Diplomatic intercepts in peace and war: Chanak 1922

Recent Public Record Office releases of British Foreign Office documents include diciphered diplomatic messages from several European capitals intercepted from 1919 onwards by a department of the Foreign Office called the Government Code and Cipher School (GCCS). These intercepts were called 'bjs' - 'blue jackets', from the blue folders in which they were regularly delivered to a very few top government officials. This paper is based on bjs mainly from French, Italian, American and Turkish capitals and embassies during the autumn of 1922 when a genocidal war was being fought along the Black Sea southern coast between Greece and Kemalist Turkish forces under the future President, Ismet Inonu. What became known as 'the Chanak Affair' led the Powers perilously close to renewing hostilities terminated at the Armistice of 1919. Despite the attention given by Lloyd George, Curzon and Churchill to the implications of the bjs as to Turkish, French and Italian intentions, peace was established on the ground before the end of the year by Inonu and the British C-in-C, General Harington.     

Sir George Clerk and the struggle for British influence in central Europe, 1919–26

During the Great War, Sir George Clerk was a senior Foreign Office official, strongly sympathetic to the cause of the ‘oppressed nationalities’ of Austria‐Hungary and the liberal ideals associated with the journal, The New Europe. In 1919 he was granted a unique opportunity to shape the face of the New Europe when he embarked on his mission to Hungary. As British minister to Czechoslovakia in the early 1920s, Clerk harnessed his idealism for the Czechs to his ambition to make Prague a centre of British influence and power in central Europe. Though this policy ultimately failed, Clerk showed a greater rapport and sympathy for the Czechs than any of his successors.     

"The Quest": The Strange Life of W. J. Garnett

This article investigates the career of a British diplomat, William Garnett, whose unusual life has until know been neglected by historians. Garnett's papers, held at Lancashire Record Office, are a particularly rich source for historians of British diplomacy, the British Foreign Office, and overseas travel in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Garnett was often outspoken and indiscreet in his private correspondence and his archive, on which this article draws, provides valuable insights into British representation and British policy in the countries to which he was posted in the period 1902-1919.     

The Eurafrique Initiative,Ernest Bevin and Anglo–French Relations in the Foreign Office, 1945–1950

This analysis examines the prevalence of Eurafrican thinking in the British Foreign Office throughout the late 1940s. Drawing on British and French diplomatic archives, it reveals the centricity of the Foreign Office, and British Embassy at Paris to a project largely confined to the mental map of the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin. The financial stains facing Britain, often misinterpreted as “decline”, seemed a temporary phenomenon that “multilateral European cooperation” could rectify. Although shelved in 1949–1950, the Eurafrique initiative has seen few historians analyse its strategies across the corridors of power. This analysis reappraises British desires for Western European “co-operation” and a renewed faith in the Entente Cordiale as a geo-political counterweight to growing East–West bipolarity. Discussions of strategies to pool African possessions to recover the European economy were short-lived. Yet they challenged prospects of long-term economic dependence upon the United States in favour of an Anglo–French led European bloc.     

Moore,R. (2010). Nuclear Illusion,Nuclear Reality Britain the United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1958–64

W.N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin and M.E. Lambert (eds.), Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, First Series, Volume XX. German Reparation and Allied Military Control 1922. Russia, March 1921‐December 1922 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1976). 970 + lxx pp. £23. ISBN 0–11–591553–2

W.N. Medlicott and Douglas Dakin (eds.), assisted by Gillian Bennett, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, First Series, Volume XXII. Central Europe and the Balkans 1921. Albania 1921–2 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1980). 885 + cxii pp. £45. ISBN 0–11–591555–9

David S. Newhall, Clemenceau. A Life at War (The Edwin Meilen Press: Lampeter, 1991). 682 + xv pp. £35.95. ISBN 0–88946–785–4

J. Calvitt Clarke III, Russia and Italy against Hitler. The Bolshevik‐Fascist Rapprochement of the 1930s (Contributions to the Study of World History No. 21, Greenwood Press: Westport, Connecticut, 1991). 218 + xvii pp. £59.95. ISBN 0–313–27468–1

David Dutton, Simon. A political biography of Sir John Simon (Aurum Press, 1992). 364 + viii pp. £25. ISBN 1–85410–204–4

Peter Neville, Neville Chamberlain. A study in failure? (Personalities and Power Series, Hodder and Stoughton, 1992). £5. ISBN 0–340–56308–7     

Sir George Clerk and the struggle for British influence in central Europe, 1919-26

During the Great War, Sir George Clerk was a senior Foreign Office official, strongly sympathetic to the cause of the 'oppressed nationalities' of Austria-Hungary and the liberal ideals associated with the journal, The New Europe. In 1919 he was granted a unique opportunity to shape the face of the New Europe when he embarked on his mission to Hungary. As British minister to Czechoslovakia in the early 1920s, Clerk harnessed his idealism for the Czechs to his ambition to make Prague a centre of British influence and power in central Europe. Though this policy ultimately failed, Clerk showed a greater rapport and sympathy for the Czechs than any of his successors.     

British Foreign Policy,the Financial Elite,and the Nationalisation of the Constantinople Quays Company, 1934–1945

The analysis examines the role of British financial institutions, namely the Bank of England and the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders [CFB], in the making of British policy towards Turkey. The nationalisation of the Constantinople Quays Company, a port operator purchased in 1907 by the British and French governments, serves as a case study through which business–state relations, the role of finance in the conduct of international relations, and the impact of perceptions on policy decisions are explored. In this case, the financial elite’s role was minimal during most of the period considered, becoming more important in the final war years in a framework of the Anglo–Turkish debt restructuring negotiations of 1944. Significantly, the CFB, rather than the Bank, represented the British government in the negotiations. There exists an abundance of evidence of the divergent views between Whitehall and the financial elite about Turkey’s trustworthiness as a debtor and a signatory to treaties. The British government’s perceptions were much more positive than those of the financial elite. This difference stemmed from the different interests involved: Whitehall sought to secure Turkey’s collaboration in the increasingly unstable global security environment while the Bank and the CFB were more concerned with investor and bondholder interests and attempted to avoid further financial losses.     

Third world neutralism and British Cold War strategy, 1960–62

European decolonization appeared to the Western powers to open up fresh areas of the globe to Cold War competition. Concerned by the coincidence of Afro-Asian and Sovier pressure on the European colonial powers, and preoccupied with the redefinition of Britain's global role in the wake of decolonization, the British Foreign Office was convinced, despite much evidence to the contrary, that the West needed to champion ‘neutralism’ in order to prevent the Afro-Asian states from orienting towards the Soviet sphere. This article argues that this policy was determined more by their anxieties about Anglo-American relations in the wake of decolonization than by a deeply held conviction of the imminence of the extension of the communist world.     

What really happened at Paris?

Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. £27.50.

British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from The Foreign Office Confidential Print (General Editors K. Bourne and D. Cameron Watt). Part II. From the First to the Second World War. Series I. The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 (ed.) M. Dockrill, Vols. 1–7. University Publications of America, 1989. $1050 (14 vols).

Bruce Kent, The Spoils of War. The Politics, Economics and Diplomacy of Reparations 1918–1932, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. £40.

F.S. Northedge, The League of Nations: Its Life and Times 1920–1946, Leicester: Leicester University Press, paperback edition, 1988, £12.95.

Klaus Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peace‐making, 1918–1919: Missionary Diplomacy and the Realities of Power. Translated from the German by Rita and Robert Kimber, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1985. $40.

Arthur Walworth, Wilson and His Peacemakers: American Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, New York: Norton, 1986 £24.75.     

Decline and fall of the Versailles settlement

W.N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin and M.E. Lambert (eds.), Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, First Series, Volume XX. German Reparation and Allied Military Control 1922. Russia, March 1921-December 1922 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1976). 970 + lxx pp. £23. ISBN 0-11-591553-2

W.N. Medlicott and Douglas Dakin (eds.), assisted by Gillian Bennett, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, First Series, Volume XXII. Central Europe and the Balkans 1921. Albania 1921-2 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1980). 885 + cxii pp. £45. ISBN 0-11-591555-9

David S. Newhall, Clemenceau. A Life at War (The Edwin Meilen Press: Lampeter, 1991). 682 + xv pp. £35.95. ISBN 0-88946-785-4

J. Calvitt Clarke III, Russia and Italy against Hitler. The Bolshevik-Fascist Rapprochement of the 1930s (Contributions to the Study of World History No. 21, Greenwood Press: Westport, Connecticut, 1991). 218 + xvii pp. £59.95. ISBN 0-313-27468-1

David Dutton, Simon. A political biography of Sir John Simon (Aurum Press, 1992). 364 + viii pp. £25. ISBN 1-85410-204-4

Peter Neville, Neville Chamberlain. A study in failure? (Personalities and Power Series, Hodder and Stoughton, 1992). £5. ISBN 0-340-56308-7     

Missing the nuclear boat? British policy and French military nuclear ambitions during the EURATOM foundation negotiations, 1955–56

This paper examines the neglected nuclear dimension of the ‘relaunch’ of Europe at Messina. France favoured British membership of EURATOM and some interests in Britain saw the commercial and diplomatic advantages of Britain's leadership of the European nuclear industry. However, the possibility of a French military nuclear programme and European nuclear proliferation compounded Britain's established reluctance either to participate in European integration or to jeopardize the prospect of Anglo‐American nuclear weapons cooperation. Britain's aversion to using the hypothetical ‘nuclear card’ is a recurrent theme in Anglo‐French diplomacy.     

Sir Eric Phipps,the British Government,and the Appeasement of Germany, 1933–1937

This article argues that Sir Eric Phipps’ reputation as an “anti-appeaser” of Germany during his Berlin embassy 1933–1937 is not accurate. While Phipps was not in favor of placating Hitler by making territorial concessions, he had much in common with those who had sought a rapprochement with Germany in the 1920s through a policy of inclusion and reconciliation. Particular importance is placed on Phipps’ attitude towards the League of Nations, with detailed consideration also being accorded to his relationship with the British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Office officials of the period, as well as his views on the Entente Cordiale.     

The Europeanisation of Arms Export Policy in the Czech Republic,Slovakia, and Poland

Abstract

The article examines British, French and Italian parliaments’ roles in overseeing the European Union's external military operations, Concordia and Artemis. It shows that a democratic deficit exists in European security and discusses factors shaping differential performance. The British European Scrutiny Committee approved both operations a posteriori. The French Parliament was involved through the use of the emergency examination procedure that required the president of the Delegation for the European Union to approve operations as an individual. The Italian Parliament had no say on Artemis and approved Concordia on the same day the operation was launched, three months after the Italian Government had agreed to its mandate and planning in the European Council. British parliamentarians asked qualitative questions, others did not.     

Dealing with the Intractable: A Possible Negotiating Position for the New British Ambassador to Berlin,Summer 1933

Foreign Office diplomats recognised the danger to British security posed by Adolph Hitler’s accession to the chancellorship of Germany in January 1933 but differed on how to meet this challenge. This article reproduces the hitherto unpublished draft instructions prepared by Owen O’Malley, a ranking official at the Foreign Office, for the newly appointed ambassador to Germany, Sir Eric Phipps, on taking up his posting in autumn 1933. Sir Robert Vansittart, the permanent under secretary, who took a sceptical but not entirely hostile view of O’Malley’s proposals, minutes O’Malley’s suggestion of a clear warning to Hitler, accompanied by the opening of negotiations with Nazi Germany recognising its enhanced position and the justice of some of its claims. Vansittart did not forward the draft memorandum to the foreign secretary, Sir John Simon, and there is, as far as I know, no copy of this in the public archives. Included is additional information on the clashes between the two men on how dictators should be treated as well as biographical information on the careers of the three men involved in this debate.     

The Political Cultures of Israel's Radical Right: Commentary on Ehud Sprinzak's The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right∗

Between 1968 and 1974 Italy was subjected to an unusually virulent campaign of right‐wing terrorism and subversion. An illustrative episode associated with this so‐called ‘strategy of tension’, which was characterized by the systematic use of covert ‘false flag’ operations, was the 17 May 1973 grenade attack outside Milan police headquarters that resulted in four dead and over 40 injured. Although the perpetrator, Gianfranco Bertoli, claimed to be an ‘individualist anarchist’ and had in fact established contacts with certain anarchist and leftist groups, subsequent judicial investigations revealed that he had been an informant and infiltrator for the Italian military intelligence service, that he had long maintained links with various anti‐communist and neo‐fascist organizations, and that he apparently received ‘cover’ and some type of logistical support prior to the attack from one or more ‘international secret services’. Although many aspects of the crime still remain murky, in all probability Bertoli was an agent provocateur acting on behalf of clandestine, quasi‐official intelligence apparatuses rather than a solitary anarchist engaging in violent ‘propaganda of the deed’.     

The UK response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: proposals for a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan, 1980–1981

Although not unexpected, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was still largely a shock to the West. It was the first time since the Second World War that the Soviets had directly intervened in a country outside the Warsaw Pact. Despite the intervention eventually being seen as Moscow's ‘Vietnam’ the West was initially unsure about what the invasion meant for stability in the region or the future conduct of East–West relations. In response to the crisis the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) proposed that Afghanistan revert to a neutral and non-aligned status in an attempt to create the basis for a viable political settlement, one that would allow the Soviet Union to withdraw troops without losing face. It launched the proposal in early 1980, lobbying other countries to support and champion the idea, culminating in a visit to Moscow by the Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, in July 1981. In this early phase of Soviet intervention the British proposals were premature but not without merit. They anticipated the strategy the Soviets would eventually adopt in their attempt to achieve an orderly withdrawal.     

Curzon,Lloyd George and the control of British foreign policy, 1919–22: A reassessment

This article reappraises the complex relationship between Lord Curzon and Lloyd George in the years between the former's appointment as Foreign Secretary and the latter's fall from office as Prime Minister in 1922. It argues that the widely held view that Lloyd George held Curzon in contempt and marginalized him in the conduct of foreign affairs is not accurate. Their relationship is presented as being one of mutual respect and significant levels of cooperation. The article thus questions the extent to which the Foreign Office suffered an ‘eclipse’ in this period.