The Eurafrique Initiative,Ernest Bevin and Anglo–French Relations in the Foreign Office, 1945–1950

This analysis examines the prevalence of Eurafrican thinking in the British Foreign Office throughout the late 1940s. Drawing on British and French diplomatic archives, it reveals the centricity of the Foreign Office, and British Embassy at Paris to a project largely confined to the mental map of the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin. The financial stains facing Britain, often misinterpreted as “decline”, seemed a temporary phenomenon that “multilateral European cooperation” could rectify. Although shelved in 1949–1950, the Eurafrique initiative has seen few historians analyse its strategies across the corridors of power. This analysis reappraises British desires for Western European “co-operation” and a renewed faith in the Entente Cordiale as a geo-political counterweight to growing East–West bipolarity. Discussions of strategies to pool African possessions to recover the European economy were short-lived. Yet they challenged prospects of long-term economic dependence upon the United States in favour of an Anglo–French led European bloc.     

The United States and the Peruvian Challenge, 1968–1975

This article explores United States–Peruvian relations during the rule of General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968–1975). Velasco pursued a sharply nationalistic foreign policy, leading to repeated diplomatic dust-ups with the United States. Peruvian officials generally acquitted themselves quite well in these episodes, in part because of their own diplomatic acumen, and in part because broader geopolitical trends of the period undermined traditional sources of United States leverage in Latin America. The United States would ultimately have to wait for a change of government to recoup some of the influence it had lost in Peru under Velasco.     

Promoting the “Shanghai Spirit” and Striving for Peaceful Development

O n 15 June, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) held its annual summit in Shanghai to mark its fifth anniversary, which attracted worldwide attention. It was attended by the heads of state of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and …     

The Welcome Asians: the Japanese in Mexico, 1897–1910

This article focuses on the development of diplomatic relations between Japan and Mexico in the second half of the nineteenth century, culminating in the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the two nations in 1888, and the subsequent effect the positive relationship between the two nations had on Japanese immigration to Mexico. Based on a spirit of reciprocity and equal status, the treaty resulted in a favourable opinion regarding Japan and the Japanese in Mexico that had a direct influence on the way in which Japanese immigrants to Mexico were viewed and treated, which stands in sharp contrast to the experiences of other Japanese migrant communities in the Americas. Viewed as agents of modernization, Japanese immigrants were welcomed or viewed neutrally by Mexican government officials and average citizens. The article also explains why, despite this positive relationship, Mexico never became a large-scale destination for Japanese immigration.     

“Driven to Tears”: Britain,CS Tear Gas,and the Geneva Protocol, 1969–1975

This analysis considers a controversy over whether the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the treaty prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare, covered CS “tear gas.” Widespread deployment of tear gases by American forces in Vietnam after 1964 attracted much international criticism as many believed the Protocol banned such agents and pressure gradually built on the British government to clarify its interpretative position. Its tabling a disarmament initiative to prohibit production and possession of biological weapons in July 1969 exacerbated the situation, provoking allegations of diverting attention from chemical weapons as a favour to America and the “Special Relationship.” Meanwhile, the outbreak of the “troubles” in Northern Ireland earlier the same year, where British forces also used CS, presented further difficulties. Britain rejected inclusion of CS under the Protocol in February 1970 but wrestled at great length over the decision and its consequences under the Harold Wilson and Edward Heath governments. Largely absent from historical accounts, this episode allows an examination of a complex, convoluted issue that had potentially wide-ranging ramifications for the interpretation of international relations and treaties. Similarly, re-creating confidential inter-departmental decision-making processes, particularly comparing scientific and legal interpretations, the processes of governmental bureaucracy and the role played by civil society demonstrates why an element with little immediate linkage to British overseas affairs proved such a conundrum.     

Resolving and Managing Conflictsin Academic Communities: The Emerging Role of the “Pracademic”

The academic world is where a new kind of dispute resolution specialist—the pracademic—is working. Solidly based in academe by virtue of his or her scholarly credentials and career, this person has also developed expertise in alternative (or appropriate) dispute resolution. The pracademic is frequently called upon to help resolve particular disputes and can help identify sources of problems among the many layers of organization found in an academic setting. The authors discuss the role, responsibilities, and challenges of pracademics and speculate on future directions for this emergent practice.     

“Hut ab,” “Promenade with Kamerade for Schokolade,” and the Flying Dutchman: British Soldiers in the Rhineland, 1918–1929

This essay explores the social history of the “British Army of the Rhine,” especially their interactions with the German population, over the eleven-year period of occupation in Cologne and part of the Rhineland. It covers the initial, sometimes fraught establishment of the occupation and interactions with the civil population, especially the perennial problem of British soldiers’ relations with German women. These were initially prohibited altogether, but the rule was quickly relaxed, and the British authorities even accepted and regulated the use of brothels, leading to criticisms back home. The essay also discusses the comparatively small number of serious violent crimes (including four murders) during the occupation, and concludes that the occupation was characterized on both sides by grudging acceptance and some degree of forbearance.     

The internal–external security nexus and EU police/rule of law missions in the Western Balkans

Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) police/rule of law missions in the Western Balkans are increasingly guided by externally imposed normative agendas that respond primarily to EU internal security needs rather than functional imperatives or local realities. In line with these needs, EU police reform efforts tend to prioritise effectiveness and crime fighting over longer- term democratic policing and good governance reforms. In practice this means that police reform initiatives are technocratically oriented, yet value ridden fitting EU security concerns and needs. As a result, the police reform process can be—and often is—disconnected from the political and socio-economic reforms necessary for long-term stability and sustainable peace. Police assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been shaped by a determined albeit questionable focus on organised crime and corruption. The focus of EU police reform in Macedonia on primarily crime-fighting aspects of policing has compromised thefunctioning of the Macedonian police. Similarly, the politics of (non-)recognition of Kosovo's self-proclaimed independence and the intrusiveness of EULEX Kosovo's executive mandate contravene meeting local challenges.     

A Behavioral Model of Dispute Escalation: The Major Powers, 1816–1976

This study combines the empirical evidence drawn from studies of conflict escalation in political science, and the social‐psychological insights concerning human inference and prediction, to develop a dynamic model of dispute escalation. This model makes systematic use of historical data concerning the behavioral unfolding of disputes involving at least one major power to generate probabilistic predictions of the war/no war outcomes of such disputes. Using the Correlates of War Project data on major power disputes in the 1816–1976 period, these predictions are tested against the actual outcomes of the disputes. Overall, the model predicts correctly nearly 94 percent of the cases and compares favorably to several null models against which it is tested. However, while not consistently biased the model's predictions are characterized by considerable instability across various probability ranges. This suggests that the incorporation of more stable factors such as underlying systemic and dyadic attributes may substantially improve the overall performance of the model as well as the stability of its predictions.     

The “Japan Card” in the United States Rapprochement with China, 1969–1972

United States rapprochement with China should be re-examined by taking into consideration the American negotiating approach towards Beijing regarding the role of Japan, the United States' major Asian ally and China's long-term rival in East Asia. Whilst announcing the Nixon Doctrine, which increased pressure on Japan to strengthen its defense and regional responsibilities, Nixon and Kissinger used the so-called “Japan Card,” Japan's possible military resurgence and China's long-term fear of it, as a tacit negotiating tool to justify to Chinese leaders the continued United States military presence in East Asia. This article examines the impact of the United States rapprochement with China on the American negotiating process with Chinese leaders for the continuation of the United States–Japan Security Treaty and to what extent it changed China's policy toward American relations with Japan.     

Ferocious Times: The IRA,the RIC,and Britain's Failure in 1919–1921

The 1916 Rising was, in military terms, a shambolic failure. Despite the fact that Britain was locked in a gruelling struggle with Germany, the Rising was still utterly crushed within a week. How then, in the aftermath of victory against Germany, did Britain fail to win the subsequent struggle with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) between 1919 and 1921? This article assesses some of the key factors that played out in the conflict, drawing particular attention to the IRA's focus on the Royal Irish Constabulary and the consequences of this, and then later, how distorted perceptions of the proximity of success ultimately undermined British commitment. One of the most remarkable features of the conflict was the widespread belief among many on the British side (and more than a few in the Republican camp) that the IRA was on the verge of total defeat when the truce was declared in 1921. The IRA had suffered heavy casualties and were running low on weapons and ammunition. Yet, somehow the movement prevailed. This article aims to shed light on how and why that happened.     

Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Wilson and the Greek Dictators, 1967–1970

The military coup of 21 April 1967 brought to power a repressive dictatorship in Greece. It proceeded to deprive Greeks of their human rights and civil liberties, outraged international public opinion and strained transatlantic relations during the Cold War. The “Greek case” culminated in the withdrawal of Greece from the Council of Europe and calls for its expulsion from NATO. This article will analyse the foreign policy considerations that determined British policy towards the Greek junta during 1967—such as Cold War realities, alliance dynamics, economic and commercial imperatives, regional instability in the Mediterranean and domestic pressures. It will look at how these factors coalesced into shaping British policy towards the Greek junta into one in which human rights had little bearing. The article will also consider the impact of the “Greek case” on the image and credibility of the Labour government of 1966–1970 and explain why vociferous anti-junta activities in London were to create such policy difficulties for the British government.     

Prelude to war: Incidence,escalation and intervention in international disputes, 1900–1976

The study provides an overview of a set of data describing the incidence and character of serious international disputes in the twentieth century. The principal findings reported include: Average annual incidence of serious international disputes has risen more than fourfold between 1900 and 1976. The underlying cause of this increase seems to be simply the increased size of the international system. The relative likelihood with which a serious dispute culminates in war is 1 in 9. However, there are definite differences in this relative frequency. Disputes involving major powers escalate to war approximately 1 in 5 times. Disputes involving only minor powers culminate in war with a likelihood of 1 in 20. Intervention in ongoing disputes increases the chance of war. The character of intervention has changed throughout the century with initiators less able to attract support and the targets of threat and force more able to do so.     

Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976–80: A Retrospective Analysis

During the late 1970s, Turkey experienced a major campaign of political terrorism that was waged by a multiplicity of leftist, ultranationalist, and separatist groups. Between 1976 and 1980, more than 5000 people lost their lives in hundreds of terrorist incidents. The steady escalation of violence amidst a major political and economic crisis undermined the country's fragile democratic system and paved the way for a military coup in September 1980. This study examines the origins and growth of the terrorist movement in Turkey, the main characteristics of political violence, and the causes of the dramatic escalation of terrorism in the late 1970s. The study suggests that although state-sponsored terrorism against Turkey facilitated the rapid proliferation of leftist, rightist, and separatist armed extremist groups, the drift into total terrorism was largely the product of domestic political and social developments.     

Caught in the Middle: The United Nations Emergency Force,Israel, and the 1960 “Rotem Crisis”

The refusal of the UN forces in Lebanon to accede to Israel's request to provide information on events they were witness to (the October 2000 abduction of three Israeli soldiers on the border), and the subsequent crisis between the two, are not unprecedented. A much more severe crisis broke out in 1960 after nearly the entire Egyptian army surprisingly deployed a few kilometres behind the UN Emergency Force's (UNEF) posts along the border with Israel in Sinai. Israel hurried to request UNEF to provide information—considered crucial to its survival—on this deployment, but was refused.

The author reviews this unknown incident and tracks on the diplomatic efforts made by the then UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld alongside about UNEF's role and functions in this affair. He examines the UN's refusal and concludes that while the Egyptians did partially violate some informal understandings with the UNSG, it was indeed justified.