Castlereagh and France

As Foreign Secretary, Castlereagh had to cope with the reality of France as an enemy as well as with France as a potential ally. This article examines the pragmatic evolution of Castlereagh's diplomacy from 1812, when an international coalition had to be brought and then kept together that could defeat Napoleon, to the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna, where France emerged as a vital part of the new European equilibrium. In settling Europe after nearly two decades of war the fate of France was central.     

The United Nations and the right to self‐determination: A response to Mahalingam's reply

France has had a long history of struggle with various forms of terrorism and over the past decade has achieved particular success against Algerian Islamic terrorist groups – the GIA and GSPC – with close links to Al-Qaeda. This article reviews France's experience of terrorism since the end of the Second World War and details the evolving state responses to these challenges and the sophisticated anti-terrorist apparatus that now serves the French state. It then considers the role of France in the post-11 September ‘war on terrorism’ and argues that France remains in the front-line of the struggle against Al-Qaeda and that the French experience has much to contribute to the international war against Islamic terrorism.     

The emergence of the Arab state system reconsidered

The literature on the Arab state system is based on the assumption that the establishment of the Arab League in 1945 heralded the birth of the system. The main argument of this article, however, is that the main features of the Arab system had crystallized in the mid-1930s and that the formation of the Arab League only instutionalized the existing patterns. Although the emerging system was deeply penetrated by Britain and France, the intense interactions among the core Arab states indicated that they enjoyed considerable leeway which allowed them to pursue their own interests and form an Arab system with its own patterns and features. In addition, it is argued that in spite of the artificiality of most of the Arab states, local nationalism (wataniyya) had become as strong as pan-Arabism (qawmiyya), and statehood had become a major attribute of the Arab system.     

France and the Origins of the United Nations, 1944–1945: “Si La France ne compte plus,qu’on nous le dise”

During their long exile during 1940–1944, various components of the “Free French” were largely kept out of the “Post-War Planning” process that took place in the American State Department. They perceived this absence as a major, and often deliberate, humiliation that made the circumstances of their exile all the more exasperating. Charles de Gaulle was seen by the “Anglo–Saxon” Allies as a figure of dubious worth and usefulness, and Washington’s general tone was to dismiss the exiles as the “so-called Free French.” They were admitted to the decision-making process only slowly and grudgingly, and not until after many of the key decisions about organising the United Nations had been taken. This article shows how that exclusion affected the French leadership, how they reacted, and suggests some lasting results. It also assesses to what extent France had a coherent contribution to the formation of a global international organisation during 1943–1944, and what factors inhibited France properly articulating that contribution.     

“A Very Great Clerk”: Sir Ronald Campbell and the Fall Of France,May–June 1940 1

Sir Ronald H. Campbell was the first British ambassador during the Second World War to manage a key bilateral relationship with a wartime ally. When the Germans invaded France in May 1940, Campbell's Embassy was transformed from a diplomatic reporting post into a frontline base that had to brief London not only on the political situation in France but also on strategic military matters. However, the British ambassador would constantly struggle to register his authority in the overall management of the Franco-British relationship, and more often than not, was bypassed by Whitehall departments, special advisors and senior ministers. Campbell only found himself in a more pivotal role as communications between the British and French Governments disintegrated and the latter moved to Bordeaux. It then fell upon Campbell to make some of the most dramatic decisions in twentieth century Franco-British history.     

“A Very Great Clerk”: Sir Ronald Campbell and the Fall Of France, May-June 1940

Sir Ronald H. Campbell was the first British ambassador during the Second World War to manage a key bilateral relationship with a wartime ally. When the Germans invaded France in May 1940, Campbell's Embassy was transformed from a diplomatic reporting post into a frontline base that had to brief London not only on the political situation in France but also on strategic military matters. However, the British ambassador would constantly struggle to register his authority in the overall management of the Franco-British relationship, and more often than not, was bypassed by Whitehall departments, special advisors and senior ministers. Campbell only found himself in a more pivotal role as communications between the British and French Governments disintegrated and the latter moved to Bordeaux. It then fell upon Campbell to make some of the most dramatic decisions in twentieth century Franco-British history.     

The relativity of decline: a reappraisal of French leadership and influence in a time of global crisis

This article is an attempt, in the context of the Eurozone crisis that has shaken Europe since 2008, to explore and deconstruct two pieces of conventional wisdom on French leadership in Europe and the world. The stereotypical image of a country in decline and denial, out of touch with today’s globalised world, is reproduced so often in the Anglo-American media and even in scholarly discourse, that is has become a self-evident truism. The article examines this truism in two different perspectives: there is, on the one hand, the axiom that France has lost influence in Europe and that the balance of power has shifted inexorably to Germany and, on the other hand, the axiom that Europe does not matter in the global ‘power shift’ and that, as part of Europe, France does not count any more either. In questioning the origins and validity of these axioms, the authors argue that a strong perception bias persists and is constantly perpetuated even though reality has changed. Not only has France rather successfully adapted to globalisation in both political and economic terms, but it has also found new ways and discourses about its role as Germany’s partner in leadership in the European Union. The paper goes on to show that both France and the EU retain and use significant levers for action in three dimensions of power—coercion, agenda-setting and attraction. It concludes that going into 2012, France remains an active and important actor, both in the EU and on the global scene. It is present and influential in major international institutions, effectively builds international coalitions and floats important ideas on reforming laissez-faire capitalism.     

Is French defence policy becoming more Atlanticist?

France is one of the most prominent European military powers and a strong proponent of an independent European military capability. Yet, France’s actions since 2009 suggest that it may be prioritizing the transatlantic relationship over the development of the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy. Does this signal a fundamental Atlanticist shift in the way that France envisions its future defence and security, or does it simply signal a temporary re-evaluation of French Europeanist security ambitions? Our analysis attempts to answer whether there is presently an Atlanticist shift evident in French foreign policy, and whether any such shift is rooted in a desire to preserve French influence through international institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This paper combines elite interviews with content analysis of French media comparing the current time with the mid-1990s to determine whether there is a shift in how defence and security issues are discussed and, if so, whether that signals a fundamental change. We find that, while there is a shift, it does not necessarily indicate a more Atlanticist posture, but suggests rather a pragmatic move to further French security goals through the most effective institutional mechanisms available.     

François Mitterrand’s Visit to Sarajevo, 28 June 1992

At 10:30 in the morning on 28 June 1992, a Dauphin helicopter landed at Sarajevo airport carrying a precious cargo: the French president, François Mitterrand. Since the beginning of the Bosnian War, Bosnian Serb forces had controlled the airport and restricted the delivery of humanitarian aid to the city’s destitute population, which formed an important cornerstone of their siege strategy. In reaching the airport, the president secured its re-opening and, with it, the commencement of one of the longest humanitarian airlifts in history. However, Mitterrand’s visit also had implications and significance beyond the Bosnian capital. The visit secured humanitarian intervention through the United Nations as the international community’s modus operandi for conflict resolution in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Through its permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council and enthusiastic engagement with humanitarian intervention, France would shape the intervention in Bosnia-Hercegovina and thus continue to justify its position amongst the world’s Great Powers.     

The emergence of the Arab state system reconsidered

The literature on the Arab state system is based on the assumption that the establishment of the Arab League in 1945 heralded the birth of the system. The main argument of this article, however, is that the main features of the Arab system had crystallized in the mid‐1930s and that the formation of the Arab League only instutionalized the existing patterns. Although the emerging system was deeply penetrated by Britain and France, the intense interactions among the core Arab states indicated that they enjoyed considerable leeway which allowed them to pursue their own interests and form an Arab system with its own patterns and features. In addition, it is argued that in spite of the artificiality of most of the Arab states, local nationalism (wataniyya) had become as strong as pan‐Arabism (qawmiyya), and statehood had become a major attribute of the Arab system.     

Conflicting Identities: French Economic Diplomacy between the State and Companies in the Twentieth Century

The question of diplomatic identity has rarely seen study from a specifically historical perspective rooted in the long term. This analysis explores the role and self-perceptions of an unknown and, yet, central actor in the French economic diplomacy: the commercial counsellor. It offers new and stimulating ideas on the entangled links between State and the business sphere in France. The fundamental ambivalence of the commercial counsellor’s identity illuminates the atypical nature of French commercial diplomacy from 1918 to the 2000s. Through assimilation into the Ministry of Economy and in a Janus-like role facing both the Quai d’Orsay and French companies, French commercial counsellors have had to endure a complicated situation whilst remaining the Cinderella of the diplomatic sphere. Deploying an historical analysis to enrich the contemporary debate on the state of diplomacy, this study explores the impact of interventions by non-state actors at the heart of the diplomatic machinery. Far from being an innovation of the 1990s, this intervention was a recurring theme throughout the twentieth century, and its examination sheds new light on the persistence of the neo-corporatist practice of commercial diplomacy in France.     

Diplomacy at the United Nations: The dual agenda of the 1992 security council summit

The Security Council summit meeting of 31 January 1992 was supposed to be a momentous event that would determine the course of the world body and international peace and security in the post-Cold War era. Despite high expectations, though, the actual meeting did not produce much more than a broadly-phrased declaration of good intentions. The article examines the hypothesis that the meeting had a dual agenda, with a hidden as well as a public part. It is argued that the main item on the hidden agenda was the confirmation, beyond any doubt or potential challenge, of Russia as the rightful successor to the USSR permanent seat on the Security Council. This suited well the weakened major remnant of the former Soviet Union as well as the other permanent members of the Security Council, especially the UK and France, who had good reasons to want to defer indefinitely any reexamination of the Council's composition and powers.     

Entente Neo-Coloniale?: Ernest Bevin and the Proposals for an Anglo-French Third World Power, 1945-1949

Ernest Bevin made the Third World Power project his own. He sought an imperial grouping led by Britain and France with economic and defence components and social-democratic values. It was to be a way to access raw materials and bolster European economies, and in time to create a global, strategic space between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Bevin's alternative vision failed, in part because the demands of cold war bipolarity trumped the Third World Power concept. The project was also poorly conceived and badly managed, and did not stem antagonism between Britain and France. France, unlike Britain, was also soon able to upgrade its imperial commercial interests through the European Communities.     

17世纪末法国与暹罗外交的斡旋者-塔查尔

大航海时代的开启让欧洲君主的视野由陆地面向海洋，而在整个扩张过程中，法国作为在西、葡、荷之后崛起的欧洲新势力，从17世纪逐步向亚洲渗透，并希望取而代之。法国抓住暹罗主动示好的机会首次向其派遣了使团，虽未取得预期的成功，但在塔查尔的推动下，路易十四决定继续坚持下去。塔氏怀着使整个暹罗改宗的理想，脱离了赴华传教团，一生5次往返于欧亚大陆之间以推动两国外交，最后他的事业却以失败而告终。虽然17世纪末法国在暹罗的种种活动已经体现出了它的殖民主义野心，但从塔查尔的主观来看，他所做的一切努力依然只是为了传播福音，拯救生灵。     

Entente Neo-Coloniale?: Ernest Bevin and the Proposals for an Anglo–French Third World Power, 1945–1949

Ernest Bevin made the Third World Power project his own. He sought an imperial grouping led by Britain and France with economic and defence components and social-democratic values. It was to be a way to access raw materials and bolster European economies, and in time to create a global, strategic space between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Bevin's alternative vision failed, in part because the demands of cold war bipolarity trumped the Third World Power concept. The project was also poorly conceived and badly managed, and did not stem antagonism between Britain and France. France, unlike Britain, was also soon able to upgrade its imperial commercial interests through the European Communities.     

W. Borodziej,S. Dębski, (Eds.), Polish Documents on Foreign Policy, 24 October 1938–30 September 1939

In 1927 in the Benedictine Abbey of St Andrew in Bruges a group of postulants was admitted as novices to the Order of Saint Benedict. Among the guests were the Chinese Ambassadors to Belgium, France and Portugal, the Belgian Ambassador to Switzerland, the Chinese chargé d'affaires at The Hague and various other dignitaries. They were there to witness their former colleague and fellow countryman, Lu Zhengxiang, enter the Benedictine Order and take the name of Frater Pierre Célestin. He had had a glittering diplomatic career in the service of China and had held the highest posts, including those of Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.     

Plus ça change, … : The Allocation of French ODA to Africa During and After the Cold War

France is frequently identified as the country whose official development assistance (ODA) aid program is most oriented toward the promotion of its foreign policy goals. We examine whether France reoriented the allocation of its aid in Africa to reflect changing priorities in the 1990s. Using panel data, we compare the patterns in French aid allocation to African recipients during the period 1980–1989 with that during the period 1990–2000. We find that nearly all the same political, economic, diplomatic, and cultural variables that explain French ODA allocation during the Cold War apply in the second period as well, though to a slightly lesser degree. The predictive strength of the prior years’ ODA commitments did increase in magnitude, suggesting that bureaucratic inertia increasingly exerts a formidable force in such decisions.     

Mediation within the French Industrial Relations Context: The SFR Cegetel Case

This article examines the introduction of mediation in the French industrial relations context, as illustrated by the case of the SFR Cegetel collective agreement on social dialogue, which was signed in June 2002. This article provides an overview of relevant French legislation and explores why mediation is used so infrequently in France to settle labor conflicts, examines the growing interest in mediation in France as exemplified in the implementation of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) programs in several firms, and analyzes the barriers and incentives to mediation as well as the impact of internal mediation on the relations between management and employees.
We conclude that while inherited customs and lack of information curtail the use of mediation, disputants increasingly favor mediation as an option when they wish to gain time or when the situation is filled with especially acute open conflict. In addition, we conclude that the introduction of mediation favors a more participatory style of management, improves relationships between management and employees, and induces a better social dialogue within the firm.     

Britain,France, and Mesopotamian Oil, 1916–1920

This analysis centres on British and French policies concerning Mesopotamian oil between 1916 and 1920. Both Powers already had some degree of interest in oil matters before the war, but these concerns did not leave a particularly strong imprint on the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. During the First World War, both Britain and France became aware of their lack of oil and identified Mesopotamian oil as a key war aim. Both Powers developed close relations with Royal Dutch-Shell to further their oil policies. After the war, the struggle for oil proved inseparable from the territorial settlement in the Middle East and relations with oil companies. All actors did not initially recognise this fact, and it was only during 1919–1920 that an increasing awareness developed that oil and territorial issues were inseparable. Combined with changes in political leadership, it made possible a “silent compromise” at San Remo in April 1920.     

France,Britain and the intervention in Libya: an integrated analysis

This article seeks to explain the decisions by Nicolas Sarkozy's France and David Cameron's Britain to intervene in the 2011 Libyan crisis. None of the three major theories of international relations—constructivism, defensive realism and liberalism—can explain on its own such intervention decisions as the Libya case. The article's novel analytical model proposes that each theory emphasizes factors and mechanisms that explain part of the decision-making process and that these factors interact with state behaviour in complex ways. Britain and France initially began to consider intervention because they felt that the emergent norm of the ‘responsibility to protect’ applied to the Libyan case and because they believed the massive flows of refugees fleeing the violence were a threat to their border security. Both countries believed military intervention could be successful at relatively low cost and that if they did not intervene the problem would not be solved. At that point, the Sarkozy and Cameron governments engaged in initial action that made them more likely to intervene by jeopardizing their future economic relations with the Gaddafi regime and making him more likely to threaten them with future terrorist attacks. Taking initial action also meant that French and British prestige would ultimately have suffered had they not intervened to achieve a satisfactory solution to the crisis. Paris and London viewed international and regional support as a critical prerequisite for intervention and they sought and attained it. Finally, the Sarkozy and Cameron governments were able to minimize any domestic political risk of intervening because they had public and/or opposition party support.