Herbert Hoover,Anglo–American Relations and Republican Party Politics in the 1920s

Herbert Hoover is often portrayed as a business-centric relatively non-political historical figure. In particular during his time as Commerce Secretary in the administrations of Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge, Hoover is often described as supporting a United States foreign policy that first and foremost served the needs of American corporations. This article attempts to recalibrate that picture by stressing Hoover’s political self-interest as a motivating factor in his policies. Far from being politically unconcerned, Hoover was a man desperate to become president of the United States. His disastrous campaign for the Republican nomination in 1920 made him doubly determined to use his power in the Republican cabinets to improve his chances for the nomination later. This can be seen in one of the most famous of Hoover’s foreign policy interventions, the Anglo-American rubber crisis. Far from serving the needs of American business, during this crisis Hoover was acting mostly from political self-interest. In particular attacking the British allowed him to reframe his image, which was seen as Anglophiliac in 1920. In the end it was a very successful rebranding, as Hoover was able to run for the presidency in 1928 from a position of strength when it came to foreign affairs.     

“Brighter Futures,Better Times”: Britain,the Empire,and Anglo–American Economic Competition in Cuba, 1898–1920

This article examines Anglo–American economic competition in Cuba in the crucial twenty years after 1898. Anglo–American economic competition on the new island nation suggest a number of things about the nature of British and American imperialism, the difficult position of smaller countries—and economies—like Cuba, and the “inevitability” of American economic pre-eminence in the evolving twentieth century. And as an important corollary to the British dimension of this question is the role that Canada and Canadian overseas investment played in the extension of Britain's economic power and influence in the wider world.     

Hanging the Kaiser: Anglo‐Dutch relations and the fate of Wilhelm II, 1918–20

The flight of the German Kaiser to the Netherlands at the end of the First World War led to a crisis in Anglo‐Dutch relations. Prime Minister David Lloyd George made the trial of the Kaiser a key issue in the British general election campaign of December 1918. Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles called for the Kaiser's surrender by the Netherlands government for trial before an international tribunal, a request the Dutch repeatedly refused during the period January to March 1920. Using both British and Dutch sources, this article highlights the internal Dutch debate over the fate of the Kaiser, and the confusion and hypocrisy with which the problem was handled by the British government.     

Beyond the American Century: Walter Lippmann and American Grand Strategy, 1943–1950

As the United States became a world Power, journalist and intellectual Walter Lippmann feared that it would become its own worst enemy. During and after the Second World War, he tried to steer the country towards coherent statecraft, to define the national interest and the limits of power, and give geopolitical expression to the role of the United States as the core of an Atlantic strategic system. But in response to world war, the Truman Doctrine, and the Korean War, he became pessimistic about the country's ability to conduct strategy effectively. In the prophetic tradition, he believed that a fatal symbiosis between America's growing strength and domestic politics led it towards crisis. Though at times ahistorical, Lippmann's concept of strategy deserves attention for its dialogue between power and identity, for its questioning of “ends” as well as means, and for its focus on the danger of self-defeating behaviour.     

Abba Eban and the Development of American–Israeli Relations, 1950–1959

Abba Eban, Israel’s ambassador in Washington and representative at the United Nations from 1950 to 1959, had a central role in the transformation of American–Israeli relations during a period of frequent discord over key strategic issues. This analysis examines the influence of one prominent actor upon bilateral ties that would eventually become the American–Israeli “special relationship.” Eban’s oratory talent, linguistic skills, and effective style of diplomacy augmented both Israel’s image in the view of the American public and relations with official Washington. The article explores several critical elements of these relations during the 1950s, re-examining both Eban’s involvement in events such as Israel’s approach toward the problem of borders, its policy of military retaliation, and the response to severe American pressure following the 1956 Sinai campaign. Whilst not attributing the development of close relations between the two Powers solely to the works of a single individual, evidence suggests that Eban was the right man in the right place and time to provide the necessary foundations for the elevation of American–Israeli relations to “special” in the following decade.     

The Danzig Question in British Foreign Policy, 1918–1920

Among the many and often bitter territorial disputes following the collapse of Germany and Russia in Central and Eastern Europe — to mention only the questions of Vilna, Memel, Teschen, or Lemberg — the problem of the Polish sea access was particularly explosive and became the most vexing territorial problem of the whole conference. This paper examines the question of Danzig and the lower Vistula within the context of contradicting Polish, German and Western, mainly British ambitions and preferences. The author shows that the proclamation of the Free City of Danzig and the creation of the Polish Corridor, dividing Germany into two parts, was a compromise not liked in Warsaw and Berlin and one the British, always fearing fatal repercussions to future stability, only considered to be the lesser choice of evils.     

Oleaginous Diplomacy: Oil,Anglo–American Relations and the Lausanne Conference, 1922–23

There has been considerable controversy as to the significance of oil in the Lausanne Conference of 1922–1923, in particular British attempts to retain Mosul as part of Iraq. However, as this article explores, the conference also had important implications for the composition of the British-registered Turkish Petroleum Company, which was expected to win the Iraqi oil concession. In the first phase of the conference, the United States observer delegation's stance persuaded the British Government to put pressure upon the British companies involved in the TPC to admit American companies upon the latter's terms. Despite this, in the second phase, the Americans supported the Turkish delegation in its opposition to clauses in the proposed Treaty, which would have guaranteed the rights of the TPC, and forced a British compromise on the issue. The Lausanne Conference played a significant role in the Anglo–American “oil war” of the inter-war period.     

British and American military operations in the Battle of Helmand, 2006–2011

In summer 2006, elements of the British Army were deployed to Helmand province in southern Afghanistan. The US Army followed with a surge in 2009 and 2010. The British and American military forces attempted to construct a counterinsurgency (COIN) approach to win the war in Helmand from 2006 until 2011, but the operational approach implemented was most often that of conventional warfighting. The inability to successfully implement COIN owed not to a lack of will, but rather to short tours, mission command, a lack of available resources, the particular situation on the ground in Helmand and the propensity of the Taliban to launch major conventional operations during much of the period in question.     

“A Genuine and Energetic League of Nations Policy”: Lord Curzon and the New Diplomacy, 1918–1925

At the end of April 1922, S.P. Waterlow of the Central Department of the Foreign Office, which dealt with Franco–German relations and European security, put up a memorandum. This claimed: “Except on paper and as an expedient for minor purposes or an escape for some dilemma, we have not taken the League [of Nations] seriously.” It contrasted London's indifference with the active use which Paris was making of the League, asserted that “the objects of British policy and those of the League are broadly speaking identical,” and urged: “let us institute a genuine and energetic League of Nations policy.” This recommendation was strongly endorsed by the Assistant Under-Secretary, Sir William Tyrrell, who believed that such a policy would secure almost universal popular support for co-operation with France, and he proposed making a joint declaration that for the purpose of maintaining the frontiers created by the Treaty of Versailles: “the two countries would place at the disposal of the League all their resources for the enforcement of its decisions.” ¹ 1. Waterlow memorandum, 28 April, Tyrrell minute, 29 April 1922, both FO 371/7567/6200/6200/18 [Foreign Office Archives, The National Archives, Kew, England}.      

German–American Intelligence Relations, 1945–1956: New Evidence on the Origins of the BND

Under the 1998 Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released a certain amount of documents relating to a German–American intelligence co-operation that began almost immediately after the German surrender of May 1945; it lasted until 1956 when the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) was founded, today's German foreign and military intelligence service. The Americans assembled, supervised, and largely financed what is often referred to as the “Gehlen organisation,” named after its leader, former Wehrmacht general, Reinhard Gehlen, who was chief of the BND until his retirement in 1968. Whilst the existence of this co-operation had been known since the 1940s, largely due to Soviet subversion and propaganda, very little reliable information and virtually no original source material was available before the release of this, somewhat redacted, material in 2002 and 2007. This article provides a sketch of how former Wehrmacht officers, and even a number with an ominous SS past, who might well have been war criminals, came to work, first for United States military intelligence and, from 1949, for the CIA. It looks at some of their operations during those turbulent post-war years, which include the Berlin airlift and German rearmament in response to the Korean War. The potential of those newly declassified documents, unfortunately, cannot be corroborated from other sources as long as German and Russian archives remain closed. Despite its manifold limitations, this material provides an exciting window into transatlantic intelligence history.     

Ethnic Actors and International Crises: Theory and Findings, 1918–2001

One of the most sustained debates among students of international politics concerns the linkage of systemic polarity to levels of stability. The present investigation attempts to contribute to this dialogue in two ways.

First, prior studies of polarity and stability are reappraised in terms of the central concepts and presumed causal linkage, leading to several changes in approach. Specifically, polarity cannot be assessed only in terms of the distribution of power; the concept also should incorporate the notion of autonomous decision centers. With respect to instability, war is considered to be a less complete indicator than international crisis. Incorporating these revised concepts, a model of security regimes is devised deductively, including a rank‐ordering of polarity configurations in terms of stability levels.

Second, renewed testing focuses on the presumed ordering of configurations from most to least stable: bipolarity (1945–62), multipolarity (1929–39) and polycentrism (1963–85). Data from the International Crisis Behavior Project on 292 cases from 1929 to 1985 provide the evidence to compare the phases of polarity. A set of bivariate indicators and a multivariate index are used in the assessment of instability, with each confirming the hypothesized ordering of polarity configurations.     

Great Powers,Counter Secession,and Non-Recognition: Britain and the 1983 Unilateral Declaration of Independence of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”

The role of Great Powers in processes of secession and recognition has attracted increasing attention from scholars in recent years. This analysis examines how Britain rallied international opposition to the November 1983 unilateral declaration of independence [UDI] of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” [TRNC]. The British Government tried hard to prevent the UDI. Once it occurred, Britain led efforts to condemn the move. It resulted in United Nations Security Council Resolution 541, which declared the TRNC illegal and called on states not to recognise it. As well as exploring the diplomacy behind the counter-secession efforts, this examination also answers a long-standing question as to whether any countries aside from Turkey ever recognised the TRNC. It also challenges the widely held view amongst Greek Cypriots that Britain invariably supports the Turkish Cypriots on the Cyprus Problem.     

Anglo–French Imperial Relations in the Arab World: Intelligence Liaison and Nationalist Disorder, 1920–1939

Faced with intractable problems of popular protest and nationalist insurgency, French and British imperial administrations across the Arab world frequently exchanged various forms of covert intelligence with one another. Much of this information was open source human intelligence relating to local political activity. Higher grade material, and particularly signals intelligence was less regularly shared, not least as the Entente partners continued to spy on each other throughout the inter-war years. Ironically, while the French and British colonial security services shared similar pre-occupations and objectives, their common threat perceptions were not enough to break down the abiding mutual suspicions between them. As a result, their networks of information exchange remained patchy. This only made the tasks of imperial government and the containment of disorder harder than might otherwise have been the case.     

Britain,France, and Mesopotamian Oil, 1916–1920

This analysis centres on British and French policies concerning Mesopotamian oil between 1916 and 1920. Both Powers already had some degree of interest in oil matters before the war, but these concerns did not leave a particularly strong imprint on the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. During the First World War, both Britain and France became aware of their lack of oil and identified Mesopotamian oil as a key war aim. Both Powers developed close relations with Royal Dutch-Shell to further their oil policies. After the war, the struggle for oil proved inseparable from the territorial settlement in the Middle East and relations with oil companies. All actors did not initially recognise this fact, and it was only during 1919–1920 that an increasing awareness developed that oil and territorial issues were inseparable. Combined with changes in political leadership, it made possible a “silent compromise” at San Remo in April 1920.     

Puppet Dictator in the Banana Republic? Re-examining Honduran–American Relations in the Era of Tiburcio Carías Andino, 1933–1938

Most scholarship depicts the Honduran president, Tiburcio Carías Andino, as little more than an obedient puppet of the United States and the United Fruit Company, the classic client dictator running the archetypal “banana republic.” Using both Honduran and American sources, this article challenges the validity of Carías’ supposedly unquestioned compliance with American demands, arguing that Carías was an independent actor capable of using, manipulating, and defying the United States in pursuit of his own disparate goals.     

“Ultimate Destiny” Delayed: The Liberals,the Organization of American States,and Canadian Foreign Policy, 1963–1968

Until Canada joined in 1990, the issue of its membership in the Organisation of American States bedevilled Canadian foreign policy, which many observers saw as a decisive test of Ottawa’s interest in Latin America. Under the Liberal government of Lester Pearson, prime minister from 1963 to 1968, and the stewardship of his secretary of state for External Affairs, Paul Martin, Canada seemed poised to join OAS. But a mixture of foreign and domestic factors—including American intervention in the Dominican Republic, Cuba’s isolation within the hemisphere, and growing Canadian nationalism—ruined this initiative. Using the Pearson government’s policy toward the OAS as a lens through which to explore the direction of Canadian foreign relations in the 1960s, this analysis also examines competing views of Canada’s place in the world.