Dual engagement: France and the Persian Gulf

With the end of the Cold War international relations began anew without the bipolar constraints of two ideologically opposed superpowers. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 represented the first challenge to the nascent post‐Cold War Persian Gulf security environment. Within the region, France is once again increasingly active in the economic, political and military fields. The re‐evaluation of Washington's ability to remain engaged at its current levels within the Gulf may be attributed in large part to a growing sensitivity in Riyadh and other Arab capitals to the visible US presence coupled with an American foreign policy which is, at times, inconsistent. The net future effect of contemporary trends may be one in which the Gulf Sheikhdoms welcome French ascendancy and US decline. France has experienced its own foreign policy transformation marked by the leadership of President Chirac. Where President Mitterrand sought the role of power broker in regional affairs, President Chirac seeks increased influence and importance.     

'Suez in reverse': The Arab response to the Iraqi bid for Kuwait, 1961-63

On 25 June 1961,';Abd al-Qarim Qassem, the ruler of Iraq, declared Kuwait to be an integral par of Iraq. The announcement ignited a crisis involving Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and aLL the Arab states. In retrospect, and in light of Saddam Husayn's subsequent invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, one may regard this event as a 'dress rehearsal'. Despite its being mainly an Arab crisis, most studies have focused on the role of the Western powers-in particular Britain. This article, in contrast, aims to shed new light on the conduct of the Arab states during the Arab world operated as a system with its own features and characteristics. The article shows that the crisis heralded the decline of President Nasser's central role in the Arab system - a trend that was reinforced with the demise of the Egyptain-Syrian merger shortly after. In addition, although the dialogue between the Arab rules was couched in pan-Arab terminology, the players acted according to thier own interests, thus strengthening the territorial Arab state.     

'Suez in reverse': The arab response to the iraqi bid for Kuwait, 1961-63

On 25 June 1961,';Abd al-Qarim Qassem, the ruler of Iraq, declared Kuwait to be an integral par of Iraq. The announcement ignited a crisis involving Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and aLL the Arab states. In retrospect, and in light of Saddam Husayn's subsequent invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, one may regard this event as a 'dress rehearsal'. Despite its being mainly an Arab crisis, most studies have focused on the role of the Western powers-in particular Britain. This article, in contrast, aims to shed new light on the conduct of the Arab states during the Arab world operated as a system with its own features and characteristics. The article shows that the crisis heralded the decline of President Nasser's central role in the Arab system - a trend that was reinforced with the demise of the Egyptain-Syrian merger shortly after. In addition, although the dialogue between the Arab rules was couched in pan-Arab terminology, the players acted according to thier own interests, thus strengthening the territorial Arab state.     

Italy and the Gulf Crisis: European and domestic dimensions

Much recent international press coverage of Spain's difficulties portrays a country rapidly approaching political, economic and social meltdown. Its economy is contracting, its unemployment rate is at unprecedented levels and its sovereign risk premium hovers at apparently unsustainable levels. Spain will undoubtedly require external financial help from its European partners, as well as more time and flexibility to achieve its fiscal targets. But it also has a number of strengths that are too often overlooked. Spending cuts and structural reforms are proceeding at a lively pace, unit labour costs are falling significantly, and exports and productivity are on the rise. In short, there is light at the end of the tunnel.     

Superpower and Small-State Mediation in the Qatar Gulf Crisis

ABSTRACT

The Qatar Gulf crisis of 2017 saw a number of mediation initiatives, including those of the United States and Kuwait. However, the two countries present two substantially distinct models of third-party intervention: superpower mediation (the United States) and small-state mediation (Kuwait). Comparing the two types of intervention in this crisis in terms of their ability to de-escalate tension and effectively resolve the Gulf crisis with respect to three variables – timing of mediation, leverage of the mediator (hard power versus legitimacy) and interest of the mediator – it would seem that small-state mediation has been more effective in crisis de-escalation, while superpower mediation has further exacerbated the crisis.     

从伊朗核危机看印度-美国战略关系

近期以来,美国力图以强化核不扩散机制为由开展与印度的民用核能合作,深化双边在战略层面的关系;与此同时,美国极力通过国际机制和军事威慑加强对据信正秘密发展核武器的伊朗进行制裁。由于印度、伊朗的相异处境及与美国和国际核机制的关联,伊朗核问题不可避免地成为影响、度量印美关系的重要因素之一。     

The Case of the Missing Hegemon: British Nonintervention in the American Civil War

Balance of power theories have come roaring back into prominence in recent years as international relations theory grapples with new developments, including offshore balancing and soft balancing. Recent works demonstrate the importance of more than just the distribution of power, and have addressed the role that domestic politics plays in balancing. One overlooked aspect of this debate, with implications for offensive realism and the current discussion on the United States and soft balancing, is the role that nonintervention conventions play in decision making. British nonintervention during the American Civil War presents a case at odds with offensive realist theory, as Britain should have intervened to protect its national interests—cotton, trade, and shipping—while also restraining a regional hegemonic power. Domestic cleavages, democratic peace norms, and public opinion pressures do not sufficiently explain this behavior. Instead, this paper posits that nonintervention was a result of British adherence to precedents and conventions.     

Hegemony,Force Posture,and the Provision of Public Goods: The Once and Future Role of Outside Powers in Securing Persian Gulf Oil

International relations theories emphasize the stabilizing role hegemons play in world politics. But little scholarship has examined the link connecting hegemony to its potentially positive returns in the security realm: force posture. We correct this deficit by developing and testing an argument about the consequences of different hegemonic force postures under varying threat conditions. We present a typology of force posture options and probe their effects through over-time analysis of how major powers have worked to provide one particularly important public good since 1945: access to Persian Gulf oil. Drawing on field work, we also explore the implications of our framework for current and future US force posture in the region. We conclude that hegemonic stability is a very real phenomenon in the Gulf, but it does not require the massive forward deployment of US forces that has characterized the past twenty years of US presence there.