Austen Chamberlain and Britain's Relations with France, 1924–1929

Several historians have suggested that Austen Chamberlain's Francophile tendencies during his period as foreign secretary between 1924 and 1929 were the defining features of his European diplomatic strategy. By examining four key events: the rejection of the Geneva Protocol, the conclusion of the Treaty of Locarno, the Anglo–French Compromise on disarmament and the negotiation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, this article argues that Chamberlain's relationship with the French was not entirely harmonious. After the high point of Locarno, Britain's relations with France became increasingly tense because of Chamberlain's growing disillusionment with Briand's willingness to pursue a diplomatic agenda that did not have at its heart a reinvigorated Entente Cordiale.     

The Danzig Question in British Foreign Policy, 1918–1920

Among the many and often bitter territorial disputes following the collapse of Germany and Russia in Central and Eastern Europe — to mention only the questions of Vilna, Memel, Teschen, or Lemberg — the problem of the Polish sea access was particularly explosive and became the most vexing territorial problem of the whole conference. This paper examines the question of Danzig and the lower Vistula within the context of contradicting Polish, German and Western, mainly British ambitions and preferences. The author shows that the proclamation of the Free City of Danzig and the creation of the Polish Corridor, dividing Germany into two parts, was a compromise not liked in Warsaw and Berlin and one the British, always fearing fatal repercussions to future stability, only considered to be the lesser choice of evils.     

The Rhetoric of Appeasement: Hitler's Legitimation and British Foreign Policy, 1938–39

Few grand strategies have been more scrutinized than Britain's decision to appease Nazi Germany. From 1933 to 1938, Britain eschewed confrontation and attempted to settle German demands. However in the five months following the negotiations at Munich, the British abandoned appeasement and embraced a policy of confronting the German state. The roots of both appeasement and confrontation can be found in Germany's legitimation strategies. Until the Munich crisis, Adolf Hitler justified Germany's aims with appeals to collective security, equality, and self-determination—norms central to the European system established by the Treaty of Versailles. After Munich, in contrast, German politicians abandoned these legitimation strategies, arguing instead that expansion was justified as a matter of German might, and not international rights. As Britain came to see German demands as illegitimate, so too did they decide this revisionist state was insatiable, impervious to negotiation, and responsive only to the language of force.     

British Policy and the Ruhr Crisis 1922–24

This article provides an overview of British policy during a defining episode in the interwar period — the Ruhr crisis of 1923–4. The author assesses the external considerations influencing Britain's policy (especially the roles of France, Germany, and the United States), and also explores the processes of foreign policy making within Britain's complex bureaucratic system. In particular, the relationship between the Foreign Office and the Treasury is analyzed and its impact on European policy assessed. The article challenges traditional views of British policy at this time, concluding that it was far more complex, but also far more limited and constrained, than previous studies would suggest.     

A More Pragmatic and Flexible Foreign Policy

During his second tenure, Clinton will pay more attention to diplomatic workand may make some adjustments in his foreign policy while maintainingcontinuity of the policy during his first tenure.1. The guideline of foreign policy of the new administration would be charac-terized by the following three features:     

Turkey's New Foreign Policy and the Future of Turkey–EU Relations

When European Muslim citizens are involved in social conflicts or when they contest the place that is given them in Europe, these political claims are often seen as radical and inspired by external influences. If an attempt is made to understand what part the influences of the so-called Muslim “countries of origin” play in the way Muslims contest European models of society and integration, it turns out that the roots of radicalisation are often purely European. The idea that it is the Islamic and communitarian nature of the European Muslim way of life which is at the base of their failing integration has to be challenged. Indeed, the initiatives of religious actors have failed to channel the radicalisation of European Muslims’ political demands. The role of the religious variable is of much less importance in political radicalisation than the lack of an institutional response to the demands for greater social and economic integration.     

British Foreign Policy,the Financial Elite,and the Nationalisation of the Constantinople Quays Company, 1934–1945

The analysis examines the role of British financial institutions, namely the Bank of England and the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders [CFB], in the making of British policy towards Turkey. The nationalisation of the Constantinople Quays Company, a port operator purchased in 1907 by the British and French governments, serves as a case study through which business–state relations, the role of finance in the conduct of international relations, and the impact of perceptions on policy decisions are explored. In this case, the financial elite’s role was minimal during most of the period considered, becoming more important in the final war years in a framework of the Anglo–Turkish debt restructuring negotiations of 1944. Significantly, the CFB, rather than the Bank, represented the British government in the negotiations. There exists an abundance of evidence of the divergent views between Whitehall and the financial elite about Turkey’s trustworthiness as a debtor and a signatory to treaties. The British government’s perceptions were much more positive than those of the financial elite. This difference stemmed from the different interests involved: Whitehall sought to secure Turkey’s collaboration in the increasingly unstable global security environment while the Bank and the CFB were more concerned with investor and bondholder interests and attempted to avoid further financial losses.     

India''''s Adjustment of Foreign Policy and Sino-Indian Relations

Since the beginning of this year, India has shown a series of marvelous accomplishments in foreign policy, of which, beside dramatic change of relations with, Pakistan, perhaps the most eye-catching is the rapid warm-up of Sino-lndian relations. During the     

Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Wilson and the Greek Dictators, 1967–1970

The military coup of 21 April 1967 brought to power a repressive dictatorship in Greece. It proceeded to deprive Greeks of their human rights and civil liberties, outraged international public opinion and strained transatlantic relations during the Cold War. The “Greek case” culminated in the withdrawal of Greece from the Council of Europe and calls for its expulsion from NATO. This article will analyse the foreign policy considerations that determined British policy towards the Greek junta during 1967—such as Cold War realities, alliance dynamics, economic and commercial imperatives, regional instability in the Mediterranean and domestic pressures. It will look at how these factors coalesced into shaping British policy towards the Greek junta into one in which human rights had little bearing. The article will also consider the impact of the “Greek case” on the image and credibility of the Labour government of 1966–1970 and explain why vociferous anti-junta activities in London were to create such policy difficulties for the British government.     

Sir George Clerk and the struggle for British influence in central Europe, 1919–26

During the Great War, Sir George Clerk was a senior Foreign Office official, strongly sympathetic to the cause of the ‘oppressed nationalities’ of Austria‐Hungary and the liberal ideals associated with the journal, The New Europe. In 1919 he was granted a unique opportunity to shape the face of the New Europe when he embarked on his mission to Hungary. As British minister to Czechoslovakia in the early 1920s, Clerk harnessed his idealism for the Czechs to his ambition to make Prague a centre of British influence and power in central Europe. Though this policy ultimately failed, Clerk showed a greater rapport and sympathy for the Czechs than any of his successors.     

Scientific Outlook on Development and China＇s Foreign Policy

More than half a century has passed since the founding of the People＇s Republic of China. There have been successes as well as failures in China＇s policies and practices at home and abroad. The failures are stepping stones for success; lessons drawn from errors lead to truth. Chinese leader Hu Jintao recently spoke about ＂Scientific Outlook on Development, ＂＇ a summary of past history and an important guiding principle for China＇s economic and social development both now and in future. The authors believe that this is a major development in China＇s strategic thinking following Deng Xiaoping＇s ＂Reform and Opening Up＂ and Jiang Zemin＇s ＂Three Representatives＂ and that it should be upheld and applied to foreign policy decision making.     

Oil Scarcity Ideology in US Foreign Policy, 1908–97

Over the past century peak oil forecasts have had a profound influence on US foreign policy. Unquestioned acceptance of these forecasts, all of which proved wrong, repeatedly led policymakers to assume that rival powers sought to seize dwindling supplies or that disaffected exporter states would decline to sell. Perennial expectation of impending scarcity elevated the perceived importance of foreign oil, especially from the Middle East (ME). In response, increasingly aggressive US policies were adopted to secure ME oil. I call belief in an oil scarcity imperative for aggressive policy oil scarcity ideology. Policymakers’ concerns over oil's availability were repeatedly challenged by market information, which was always ignored. Recurring pessimism over future supply during times of high price was always followed by oversupply and low price, yet aggressive polices to secure supply were never reassessed after scarcity failed to materialize. Scarcity ideology's exemption from scrutiny drove a policy ratchet: US–ME policy could become more aggressive, but not less.     

The Future and Influence of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy

AftertheColdWarespeciallyafter″9·11″incidenttheinternationalsituationhasprofoundlychangedandthepoliticalturbulencehasintensified.Securi-tyissuesaresoprominentthatithasbecomeoneofthetopicsfordiscussionworldwidearousinggreatattentionfromallcountriesespeciallythebigpow-ers.InthisregardtheEUhasbeenmakingagreatefforttoworkoutitscommonforeignandsecuritypolicyandcarrieditforwardasthefocalpointintheconstructionofintegration.IwillputforwardthreepointsinregardtotheprospectsofEUcom-monforeignandsecu…     

Sir Eric Phipps,the British Government,and the Appeasement of Germany, 1933–1937

This article argues that Sir Eric Phipps’ reputation as an “anti-appeaser” of Germany during his Berlin embassy 1933–1937 is not accurate. While Phipps was not in favor of placating Hitler by making territorial concessions, he had much in common with those who had sought a rapprochement with Germany in the 1920s through a policy of inclusion and reconciliation. Particular importance is placed on Phipps’ attitude towards the League of Nations, with detailed consideration also being accorded to his relationship with the British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Office officials of the period, as well as his views on the Entente Cordiale.     

Change and Stability in Eastern Asia: Nationalism,Communism, and British Policy, 1948–1955

British policy in Eastern Asia, 1948–55, aimed to combine the attainment of change leading to stability, to be secured through cooperating with nationalism against the growing threat from communism. After initial errors, ministers and officials revealed realism and flexibility, as shown in policies towards Burma, Malaya, and China. As regards Japan, the United States dominated decisionmaking and British views were rather negative towards the viability of political reform in the longer term and towards economic revival. The collapse of French authority in Indo-China pushed Anthony Eden towards compromise with the communist powers at the Geneva conference in 1954: Britain diverged from the US in supporting a strictly defensive alliance (SEATO), which was linked with an ambivalent approach to the future of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.     

International Order in the 21st Century and China''''s Foreign Policy

Dramatic changes have occurred in the post-Cold Warworld strategic configuration and international order withtheir replacements burgeoning. This confronts nations, bigpowers in particular, with new strategic choices. Indeed unfol-ding before us is a contention among them for seizing the initia-tive in the emerging international landscape in the21st century.Thus how to correctly assess and respond to these changes forpursuing a reasonable strategy and selecting a right policy op-tion is not on…     

U.S.,Europe and China in Russia''''s Foreign Policy

Regardingitsmilitarystrengthespeciallythenu-cleararsenalRussiaisstillmoreorlessaglobalpowercomparedwiththeU.S.Howeverintermsofthecomprehensivenationalstrengthitisatmostaregionalpowerrankingahead.ThreeyearsagoRussiawascalleda″second-classcountry″byPutin.AlthoughRussiapaysattentiontobothglobalandregionalissuesitconcernsmoreaboutthosehavingdirectbearingonitsnationalinterests.U.S.EuropeandChinaarevalueddifferentlyinRussia'sforeignaffairs.Nomatterwhatkindofroleeachofthemplaysleadingindispens…