The Danzig Question in British Foreign Policy, 1918–1920

Among the many and often bitter territorial disputes following the collapse of Germany and Russia in Central and Eastern Europe — to mention only the questions of Vilna, Memel, Teschen, or Lemberg — the problem of the Polish sea access was particularly explosive and became the most vexing territorial problem of the whole conference. This paper examines the question of Danzig and the lower Vistula within the context of contradicting Polish, German and Western, mainly British ambitions and preferences. The author shows that the proclamation of the Free City of Danzig and the creation of the Polish Corridor, dividing Germany into two parts, was a compromise not liked in Warsaw and Berlin and one the British, always fearing fatal repercussions to future stability, only considered to be the lesser choice of evils.     

British Policy and the Ruhr Crisis 1922–24

This article provides an overview of British policy during a defining episode in the interwar period — the Ruhr crisis of 1923–4. The author assesses the external considerations influencing Britain's policy (especially the roles of France, Germany, and the United States), and also explores the processes of foreign policy making within Britain's complex bureaucratic system. In particular, the relationship between the Foreign Office and the Treasury is analyzed and its impact on European policy assessed. The article challenges traditional views of British policy at this time, concluding that it was far more complex, but also far more limited and constrained, than previous studies would suggest.     

The Rhetoric of Appeasement: Hitler's Legitimation and British Foreign Policy, 1938–39

Few grand strategies have been more scrutinized than Britain's decision to appease Nazi Germany. From 1933 to 1938, Britain eschewed confrontation and attempted to settle German demands. However in the five months following the negotiations at Munich, the British abandoned appeasement and embraced a policy of confronting the German state. The roots of both appeasement and confrontation can be found in Germany's legitimation strategies. Until the Munich crisis, Adolf Hitler justified Germany's aims with appeals to collective security, equality, and self-determination—norms central to the European system established by the Treaty of Versailles. After Munich, in contrast, German politicians abandoned these legitimation strategies, arguing instead that expansion was justified as a matter of German might, and not international rights. As Britain came to see German demands as illegitimate, so too did they decide this revisionist state was insatiable, impervious to negotiation, and responsive only to the language of force.     

Change and Stability in Eastern Asia: Nationalism,Communism, and British Policy, 1948–1955

British policy in Eastern Asia, 1948–55, aimed to combine the attainment of change leading to stability, to be secured through cooperating with nationalism against the growing threat from communism. After initial errors, ministers and officials revealed realism and flexibility, as shown in policies towards Burma, Malaya, and China. As regards Japan, the United States dominated decisionmaking and British views were rather negative towards the viability of political reform in the longer term and towards economic revival. The collapse of French authority in Indo-China pushed Anthony Eden towards compromise with the communist powers at the Geneva conference in 1954: Britain diverged from the US in supporting a strictly defensive alliance (SEATO), which was linked with an ambivalent approach to the future of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.     

British Foreign Policy,the Financial Elite,and the Nationalisation of the Constantinople Quays Company, 1934–1945

The analysis examines the role of British financial institutions, namely the Bank of England and the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders [CFB], in the making of British policy towards Turkey. The nationalisation of the Constantinople Quays Company, a port operator purchased in 1907 by the British and French governments, serves as a case study through which business–state relations, the role of finance in the conduct of international relations, and the impact of perceptions on policy decisions are explored. In this case, the financial elite’s role was minimal during most of the period considered, becoming more important in the final war years in a framework of the Anglo–Turkish debt restructuring negotiations of 1944. Significantly, the CFB, rather than the Bank, represented the British government in the negotiations. There exists an abundance of evidence of the divergent views between Whitehall and the financial elite about Turkey’s trustworthiness as a debtor and a signatory to treaties. The British government’s perceptions were much more positive than those of the financial elite. This difference stemmed from the different interests involved: Whitehall sought to secure Turkey’s collaboration in the increasingly unstable global security environment while the Bank and the CFB were more concerned with investor and bondholder interests and attempted to avoid further financial losses.     

Emotions and the British Government’s Decision for War in 1914

ABSTRACT

Recent years have witnessed increasing interest amongst international historians in the impact of emotions on foreign policy decisions as part of a broader movement usually known as the ‘emotional turn’. This trend is associated with findings from the field of neuroscience that cognition and emotion—rather than operating independently—remain inextricably bound together in human decision-making. Most work thus far has concentrated on American foreign policy since 1945, but this analysis broadens the focus to consider the impact of emotions on British decision-makers, especially Cabinet ministers, as they debated whether to go to war in 1914. It shows that despite a tendency by the protagonists themselves to interpret their actions in rational terms, sufficient evidence of emotions exist in the written record to allow a fresh approach to the July Crisis. Whilst emotions must be seen as acting alongside rational mental processes, rather than regularly over-powering them, a focus on the subject helps explain different approaches taken by individual ministers, why the majority came to approve intervention in the conflict, and how Prime Minister Herbert Asquith, partly by appearing to control his feelings, minimised resignations over the fateful decision. It also allows a new view about why the Cabinet decided to go to war on 4 August in defence of Belgium, despite deciding just a few days earlier that the question of fulfilling the 1839 guarantee of Belgian neutrality was ‘one of policy than of legal obligation’.     

The Ulster Defence Regiment and the Question of Catholic Recruitment, 1970–1972

This article aims to consider the factors which led to a serious under-representation of Catholics within the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) during the Northern Ireland “Troubles.” A considerable number of UDR members were implicated in collusion with loyalist paramilitaries in their targeting of Catholic civilians throughout the conflict. Further, neither the British political nor military establishment made any significant moves towards addressing Catholic grievances regarding the UDR during the crucially formative years of 1970–1972. Despite this, Catholic under-representation has often been discussed with sole or particular reference to Republican paramilitary targeting of Catholic members of the force; this is in order to dissuade any further such involvement on the part of this demographic. The validity of such assertions will be examined in this article, along with a number of other factors which have been hitherto largely underplayed or outright ignored as contributing to this under-representation.     

Economic Interests and Threat Assessment in the US Congress, 1890–1914

Why do some domestic actors see the international environment as a threatening place populated by untrustworthy powers, when others find opportunities for peaceful cooperation in the same conditions? Because these actors confront the same international environment, the reasons for their divergent evaluations must rest on differences in their own beliefs and interests. In this article, we consider the impact of societal interests in trade and trade protection on elite assessments of the international environment. We examine evaluations of the international environment in speeches given in the US Congress during naval appropriations debates between 1890 and 1914. The manufacturing sector’s interest in trade protection led political leaders who represented manufacturing regions to offer more negative assessments of the international environment, while those representing export-oriented agricultural areas of the country gave more positive evaluations. These effects were roughly comparable to those associated with party, as well as individual-level characteristics, such as having served as a military officer.     

“We Can't be more Russian than the Russians”: British Policy During the Liman von Sanders Crisis, 1913–1914

This article examines British policy in the Liman von Sanders crisis, which arose between Germany and Russia in late 1913. It takes issue with recent arguments that Britain was too closely bound to the Dual Alliance of France and Russia, that concern for her Indian empire determined her foreign policy, and that the Anglo-German cooperation in 1912 and 1913 was a hollow détente. Britain played an important role in resolving the crisis, by restraining an erratic Russian policy and appealing to Germany to make concessions. Moreover, Britain was the dominant power in the entente and influenced French restraint in this crisis. This served Britain's interests in Turkey, which aimed at the strengthening of that state. Finally, the resolution of the crisis demonstrated a functioning international system, based on alliances and the Concert of Europe, not a system on the verge of collapse into war.     

Separated by the Atlantic: The British and de Gaulle, 1958–1967

The British and French held divergent views from the late 1940s on relations with the United States and on the development of European integration. Differences between the two countries caused particular strain once General Charles de Gaulle returned to power in 1958. The clash that ensued between British and French policies towards the Atlantic Alliance and Europe during his presidency is the subject of this article. It suggests that while the British were unable to overcome de Gaulle's resistance to their membership of the EEC, Britain's fortunes in Europe were nevertheless improved by the Wilson government's response to de Gaulle's actions in the Atlantic Alliance.     

Sir Austen Chamberlain and British Foreign Policy 1931–37

This article seeks to analyze Sir Austen Chamberlain’s critique of British foreign policy in the six years before his death in 1937. It presents Chamberlain as one of the most perceptive contemporary observers of the international scene, and in particular of Hitler’s Germany. Unusually among British politicians, Chamberlain drew a direct causal connection between the domestic policy of the Nazi regime and its likely behaviour in the international arena. However, it is suggested that the basis for his understanding was an innate anti-Germanism, which can be dated back to his experiences as a young man in the 1880s.     

Peace and quiet in the British House of Commons, 1990–2010

This article is concerned with disruption by Members of Parliament in the British House of Commons between 1990 and 2010. Disorder in the “Thatcherite” parliaments of the 1980s has been the subject of parliamentary and academic investigation, but the phenomenon since then has gone unexamined. This article introduces a distinction between non-tolerated and tolerated disorder. Non-tolerated disorder has been relatively rare in the House of Commons between 1990 and 2010, and can mainly be attributed to a handful of parliamentary “mavericks”. Tolerated disorder, which forms an accepted part of the Commons' culture, is also explored, and recent changes to the House are examined for their potential effects on the phenomenon. While opinions vary about the desirability of tolerated disorder, this article accepts the argument that it is a symptom of serious problems with the British governing tradition and will persist unless and until those problems are addressed.     

‘Walking the tightrope’: The Kosovo conflict and Russia in European security, 1998–August 1999

This article argues that Russia has pursued a policy of inclusive multipolarity towards European security after Primakov's appointment as Foreign Minister in 1996. This policy focused on three dimensions to constrain NATO and ensure a Russian voice in Europe. First, ties with NATO; second, the pursuit of OSCE reform and a European ‘Security Charter'; third, the primacy of the UN Security Council in international affairs. NATO actions in the Kosovo crisis deeply undermined all dimensions of this policy. However, inclusive multipolarity was not discarded by the Russian leadership. The tortuous path of Russian accommodation after May 1999 highlighted Russian attempts to reinstate this policy and restore a Russian voice in European security affairs — with limited success. This article examines the evolution of Russian shifts in this crisis until Vladimir Putin's appointment as Prime Minister in August 1999.     

British and American military operations in the Battle of Helmand, 2006–2011

In summer 2006, elements of the British Army were deployed to Helmand province in southern Afghanistan. The US Army followed with a surge in 2009 and 2010. The British and American military forces attempted to construct a counterinsurgency (COIN) approach to win the war in Helmand from 2006 until 2011, but the operational approach implemented was most often that of conventional warfighting. The inability to successfully implement COIN owed not to a lack of will, but rather to short tours, mission command, a lack of available resources, the particular situation on the ground in Helmand and the propensity of the Taliban to launch major conventional operations during much of the period in question.     

“The Greatest Success of British Diplomacy in East Asia in Recent Years”? British Diplomacy and the Ending of Confrontation, 1965–1966

Arthur de la Mare, an under-secretary of state at the British Foreign Office, wrote in 1967 that the ending of the Malaysia–Indonesia Confrontation of 1963–1966 was “the greatest success of British diplomacy in East Asia in recent years.” However, historians generally believe British influence in the process to end this conflict was extremely limited, as it has been widely accepted that this conflict ended through bilateral negotiations between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur. On one level, this view is accurate, but “Confrontation” took months to end and, during this process, British, American, and Malaysian officials hoped to encourage a change in leadership in Jakarta and an eventual end to the conflict. Confrontation was an anti-colonial and a regional dispute greatly affected by the Cold War environment in Southeast Asia and, therefore, not immune from international events or actors, especially the final phase of the conflict.     

Ministers,Markets and Missiles: The British Government,the European Economic Community and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1964–68

Existing accounts of British efforts to achieve a nuclear non-proliferation treaty between 1964 and 1968 largely overlook the later stages of decision making within the Labour government. Scrutiny of previously classified sources reveals that a desire for entry into the European Economic Community had a much larger influence on the content and conduct of British non-proliferation policy than previously suggested. By 1967, Prime Minister Harold Wilson sought a secondary role in treaty negotiations, and left the running to the superpowers. This avoided unnecessary conflict with the countries of the Community, resentful of the Treaty's discriminatory terms, and helped to protect Britain's application to join the EEC. Although this bid was unsuccessful, ambitions for future membership continued to influence non-proliferation policy in 1968. Indeed, a desire for future entry into the EEC helps to explain why Britain became the first nuclear weapon state to ratify the Treaty.     

The Secret Agent,International Policing,and Anarchist Terrorism: 1900–1914

An unprecedented expansion of global anti-terrorist policing took place after 1900, although the security forces projected outside their borders by Russia, Italy, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain, and Argentina displayed an enormous diversity in size and effectiveness. Crucial to successful policing was how these countries improved their intelligence through recruiting and handling informers, maintained secrecy and good relations with local police, and handled the media. The British approach to anarchist control was arguably the most successful. Italian international policing was the most far-reaching, while the United States long remained the world's most under-policed large country. On examination, the view that anti-anarchist policing was a case of conservative imperial regimes versus the Western democracies loses validity. During this period, a general trend saw the transfer of anarchist surveillance from the hands of diplomats into those of interior ministry officials and the police, all in the name of greater centralization, professionalization, and efficiency.