Reprecincting and Voting Behavior

Despite the expansion of convenience voting across the American states, millions of voters continue to cast ballots at their local precincts on Election Day. We argue that those registered voters who are reassigned to a different Election Day polling place prior to an election are less likely to turn out to vote than those assigned to vote at the same precinct location, as a new precinct location incurs both search and transportation costs on reassigned voters. Utilizing voter file data and precinct shape files from Manatee County, Florida, from before and after the 2014 General Election, we demonstrate that the redrawing of precinct boundaries and the designation of Election Day polling places is not a purely technical matter for local election administrators, but may affect voter turnout of some registered voters more than others. Controlling for a host of demographic, partisan, vote history, and geospatial factors, we find significantly lower turnout among registered voters who were reassigned to a new Election Day precinct compared to those who were not, an effect not equally offset by those voters turning to other available modes of voting (either early in-person or absentee). All else equal, we find that registered Hispanic voters were significantly more likely to abstain from voting as a result of being reassigned than any other racial group.     

‘What do we have to lose?’: Local economic decline,prospect theory,and support for Brexit

The Brexit referendum confronted British voters with a choice that could have profound consequences for the British economy in a context of high uncertainty. Drawing on important lessons from prospect theory, I argue that citizens who were in the domain of economic losses were more likely to take a risk and vote in favor of Brexit. On the contrary, I hold that citizens who were in the domain of economic gains tended to be more risk averse and were more likely to support ‘Remain’ in the referendum. Using data from several waves of the British Election Study 2014–2019 Internet Panel, I find strong support for these theoretical expectations. British voters who lived in declining areas were significantly more likely to think that leaving the EU would lead to improvements in the national economy. These prospective economic evaluations (captured about a month prior to the referendum) in turn are related to the ‘Leave’ vote in the Brexit referendum.     

Moving the campaign from the front door to the front pocket: field experimental evidence on the effect of phrasing and timing of text messages on voter turnout

Despite the widespread scholarly attention given to get-out-the-vote tactics the recent one and a half decade, few have studied the effect of short text messages (SMS) on voter turnout, and no previous such study has been conducted outside the US. We analyze four SMS experiments with more than 300,000 voters conducted in relation to two elections in Denmark and find intention-to-treat (ITT) effects between 0.33 and 1.82 percentage points with a pooled effect of 0.74 percentage points. Furthermore, we vary the timing and the content of the messages to test existing theories of text messages as mobilization tools. In one experiment, we find messages delivered before Election Day to have a higher effect than those delivered on Election Day, while we find no additional effect of delivering multiple messages. We also vary message content and in general find no significant differences from sending different messages.     

Was there a ‘Youthquake’ in the 2017 general election?

Studies using data from the British Election Study and the British Social Attitudes survey have concluded that the case for a significant rise in turnout amongst young people at the 2017 general election remains unproven. A limitation of these data sets for assessing the so-called Youthquake thesis is the small number of younger voters they contain. In this research note we use data from the UK Household Longitudinal Survey to produce more robust estimates of turnout amongst people aged under thirty between the 2010, 2015, and 2017 general elections. Our findings support the claim that turnout increased markedly among voters in this age group in 2017. They also demonstrate that the increase in youth turnout was not specific to 2017 but, rather, represented a continuation of a change between 2010 and 2015. Our analysis confirms the heightened importance of age as a predictor of vote choice in 2017, with younger voters significantly more likely to vote Labour compared to 2010 and 2015.     

Don't Forget to Vote: Text Message Reminders as a Mobilization Tool

Current explanations of effective voter mobilization strategies maintain that turnout increases only when a potential voter is persuaded to participate through increased social connectedness. The connectedness explanation does not take into account, however, that registered voters, by registering, have already signaled their interest in voting. The theory presented in this article predicts that impersonal, noticeable   messages can succeed in increasing the likelihood that a registered voter will turn out by reminding the recipient that Election Day is approaching. Text messaging is examined as an example of an impersonal, noticeable communication to potential voters. A nationwide field experiment (n = 8,053) in the 2006 election finds that text message reminders produce a statistically significant 3.0 percentage point increase in the likelihood of voting. While increasing social connectedness has been shown to positively affect voter turnout, the results of this study, in combination with empirical evidence from prior studies, suggest that connectedness is not a necessary condition for a successful mobilization campaign. For certain voters, a noticeable reminder is sufficient to drive them to the polls.     

Issue and leader voting in U.S. presidential elections

The “Issues and Leaders” model shows that aggregate votes for President in U.S. elections from 1972 to 2012 can be accurately predicted from people's perceptions of the candidates' issue handling competence and leadership qualities. For the past five elections, the model's ex ante forecasts, calculated three to two months prior to Election Day, were competitive with those from the best of eight established political economy models. Model accuracy substantially improved closer to Election Day. The Election Eve forecasts missed the actual vote shares by, on average, little more than one percentage point and thus reduced the error of the Gallup pre-election poll by 30%. The model demonstrates that the direct influence of party identification on vote choice decreases over the course of the campaign, whereas issues gain importance. The model has decision-making implications in that it advises candidates to engage in agenda setting and to increase their perceived issue-handling and leadership competence.     

A new barrier to participation: Heterogeneous application of voter identification policies

In democratic societies there is a tension between maximizing ballot access and minimizing voter fraud. Since the 2000 presidential election, this tension has been central to discussions about election reform at the national, state, and local level. We examine this tension by focusing on the implementation of voter identification laws in one state that has experienced significant issues in recent elections, and that is currently implementing election reform: New Mexico. We hypothesize that Hispanic voters are more likely to show some form of identification than other types of voters. Using a voter data set from New Mexico's First Congressional District in the 2006 election, we find that Hispanic, male and Election Day voters are more likely to show some form of identification than non-Hispanic, female and early voters. In addition, using an overlapping study of Bernalillo County 2006 poll workers, which almost entirely overlaps with the First Congressional District, we find no evidence that differences in poll worker partisanship or ethnicity produce differences in voter identification procedures. Our findings suggest that broad voter identification laws, which may be applied unequally, may be perceived as discriminatory.     

Expressions of Distrust: Third-Party Voting and Cynicism in Government

Voter distrust of the national government is an ongoing theoretical concern for scholars who study voting behavior in the United States. Previous research demonstrates that distrustful voters are less likely to vote for major party candidates than their more trusting counterparts. Using the American National Election Survey, we explore the relationship between citizen distrust and voting for three major third-party challengers (Wallace, Anderson, and Perot) and the use of trust levels as predictors of third- party voting. We find citizen trust levels are significant and strong predictors of third-party voting, independent of other common explanatory variables of vote choice. We also find trust levels are stable over time, and we find little evidence to support the argument that trust levels measure trust of incumbent political figures.     

Who Is Mobilized to Vote? A Re‐Analysis of 11 Field Experiments

Many political observers view get-out-the-vote (GOTV) mobilization drives as a way to increase turnout among chronic nonvoters. However, such a strategy assumes that GOTV efforts are effective at increasing turnout in this population, and the extant research offers contradictory evidence regarding the empirical validity of this assumption. We propose a model where only those citizens whose propensity to vote is near the indifference threshold are mobilized to vote and the threshold is determined by the general interest in the election. Our three-parameter model reconciles prior inconsistent empirical results and argues that low-propensity voters can be effectively mobilized only in high-turnout elections. The model is tested on 11 randomized face-to-face voter mobilization field experiments in which we specifically analyze whether subjects' baseline propensity to vote conditions the effectiveness of door-to-door GOTV canvassing. The evidence is consistent with the model and suggests that face-to-face mobilization is better at stimulating turnout among low-propensity voters in prominent elections than it is in quiescent ones .     

Risk Attitudes and the Incumbency Advantage

Explanations for the incumbency advantage in American elections have typically pointed to the institutional advantages that incumbents enjoy over challengers but overlook the role of individual traits that reinforce this bias. The institutional advantages enjoyed by incumbents give voters more certainty about who incumbents are and what they might do when (and if) they assume office. We argue that these institutional advantages make incumbents particularly attractive to risk-averse individuals, who shy away from uncertainty and embrace choices that provide more certainty. Using data from 2008 and 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, we show that citizens who are more risk averse are more likely to support incumbent candidates, while citizens who are more risk accepting are more likely to vote for challengers. The foundations of the incumbency advantage, we find, lie not only in the institutional perks of office but also in the individual minds of voters.     

If it Weren't for Those ?∗!&∗@!∗ Nader Voters we Wouldn't Be in This Mess: The Social Determinants of the Nader Vote and the Constraints on Political Choice

Much has been written about the effect of Ralph Nader's recent experience in Presidential politics—in particular about the consequential election of 2000. The general view is that Nader's direct effect on that contest was to cost Gore the election and the indirect effect was to undermine popular and professional support for third-party challenges from the left. In this paper, we revisit this debate by contrasting Nader voters with both Nader-supporting Gore voters and non-voters using data from the 2000 National Election Studies. In line with some predictions, we find that the Nader voters had a tendency to come from privileged positions in terms of income and occupation and to embrace consistently progressive policy positions. More surprising is the fact that Latino voters were disproportionately attracted to Nader and that Nader voters were mobilized to vote in numbers far higher than has been previously reported. This mobilization effect is also evident in Nader-supporting Gore voters under the age of 34. A final analysis suggests that little separates those Nader voters who were divided in their support for Gore.     

Getting Out the Latino Vote: How Door-to-Door Canvassing Influences Voter Turnout in Rural Central California

Using randomized experimentation, this study of a municipal election in Central California examines the effects of face-to-face canvassing on voter turnout. This is the first randomized experiment to focus on Latino voter mobilization. Building on previous field experimentation, this study focuses on a local school board election held in Dos Palos, CA. Two kinds of appeals were made to potential voters: one emphasized ethnic solidarity; the other emphasized civic duty. Canvassing was remarkably successful; voters who were contacted were significantly more likely to vote. The mobilization effort had a particularly large effect on the turnout of Latino Democrats.     

US voter registration reform

Voter registration in the United States changed after the 2000 election with a requirement that states adopt statewide voter registries. However, these registries vary in design in practice, with some states having state managed “top–down” registries and other states having more decentralized “bottom–up” registries. I compare the effect of moving to a top–down registry with the adoption of Election Day registration – where voters can register to vote the day of the election – on voters saying that they are not registered because of election management problems or not voting because of a voter registration issue. EDR had a pronounced effect on reducing voter registration problems but the adoption of new voter registries had minimal effect on the same problems.     

The effects of local campaigning in Great Britain

Political parties devote many resources to local campaigning to contact voters directly. But parties do not choose to contact voters at random; they contact those voters they believe more likely to be swayed. This strategic behaviour introduces an empirical challenge: separating the effect of contact itself from the selection effect — the fact that contacted voters may be more likely to be swayed in the first place. I rely on the panel structure of the British Election Study to separate the effect of contact itself from the selection effect for the 2015, 2017, and 2019 General Elections. My findings show that parties successfully increase their support through local campaigning by a combination of conversion and mobilization. The effectiveness of local campaigning is relative similar throughout the three elections, despite the very different electoral environments.     

On the nature of voters’ coalition preferences

An expanding literature indicates that in multiparty systems with coalition governments, citizens consider the post-electoral bargaining process among parties when casting their vote. Yet, we know surprisingly little about the nature of voters’ coalition preferences. This paper uses data from the Austrian National Election Study to examine the determinants as well as the independence of preferences for coalitions as political object. We find that coalition preferences are strongly informed by spatial considerations; but additional non-ideological factors, such as party and leader preferences, also play a fundamental role. We also find that coalitions enjoy a certain degree of independence from other objects of vote choice and they do not always represent a simple average score on the feeling thermometer of the constituent parties. There are, however, substantial differences among voters, with party identifiers and those with extreme ideology being less likely to consider coalitions as separate entities from their component parties.     

The paradox of voting intelligently

Classical economic models predict far less voting than happens in practice. Expressive voting may partly explain the divergence, but some who are generally uninterested in politics and thus unlikely to take elections as an important form of personal expression nevertheless vote. One possible explanation is that these voters overestimate the instrumental, outcome-changing consequences of voting; such systematic misperception may be more likely among those with less cognitive capacity. Analysis of responses to the American National Election Studies confirms this hypothesis: while intelligence and interest both increase the likelihood of voting, the combination enhances the likelihood of turnout still further.     

Telling more than they can know? Does the most important issue really reveal what is most important to voters?

Recent British Election Studies have asked respondents to nominate ‘the most important issue’. Responses to this question have been used to explain individual vote decisions and characterise the issue-component of those elections. This paper, however, finds limited evidence that individuals place more weight on those issues that they report as ‘most important’ when they vote. It also finds that aggregate responses to the MII question broadly match the estimated ‘average’ impact of those issues on voters. This suggests that even if voters have a limited understanding of what issues matter to themselves they have some understanding of what makes their fellow voters tick.