“Under the Influence of Mahan”: Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt and their Understanding of American National Interest

This article explores links in the grand strategic outlook of Theodore Roosevelt and Franklin Roosevelt, with particular reference to the influence upon both men of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. It focuses upon an episode during Franklin Roosevelt's tenure as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, when he was in direct correspondence with both Theodore and Mahan on matters of grand strategy and naval policy. The paper argues that Theodore Roosevelt proved a crucial conduit in the formulation of Franklin Roosevelt's grand strategic outlook, both through his promulgation of Mahanian thought and his support of Franklin's correspondence with the Admiral. This in turn would be important later during Franklin Roosevelt's leadership of the United States.     

Intolerant Allies: Canada and the George W. Bush Administration, 2001–2005

This analysis examines the disharmony in American–Canadian relations in the period from 2001 to 2005. Canada and the United States co-operated in the early days after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, managing their mutual border and fighting the war in Afghanistan. Yet they soon came into conflict over American plans to invade Iraq and create a ballistic missile defence [BMD] system for North America. President George W. Bush and Paul Cellucci, his ambassador in Ottawa, were insensitive to Canadian concerns. Canadian leaders sent mixed messages to Washington, hinting that they would support a war in Iraq and participate in the BMD system, but ultimately deciding against each. The article examines the limitations of the tolerant ally interpretation of the Canadian–American relationship and illuminates the role of leadership in the rupture that took place between the two countries.     

A Review of: “With God on Our Side: George W. Bush and the Rise of the Religious Right”∗

Recent evidence supports the important political role that political network size and distribution plays at both the individual and system levels. However, we argue that the evidence is likely stronger than the current literature suggests due to network size measurement limitations in the extant literature. The most common approach to measuring political network size in sample surveys—the “name generator” approach—normally constrains network size measurement to three to six individuals. Because of this constraint, research often undercounts individual network size and also leads to a misrepresentation of the distribution of the underlying variable. Using multiple data sets and alternative measurement approaches, we reveal that political network hubs—individuals with inordinately large network sizes not captured by name generators—exist and can be identified with a simple summary network measure. We also demonstrate that the summary network size measure reveals the expected differences in communicative, personality, and political variables across network size better than name generator measures. This suggests that not only has prior research failed to identify network hubs, but it has likely underestimated the influence of political network size at the individual level.     

A Whiff of Cordite: Theodore Roosevelt and the Transoceanic Naval Arms Race, 1897–1909

Theodore Roosevelt's most enduring contribution to American power and influence in the world was in the promotion and construction of a blue water navy. Although much has been written about Roosevelt's notion of a uniquely American imperial vocation, as well as of his social Darwinist conception of Great Power competition, the priority he awarded to American naval power was based above all on a dispassionate and pessimistic interpretation of the direction of international affairs between 1890 and 1909. Bracketed by the inauguration of German Weltpolitik on the one hand and the Japanese naval triumph at Tsushima on the other, Roosevelt's naval policy was not the product of a romantic imperial imagination but rather of a wholly objective appreciation of the most fundamental imperative of American national security for the near and distant future.     

Sport,Empire, and Diplomacy: “Ireland” at the 1930 British Empire Games

ABSTRACT

International sport, as Geoffrey Pigman has correctly observed, emerged “as a quintessential case study demonstrating the part that public diplomacy plays in contemporary diplomacy.” The British Empire Games/Commonwealth Games [BEG/CG] are one such example, being the second largest multi-national multi-sport event today. Their origins lie in the interwar era when members of sporting organisations, many of whom were active in other formal aspects of public life, considered the organisation of specific Imperial events through international networking. Described as lacking a “thoroughly analytical and interpretive account of their history,” questions of identity politics, public diplomacy and statecraft are at their core because the BEG, inaugurated in 1930, represented qualities and values that appealed to governments, civil society, and sportspeople alike. In the waning of the British Empire, the BEG was one attempt to maintain Imperial prestige and cement cultural bonds. Yet, not only is there an absence of analytical accounts of their history, but the inter-relationships between the BEG and diplomacy, and among global sport and diplomacy more broadly, have been similarly under-investigated. This absence is striking, representing a missed opportunity in understanding the development of global sport and international relations more generally.     

‘A conference now': Lloyd George and peacemaking, 1939: Sidelights from the unpublished letters of A.J. Sylvester

Lloyd George's latest infatuation [with Hitler, after his visit to Germany in 1936] was something more than the momentary lapse of a failing dotard. To sup with the devil was completely in character for the man who, at the summit of affairs in 1919, had been drawn to power like a moth to a candle, who had come to worship success for its own sake and on its own terms and to make it the first and last determinant oi his actions; and who, for his final appearance on the world stage, a few years after the Berchtesgaden visit, aspired to a role that would reconcile power with practical politics ‐ that of a British counterpart to Marshal Petain; in which capacity, let it be said, he would doubtless have pulled off a better “deal” than most. (A. Lentin, Lloyd George, Woodrow Wilson and the Guilt of Germany. An Essay in the Pre‐history of Appeasement, 1984, p. 154.)     

“Brighter Futures,Better Times”: Britain,the Empire,and Anglo–American Economic Competition in Cuba, 1898–1920

This article examines Anglo–American economic competition in Cuba in the crucial twenty years after 1898. Anglo–American economic competition on the new island nation suggest a number of things about the nature of British and American imperialism, the difficult position of smaller countries—and economies—like Cuba, and the “inevitability” of American economic pre-eminence in the evolving twentieth century. And as an important corollary to the British dimension of this question is the role that Canada and Canadian overseas investment played in the extension of Britain's economic power and influence in the wider world.     

How the West Was One: France,America, and the “Huntingtonian Reversal”

Samuel Huntington was such a prolific scholar that it is sometimes difficult for researchers to keep up with his many policy analyses and recommendations. This article deals with one important Huntingtonian thesis, of the late 1990s. The thesis appertains to Huntington's worry about the US becoming a “lonely superpower” due to a French-led campaign to drive a wedge between America and its transatlantic allies. The authors detail the current irony inherent in what they call a “Huntingtonian reversal.” Today, unlike in 1999 when Huntington propounded his “lonely superpower” thesis, it can appear as if it is America that seeks to drive a wedge between itself and the European allies. Moreover, should the West become “one” again, it will in part be due to French efforts to revive transatlantic solidarity.     

Tweaking the Lion's Tail: Edgar J. Tarr,the Canadian Institute of International Affairs,and the British Empire, 1931–1950

In its first 2 decades the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA), Canada's premier foreign policy think tank, never functioned merely as a neutral and apolitical research organization. Under the leadership of Edgar Tarr, president of the Monarch Life Assurance Company, and in its capacity as the Canadian Council of the transnational Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), in the 1930s and 1940s the CIIA became an instrument that championed Canadian national autonomy and sought to expand Canada's international role, while challenging British imperialism, racism, and Anglo–Saxon dominance. Prominent Canadian diplomats and other officials were complicit in this enterprise, which reached its apogee at the IPR conference held at Mont Tremblant, Quebec, in December 1942. The CIIA's activities during this period revealed the porosity and imprecision of the boundaries in Canada between the state and non-state realms. Throughout World War II, DEA and other Canadian government representatives attended CIIA and IPR conferences as “official non-officials,” effectively cooperating with private individuals in a network of purportedly non-governmental organizations that enabled Canada to exert leverage on the British government, reject British leadership, align itself with the United States, and secure a greater world role. CIIA leaders and Canadian officials also consciously encouraged nationalist forces in India, China, and Southeast Asia that sought to reject colonial rule and Western dominance. CIIA activities thus became part of a web of diplomatic interactions across a transnational network of think tanks within and outside the British Empire that had their own impact upon international affairs.