从战争到战争:论一战对二战的影响

本文以第一次世界大战与第二次世界大战的战争本质中的共同点为基础展开讨论。这两场战争都是大规模的工业化战争,均历经过度的、失控的暴力、死亡和破坏。它们不仅见证了包括新技术和强大武器在内的军事方法和战争手段的发展,也见证了全面的扩张,或者说是战争向人类生活各个领域的越界(Entgrenzung)。在两次世界大战中,扩张或者侵略的概念已经延伸并超越总体战的概念范畴。如果忽略德国记忆的存在和对大战争的解读,只谈第二次战争是绝对不全面的,20世纪30年代的德国社会目睹了——一代人的——第一次世界大战的异化,即一战逐渐失去了在记忆中的重要位置。随后的世界大战用大规模屠杀、破碎的档案和巨大的破坏强化了该进程。更多的受害者,特别是平民百姓的死难,对六百万欧洲犹太人的谋杀使这场规模宏大的暴力的越界达到了巅峰,这一切都使第一次世界大战似乎成了第二次世界大战的灾难的序曲。     

伊拉克战争与世界政治主要矛盾

本文以当前的伊拉克战争为案例 ,从梳理冷战后美国战略家的认识入手 ,对当今世界政治主要矛盾进行了初步论证。认为 ,在全球化纵深发展的今天 ,谈论“世界政治”比“国际政治”更有意义。由于世界政治包含“国际政治”和“超国际政治”两个范畴 ,因此当今世界是两对主要政治矛盾并存。一对是传统国际政治范畴里的称霸与反霸 (或单极与多极 )的矛盾 ,矛盾双方分别是美国与多强 ;另一对是超国际政治范畴里的各国联合应对全球性难题的矛盾 ,当前主要集中在恐怖与反恐这对矛盾上。伊拉克战争使两对矛盾空前激化并相互重叠 ,导致世界战略格局出现强力颠簸。在这两对矛盾中 ,中国都不是焦点 ,这是中国战略机遇期得以保持的根本前提     

The Tragedy of Liberalism How Globalization Caused the First World War

The belief that globalization enhances peace, a central tenet of liberal theory, enjoys substantial support in recent scholarship on trade and conflict. To conclude that liberalism is right, however, is premature and wrong. Liberal theory is not sufficiently grounded in international trade theory to show how globalization generates constraints on military force, nor does it adequately link these constraints to strengthened peace. This article uses the Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade to connect globalization's economic effects to increased constraints on military force and then explores how, in the nineteenth century, globalization affected European peace. As liberal theory predicts, globalization generated substantial constraints on military force in prewar Europe. Yet there are important flaws in liberalism's logic linking these constraints to strengthened international peace. Contrary to liberal theory, globalization did not strengthen prospects for peace in prewar Europe but was a major cause of the First World War.     

Rage of Honor: Entente Indignation and the Lost Chance for Peace in the First World War

Why the First World War ended in 1918 and not earlier remains a major puzzle. We propose a new theory that emphasizes how honor prolongs wars beyond what rationalist theories can explain. It argues that when honor is insulted, an affronted actor will strive to punish the offender. Absent an apology, the pursuit of a satisfactory punishment leads the affronted belligerent to ignore unfavorable battlefield information, hold logically irreconcilable beliefs, process information in emotional terms, and obsess over status. We predict that wars of prevention and territorial occupation are most likely to elicit honor considerations. We test our argument against an obscure episode in the war where Germany and the United States made peace overtures in December 1916. We demonstrate that honor concerns made Entente decision makers see German aggression as an affront to their honor that only the destruction of Germany's political regime could redress.     

The First World War as Catalyst and Epiphany: The Case of Henry P. Davison

The experience of the First World War was central to the emergence of a trans-Atlantic elite committed to close collaboration and an international alliance, either formal or de facto, between Great Britain and the United States. The reactions to the conflict of Henry P. Davison, dominant partner in J. P. Morgan and Company, illustrate the manner in which the First World War was catalytic in the creation of an Atlanticist elite. Davison, moreover, experienced something like a personal epiphany during the war, metamorphosing from a hard-driving businessman into an international philanthropist who developed ambitious schemes to remake the world. For seven years, Davison energetically sought to affect the course, outcome, and consequences of the First World War. Fundamental to Davison's worldview were the desirability and necessity of Anglo-American collaboration, on which all his other plans were predicated. When the war ended, Davison proposed almost visionary schemes, on the one hand to provide massive American governmental and private economic assistance to finance European postwar relief and reconstruction efforts and, on the other, to establish an international Red Cross organization that would mount a massive campaign to eradicate global public health problems. Although abortive in the short term, in the longer run his plans proved prophetic, anticipating the post-Second World War Marshall Plan and World Health Organization.     

The First World War as Catalyst and Epiphany: The Case of Henry P. Davison

The experience of the First World War was central to the emergence of a trans-Atlantic elite committed to close collaboration and an international alliance, either formal or de facto, between Great Britain and the United States. The reactions to the conflict of Henry P. Davison, dominant partner in J. P. Morgan and Company, illustrate the manner in which the First World War was catalytic in the creation of an Atlanticist elite. Davison, moreover, experienced something like a personal epiphany during the war, metamorphosing from a hard-driving businessman into an international philanthropist who developed ambitious schemes to remake the world. For seven years, Davison energetically sought to affect the course, outcome, and consequences of the First World War. Fundamental to Davison's worldview were the desirability and necessity of Anglo–American collaboration, on which all his other plans were predicated. When the war ended, Davison proposed almost visionary schemes, on the one hand to provide massive American governmental and private economic assistance to finance European postwar relief and reconstruction efforts and, on the other, to establish an international Red Cross organization that would mount a massive campaign to eradicate global public health problems. Although abortive in the short term, in the longer run his plans proved prophetic, anticipating the post–Second World War Marshall Plan and World Health Organization.     

The Revitalization of Diplomatic History: Renewed Reflections

Diplomacy is one of the oldest human institutions, with diplomatic records dating back to some of the earliest civilizations. At present, the methods and content of diplomatic history have much to offer modern scholars, but the field as a whole suffers from being out of step, philosophically, with the mainstream of historical and political-scientific study. The departure of diplomatic history from the philosophical mainstream both of political science and of history in general has left the field in dire straits. Fallen from its former grace, diplomatic history requires a new vision: not a groundbreaking, original vision, but a vision informed by previous generations, adapting their foundational principles to the ideals and demands of the twenty-first century academy. It is thus not only the Grand Tradition itself, but its ethos that must be preserved, in order to retain the distinguishing character and methods of diplomatic and military history as independent, politically moderate academic disciplines, regardless of their reputation among neighboring fields.     

The Alliance Politics of Concerted Accommodation: Entente Bargaining and Italian and Ottoman Interventions in the First World War

This article examines the challenges allies face in coordinating diplomatic efforts to accommodate and peel off their main enemy's potential allies. It elucidates the key dimensions, and the underlying coordination dynamics, of this problem of “concerted accommodation,” and it develops propositions about the conditions that shape the efficacy of such efforts. The argument links allies’ strength to their divergent or convergent assessments of the target state's ability to tip the war toward victory or defeat. Divergent assessments foster weak allied efforts that are likely to fail, but when allies agree that the target is a potential “war-tipper,” they will support their concerted accommodation policy with more robust cooperation that is more likely to work. The causal arguments and mechanisms are examined in a paired comparison analysis of two First World War cases: the Entente's efforts to induce (1) Ottoman neutrality and (2) Italian intervention.     

论一战前后西伯利亚大铁路在俄国对外战略中的地位

西伯利亚大铁路的修筑改变了东北亚国家的地缘关系,是列强在东北亚地区利用铁路开展竞争的滥觞。一战前,沙皇俄国利用铁路推行扩张政策;一战后,苏维埃俄国在重构东方发展环境过程中仍须倚重西伯利亚大铁路。俄国政权的更迭并没阻碍西伯利亚大铁路战略地位的延续。     

We Cannot Go On: Disruptive Innovation and the First World War Royal Navy

Insights from Disruptive Innovation theory (DI) are often used in the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of national security policy. DI explains why successful companies are sometimes defeated by new competitors with relatively unsophisticated products. Although DI is highly influential in the business literature, its applicability to military doctrine has not been persuasively shown. Proposed here is a more abstract and general version of DI, which improves its foundations, adapts it to militaries, and suggests a framework for the reliable identification of disruptive innovations. This new theory is tested by examining the Royal Navy before and during World War I and evaluating how well it explains the Royal Navy's success at developing Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) to protect the battlefleet from submarine attacks and the near failure at implementing convoy tactics to protect merchant shipping. This generalized version of DI successfully explains several key features of the case.     

后冷战时期日本亚洲外交的布局

进入新世纪以来日本的亚洲外交可以概括为:小泉强化日美同盟为"基轴"的外交安保战略使日本的亚洲外交陷入死胡同;安倍的"价值外交""新基轴"虽然表现出一些灵活性,但没有脱离小泉时期的外交实质。福田康夫上台,可能意味着小泉-安倍亚洲外交路线的终结,但日本的亚洲外交布局总是取决于其国内的政治走向的。     

二战后联邦德国的俄罗斯历史研究——曼弗雷德·希尔德麦尔教授来华讲学纪要

德国哥廷根大学曼弗雷德·希尔德麦尔（Manfred Hildermeier）教授2009年5月19日在中国社会科学院世界历史研究所、5月20日在苏州科技大学历史文化学院作了题为《二战后联邦德国的俄罗斯历史研究》的学术报告,现将报告主要内容译成中文予以发表。     

伊战凸显国际形势变化中的宗教因素

自2003年3月23日美国发动伊拉克战争迄今已历四年。四年来,美国软硬实力、内政外交因为这场战争而发生了什么样的变化?国际战略形势又随之出现了哪些变迁?对中国而言,加速发展的战略机遇期是否还将持续?伊拉克战争本身又带来哪些启示?围绕这些问题,《现代国际关系》编辑部举办了“伊拉克战争四周年国际战略形势”专题研讨会,邀请一些知名国际问题专家进行了深入探讨。现将与会专家学者的主要观点辑录刊发,以期对读者更好地理解和把握这些问题有所裨益。     

印度对第一次印支战争的政策演变

印度独立后对印度支那人民的反法斗争采取中立的＂不卷入＂政策,但到1954年日内瓦会议前后,印度抛弃＂不卷入＂政策,以外交斡旋的方式积极介入调停。印度在日内瓦会议上的外交斡旋促进了日内瓦协议的签订。印度对第一次印度支那战争的政策演变是印度对国家利益认知不断提升的结果。     

印度与第一次印度支那战争

第一次印度支那战争的爆发及政治解决,对印度外交来说是一次严峻的挑战,同时也是印度提升国际地位的一次难得机遇。印度出于反对殖民主义、和平共处、不结盟等因素的考虑,不断调整其印度支那政策,从中立的"不干涉"政策,进而逐渐转变为积极的调停政策。印度发挥在日内瓦会议上了独特的作用。研究这一案例,有助于加深我们对印度外交特点的认识。