The Evolution of China’s Security Challenges and Grand Strategy

This article examines changes in China’s security perceptions since 1949 and sketches the evolution of China’s grand strategy. In tracing the evolution of China’s security perceptions and grand strategy since 1949, it identifies elements of change as well as continuity. The changes reflect dramatic developments in the PRC’s capabilities and the international circumstances it faces, both of which have shaped the grand strategic choices of China’s leaders. During most of the Cold War decades, a relatively weak China’s vulnerability to serious military threats from much more powerful adversaries led the CCP to adopt grand strategies focused on coping with a clearly defined external security challenge. After the Cold War and especially in the 21st century, an increasingly complex array of internal and external security concerns confronts China’s leaders with new challenges. The paper concludes with a discussion of the significance of the recently established National Security Commission and offers brief observations about its potential significance for the CCP’s leadership in their fight against the new domestic and international security challenges it faces. The novelty of China’s security challenges at home and abroad in the 21st century is a consequence of the end of the Cold War international order and perhaps more importantly, a consequence of China’s successful modernization since 1979.     

The Rhetoric of Appeasement: Hitler's Legitimation and British Foreign Policy, 1938–39

Few grand strategies have been more scrutinized than Britain's decision to appease Nazi Germany. From 1933 to 1938, Britain eschewed confrontation and attempted to settle German demands. However in the five months following the negotiations at Munich, the British abandoned appeasement and embraced a policy of confronting the German state. The roots of both appeasement and confrontation can be found in Germany's legitimation strategies. Until the Munich crisis, Adolf Hitler justified Germany's aims with appeals to collective security, equality, and self-determination—norms central to the European system established by the Treaty of Versailles. After Munich, in contrast, German politicians abandoned these legitimation strategies, arguing instead that expansion was justified as a matter of German might, and not international rights. As Britain came to see German demands as illegitimate, so too did they decide this revisionist state was insatiable, impervious to negotiation, and responsive only to the language of force.     

The Spirit of Ulysses? Ideology and British Appeasement in the 1930s

The British government's appeasement of fascism in the 1930s derived not only from economic, political, and strategic constraints, but also from the personal ideologies of the policy makers. Widespread guilt about the terms of the Versailles Treaty and tensions with France created sympathy for German revisionism, but the Cabinet properly recognized that Nazi Germany represented the gravest threat to peace in the 1930s. Fear of war and the recognition that Britain would have to tolerate peaceful change underlay attempts to appease the dictators, culminating in the Munich agreement in September 1938. After Munich, continued German belligerence, the Kristallnacht, and British intelligence assessments indicating that Hitler was prepared to attack the Western powers led to a reassessment of appeasement. The British government gave security guarantees to several European countries, seeking to deter future aggression and to lay the groundwork for a successful war against Germany should it prove necessary. While most of the British elite detested communism, anti-communist views did not govern British policy; security considerations required Soviet support in Eastern Europe, and Britain and France made a determined effort to secure Soviet support for the Peace Front.     

Growing without a Strategy? The Case of European Security and Defence Policy

Contrary to the expectations of many experts and politicians, one of the most politically sensitive sectors of the European integration process, the common foreign and security policy, has seen remarkable growth in recent years. The pressure of crises and conflicts beyond the EU's borders and the need to deal with them in a unitary way has driven the governments of member states and the community institutions to take development of CFSP/ESDP more seriously. The process has been pragmatic, establishing the mechanisms and policies required to respond to the challenges. It is this bottom-up, disorderly growth that the Constitutional Treaty had attempted to rationalise in a coherent framework, completing the work of the preceding treaties. With the stalled ratification of the CT, this growth has continued. But it cannot go on indefinitely. In order to bring order and coherence into CFSP/ESDP bodies and procedures, the substance of the Constitutional Treaty must be saved and approved rapidly.     

Beyond the American Century: Walter Lippmann and American Grand Strategy, 1943–1950

As the United States became a world Power, journalist and intellectual Walter Lippmann feared that it would become its own worst enemy. During and after the Second World War, he tried to steer the country towards coherent statecraft, to define the national interest and the limits of power, and give geopolitical expression to the role of the United States as the core of an Atlantic strategic system. But in response to world war, the Truman Doctrine, and the Korean War, he became pessimistic about the country's ability to conduct strategy effectively. In the prophetic tradition, he believed that a fatal symbiosis between America's growing strength and domestic politics led it towards crisis. Though at times ahistorical, Lippmann's concept of strategy deserves attention for its dialogue between power and identity, for its questioning of “ends” as well as means, and for its focus on the danger of self-defeating behaviour.     

Sir Eric Phipps,the British Government,and the Appeasement of Germany, 1933–1937

This article argues that Sir Eric Phipps’ reputation as an “anti-appeaser” of Germany during his Berlin embassy 1933–1937 is not accurate. While Phipps was not in favor of placating Hitler by making territorial concessions, he had much in common with those who had sought a rapprochement with Germany in the 1920s through a policy of inclusion and reconciliation. Particular importance is placed on Phipps’ attitude towards the League of Nations, with detailed consideration also being accorded to his relationship with the British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Office officials of the period, as well as his views on the Entente Cordiale.     

Anglo–French Imperial Relations in the Arab World: Intelligence Liaison and Nationalist Disorder, 1920–1939

Faced with intractable problems of popular protest and nationalist insurgency, French and British imperial administrations across the Arab world frequently exchanged various forms of covert intelligence with one another. Much of this information was open source human intelligence relating to local political activity. Higher grade material, and particularly signals intelligence was less regularly shared, not least as the Entente partners continued to spy on each other throughout the inter-war years. Ironically, while the French and British colonial security services shared similar pre-occupations and objectives, their common threat perceptions were not enough to break down the abiding mutual suspicions between them. As a result, their networks of information exchange remained patchy. This only made the tasks of imperial government and the containment of disorder harder than might otherwise have been the case.     

Steven Morewood,The British Defence of Egypt 1935–1940

Michael Graham Fry (ed.), Power, Personalities and Politics: Essays in Honour of Donald Cameron Watt (London: Frank Cass 1992) £35. ISBN 0 7146 3428 X.

John L. Offner, An Unwanted War: The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain over Cuba, 1895–1898 (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1992), $43.95 (hb), $16.45 (pb).

Michael Leifer and John Phipps, Vietnam and Doi Moi: Domestic and International Dimensions of Reform, RIIA Discussion Paper No. 35 (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs: 1991) 40 + ii pp. £5. ISSN 0951–4171.

Michael C. Williams, Vietnam at the Crossroads (London: Pinter Publishers for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992) 104 + viii pp. £22.50 (hb); £8.95 (pb). ISBN 1–85567–051–8 (hb); 1–85567–052–6 (pb).

Neville Brown, The Strategic Revolution: Thoughts for the Twenty‐First Century (Brassey's: London, 1992), 248 pp.     

Sport,Empire, and Diplomacy: “Ireland” at the 1930 British Empire Games

ABSTRACT

International sport, as Geoffrey Pigman has correctly observed, emerged “as a quintessential case study demonstrating the part that public diplomacy plays in contemporary diplomacy.” The British Empire Games/Commonwealth Games [BEG/CG] are one such example, being the second largest multi-national multi-sport event today. Their origins lie in the interwar era when members of sporting organisations, many of whom were active in other formal aspects of public life, considered the organisation of specific Imperial events through international networking. Described as lacking a “thoroughly analytical and interpretive account of their history,” questions of identity politics, public diplomacy and statecraft are at their core because the BEG, inaugurated in 1930, represented qualities and values that appealed to governments, civil society, and sportspeople alike. In the waning of the British Empire, the BEG was one attempt to maintain Imperial prestige and cement cultural bonds. Yet, not only is there an absence of analytical accounts of their history, but the inter-relationships between the BEG and diplomacy, and among global sport and diplomacy more broadly, have been similarly under-investigated. This absence is striking, representing a missed opportunity in understanding the development of global sport and international relations more generally.     

U.S. National Strategy: betweem Offensive and Integration

As the hegemonic country in the world system, U. S. national strategy is global and multi-directional. Since September 11, 2001, America has made series of adjustments in its global strategy, including adjustment in security focus and change of security means. Come what may, since America has become the superpower in the world system, its national strategy has always been between offensive and integration. In a sense, current American strategy is the combination of the two. Although different government would tilt toward one direction, none of     

America,Britain, and Swaraj: Anglo-American Relations and Indian Independence, 1939–1945

In the years before and during the Second World War, the Roosevelt Administration played an important and often overlooked role in encouraging Britain's disengagement from the Indian subcontinent. Roosevelt's motivations in pressing for Indian independence were varied. They included a mix of principled opposition to colonialism, practical concern for the outcome of the war and pragmatic jockeying for influence with post-colonial nations when the war was won. Churchill's government was wary of being pushed by Washington to move more quickly to “quit India” than it thought prudent. U.S. policy and actions clearly influenced the direction of events toward independence, but U.S. caution as the war ground on led to disillusionment among nationalist leaders. This reaction would have consequences once swaraj was won and India came into its own, at a time when the Cold War was becoming the dominant factor in America's view of the world.     

The Invisible Hand? Critical Information Infrastructures,Commercialisation and National Security

Corporatisation of critical information infrastructure (CII) is rooted in the ‘privatisation wave’ of the 1980s-90s, when the ground was laid for outsourcing public utilities. Despite well-known risks relating to reliability, resilience, and accountability, commitment to efficiency imperatives have driven governments to outsource key public services and infrastructures. A recent illustrative case with enormous implications is the 2017 Swedish ICT scandal, where outsourcing of CII caused major security breaches. With the transfer of the Swedish Transport Agency’s ICT system to IBM and subcontractors, classified data and protected identities were made accessible to non-vetted foreign private employees – sensitive data could thus now be in anyone’s hands. This case clearly demonstrates accountability gaps that can arise in public-private governance of CII.     

Meeting Hauteur with Tact,Imperturbability, and Resolution: British Diplomacy and Russia, 1856–1865

This article takes a broad view of Anglo–Russian relations in the years between the Peace of Paris, 1856, and the death of Viscount Palmerston, 1865, examining the shifts within that period in an essentially high-political diplomatic history. It traces a number of strands in geopolitics, offering a sense of the competing strategies of the European Great Powers, particularly the roles of British diplomats: the private and public communication amongst prime ministers, foreign secretaries, ambassadors, ministers-plenipotentiaries and consular officials concerning British policy towards Russia in the post-Crimean War period. It outlines the principles that underlay that policy and the ways in which the diplomatic network observed the tsar and his advisors and agents, assessed the developing situation in Russia, Central Asia, and the Ottoman Balkans, made decisions, and implemented policy. It focusses on the diplomatists’ attitudes and perceptions—how they thought about Russia and British interests and how they worked to protect them. It also analyses British policy in light of the European dimension. The years 1856 to 1865 not only witnessed Russian attempts to undermine the Crimean settlement, they also saw revisionist Bonapartist France work to destroy the constraining Vienna system of 1815—primarily in northern Italy. These policies complicated British attempts to maintain the status-quo and defend their interests in the East. The evolving situation was highly complex.     

Change and Stability in Eastern Asia: Nationalism,Communism, and British Policy, 1948–1955

British policy in Eastern Asia, 1948–55, aimed to combine the attainment of change leading to stability, to be secured through cooperating with nationalism against the growing threat from communism. After initial errors, ministers and officials revealed realism and flexibility, as shown in policies towards Burma, Malaya, and China. As regards Japan, the United States dominated decisionmaking and British views were rather negative towards the viability of political reform in the longer term and towards economic revival. The collapse of French authority in Indo-China pushed Anthony Eden towards compromise with the communist powers at the Geneva conference in 1954: Britain diverged from the US in supporting a strictly defensive alliance (SEATO), which was linked with an ambivalent approach to the future of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.     

Security and discourse: the Israeli–Palestinian water conflict

When conflictive viewpoints are discursively strengthened, they develop into a ‘conflict discourse’ with a specific discursive structure which perpetuates conflict, like the discursive securitisation of an issue for varying audiences. When they are weakened, however, societal discourse can potentially change so that agreement becomes possible again, thus achieving discursive conflict transformation. This article analyses the Israeli and the Palestinian water discourse. On both sides, the dominant discourse structures underscore the conflictive issues regarding the distribution of water between Israelis and Palestinians, thus making communication, let alone negotiation, downright impossible. While Palestinians regard the natural water resources as sufficient in principle and the existing scarcity as entirely politically induced, Israelis perceive the natural water resources as absolutely scarce while receiving major de-securitisation impulses from the possibility of desalination. In the respective (minor) counter-discourses, however, possible starting points for dialogue and conflict resolution are visible.     

In Pursuit of a Pacific Strategy:British Planning for the Defeat of Japan, 1943–45

This article seeks to explain why the British pushed for a role in Pacific operations during the Second World War when it faced other strategic priorities in Southeast Asia, as well as a powerful American military that maintained tight control over operational decision-making. Although several quarters in Whitehall, including the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, had doubts about the necessity of a Pacific strategy, there were sensible reasons behind pursuing such a course. It would illustrate to an “anti-imperialist” America that Britain was not only interested in recovering its colonial possessions but also prepared to fight the Japanese on their homeland. More importantly, taking part in the main operations would allow the British to claim a voice at the peace table while helping to encourage the Americans to cement their close working relationship with Britain in the postwar period.     

European security policy for the people? Public opinion and the EU's Common Foreign,Security and Defence policy

The democratic foundations of European integration in the foreign and defence realm are increasingly being debated. This article looks at the question of democratic legitimacy from one particular angle, by examining public opinion as measured in Eurobarometer surveys between 1989 and 2009. Based on reflections about the relation between polling results and wider questions of democracy, it examines three aspects of public opinion: general support for a common foreign and a common defence policy; differences among support rates in EU member states; and what roles Europeans would prefer for European armed forces. It turns out that general support for a common foreign policy is high, whereas the desirability of a common defence policy is much more contested. Moreover, citizens across Europe would prefer European armed forces to take on traditional tasks, as territorial defence. An EU defence policy that goes beyond strict intergovernmentalism and is directed towards protecting international law and universal human rights would thus require a significant communicative effort to become accepted.