The Secret Agent,International Policing,and Anarchist Terrorism: 1900–1914

An unprecedented expansion of global anti-terrorist policing took place after 1900, although the security forces projected outside their borders by Russia, Italy, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain, and Argentina displayed an enormous diversity in size and effectiveness. Crucial to successful policing was how these countries improved their intelligence through recruiting and handling informers, maintained secrecy and good relations with local police, and handled the media. The British approach to anarchist control was arguably the most successful. Italian international policing was the most far-reaching, while the United States long remained the world's most under-policed large country. On examination, the view that anti-anarchist policing was a case of conservative imperial regimes versus the Western democracies loses validity. During this period, a general trend saw the transfer of anarchist surveillance from the hands of diplomats into those of interior ministry officials and the police, all in the name of greater centralization, professionalization, and efficiency.     

“We Can't be more Russian than the Russians”: British Policy During the Liman von Sanders Crisis, 1913–1914

This article examines British policy in the Liman von Sanders crisis, which arose between Germany and Russia in late 1913. It takes issue with recent arguments that Britain was too closely bound to the Dual Alliance of France and Russia, that concern for her Indian empire determined her foreign policy, and that the Anglo-German cooperation in 1912 and 1913 was a hollow détente. Britain played an important role in resolving the crisis, by restraining an erratic Russian policy and appealing to Germany to make concessions. Moreover, Britain was the dominant power in the entente and influenced French restraint in this crisis. This served Britain's interests in Turkey, which aimed at the strengthening of that state. Finally, the resolution of the crisis demonstrated a functioning international system, based on alliances and the Concert of Europe, not a system on the verge of collapse into war.     

“Only the USSR Has … Clean Hands”: The Soviet Perspective on the Failure of Collective Security and the Collapse of Czechoslovakia, 1934–1938 (Part 1)

The first part of this two part essay is a re-examination of the Czechoslovak crisis (1934–1938) based on papers from the Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii in Moscow. The essay is also grounded in British, French, and Romanian archives and the standard published collections, including the American and German series. It is about the development and conduct of Soviet collective security policy in the key years leading to the “Munich crisis” in September 1938. Evidence from the Moscow archives demonstrates that the Soviet government was serious about collective security and that it was ready to participate in an anti-Nazi alliance. Its initiatives were repeatedly rebuffed in Europe, notably in Paris and London. Even in Prague, the Czechoslovak president, Eduard Bene?, was an undependable ally. These rebuffs led the Soviet government to be cautious during the Munich crisis. The Soviet Union would not act unilaterally, but what it actually did do was intended to defend Czechoslovak security within the constraints of Anglo–French abandonment in which Bene?? himself was complicit.     

Bargaining,Fear, and Denial: Explaining Violence Against Civilians in Iraq 2004–2007

From mid-2004 to mid-2007, the Iraq war was distinguished from other comparable insurgencies by its high rates of civilian victimization. This has been attributed to a number of different factors, including the role of Islamic fundamentalist groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq as well as the regional ambitions of Iran and Syria. Using an unpublished dataset of violence in Iraq from 2003–2008 from the Iraq Body Count (IBC), this paper argues that the violence against civilians is best understood as a combination of three interacting logics—bargaining, fear, and denial—that are predominantly local in character. First, armed Iraqi actors bargained through violence both across and within sectarian communities, and were driven by mechanisms of outbidding and outflanking to escalate their attacks on civilians. Second, the pervasive fear about the future of the Iraqi state encouraged the “localization” of violence in Iraq, particularly in the emergence of a security dilemma and the proliferation of criminal and tribal actors. Finally, Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq played the spoiler in Iraq, using mass-casualty attacks to generate fear among the population and deny U.S. efforts to build a functioning state. Only by addressing each of these three logics as part of its counter-insurgency strategy can the U.S. put an end to violence against civilians and develop the Iraqi state into a credible competitor for the loyalties of the population.     

“Trade with the Devil”: Rubber,Cold War Embargo,and US–Indonesian Relations, 1951–1956

This article examines the issue of rubber in US–Indonesian relations in the 1950s. Indonesia, attempting to promote its economic development, sought to sell natural rubber to the Communist People's Republic of China. In so doing, it risked alienating the United States, which for its part led anti-PRC trade embargo efforts while at that same time attempting to woo Third World neutrals such as Indonesia. The article explores the course and complexities of this issue on both sides, and concludes that, in the end, Washington decided that enforcing an increasingly questionable rubber embargo was not worth a rupture in relations with Jakarta. It also finds that President Eisenhower, although keenly aware of the issues at stake, did not provide the decisive leadership that would allow Washington to take the initiative, rather than react to circumstances, regarding the sale of rubber to the People's Republic of China.     

Allies at War in Afghanistan: Anglo–American Friction over Aerial Poppy Eradication, 2004–2007

From 2004 to 2007, the Anglo–American alliance was at the heart of counter-narcotics policy-making in Afghanistan. Despite agreement on the broader direction of strategy, one issue generated significant diplomatic conflict: aerial eradication. The debate over its introduction was extremely controversial within both the Anglo–American alliance and the wider George W. Bush Administration, pitting the State Department and its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs against the Pentagon and the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Both the Pentagon and British bitterly opposed its introduction fearing it would alienate the rural community and ultimately damage the coalition’s hearts and minds campaign. This analysis provides unique coverage of the fraught policy-making process, paying particular attention to how the British opposed aerial eradication, which included conspiring with the Pentagon in an attempt to defeat the policy. This area of the debate is particularly under-researched, yet is significant as Britain was, after all, the G8 lead nation on counter-narcotics.     

“Brighter Futures,Better Times”: Britain,the Empire,and Anglo–American Economic Competition in Cuba, 1898–1920

This article examines Anglo–American economic competition in Cuba in the crucial twenty years after 1898. Anglo–American economic competition on the new island nation suggest a number of things about the nature of British and American imperialism, the difficult position of smaller countries—and economies—like Cuba, and the “inevitability” of American economic pre-eminence in the evolving twentieth century. And as an important corollary to the British dimension of this question is the role that Canada and Canadian overseas investment played in the extension of Britain's economic power and influence in the wider world.     

Terrorist Incidents in India, 1998–2004: A Quantitative Analysis of Fatality Rates

Using data from the University of Maryland's Global Terrorism Database II, this paper first provides information on the nature of terrorist incidents in India in the period 1998-2004: the Indian states that were worst affected by terrorist incidents and fatalities; the terrorist groups responsible for such incidents and their modus operandi. Next, the paper focuses on the issue of fatalities from terrorist incidents. It inquires into the extent to which the number of fatalities following an incident was influenced by the type of attack (bombings, armed assault, etc.) and the extent to which it was influenced by the type of terrorist group. By examining the number of fatalities resulting from terrorist attacks in India, the paper disentangles the influence on this number of attack type and attack group. Lastly, the paper applies Atkinson's concept of equality-adjusted income to terrorism to arrive at the concept of equality-adjusted deaths from terrorist incidents: in order to avoid spectacular incidents resulting in the loss of a large number of lives—as in New York on September 11, 2001 and in Mumbai 26–29 November 2008—“society” might be prepared to tolerate “low-grade” terrorism which resulted in a larger number of deaths in total but avoided a large number of deaths from a single iconic incident.     

“Driven to Tears”: Britain,CS Tear Gas,and the Geneva Protocol, 1969–1975

This analysis considers a controversy over whether the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the treaty prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare, covered CS “tear gas.” Widespread deployment of tear gases by American forces in Vietnam after 1964 attracted much international criticism as many believed the Protocol banned such agents and pressure gradually built on the British government to clarify its interpretative position. Its tabling a disarmament initiative to prohibit production and possession of biological weapons in July 1969 exacerbated the situation, provoking allegations of diverting attention from chemical weapons as a favour to America and the “Special Relationship.” Meanwhile, the outbreak of the “troubles” in Northern Ireland earlier the same year, where British forces also used CS, presented further difficulties. Britain rejected inclusion of CS under the Protocol in February 1970 but wrestled at great length over the decision and its consequences under the Harold Wilson and Edward Heath governments. Largely absent from historical accounts, this episode allows an examination of a complex, convoluted issue that had potentially wide-ranging ramifications for the interpretation of international relations and treaties. Similarly, re-creating confidential inter-departmental decision-making processes, particularly comparing scientific and legal interpretations, the processes of governmental bureaucracy and the role played by civil society demonstrates why an element with little immediate linkage to British overseas affairs proved such a conundrum.     

“A Very Great Clerk”: Sir Ronald Campbell and the Fall Of France,May–June 1940 1

Sir Ronald H. Campbell was the first British ambassador during the Second World War to manage a key bilateral relationship with a wartime ally. When the Germans invaded France in May 1940, Campbell's Embassy was transformed from a diplomatic reporting post into a frontline base that had to brief London not only on the political situation in France but also on strategic military matters. However, the British ambassador would constantly struggle to register his authority in the overall management of the Franco-British relationship, and more often than not, was bypassed by Whitehall departments, special advisors and senior ministers. Campbell only found himself in a more pivotal role as communications between the British and French Governments disintegrated and the latter moved to Bordeaux. It then fell upon Campbell to make some of the most dramatic decisions in twentieth century Franco-British history.     

“I know! I live here”: poor women and the work of empowerment

To trace the effects of empowerment programmes in the Global South, attention needs to be focused on the everyday practices of frontline staff, or fieldworkers, who convey empowerment ideas and practices at the grassroots. This is especially critical when fieldworkers work in the marginalised communities where they also live. Instead of looking outward towards a programme’s outcomes, this article turns inward to examine the impact of women fieldworkers’ dual experiences of development on their decisions and practices in the field. The ethnography of women fieldworkers in a government-led women’s empowerment programme for the poor in Delhi, India reveals the uneasy relationship of women’s empowerment to the larger contradictory development paradigm that they work within. Fieldworkers used their experiences as poor women to meet programme quotas, while also side-lining social change in favour of shielding clients from ineffective programme activities.     

“Only the USSR Has… Clean Hands”: The Soviet Perspective on the Failure of Collective Security and the Collapse of Czechoslovakia, 1934–1938 (Part 2)

The second part of this two part essay focuses on the Czechoslovak crisis in 1938, based on papers from the Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii in Moscow and the recently published journals of Soviet ambassador in London, Ivan M. Maiskii. The essay is also grounded in British, French, and Romanian archives, and the standard document collections, including the American and German series. The Soviet Union did all that it could do, given Anglo-French abdication, to help the Czechoslovak goverment defend its independance against Nazi Germany. The British and French portrayed a manipulative Soviet Union, seeking to abandon treaty commitments to Czechoslovakia, while at the same time they fled from obligations to Prague and projected their own evasions onto Moscow. In spite of everything, the Czechoslovak president, Edvard Bene?, might have held the fate of his country in his own hands. Would he do “something crazy”, would Czechoslovakia fight alone at the outset, hoping that public opinion would force France and Great Britain into war? Tragically, Bene? would not bid va banque and indeed was complicit in the Anglo-French abandonment of his country. By its reckoning, the Soviet Union escaped the crisis with “clean hands”, though a clear conscience was no consolation in Moscow, where the government had to contemplate the ruin of collective security and its own isolation in Europe.     

“Hut ab,” “Promenade with Kamerade for Schokolade,” and the Flying Dutchman: British Soldiers in the Rhineland, 1918–1929

This essay explores the social history of the “British Army of the Rhine,” especially their interactions with the German population, over the eleven-year period of occupation in Cologne and part of the Rhineland. It covers the initial, sometimes fraught establishment of the occupation and interactions with the civil population, especially the perennial problem of British soldiers’ relations with German women. These were initially prohibited altogether, but the rule was quickly relaxed, and the British authorities even accepted and regulated the use of brothels, leading to criticisms back home. The essay also discusses the comparatively small number of serious violent crimes (including four murders) during the occupation, and concludes that the occupation was characterized on both sides by grudging acceptance and some degree of forbearance.     

Being Nuclear on a Budget: Churchill,Britain and “Atoms for Peace,” 1953–1955

This analysis critiques the impact of President Dwight Eisenhower’s 1953 “Atoms for Peace” initiative on Washington’s alliance with Britain, itself a newly crowned nuclear state. Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s taste for personal diplomacy led him to support his friend’s proposal without real consideration for how the contributions of fissionable materials and manpower demanded by the scheme would damage Britain’s overstretched domestic nuclear project. Membership of an international atomic agency allowed Britain to reaffirm its global status whilst depleting the resources needed to develop its native technology. In turn, the article discusses the commercial challenge posed by American nuclear firms and highlights how reactor exports quickly became a contest between the quality of British research and the quantity of American subsidies. In this way, it establishes how “Atoms for Peace” prejudiced both Britain’s domestic nuclear effort and export potential, in turn shedding light on Washington’s relations with an ailing Great Power.