Keywords,case law and the Court of Justice: the need for legislative intervention in modernising European trade mark law

Recent preliminary references to the CJEU on online keyword advertising and registered trade mark infringement have exposed the challenges facing EU registered trade mark law in its response to new technologies. These cases and the challenges they pose provide a timely prism through which to examine the European trade mark law-making process and the role of the CJEU within that process. This article will employ an analysis of the way in which the CJEU has developed certain key new aspects of the law on ‘infringing use’ to explore concerns over the CJEU's role and approach. It will be argued that, driven by policy considerations, the CJEU has acted creatively to develop the law of infringement in ways that cannot be sustained by the TMD and CTMR and which are likely to cause increasing uncertainties going forward. With the European Commission currently considering reform of Trade Marks Directive 2008/95/EC and Community Trade Mark Regulation 207/2009/EC, this paper will argue that there is a need for more comprehensive and forward-looking legislative intervention than has yet been proposed and that such intervention will be essential to restoring balance in the European trade mark law-making process.     

The new consumer and business protection regulations: another string to the brand owner's bow?

Legal context: This article assesses the impact of The Consumer Protectionfrom Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (CPRs) (implementing theUnfair Commercial Practices Directive) and The Business. Protectionfrom Misleading Marketing Regulations 2008 (BPRs) (implementingthe consolidated and codified Misleading and Comparative AdvertisingDirective) on areas of marketing and advertising in which IPrights often become involved and the impact of the recent ECJdecisionon their application in the O2 v Hutchison 3G referencebythe Court of Appeal. Key points: The CPRs govern advertising and promotional activities aimedat consumers. Much of the consumer and business protection legislationpreviously scattered amongst various Acts has been repealedand replaced by elements of the BPRs or CPRs. In total, 36 Regulationsand Orders and 41 Acts are affected. The BPRs now govern misleadingmarketing and comparative advertising, previously dealt withunder the Control of Misleading Advertising Regulations 1988.The article looks at how these Regulations may be applied insituations which interested parties currently attempt to resolveusing trade mark or passing off laws. Practical significance: The new Regulations are aimed at the protection of consumersand businesses from unscrupulous marketing and trade promotionpractices which affect their economic behaviour. Thirty-onepractices are specifically identified as automatically fallingfoul of the Regulations. Businesses will need to review theirpractices to avoid the possibility of criminal penalties includingfines and imprisonment for consenting, conniving, or recklessofficers of businesses involved in such practices. Until the ECJ decision in O2 v Hutchison 3G, it had been thought(from Jacob LJ's finding in his reference to the ECJ in thiscase) that trade mark law had no role to play in comparativeadvertising as it was specifically provided for under the ComparativeAdvertising Directive and hence under the BPRs. Since thesedid not provide an individual right of action (the OFT or TradingStandards alone may enforce), it left trade mark owners withlittle muscle in comparative advertising situations. However,the ECJ made clear that where practices fail to satisfy thecriteria set out in the Directive for legitimate comparativeadvertising, trade mark law may be invoked as a remedy. Thiswill be a relief to major brand owners for whom comparativeadvertising is commonly a concern.     

Dishonestly and without due cause

Legal context: UK trade mark law was harmonised with the laws of other EU memberstates pursuant to the Trade Marks Directive (89/104/EEC) withthe coming into force of the Trade Marks Act 1994. Since then,the English courts have sought to absorb into English jurisprudencecontinental concepts of unfair competition, and a new code relatingto the use of another's trade mark in comparative advertising.Traditionally, the English approach has been more liberal andless protective of a trade mark owner's rights than that ofcontinental jurisdictions, but since 1994 the ECJ has been calledupon to provide frequent guidance on the interpretation of expressionssuch as the "essential function" of a trade mark and the "dutyto act fairly" in relation to the legitimate interests of thetrade mark proprietor. Key points: This article examines the way in which some recent decisionsof the ECJ have led to the English courts having greater regardto the property interests of the trade mark owner and less regardto the concepts of free market competition and consumer protection.In the recent High Court case of L'Oréal and others vBellure NV and others, Lewison J made findings of infringementunder s.10(1) and (3) Trade Marks Act 1994 where he found thatthere was "free riding" on the back of the reputation of certainof L'Oreal's trade marks without there being any evidence ofconfusion or association between the trade marks and the defendants'signs. Practical significance: For trade mark owners, this change in the approach of the Englishcourts opens up new opportunities to combat look-alike productsand comparative advertisements which take unfair advantage ofthe reputation of established marks.     

Comparative advertising is not trade mark infringement

The Court of Appeal has indicated that the use of a competitor'sregistered trade mark for comparative advertising is not trademark infringement.     

Advocate General says comparative advertising is not a matter of trade mark law

According to Advocate General Mengozzi, trade mark infringementis not relevant in assessing the legality of a third party'suse of an identical trade mark or similar sign in comparativeadvertising, but such advertising is governed exhaustively byArticle 3a of the Misleading Advertising Directive (84/450),as amended by the Comparative Advertising Directive (97/55)(‘CAD’).     

A Case for Applying the Theoretical Semiotics in the Practice of Trade Mark Law

The application of semiotics in trade mark law is an interdisciplinary endeavour in its infancy. The author traces its genesis in recent years and situates it within the context of general theoretical approaches, in particular of an interdisciplinary kind, appearing in the trade mark law literature in the past. The purposes for which such theories are applied, and questions of methodology arising from this, are examined. In particular, it is observed that semiotic theory has, by and large, been used for the purpose of debating legal policy in trade mark law (especially in the United States), and that this has given rise to argument about the extent to which semiotic theory can exert any normative force of its own upon the law. This article offers a different perspective. It is sought to demonstrate the usefulness of theoretical semiotics in solving trade mark law questions in practice. The author emphasises that this involves no threat to orthodox legal problem-solving methodology (whatever one may think of the orthodoxy), and in particular does not require the normative use of semiotic theory. Taking as a starting point the concept of ‹trade mark use’, and having regard to trade mark law and literature in Europe, the United States and Australia, the author proceeds to demonstrate the proposed approach by reference to some current problems in trade mark infringement.     

Geico and Google settle trade mark/keyword advertising lawsuit

Google's sale of GEICO's trade marks for use in keyword-triggered‘sponsored link’ advertising did not create a likelihoodof confusion where the keyword-triggered advertisements didnot include GEICO's marks in the headings or text, but a settlementbetween the parties prevented the court from deciding Google'sliability for trade mark infringement for keyword-triggeredadvertisements that use GEICO's marks.     

Is consent required to use registered trade marks on model replica cars?

A car manufacturer that is a proprietor of a trade mark registeredfor toys cannot prohibit use by a third party of its trade markon model replica cars unless such use affects the functionsof the trade mark or takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimentalto, the distinctive character or repute of the mark.     

Don't be a Martyr to Res Judicata

The High Court rules that a party who unsuccessfully opposesa trade mark application cannot later re-challenge the validityof the same trade mark by way of defence to an infringementclaim.     

From Brand Performance to Consumer Performativity: Assessing European Trade Mark Law after the Rise of Anthropological Marketing

Since the 2009 CJEU decision in L'Oréal v. Bellure, the idea that a brand's image is the property of the trade mark owner has become increasingly entrenched within European trade mark law. Brand image is now protected even where there is no harm to the underlying mark. However, the courts have largely failed to acknowledge the radical ways in which the marketplace for goods bearing trade marks has changed in the past three decades. One key shift is that businesses and marketers no longer view the brand creation process from a top‐down ‘brand performance’ perspective, but, rather, through the prisms of ‘anthropological marketing’ and ‘consumer performativity'. Through an interdisciplinary approach, this article dissects the process of brand creation in the context of European trade mark law, and argues that the law must take account of consumer agency when the question of who should own brand image arises.     

Polish Supreme Administrative Court says no to trade marks for trade mark attorneys

The Supreme Administrative Court of Poland rejected the cassationcomplaint brought by the Kulikowska & Kulikowski (K&K)law firm and thereby confirmed that trade mark attorneys cannotapply for trade mark registrations in their own interest.     

Post-sale confusion

Legal context: Recent case law has established that post-sale confusion isrelevant to determining whether registered trade mark infringementhas occurred under UK law. This raises questions as to whatthat relevance is in practice and as to whether the common lawof passing off should develop accordingly so as to take post-saleconfusion into account. Key points: In this article, the authors review the case law on the relevanceof post-sale confusion to actions for trade mark infringementand passing off. They conclude that U K law does regard post-saleconfusion as relevant to trade mark infringement, provided thatthere is also sufficient similarity on a mark-for-sign basisat the point of sale. They argue that the tort of passing offshould develop in the same way. Practical significance: Brands can be harmed even where there is no confusion at thepoint of sale. The law's development to recognize this providesimportant weapons for brand owners, particularly in the contextof ‘look-alike’ products.     

Whose trade mark rights? What the Microsoft case means for trade mark owners

Legal context. The article considers the influence of the commissionruling in the Microsoft case, forcing Microsoft to use its WINDOWS-trademark for an ‘unbundled’ version of the program inthe light of the trade mark owner's properties rights. The scopeof these rights is determined by the function of the trade markand the rights that the trade mark laws confer to the ownerin case of infringement. Key points. Trade marks are protected as property rights undercommunity law. They are the embodiment of past investments andtransform the reputation of the owner into a bankable asset.Consumers rely on trade mark owners' control over quality. Thisis mirrored by the rights of the trade mark owner to stop interferencewith quality and image, in particular in the context of resaleof altered products. Any interference that would be considereda trade mark infringement if committed by a private party shouldbe considered an interference with the protected property rightif caused by a government agency. This interference is not justifiedby the public interest because trade mark rights also embodyimportant public interests. Practical significance. If the analysis proposed in the articleis followed, intellectual property rights have to be given greaterweight in shaping antitrust remedies.     

Trade mark use in transit: EU-phony or cacophony?

Legal context The present article discusses the opinion of Advocate-GeneralJacobs in Case C-405/05 Class International BV v Unilever NVand others, according to which trade mark owners cannot opposethe entry into the European Union of grey market non-Communitygoods placed in external transit, on the grounds of Article5(1) of the Trade Mark Directive, or any equivalent provision,as such entry does not constitute trade mark use. Key points We examine the consistency of this approach withprior case law of the European Court of Justice, namely in theCommission v France, Rioglass, The Polo/Lauren and Rolex casesand draw a parallelism with Council Regulation (EC) 1383/2003. Practical significance We conclude that trade mark owners shouldbe allowed to prohibit the placing in transit of goods whichwould infringe an intellectual property right under the lawof the transit country, unless the owner or consignor of thelitigious goods can undeniably prove that the goods are notdestined for the internal market. Stop press. At the end of the article the authors provide abrief analysis of the European Court of Justice's decision of18th October 2005 in this case.     

The irresistible force of freedom of speech meets the immovable object: trade mark law in South Africa

Legal context. The right of freedom of expression is a fundamentalright entrenched in the Bill of Rights incorporated in the SouthAfrican Constitution. While intellectual property rights donot enjoy this status, they are internationally recognised rightsgranted by a law of general application and may thus in termsof the Constitution limit the fundamental rights protected inthe Bill of Rights, and more particularly the right of freedomof expression. Where the enforcement of trade mark rights comes into conflictwith the right of freedom of expression, the two rights mustbe weighed up against one another and the competing interestsof the owner of the trade mark against the claim of expressionof a user without permission must be considered. The departurepoint of the weighing up process is that neither right is superiorto the other. Key points. This article discusses an action brought by SabmarkInternational, which claimed that Laugh It Off Promotions CCinfringed its registered trade mark BLACK LABEL in respect ofbeer by using a corruption of this mark with strong politicalundertones as ornamentation on T-shirts sold by it. It was claimedthat the offending use diluted Sabmark's registered trade mark.In an appeal, the Constitutional Court rejected the claim onthe basis that Sabmark had not shown that the offending usewas likely to cause economic damage to it. Practical significance. The case in effect equated trade markrights with rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights and thusgave important recognition to intellectual property rights.It created a precedent in intellectual property law, if notin South African law in general, in that the constitutionalcourt overruled a decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA)and in effect ruled that the SCA had not interpreted the relevantprovision of the Trade Marks Act correctly.     

The Consumer as the Empirical Measure of Trade Mark Law

Although consumer responses to signs and symbols lie at the heart of trade mark law, courts blow hot and cold on the relevance of empirical evidence – such as surveys and experiments – to establish how consumers respond to alleged infringing marks. This ambivalence is related to deeper rifts between trade mark doctrine and the science around consumer decision‐making. This article engages with an approach in ‘Law and Science’ literature: looking at how cognitive psychology and related disciplines conceptualise consumer decision‐making, and how counterintuitive lawyers’ approaches appear from this perspective. It demonstrates how, especially when proving confusion, decision‐makers in trade mark demand the impossible of empiricists and are simultaneously blind to the weaknesses of other sources of proof. A principled divergence, without seeking to collapse the gaps between legal and scientific approaches, but taking certain small steps, could reduce current problems of proof and contribute to better‐informed, more empirically grounded decisions.     

Trade marks plus? the role of trade marks in the global economy and the danger of over-protection

This article examines the economic role of the trade mark, both as a structuring device and as a means of adding value to products. It shows how its role as a flexible structuring device that provides a distinct focus for goodwill derives from the special meaning of the term “origin” or “trade origin” in trade mark law, this being what a trade mark is supposed to indicate. Firms can control the identity that a trade mark signifies and confers on the products with which it is used without being tied to any particular set of production arrangements. This article also considers how goodwill can be a source of economic benefit both through reducing transaction costs and, in some cases, through adding value to products. This article then examines the economic rationale for the legal protection of trade marks and shows how this is analogous to the rationale for awarding property rights over tangible resources and different from that for other forms of intellectual property right. The pressure to expand the legal protection of stronger trade marks is explored and it is accepted that there is an economic case for doing so. However, it is argued that the additional protection must be carefully calibrated through definitions that take account of its economic rationale and avoid the danger of over-extending it. In particular, this danger of over-protection arises from making a false analogy between stronger trade marks and the kind of intangible output that is the subject of the other forms of intellectual property right.     

In Person

Tibor Gold was born in 1942 in Budapest, Hungary. In 1958 hecame to England, where he gained degrees in physics from OxfordUniversity and in law from London University. A chartered patentattorney, registered trade mark attorney, and     

'Trade mark use' in Europe: revisiting Arsenal in the light of Opel and Picasso

Legal context: The European Court of Justice (ECJ) decision in the case ofArsenal Football Club v. Reed led to uncertainty regarding thepractical scope of a trade mark proprietor's property rights. Key points: The uncertainty resulted from a failure of the ECJ to addressclearly the issue of what constitutes infringing trade markuse. The ECJ ignored the question of the High Court as to whetheruse of a trade mark as an indication of origin is necessaryfor establishing infringement. They instead established an ambiguousstandard for what constitutes infringing trade mark use, suggestingthat only use that jeopardises the essential function of a trademark is an infringing use. This ambiguity has had problematicimplications for subsequent interpretations of trade mark law,particularly in the Court of Appeal in Arsenal and the Houseof Lords in R v Johnstone. Two relatively new ECJ cases may help clarify the issue. InOPEL, the ECJ suggested that infringing use of a trade markmust be use that is perceived by the relevant public as a designationof origin. The Picasso decision limits the effect of the Arsenaldecision on the relevance of confusion in non-sale situationsto the facts of Arsenal. In particular, it stresses the pointthat when assessing likelihood of confusion in the context ofan opposition to an application for registration the court shouldfocus on the perception of the relevant public at the pointof sale. Practical significance: The benefit of these two cases is that they create some clarityfor legal practitioners and the Courts when addressing the questionof what constitutes infringing trade mark use.