Two-Level Negotiations and U.S. Foreign Policy: The Failure of the Johnson Plan for the Palestinian Refugees, 1961–1962

The Kennedy administration sought to resolve the Palestine refugee problem in 1961–62 with a plan for compensation, resettlement, or repatriation under the formal auspices of the United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission and negotiated by UN special envoy Dr. Joseph Johnson. The negotiations failed and the plan was canceled by the administration in December 1962. The article utilizes a multi-level conceptual model which examines the links between interstate negotiation, domestic politics and boundary-crossing interactions between foreign states and non-state domestic actors and their impact on foreign policy. It analyzes the multi-level negotiations that were conducted between representatives of the governments of Israel and the United States regarding the Johnson proposals, discussions held between Israel representatives and American Jewish leaders and prominent Jewish individuals, and between American government representatives and these same Jewish leaders and individuals. The study analyzes the factors that contributed to the failure of the plan and illustrates the nexus between foreign policy and domestic politics and the role of non-state actors in foreign policy decision making.     

Why the U.S. Military Budget is ‘Foolish and Sustainable’

What defense budget the United States should have and what defense budget it can afford are separate questions. The debate raging in Washington about Pentagon spending ignores the distinction. Doves insist that we need a more modest military strategy because the current one is wasteful and economically unsustainable. Hawks say that the current approach is sensible and affordable. This article takes a third path, arguing that U.S. military policy is likely to remain extravagant because it is sustainable. We adopted our current strategy—which amounts to trying to run the world with the American military—because we could, not because it was wisest. Wealth and safety make the consequences of bad defense policy abstract for most U.S. taxpayers. So we buy defense like rich people shop, ignoring the balance of costs and benefits. We conflate ideological ambition with what is required for our safety. Unfortunately, the current political demand for austerity and fewer wars will only temporarily restrain our military spending and the ambitions it underwrites.     

The impact of the Iraqi Crisis on the transatlantic link. A summary of views on the US–EU and US–NATO relationship

Lithuania's security orientation has evolved significantly since 1991. It has moved from prioritising Baltic and, then, Nordic, cooperation to focusing on partnership with Poland, and seeking NATO and European Union membership. Initially re‐buffed by both, Lithuania has gradually sought to strengthen its de facto ties with NATO and WEU, and to build up its economic ties with the EU and its member states, in the belief that this provided a form of ‘soft’ security, and prepared the way for eventual membership of NATO and the EU.     

A Review of: “Joshua Alexander Geltzer. U.S. Counter-Terrorism Strategy and al-Qaeda: Signalling and the Terrorist World-View.”

Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1987. Pp. xxii + 238.

Leonard Weinberg and William Lee Eubank, The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism. London and Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987. Pp.155.

Robin Erica Wagner‐Pacifici, The Moro Morality Play: Terrorism as Social Drama. London and Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1986. Pp.360.

Leonardo Sciascia, The Moro Affair. London: Carcanet Press, 1987. Pp.175.     

The Changes of the U. S. and the Constraints It Facing

The war in Iraq is coming to an end, and the military actions are giving place to the reconstructions of that country's political, economic and social systems. This war marks a major event in international rela     

Models of Crisis Decision Making and the 1990–91 Gulf War

The 1991 Persian Gulf War is a “most likely” case for several crisis decision-making models. It commanded presidential attention, arose when bureaucrats were fighting over post-Cold War budgets, and evoked the strong organizational cultures of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. We use this case to assess the contexts, decision stages, and issue areas in which alternative crisis models have the most explanatory power. We find that presidents are most powerful in agenda setting, choosing among options, crises, and high-politics issues. Bureaucratic politics diminishes in crises and best explains the behavior of mid-level careerists, the formulation of options, and the shaping of post-war budgets. Most striking, even in crises organizational cultures strongly shape tactical military decisions, choices among weapons systems, and the willingness of officials to risk their careers on behalf of their organizations’ values. Overall, these findings argue for greater attention to the influence of organizational cultures in crises.     

A Crisis of Empire: The Anglo–Ottoman Dispute Over the Aden Frontier, 1901–1905

The crises which accompanied the rise and decline of the European empires have not been the object of systematic study in the manner of superpower crises of the Cold War period. Many of the techniques used to study Cold War crises have broader scope, including the models of governmental politics and organisational process developed by Graham Allison. The application of the Allison models to the events surrounding the delimitation of the Aden frontier between 1901 and 1905 illuminates significant aspects of the Anglo–Ottoman confrontation: they explain the manner in which non-rational elements in the policy-making process transformed a relatively insignificant issue into a crisis situation. Such insights also require a detailed examination of the documentary record which in this instance reveals the discord amongst British policy-makers and the organisational imperfections of the bureaucracy. The frontier Commissioners, the Aden Resident, the Government of India, the metropolitan government in London and the embassy in Constantinople were involved in a series of factional squabbles over the Aden frontier, the resolution of which often required the coercion of the Ottomans by the deployment of warships along the Yemen coast. Coordination amongst these different elements in the bureaucracy also played a role in generating tensions between London and Constantinople. The case of the Anglo–Ottoman dispute over the Aden frontier suggests that the analysis of internal governmental politics and organisational processes can be applied successfully to crises of empire which predate the Cold War era.     

Crisis leadership and non‐communication: Marcos of the philippines

For all of their centralized power and undisputed authority, even crisis leaders are susceptible to breakdowns in political communication. This is particularly significant when martial rule or a state of emergency—most effective when of short duration— becomes open‐ended; the sense of urgency no longer prevails.

In the initial stage of proclaiming a constitutional emergency it is perhaps easiest to create an atmosphere of crisis and to promote a collective sense of danger. A climate of national fear and insecurity, in turn, enables the constitutional dictator to mobilize broad support even for draconian measures imposed at the expense of individual freedoms. With the prolongation of the emergency, however, and the institutionalization of crisis government, certain immunities to authoritarianism do begin to surface. As suggested by periods of prolonged emergency rule in India and South Korea, the leader becomes remote and isolated; he or she no longer feels quite so compelled to communicate; domestic opposition increases.

The experience of President Marcos and the Philippines since 1972 illustrates some of the political dynamics of the modern, permanent “emergency state.” What has happened to the New Society program of reforms should help in understanding the critical link of communication between leaders and their followers under conditions of either real or manipulative domestic political stress.     

Features of the International Situation in 2005 As Seen from the U. N.Reform

In 2005, when the United Nations was celebrating the 60th anniversary of its birth, a new upsurge of reform started. Although results of the reform were insignificant, it had caused a fluctuating change of events on international scene. In the course of a…     

Sidelights of a Meeting with the President of India Dr. A P J Abdul Kalam

(In the afternoon of May 3, 2006, Mr. AiPing, Council Member and Mr. Ji Ping,Associate Research Fellow of the ChineseAssociation for International Understanding calledon Indian President APJ. Abdul Kalam inRasthrapati Bhavan, New Delhi.)“Welcome to the R…     

Progressivism Armed? Reform and the Origins of the Modern U.S. Military

During the four decades before World War I, both the United States Army and the United States Navy underwent a massive transformation. What had been a frontier constabulary in 1880 became a world class army in 1918. What had been a hodgepodge of obsolete vessels in the 1880s emerged as a force second only to the Royal Navy during the same period. This article discusses the factors that help account for this remarkable change.     

Crisis studies and the near east: The cases of Lebanon and Cyprus†

This paper is about the relationship between foreign trade and national power in the contemporary Asia Pacific. Imports and exports among the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Community) members are studied over time in order to assess the extent to which this trade has evolved in ways which ceteris paribus provide the larger trading states with more or less leverage to influence the smaller ones. We offer a conceptual discussion of conditions that are likely to shape the incentives to actually use such leverage and, if actually exercised, the prospects that such attempts may succeed. A pattern analysis of trade in the Asia Pacific then follows from which we conclude that the smaller non‐Latin American APEC countries have diversified their trading partners recently and thus reduced their exposure to leverage based on asymmetric dependence in their trade relations. At the same time, we expect from our conceptual discussion that the larger APEC countries are generally more likely to exercise self restraint than to use trade to extract gains on other issues.     

The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy

Coercive diplomacy has long been seen as a viable alternative to war by political decision-makers. There is, however, a long line of credible academic and policy critique—stretching back to the Cold War—that asserts the failures of coercion almost always overwhelm its benefits. Our examination of the 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani crisis supports the overall analytical consensus that coercive methods, under certain circumstances, accomplish little. We discover that India's use of coercive diplomacy was severely hobbled because of Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons, strong Pakistani conventional forces, and other geopolitical realities that strongly favored Pakistan. Despite careful attempts by Indian elites to apply the principles of “forceful persuasion” to end the crisis on terms favorable to India (the stronger power in the dispute), the Indian strategy failed to accomplish most of its objectives. Our analysis thereby exposes the limits of coercion and compellance for solving chronic territorial and ideological disputes between enduring rivals.     

The arms race noninteraction puzzle: The effects of concept choice and measurement error on the estimation of the U.S.‐U.S.S.R. arms race

The continuing failure to find interaction in the U.S.‐U.S.S.R. arms race remains a puzzle. In this analysis the effects of concept choice and measurement error on the estimation of a Richardson‐type model of the U.S.‐U.S.S.R. arms race is examined. Employing a multiple indictor model, it is demonstrated that significant random and systematic measurement error exists. The use of military expenditures as an indicator of economic burden is shown to generate severe statistical problems. Lastly, it is demonstrated that the lack of fit of typical single indicator models is more a measurement error problem than a model specification problem.