CHINA-U.S. Relations in 2007： Increased Challenges

1. The development of China-U.S. relations in 2007 will be influenced mainly by the following factors: (1) The trend of U.S. economic development; (2) The changes in U.S. domestic politics; (3) the Iraq issue; (4) The Taiwan question; (5) The way China deals with China-U.S. relations.     

Palmerston and Anglo–French Relations, 1846–1865

Conventionally, it was Palmerston's political nemesis, Lord Aberdeen (foreign secretary 1841–46), who brokered an entente cordiale with François Guizot and France in the early 1840s, which the belligerent and unequivocally “English” Palmerston then systematically destroyed when he returned to office in 1846. However, not only is this a distortion of the relationship between Britain and France prior to 1846, it also fails to appreciate the nuances of Palmerston's approach to Anglo–French politics. Naval scares and rhetorical constructions of English and British identities certainly drew Palmerston to adopt aggressive positions towards France on occasion, but against this must be set his close personal ties with leading French statesmen, not least Napoleon III himself, and his desire to maintain peaceful harmonious relations with France in order to free Britain's diplomatic hand elsewhere in the world. Although superficially swinging between extremes of amity and enmity, therefore, Anglo–French relations under Palmerston's guidance were in fact far more cordial and close than has sometimes been allowed.     

Russian–Japanese relations after the Russo-Japanese war in the context of world politics

Abstract

The Treaty of Portsmouth could not solve all the diplomatic problems between Russia and Japan, and dissenting voices were heard in both countries. Nevertheless, Russo-Japanese relations went in the direction of not only normalization, but also building an alliance. That radical change from hostility has not often happened in history and needs careful research, in particular the early stages of this process after the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth. The construction of an alliance was not the primary goal at the beginning of Russo-Japanese negotiations after the war between the two nations. This goal appeared during the process of solving different problems, and so the international situation is extremely important to understand changes in Russo-Japanese relations. This process had several facets. First, there was the deterioration in Anglo-German relations with a corresponding realignment of British policy towards Russia. Second was the resolution of problems in Central Asia between Russia and Great Britain. Third, there was the mutual interests Japan and Russia had in China, in particular rail interests, which were related to the organic unity of the northern part of the Russian railroad in China. Finally, Russia had the desire to keep relations with France as a corner-stone of foreign policy.     

Lord Home and Anglo–American Relations, 1961–1963

This article focuses on the role of Lord Home, the British Foreign Secretary, in the conduct of Anglo–American relations between 1961 and 1963. It studies three controversial policy areas: the newly independent states of Laos and the Congo, along with the debate over the decolonization of British Guiana; the key Cold War issues of Berlin and Cuba; and a variety of nuclear weapons–related matters. It is argued that Home, in constantly striving to maintain the alliance, was more pro-American than Macmillan. He exercised an important restraining and calming influence on the Prime Minister, preventing him from pursuing potentially damaging initiatives. However, the relationship between the two men was strong. Home’s diplomacy usually complimented Macmillan’s interventions and they often worked together.     

New Starting-point,New Challenges Sino——Russian Relations in the New Century

Through almost ten years of development since the independence of the RussianFederation, Sino-Russian relations has achieved remarkable progress withwhich both feel satisfied and won high praise from the international community.Looking forward into the new century, how to further enhance relations betweenBeijing and Moscow and further promote their strategic cooperative partnership soas to make more contributions to the world peace and development are drawing     

EU–Russia Security Relations and the Survey of Russian Federation Foreign Policy: One Year On

Abstract

The Kremlin's change of leadership on 7 May 2008 and growing international fears of Russia's resurgence, especially in the aftermath of the Georgian conflict, make this an interesting time to reflect upon EU–Russia security relations. This article does so by examining closely the Survey of Russian Federation Foreign Policy and, one year on from its approval, drawing upon subsequent developments as preliminary corollary or otherwise of its bearing on policy. On balance, it seems that the Kremlin's evolving perception of Russia and international relations has encouraged revised priorities and objectives and a more forceful foreign policy that not only slow progress in filling the Common Spaces, but also increase the likelihood of Russia–EU competition especially in their shared neighbourhood.     

From Friendship to Patronage: France–Israel Relations, 1958–1967

The article has two main theses: first, that from 1958 to 1967—Charles de Gaulle's presidency—there was a typical patron-client relationship between France and Israel that lasted until the Six Day War. It challenges the frequent claim in the literature that relations between Israel and France did not essentially change after de Gaulle's rise to power. Second, it argues that the basis on which this relationship was founded was rocky from the start since as a client, Israel was not ready to accede to French demands that it restrain its security policy to conform to key French interests.     

Abba Eban and the Development of American–Israeli Relations, 1950–1959

Abba Eban, Israel’s ambassador in Washington and representative at the United Nations from 1950 to 1959, had a central role in the transformation of American–Israeli relations during a period of frequent discord over key strategic issues. This analysis examines the influence of one prominent actor upon bilateral ties that would eventually become the American–Israeli “special relationship.” Eban’s oratory talent, linguistic skills, and effective style of diplomacy augmented both Israel’s image in the view of the American public and relations with official Washington. The article explores several critical elements of these relations during the 1950s, re-examining both Eban’s involvement in events such as Israel’s approach toward the problem of borders, its policy of military retaliation, and the response to severe American pressure following the 1956 Sinai campaign. Whilst not attributing the development of close relations between the two Powers solely to the works of a single individual, evidence suggests that Eban was the right man in the right place and time to provide the necessary foundations for the elevation of American–Israeli relations to “special” in the following decade.     

Austen Chamberlain and Britain's Relations with France, 1924–1929

Several historians have suggested that Austen Chamberlain's Francophile tendencies during his period as foreign secretary between 1924 and 1929 were the defining features of his European diplomatic strategy. By examining four key events: the rejection of the Geneva Protocol, the conclusion of the Treaty of Locarno, the Anglo–French Compromise on disarmament and the negotiation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, this article argues that Chamberlain's relationship with the French was not entirely harmonious. After the high point of Locarno, Britain's relations with France became increasingly tense because of Chamberlain's growing disillusionment with Briand's willingness to pursue a diplomatic agenda that did not have at its heart a reinvigorated Entente Cordiale.     

Oleaginous Diplomacy: Oil,Anglo–American Relations and the Lausanne Conference, 1922–23

There has been considerable controversy as to the significance of oil in the Lausanne Conference of 1922–1923, in particular British attempts to retain Mosul as part of Iraq. However, as this article explores, the conference also had important implications for the composition of the British-registered Turkish Petroleum Company, which was expected to win the Iraqi oil concession. In the first phase of the conference, the United States observer delegation's stance persuaded the British Government to put pressure upon the British companies involved in the TPC to admit American companies upon the latter's terms. Despite this, in the second phase, the Americans supported the Turkish delegation in its opposition to clauses in the proposed Treaty, which would have guaranteed the rights of the TPC, and forced a British compromise on the issue. The Lausanne Conference played a significant role in the Anglo–American “oil war” of the inter-war period.     

International cooperation in exchange‐rate management: Coordination of U.S. and Japanese intervention, 1977–1990

What are the determinants of international cooperation in exchange‐rate management? To answer this question, coordination of foreign exchange intervention by the United States and Japan from 1977 to 1990 is analyzed. An examination of the data raises two empirical puzzles: (1) Why do the periods of active intervention and high cooperation coincide?; (2) Why does Japan intervene unilaterally more often than the United States? Some hypotheses drawn from various theories of cooperation are tested, but none of them receive strong support. Instead, intervention volume and learning by U.S. administrations account for the variance in coordination. These findings resolve the two puzzles: (1) The periods of active intervention are the time of high need for cooperation; (2) Japan is obliged to intervene unilaterally while the United States is learning to cooperate.     

Saving the league: V.K. Wellington Koo,the league of nations and Sino‐Japanese conflict, 1931–39

In 1919, VK. Wellington Koo, the most famous Chinese diplomat of the early twentieth century, participated in the creation of the League of Nations at the Paris Peace Conference. Little over a decade later, as Japanese forces expanded into Manchuria and North China, Koo struggled to save the League he had helped found. He argued that inability or refusal to brand Japan as an aggressor would sound the League's death knell. In vain, Koo tried to convince European statesmen that the Far Eastern Crisis was a litmus test of the League's viability as a collective security organization. From 1936 on, League inaction in the face of Japanese, German and Italian expansion left Koo thoroughly disillusioned. The lessons of the League were not forgotten during World War II, when Koo argued that a more effective collective security organization, in the form of the United Nations, be created on a basis similar to Franklin D. Roosevelt's Four Policemen concept.