglo–American Relations and the Lausanne Conference, 1922–23

There has been considerable controversy as to the significance of oil in the Lausanne Conference of 1922–1923, in particular British attempts to retain Mosul as part of Iraq. However, as this article explores, the conference also had important implications for the composition of the British-registered Turkish Petroleum Company, which was expected to win the Iraqi oil concession. In the first phase of the conference, the United States observer delegation's stance persuaded the British Government to put pressure upon the British companies involved in the TPC to admit American companies upon the latter's terms. Despite this, in the second phase, the Americans supported the Turkish delegation in its opposition to clauses in the proposed Treaty, which would have guaranteed the rights of the TPC, and forced a British compromise on the issue. The Lausanne Conference played a significant role in the Anglo–American “oil war” of the inter-war period.     

Anglo–American Relations 1950–51: Three Strikes for British Prestige

In 1949–1950, Britain rejected ideas of being a third force between the post-war Superpowers and adopted instead an approach that has been the keystone of British foreign policy from that point onwards: “hugging America close.” The aspiration was to establish a position closely related to the United States yet sufficiently independent, effectively to harness American power to British ends. This now familiar position has been much-debated recently in the context of post-9/11 military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan especially. However, this analysis examines three crises immediately following the British decision in 1949–1950 to give priority to the Anglo–American “special relationship” to demonstrate that, for Britain, this policy from the onset was both advantageous and potentially difficult. The outcomes of crises over NATO's Atlantic Command, Iranian oil, and ANZUS demonstrate how expansion of United States influence benefitted Britain but sometimes also required painful British adjustment and loss of prestige.     

German–American Intelligence Relations, 1945–1956: New Evidence on the Origins of the BND

Under the 1998 Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released a certain amount of documents relating to a German–American intelligence co-operation that began almost immediately after the German surrender of May 1945; it lasted until 1956 when the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) was founded, today's German foreign and military intelligence service. The Americans assembled, supervised, and largely financed what is often referred to as the “Gehlen organisation,” named after its leader, former Wehrmacht general, Reinhard Gehlen, who was chief of the BND until his retirement in 1968. Whilst the existence of this co-operation had been known since the 1940s, largely due to Soviet subversion and propaganda, very little reliable information and virtually no original source material was available before the release of this, somewhat redacted, material in 2002 and 2007. This article provides a sketch of how former Wehrmacht officers, and even a number with an ominous SS past, who might well have been war criminals, came to work, first for United States military intelligence and, from 1949, for the CIA. It looks at some of their operations during those turbulent post-war years, which include the Berlin airlift and German rearmament in response to the Korean War. The potential of those newly declassified documents, unfortunately, cannot be corroborated from other sources as long as German and Russian archives remain closed. Despite its manifold limitations, this material provides an exciting window into transatlantic intelligence history.     

The Eurafrique Initiative,Ernest Bevin and Anglo–French Relations in the Foreign Office, 1945–1950

This analysis examines the prevalence of Eurafrican thinking in the British Foreign Office throughout the late 1940s. Drawing on British and French diplomatic archives, it reveals the centricity of the Foreign Office, and British Embassy at Paris to a project largely confined to the mental map of the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin. The financial stains facing Britain, often misinterpreted as “decline”, seemed a temporary phenomenon that “multilateral European cooperation” could rectify. Although shelved in 1949–1950, the Eurafrique initiative has seen few historians analyse its strategies across the corridors of power. This analysis reappraises British desires for Western European “co-operation” and a renewed faith in the Entente Cordiale as a geo-political counterweight to growing East–West bipolarity. Discussions of strategies to pool African possessions to recover the European economy were short-lived. Yet they challenged prospects of long-term economic dependence upon the United States in favour of an Anglo–French led European bloc.     

Herbert Hoover,Anglo–American Relations and Republican Party Politics in the 1920s

Herbert Hoover is often portrayed as a business-centric relatively non-political historical figure. In particular during his time as Commerce Secretary in the administrations of Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge, Hoover is often described as supporting a United States foreign policy that first and foremost served the needs of American corporations. This article attempts to recalibrate that picture by stressing Hoover’s political self-interest as a motivating factor in his policies. Far from being politically unconcerned, Hoover was a man desperate to become president of the United States. His disastrous campaign for the Republican nomination in 1920 made him doubly determined to use his power in the Republican cabinets to improve his chances for the nomination later. This can be seen in one of the most famous of Hoover’s foreign policy interventions, the Anglo-American rubber crisis. Far from serving the needs of American business, during this crisis Hoover was acting mostly from political self-interest. In particular attacking the British allowed him to reframe his image, which was seen as Anglophiliac in 1920. In the end it was a very successful rebranding, as Hoover was able to run for the presidency in 1928 from a position of strength when it came to foreign affairs.     

China＇s Soft Power and the Development of China-Africa Relations

With the deepening of China-Africa relations in all fields, China's influence in Africa has been strengthening. This is     

China-India Relations： Course of Development and Prospects

This year marks the 60^th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and India. During the period, China-India relations experienced smooth development, twists and turns, and fine days after storms, with friendship and cooperation as the main stream. The steady and benign development of relations between China and India, two vigorously rising powers, not only accords with the common interests of the people of both countries but are also beneficial to the peace and prosperity of Asia and the world over, and it promises a bright future.     

Arab Countries'''' Reform and Development of China-Arab Relations

For a nation state, social, political, and economic reform is a common phenomenon as it helps promote development of a country and progress of a nation. In today's world, where the international situation is undergoing profound changes and economic globalization is forging fast ahead, it has become a trend of the times and natural tendency of history for a nation     

Edward Heath and Anglo–American Relations 1970–1974: A Reappraisal

As British Prime Minister, Edward Heath is generally believed to have presided over a distinct cooling in Anglo– American relations. His frosty personality, use of the term “natural”—instead of “special”—relationship, and determination to re-orient British foreign policy towards the European Community are felt to have deliberately foreclosed a more intimate partnership with the administration of Richard Nixon. This interpretation is captured most vividly in the writings of the President's National Security Adviser, and later Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. In contrast to such views, this article argues that despite considerable challenges, Anglo– American relations during Heath's premiership were not fundamentally weakened. Nor can Heath be considered “anti-American.” Moreover, the frictions experienced were often the result of American actions rather than anything which happened in London. A new understanding of Heath's actions and the circumstances of the time are needed when assessing the “special relationship” in this period.     

High and Low Tide: Sino–American Relations and Summit Diplomacy in the Second World War

Studies of Chinese involvement in Allied relations during the Second World War tend to focus on the Cairo Conference of November 1943 and see it as the high point for China’s wartime diplomacy. This analysis argues that the Moscow Foreign Ministers’ Conference, held just prior to Cairo in late October–early November, was more important for the achievement of China’s longer-term interests. The participation at Moscow of Cordell Hull, the American secretary of state, was unique as the State Department was absent from almost all the Allied wartime summits. President Franklin Roosevelt liked to conduct his diplomacy personally. In Moscow, however, Hull represented the United States, and his patience and persistence led to the inclusion of China in the Four Nation Declaration that resulted from the meeting. That, in turn, meant that China was eventually included as a permanent member of the eventual United Nations Security Council and seen as a post-war Great Power. It was a more significant outcome than those resulting from the Cairo Conference.     

International relations scholarship,academic institutions and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict

This paper explores the role of academic scholarship and practice in constituting, aggravating, and resolving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The first section of the paper examines how scholarly discourse and methods of analysis contribute to shaping (mis)understandings of on-the-ground conflict dynamics. To demonstrate this point, the paper first overviews conventional social science methods used in mainstream international relations (IR) scholarship that tend to reify, freeze and homogenize ‘the conflict’ as well as conflict parties and then uses a different scholarly approach—namely a processual, peace-studies-oriented methodology—that provides a very different ‘picture’ of the conflict, its parties and appropriate strategies of engagement in the pursuit of peace. The second section of the paper uses three brief case studies to demonstrate how Israeli and Palestinian academics help constitute ‘the conflict’ and its parties not only through their scholarship but also through their ‘practice’. These examples also show the importance of re-evaluating analytical models to include contextual dynamics such as time, place and sources of available power as well as to recognize the diversity of Palestinian and Israeli views regarding the sources of—and best approaches for addressing—‘the conflict’.     

British and American military operations in the Battle of Helmand, 2006–2011

In summer 2006, elements of the British Army were deployed to Helmand province in southern Afghanistan. The US Army followed with a surge in 2009 and 2010. The British and American military forces attempted to construct a counterinsurgency (COIN) approach to win the war in Helmand from 2006 until 2011, but the operational approach implemented was most often that of conventional warfighting. The inability to successfully implement COIN owed not to a lack of will, but rather to short tours, mission command, a lack of available resources, the particular situation on the ground in Helmand and the propensity of the Taliban to launch major conventional operations during much of the period in question.     

Diversity of the Model of Development and the Choice in the Harmonious Development

Since the end of the cold war, the world has undergone extensive, complex and profound changes. The features of such changes are multi -polarization, globalization and diversification. These three features are interconnected and closely linked. They influence each other and promote each other. Muhipolarization, globalization and diversification are still in the process of development, and are therefore fluid and constantly changing. Generally speaking, the development of the world situation is in favour of world peace and stability. But in the process of multi-polarization, globalization and diversification, various unprecedentedly complicated contradictions and new problems crop up, so we still need to jointly and appropriately handle the situation.     

The United States,the Israeli Nuclear Program,and Nonproliferation, 1961–69

As was evident from the intense reaction to Donald Trump’s comments during the 2016 presidential campaign about nuclear proliferation, many analysts believe that the United States has consistently given the goal of nonproliferation a top priority since the beginning of the nuclear age. That conviction, in turn, plays a major role in policy debates among experts in this area. In this article, I show that nonproliferation does not necessarily take precedence over other important US geopolitical interests through a close examination of American policy toward the Israeli nuclear program during the 1960s. Although nonproliferation goals certainly came into play, US officials repeatedly gave priority to other key objectives and, to a real extent, even believed that Israel’s nuclearization could hold certain strategic advantages. This finding, of course, has important theoretical implications for the basic question of whether international politics still works essentially as it did in the pre-nuclear era, as well as for policy debates over nuclear proliferation.     

Sino-Canadian Energy Relations： Opportunities, Challenges and Development Path

Global oil markets are increasingly jittery because of the recent political turbulence in North Africa and the Middle East,prompting China to seek more cooperation with other countries in the field of unconventional energy resources.Considering form the perspective of a hedging strategy,China should expand its cooperation with developed energy-exporting countries.China and Canada are highly complementary in the areas of energy exploration and mutual trade and this provides a broad space for their energy cooperation.However,up until now,this potential has not yet been fully explored,and there have been few substantial achievements in bilateral energy cooperation.Various reasons,including economical and political,can be attributed to this.The Chinese government and enterprises should both make efforts to overcome obstacles and make good use of all advantages to further develop energy cooperation with Canada,so as to realize greater energy politics and economic interests.