Palmerston and Anglo–French Relations, 1846–1865

Conventionally, it was Palmerston's political nemesis, Lord Aberdeen (foreign secretary 1841–46), who brokered an entente cordiale with François Guizot and France in the early 1840s, which the belligerent and unequivocally “English” Palmerston then systematically destroyed when he returned to office in 1846. However, not only is this a distortion of the relationship between Britain and France prior to 1846, it also fails to appreciate the nuances of Palmerston's approach to Anglo–French politics. Naval scares and rhetorical constructions of English and British identities certainly drew Palmerston to adopt aggressive positions towards France on occasion, but against this must be set his close personal ties with leading French statesmen, not least Napoleon III himself, and his desire to maintain peaceful harmonious relations with France in order to free Britain's diplomatic hand elsewhere in the world. Although superficially swinging between extremes of amity and enmity, therefore, Anglo–French relations under Palmerston's guidance were in fact far more cordial and close than has sometimes been allowed.     

Collective memory in Germany and the great foreign policy debate: the case of the European refugee crisis

Abstract

Embedded within the wider normalization–continuity debate about the nature of Germany’s actorness, this article assesses the impact of collective memory on German foreign policy during the European refugee crisis. The Federal Republic’s open-door policy in autumn 2015 bewildered many observers who saw it as a self-harming act of charity. Based on a three-stage empirical framework, the article argues that Germany’s initial behaviour cannot be understood without accounting for the influence that collective memory still exerts in Germany today. The open-door policy was irreconcilable with Germany’s immediate material interests, but instead shaped by collective memory-inspired humanitarian and European principles. This conclusion challenges the growing consensus among students of German foreign policy that Germany is becoming a normal actor which has freed itself from the constraints of the past and behaves in congruence with its material interests. This article seeks to make a timely contribution to the knowledge about collective memory in international relations, Germany’s foreign policy in the specific as well as wider context, and the dynamics of the European refugee crisis.     

“The Human Factor”: French–West German Bilateralism and the “Logic of Appropriateness” in the European Crisis of the Mid-1960s

This analysis reviews a crucial moment in the contemporary political and constitutional history of Western Europe. Prior to the “empty chair crisis” in 1965–1966, an important Franco–West German summit had failed and allowed the French president, Charles De Gaulle, to jeopardise negotiations in the European Economic Community. This analysis not only illustrates the overwhelming importance of Franco–West German bilateralism in the prelude to the crisis, but also analyses the negotiating behaviours of De Gaulle and West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard at the summit of 11–12 June 1965. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Erhard, rather than the allegedly anti-European De Gaulle, doomed the negotiations. Furthermore, this study draws pragmatically on social institutionalism and constructivism to shed light on Erhard’s mental map and identify the relevant considerations in his decision-making and bargaining. Rational choice approaches fail to explain the “human factor” in Erhard’s negotiating behaviour and the mysterious breakdown of Franco–West German entente in summer 1965.     

German crisis management and leadership—from ignorance to procrastination to action

The financial crisis of 2008 and even more so the crisis of the Eurozone drastically increased the demand for decisive leadership and public crisis management. Due to the size of its economy and its position in the global as well as in the European economy, Germany should take the lead in this crisis management. Germany’s management of the two crises differs but also shows strong similarities. A “center-left Grand Coalition” managed the global financial crisis; a global crisis in which Germany was one among several relevant global players. A center-right government under the leadership of the same chancellor then during the sovereign debt crisis manages the Eurozone crisis. This is a regional crisis but with global implications. German government was slow in responding to both crises but acted eventually after some procrastination. Both cases, however, differ with regards to Germany’s actual role in crisis management. During the global financial crisis, other global actors pushed Germany to the forefront. The Eurozone crisis, a regional crisis, demands a leading role of Germany, the largest economy and member state of the EU. The paper, however, argued that the German crisis management with regards to the Eurozone is very much driven by ideas that preserve German norms but do not live up to the challenges of the crisis. Germany’s insistence in its own interests and norms hinders the delivery of a comprehensive crisis management of the Eurozone crisis within the European Union.     

The end of literature and the beginning of praxis: Wagō Ryōichi's Pebbles of Poetry

Abstract

On 16 March 2011, shortly after the hydrogen explosion in the third nuclear block, Wagō Ryōichi (1968–), a poet who has lived in Fukushima for decades, started using Twitter as an alternative method for his action poetry. The tweets from his nearly desolate hometown immediately gained public reception, spreading all across the country and beyond, being compiled into an anthology titled Shi no tsubute (Pebbles of poetry). This study examines the flood of words he posted during the critical post-earthquake turmoil, aiming to conceive them as radically redefining (albeit temporarily) the quotidian that has long been institutionalized during the country's recent history. Despite their later publication in book forms, Wagō's tweets initially circulated more like graffiti than printed books, being a more fundamentally contingent form of writing than his previously printed letters. Epitomizing the bio-sociological conditions (or what Karatani Kōjin calls ‘singularities’) arising from the intensified experience immediately following the Fukushima incident, Wagō's scribbles on the internet bear much resemblance to Terayama Shūji's mobilization of street epic in the 1960s–70s, or, more theoretically, Bergson's conception of evolution as multiplicity arising from intense temporality. His graffiti praxis is itself a renewed ethics, sharing the spirit of the-end-of-literature discourses by Karatani and others since the 1980s.     

Comments on James L. Gelvin's “Al-Qaeda and Anarchism: A Historian's Reply to Terrorology”

The article deals with the intellectual and philosophical background of Sartre's thought, which made him susceptible to the influence of left-wing totalitarian structures in general and to left-wing terrorism in particular. Consequently it is argued that Sartre's identification with Stalinism in his younger years, and his later sympathies with the infamous German Baader-Meinhof terrorist gang, were more than mere expressions of his personality, but rather part and parcel of his special blend of existentialism and philosophy. At the end of the article, Sartre's position in this matter is contrasted with the position of another existentialist French thinker, Sartre's contemporary, Albert Camus.     

Brockdorff-Rantzau and the Struggle for a Just Peace

Weimar Germany’s first foreign minister, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, presented the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 with a pamphlet of detailed German counterproposals to the peace terms. In a concise cover letter, which was translated into English by the author of the article, the experienced diplomat Brockdorff-Rantzau put forward his most convincing arguments for a fair settlement at Versailles. Though the counterproposals were ultimately rejected, this rare document represents one of the only direct attempts at negotiation that took place between Germany and the Allied powers. This article analyzes Brockdorff-Rantzau’s style of negotiation in order to discern whether the German government’s hopes for a balanced settlement were based on naiveté or cynicism. By outlining three coherent themes in his writings—anger/defensiveness, compromise, and the rule of law—this paper argues that Brockdorff-Rantzau’s words are indicative of a more cynical motivation behind his seemingly perspicuous arguments.     

The Personalization(s) of Politics: Israel, 1949–2003

The relationship between the United States and Iran has had an important influence on world affairs during the past two decades. Accordingly, the U.S. news media have an instrumental role in portraying U.S.‐Iran relations to the public. The Iranian Revolution and hostage crisis of 1979–1981, the TWA hijacking of 1985, the Irangate controversy of 1986–1987, and the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991 are examples of important media events that have impacted public opinion regarding U.S. policy toward Iran. This research analyzes government and print media portrayals of the Reagan administration's U.S.‐Iran policy during Irangate. Results supported the prediction that the print media would fulfill their “watchdog” function by providing more critical portrayals of the United States' policy toward Iran than the Tower Commission Report, an investigative document published by President Reagan's Special Review Board. Among the three leading newspapers analyzed, there was significant diversity in the reporting of U.S.‐Iran relations. Results indicate the Reagan administration's attempt to “spin” its version of Irangate did not successfully pressure the media to neglect their watchdog role. Although the Tower Commission Report was less critical of U.S. policy toward Iran than the print media, all four print media sources portrayed the Reagan administration's policy as a flawed approach that degenerated into trading arms for hostages. Implications of these findings for future research are discussed.     

Kawabata and cinema: the ambivalence of knowledge,medium, and influence

Abstract

Many researchers have considered the involvement of Kawabata Yasunari in cinema and the medium's possible influence on his literature. Such approaches, however, tend to assume a definition of the motion pictures as visuality or montage that then influences Kawabata instead of first considering Kawabata's own conception of cinema, his own film theory. By analyzing his writings on film, including his film criticism, short stories involving cinema, and his involvement in the film A Page of Madness, this paper outlines Kawabata's conception of cinema and argues that he developed a portrait of cinema that posed it as a challenge to identity, perception and knowledge itself. Often associated with the female body, the movies became to Kawabata both an object of fascination and a threat, something ultimately to be controlled through literature and the literary subject. What influenced his literature was then perhaps this perception of cinema as posing an epistemic crisis. It is his ambivalence towards this challenge that can serve as a key for elaborating on Kawabata's complicated location within prewar modernism.     

Talleyrand and England, 1792–1838: A Reinterpretation

Talleyrand fascinated his contemporaries and later historians alike on account of his wit, style, and epigrams, and perhaps even his policies. Talleyrand drifted across the Channel many times, and so did his policy towards Britain. This article examines his mission to London, 1792–94, and his later attitude towards Britain during the Napoleonic and Restoration periods. In so doing it seeks to demythologise Talleyrand's role as the founder of the Entente Cordiale. His policy, like the Entente itself, was based on ideals rather than realities.     

Kawabata's views of language and the postwar construction of a literary genealogy

Abstract

This paper shows the ways in which, in the immediate post-war period (1945–1951), Kawabata Yasunari (1899–1972) reflected on his earlier, pre-war literary career and re-envisioned his postwar literary trajectory by constructing a new genealogy of the modern novel in Japan, in relationship to the intricate issues of the literary styles of the modern novel, ‘national language’ (kokugo), and the literary tradition. By examining his Shin bunshō tokuhon (New Guide to Literary Language, 1950), which presents Kawabata's past and present views of literary language, I will argue that Kawabata's changing views of language and literary style must be understood in the context of contemporary debates over national language policy and language reform movements. I will show the manner by which Kawabata formulated his views of language in dialogue with his two rival writers: Yokomitsu Riichi (1898–1947) in the prewar period and Tanizaki Junichirō (1886–1965) in the postwar period. As we shall see, the death of his close literary colleague Yokomitsu in 1947 and Tanizaki's unflagging literary exploration during and following the war prompted Kawabata to position himself in a genealogy of modern Japanese literary writers as well as in relationship to the linguistic and literary tradition of Japan.     

Questioning western universality: Sōseki's Theory of Literature and his novel Kusamakura

Focusing on the relation between the literary theory and the novels of modern Japanese writer Natsume Sōseki (1867–1916), this article argues that we need to include more ‘non-Western’ theories in the discussions of world literature. Furthermore, it concludes that a world literature contextualization of Sōseki's theory helps explain how his novels critically negotiate the influences from Western literature in Japan. By comparing Sōseki's theoretical and literary writing, this article shows continuity between his Theory of Literature and his novel Kusamakura, arguing that both question Western universality in defining literature. In other words, the comparison stresses Sōseki's continued preoccupation with understanding the transformation of literatures due to global interaction. During the modern period, such transformation was probably nowhere more conspicuous than in Meiji Japan, where not only society but also its literature was rapidly changing.     

“Only the USSR Has… Clean Hands”: The Soviet Perspective on the Failure of Collective Security and the Collapse of Czechoslovakia, 1934–1938 (Part 2)

The second part of this two part essay focuses on the Czechoslovak crisis in 1938, based on papers from the Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii in Moscow and the recently published journals of Soviet ambassador in London, Ivan M. Maiskii. The essay is also grounded in British, French, and Romanian archives, and the standard document collections, including the American and German series. The Soviet Union did all that it could do, given Anglo-French abdication, to help the Czechoslovak goverment defend its independance against Nazi Germany. The British and French portrayed a manipulative Soviet Union, seeking to abandon treaty commitments to Czechoslovakia, while at the same time they fled from obligations to Prague and projected their own evasions onto Moscow. In spite of everything, the Czechoslovak president, Edvard Bene?, might have held the fate of his country in his own hands. Would he do “something crazy”, would Czechoslovakia fight alone at the outset, hoping that public opinion would force France and Great Britain into war? Tragically, Bene? would not bid va banque and indeed was complicit in the Anglo-French abandonment of his country. By its reckoning, the Soviet Union escaped the crisis with “clean hands”, though a clear conscience was no consolation in Moscow, where the government had to contemplate the ruin of collective security and its own isolation in Europe.     

The Rhetoric of Appeasement: Hitler's Legitimation and British Foreign Policy, 1938–39

Few grand strategies have been more scrutinized than Britain's decision to appease Nazi Germany. From 1933 to 1938, Britain eschewed confrontation and attempted to settle German demands. However in the five months following the negotiations at Munich, the British abandoned appeasement and embraced a policy of confronting the German state. The roots of both appeasement and confrontation can be found in Germany's legitimation strategies. Until the Munich crisis, Adolf Hitler justified Germany's aims with appeals to collective security, equality, and self-determination—norms central to the European system established by the Treaty of Versailles. After Munich, in contrast, German politicians abandoned these legitimation strategies, arguing instead that expansion was justified as a matter of German might, and not international rights. As Britain came to see German demands as illegitimate, so too did they decide this revisionist state was insatiable, impervious to negotiation, and responsive only to the language of force.     

'Not Proficient in Table-Thumping': Sir Ernest Satow at Peking, 1900-1906

Satow's diplomatic career was more multifaceted than the older, often Japan-centred, assessments of his work suggest. His period as minister to China especially has not been given the attention it deserves. His appointment to the Peking legation coincided with one of the most momentous periods in Sino-Western relations in the aftermath of the Boxer crisis of 1900. Satow exercised significant influence on the negotiations which led to the Boxer settlement of September 1901; and he proved to be a shrewd and skilful player in the Great Power competition for influence in China. The last two years of his term at the head of the Peking legation were taken up with steering British diplomacy through the turbulences caused by the Russo-Japanese War.     

A Whiff of Cordite: Theodore Roosevelt and the Transoceanic Naval Arms Race, 1897–1909

Theodore Roosevelt's most enduring contribution to American power and influence in the world was in the promotion and construction of a blue water navy. Although much has been written about Roosevelt's notion of a uniquely American imperial vocation, as well as of his social Darwinist conception of Great Power competition, the priority he awarded to American naval power was based above all on a dispassionate and pessimistic interpretation of the direction of international affairs between 1890 and 1909. Bracketed by the inauguration of German Weltpolitik on the one hand and the Japanese naval triumph at Tsushima on the other, Roosevelt's naval policy was not the product of a romantic imperial imagination but rather of a wholly objective appreciation of the most fundamental imperative of American national security for the near and distant future.     

German–American Intelligence Relations, 1945–1956: New Evidence on the Origins of the BND

Under the 1998 Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released a certain amount of documents relating to a German–American intelligence co-operation that began almost immediately after the German surrender of May 1945; it lasted until 1956 when the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) was founded, today's German foreign and military intelligence service. The Americans assembled, supervised, and largely financed what is often referred to as the “Gehlen organisation,” named after its leader, former Wehrmacht general, Reinhard Gehlen, who was chief of the BND until his retirement in 1968. Whilst the existence of this co-operation had been known since the 1940s, largely due to Soviet subversion and propaganda, very little reliable information and virtually no original source material was available before the release of this, somewhat redacted, material in 2002 and 2007. This article provides a sketch of how former Wehrmacht officers, and even a number with an ominous SS past, who might well have been war criminals, came to work, first for United States military intelligence and, from 1949, for the CIA. It looks at some of their operations during those turbulent post-war years, which include the Berlin airlift and German rearmament in response to the Korean War. The potential of those newly declassified documents, unfortunately, cannot be corroborated from other sources as long as German and Russian archives remain closed. Despite its manifold limitations, this material provides an exciting window into transatlantic intelligence history.     

Brazil and the league council crisis of 1926

In 1926, the League of Nations faced a serious crisis over the proposed entry of Germany. On this decision appeared to depend the success of the Locarno treaties and the future peace of Europe. To everyone's surprise German entry was blocked, not by a vengeful European power, but by Brazil. Although it was assumed that Brazil was being manipulated, in fact it had been following its own agenda at Geneva for years, and its veto was more of an unfortunate coincidence than deliberate malice. This article unravels the crisis, and looks more deeply at the failure of statesmen to make the League a truly international organization.     

Herbert Hoover,Anglo–American Relations and Republican Party Politics in the 1920s

Herbert Hoover is often portrayed as a business-centric relatively non-political historical figure. In particular during his time as Commerce Secretary in the administrations of Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge, Hoover is often described as supporting a United States foreign policy that first and foremost served the needs of American corporations. This article attempts to recalibrate that picture by stressing Hoover’s political self-interest as a motivating factor in his policies. Far from being politically unconcerned, Hoover was a man desperate to become president of the United States. His disastrous campaign for the Republican nomination in 1920 made him doubly determined to use his power in the Republican cabinets to improve his chances for the nomination later. This can be seen in one of the most famous of Hoover’s foreign policy interventions, the Anglo-American rubber crisis. Far from serving the needs of American business, during this crisis Hoover was acting mostly from political self-interest. In particular attacking the British allowed him to reframe his image, which was seen as Anglophiliac in 1920. In the end it was a very successful rebranding, as Hoover was able to run for the presidency in 1928 from a position of strength when it came to foreign affairs.