Palmerston and Anglo–French Relations, 1846–1865

Conventionally, it was Palmerston's political nemesis, Lord Aberdeen (foreign secretary 1841–46), who brokered an entente cordiale with François Guizot and France in the early 1840s, which the belligerent and unequivocally “English” Palmerston then systematically destroyed when he returned to office in 1846. However, not only is this a distortion of the relationship between Britain and France prior to 1846, it also fails to appreciate the nuances of Palmerston's approach to Anglo–French politics. Naval scares and rhetorical constructions of English and British identities certainly drew Palmerston to adopt aggressive positions towards France on occasion, but against this must be set his close personal ties with leading French statesmen, not least Napoleon III himself, and his desire to maintain peaceful harmonious relations with France in order to free Britain's diplomatic hand elsewhere in the world. Although superficially swinging between extremes of amity and enmity, therefore, Anglo–French relations under Palmerston's guidance were in fact far more cordial and close than has sometimes been allowed.     

1905—1914年俄国的合作化运动

1905-1914年是俄国合作化运动的高速发展期,其增长速度在当时国际合作化运动中绝无仅有.局势好转、商品货币关系深入发展、相关法令的颁布以及斯托雷平农业改革的推行是促进该时期合作社大量组建的重要因素.随着合作化运动的深入,合作社联盟开始建立,它在资金流通、商品供应与调节等方面完善了合作社的发展.合作社的活动还波及文化领域,组建了图书馆、博物馆、职员培训学校,出版了合作社期刊和大众读物,上述活动提升了合作社成员的独立自主意识和责任感.     

Yvon Delbos and Anthony Eden: Anglo–French Cooperation, 1936–1938

The period of tenure of Anthony Eden and Yvon Delbos as the foreign ministers of their respective countries coincided with a remarkable improvement and convergence in Anglo–French relations. This was no accident. Both men had similar ideas in relation to the challenges confronting Britain and France in international affairs. Neither wanted really close relations with Soviet Russia and both supported non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War despite their growing concern over German and Italian intervention. Delbos was highly critical of Mussolini's Italy and was firmly opposed to a Franco–Italian rapprochement while Eden, having originally given the Duce the benefit of the doubt, came to distrust him and to oppose even conversations with Italy without prior concessions, such as the withdrawal of Italian volunteers from Spain. Finally, both supported the appeasement of Nazi Germany, including colonial concessions, although Delbos towards the end of his period as foreign minister became more sceptical as to the prospects for success.     

The Secret Agent,International Policing,and Anarchist Terrorism: 1900–1914

An unprecedented expansion of global anti-terrorist policing took place after 1900, although the security forces projected outside their borders by Russia, Italy, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain, and Argentina displayed an enormous diversity in size and effectiveness. Crucial to successful policing was how these countries improved their intelligence through recruiting and handling informers, maintained secrecy and good relations with local police, and handled the media. The British approach to anarchist control was arguably the most successful. Italian international policing was the most far-reaching, while the United States long remained the world's most under-policed large country. On examination, the view that anti-anarchist policing was a case of conservative imperial regimes versus the Western democracies loses validity. During this period, a general trend saw the transfer of anarchist surveillance from the hands of diplomats into those of interior ministry officials and the police, all in the name of greater centralization, professionalization, and efficiency.     

Economic Interests and Threat Assessment in the US Congress, 1890–1914

Why do some domestic actors see the international environment as a threatening place populated by untrustworthy powers, when others find opportunities for peaceful cooperation in the same conditions? Because these actors confront the same international environment, the reasons for their divergent evaluations must rest on differences in their own beliefs and interests. In this article, we consider the impact of societal interests in trade and trade protection on elite assessments of the international environment. We examine evaluations of the international environment in speeches given in the US Congress during naval appropriations debates between 1890 and 1914. The manufacturing sector’s interest in trade protection led political leaders who represented manufacturing regions to offer more negative assessments of the international environment, while those representing export-oriented agricultural areas of the country gave more positive evaluations. These effects were roughly comparable to those associated with party, as well as individual-level characteristics, such as having served as a military officer.     

The Eurafrique Initiative,Ernest Bevin and Anglo–French Relations in the Foreign Office, 1945–1950

This analysis examines the prevalence of Eurafrican thinking in the British Foreign Office throughout the late 1940s. Drawing on British and French diplomatic archives, it reveals the centricity of the Foreign Office, and British Embassy at Paris to a project largely confined to the mental map of the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin. The financial stains facing Britain, often misinterpreted as “decline”, seemed a temporary phenomenon that “multilateral European cooperation” could rectify. Although shelved in 1949–1950, the Eurafrique initiative has seen few historians analyse its strategies across the corridors of power. This analysis reappraises British desires for Western European “co-operation” and a renewed faith in the Entente Cordiale as a geo-political counterweight to growing East–West bipolarity. Discussions of strategies to pool African possessions to recover the European economy were short-lived. Yet they challenged prospects of long-term economic dependence upon the United States in favour of an Anglo–French led European bloc.     

Anglo–French Imperial Relations in the Arab World: Intelligence Liaison and Nationalist Disorder, 1920–1939

Faced with intractable problems of popular protest and nationalist insurgency, French and British imperial administrations across the Arab world frequently exchanged various forms of covert intelligence with one another. Much of this information was open source human intelligence relating to local political activity. Higher grade material, and particularly signals intelligence was less regularly shared, not least as the Entente partners continued to spy on each other throughout the inter-war years. Ironically, while the French and British colonial security services shared similar pre-occupations and objectives, their common threat perceptions were not enough to break down the abiding mutual suspicions between them. As a result, their networks of information exchange remained patchy. This only made the tasks of imperial government and the containment of disorder harder than might otherwise have been the case.     

Entente Neo-Coloniale?: Ernest Bevin and the Proposals for an Anglo–French Third World Power, 1945–1949

Ernest Bevin made the Third World Power project his own. He sought an imperial grouping led by Britain and France with economic and defence components and social-democratic values. It was to be a way to access raw materials and bolster European economies, and in time to create a global, strategic space between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Bevin's alternative vision failed, in part because the demands of cold war bipolarity trumped the Third World Power concept. The project was also poorly conceived and badly managed, and did not stem antagonism between Britain and France. France, unlike Britain, was also soon able to upgrade its imperial commercial interests through the European Communities.     

Conservative Leaders,Coalition, and Britain’s Decision for War in 1914

Conservative leaders may have had a decisive impact on the decision by the Liberal government to enter the Great War in August 1914. In a seminal article of 1975, Keith Wilson argued that their readiness to fight “cut the ground … from beneath the feet of the non-interventionists” in the Cabinet. Those ministers who had hitherto opposed war now recognised that continued divisions could bring the government’s collapse, in which case the Unionists, probably in a coalition with pro-war Liberals, would take office and enter the conflict anyway. Since Wilson’s essay, important light has focussed on Unionist thinking by works that look at the July Crisis as part of a longer party history. This analysis provides a detailed investigation of the actions of Unionist leaders in the days immediately leading to war. It resolves some of the main contradictions in the primary evidence, argues that the possibility of a coalition was very real and demonstrates that one key player—the first lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill—subsequently tried, with some success, to disguise his activities.     

A Crisis of Empire: The Anglo–Ottoman Dispute Over the Aden Frontier, 1901–1905

The crises which accompanied the rise and decline of the European empires have not been the object of systematic study in the manner of superpower crises of the Cold War period. Many of the techniques used to study Cold War crises have broader scope, including the models of governmental politics and organisational process developed by Graham Allison. The application of the Allison models to the events surrounding the delimitation of the Aden frontier between 1901 and 1905 illuminates significant aspects of the Anglo–Ottoman confrontation: they explain the manner in which non-rational elements in the policy-making process transformed a relatively insignificant issue into a crisis situation. Such insights also require a detailed examination of the documentary record which in this instance reveals the discord amongst British policy-makers and the organisational imperfections of the bureaucracy. The frontier Commissioners, the Aden Resident, the Government of India, the metropolitan government in London and the embassy in Constantinople were involved in a series of factional squabbles over the Aden frontier, the resolution of which often required the coercion of the Ottomans by the deployment of warships along the Yemen coast. Coordination amongst these different elements in the bureaucracy also played a role in generating tensions between London and Constantinople. The case of the Anglo–Ottoman dispute over the Aden frontier suggests that the analysis of internal governmental politics and organisational processes can be applied successfully to crises of empire which predate the Cold War era.     

“As Far as His Army Can Reach”: Military Movements and East–West Discord in Germany, 1945

This article explores the diplomatic implications of United States troop movements in Germany before and after V-E Day. Existing accounts emphasize American good will and Soviet refusal to cooperate, pointing to the example of an American convoy en route to Berlin in June 1945. Citing an “agreement” of which the American convoy commander had never heard, the Russians would allow only one-half of his troops to proceed. The agreement did exist, however, and the episode must be seen against the backdrop of Soviet suspicions regarding Western willingness to withdraw from the Soviet occupation zone. United States President Harry S. Truman did overrule British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill's calls to link withdrawal to concessions from the Soviets, but he waited two months before doing so. Prior accounts have ignored the delay's effects on Soviet perceptions. The article argues that American actions had the unintended consequence of reinforcing Soviet Chairman Joseph V. Stalin's belief in Western bad faith.     

Alan Bullock, 1914–2004: “I Only Write Enormous Books” 1

Alan Bullock (1914–2004) was one of Britain’s most distinguished scholars and the author of several extremely important books on recent and modern European civilization, history and culture. His enormous contribution to British, European, and Anglo-Saxon culture and historiography is easily discernible in his many books and essays. Chief among them his biography of Hitler, parallel study of Hitler and Stalin, three volume biography of Ernest Bevin, and the Fontana dictionaries of modern thought. One of Bullock’s greatest achievements was the establishment of St. Catherine’s College in Oxford University, at which he served as the Founding Master for more than a generation (1962–1990). Prior to WW II, recent European history was not considered a respectable research field worthy of serious academic work, nor was it thought that there existed the necessary distance from recent events for historians to deal with such history in a proper fashion. However, Alan Bullock’s books turned the study of modern and recent European history into the mainstream of postgraduate studies at Oxford. Lord Bullock contributed tremendously (together with Hugh Seton-Watson, Bill Deakin, Hugh Trevor-Roper and A. J. P. Taylor) to the breakthrough which turned contemporary history into a focus for academic research and teaching.     

Missing the nuclear boat? British policy and French military nuclear ambitions during the EURATOM foundation negotiations, 1955–56

This paper examines the neglected nuclear dimension of the ‘relaunch’ of Europe at Messina. France favoured British membership of EURATOM and some interests in Britain saw the commercial and diplomatic advantages of Britain's leadership of the European nuclear industry. However, the possibility of a French military nuclear programme and European nuclear proliferation compounded Britain's established reluctance either to participate in European integration or to jeopardize the prospect of Anglo‐American nuclear weapons cooperation. Britain's aversion to using the hypothetical ‘nuclear card’ is a recurrent theme in Anglo‐French diplomacy.     

Money,power, and donor–NGO partnerships

The term ‘partnership’ can be considered something of a Trojan Horse, disguising the reality of the complex relationships in imbalances of power and inequality, often expressed through the control of one ‘partner’ over the other. With particular reference to the experience of a small, UK-based NGO working in Uganda (Hives Save Lives – Africa), this article highlights how power is manifest within donor–NGO partnerships through the control and flow of money; and illustrates that NGOs pursuing funding from donors face many challenges that reinforce this imbalance of power.     

Britain,France, and Mesopotamian Oil, 1916–1920

This analysis centres on British and French policies concerning Mesopotamian oil between 1916 and 1920. Both Powers already had some degree of interest in oil matters before the war, but these concerns did not leave a particularly strong imprint on the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. During the First World War, both Britain and France became aware of their lack of oil and identified Mesopotamian oil as a key war aim. Both Powers developed close relations with Royal Dutch-Shell to further their oil policies. After the war, the struggle for oil proved inseparable from the territorial settlement in the Middle East and relations with oil companies. All actors did not initially recognise this fact, and it was only during 1919–1920 that an increasing awareness developed that oil and territorial issues were inseparable. Combined with changes in political leadership, it made possible a “silent compromise” at San Remo in April 1920.