Getting out the vote: Social structure and the mobilization of partisanship in the 1989 European elections

Abstract: Why do European elections look more like national elections in retrospect than in prospect? One possibility is that during the run-up to a European election party leaders appeal for the votes of their 'normal' supporters, and their success in these appeals gives rise to the 'normal' outcome of the campaign. To test this hypothesis two definitions of 'normal supporters' are evaluated and the outcome is to discredit the use of party identification as a means of identifying supporters. Instead, social structure is employed to identify the groups that might respond to party appeals, and the basic finding of the article is that supporters defined in this fashion do increase their support for appropriate parties during the run-up to a European election, as though they were responding to appeals of the hypothesized kind.     

How to vote,whether to vote: Strategies for voting and abstaining on congressional roll calls

This paper develops and tests a theory of voting and abstaining on Congressional roll calls. The theoretical model assumes that the voting behavior of legislators is oriented toward reelection, and that constituents vote retrospectively. Among the predictions of the theory are that supporters of a program are more likely to abstain than opponents, that conflicted legislators are more likely to vote on the losing side (but will abstain when the vote is very close), and that indifferent legislators will abstain when votes are not close but trade their votes when the outcome is uncertain. The empirical test is based on a series of votes on appropriations for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor from 1975 to 1982. We estimate a nested logit model of, first, the probability of voting for Clinch River, and second, the probability of abstaining from the vote, conditional on preferences regarding the program. All of the empirical results are consistent with the theoretical predictions, and most are statistically significant by conventional standards. The implication is that the abstention decision, as well as yes or no votes, can be purposive, and that the pattern of abstentions is not random among supporters and opponents.The authors gratefully acknowledge research support from the Brookings Institution and the University of Michigan School of Law, and useful comments on an earlier draft by Randall Calvert, Morris Fiorina, Rodney Fort, Amihai Glazer, Keith Krehbiel, Thomas Romer, Kenneth Shepsle, Rodney Smith, Barry Weingast, the UCI Public Choice Study Group, and the Hoover Workshop on Collective Choice.     

The right to vote no: revising the voting system and resuscitating the F-Y voter

This paper explores the possibility of revising the voting system in order to provide the citizen with the alternative of voting for none of the candidates on the ballot as opposed to selecting a specific candidate or not voting at all. We describe in general terms the nature and implications of such a proposal and leave the formal development of the model for a subsequent paper. In addition, preliminary evidence is presented as to the potential effect of this alternative on the electoral system.     

The impact of compulsory voting on inequality and the quality of the vote

Abstract

Democratic elections imply that the electorate holds incumbents accountable for past performance, and that voters select the party that is closest to their own political preferences. Previous research shows that both elements require political sophistication. A number of countries throughout the world have a system of compulsory voting, and this legal obligation boosts levels of voter turnout. Under such rules, citizens with low levels of sophistication in particular are thought to turn out to vote in higher numbers. Is it the case that the quality of the vote is reduced when these less sophisticated voters are compelled to vote? This article investigates this claim by examining the effect of compulsory voting on accountability and proximity voting. The results show that compulsory voting reduces stratification based on knowledge and level of education, and proximity voting, but it does not have an effect on economic accountability. The article concludes with some suggestions on how systems of compulsory voting might mitigate the strength of political sophistication in determining the quality of the vote decision process.     

Dimensions of the economic vote: Valence,positional and patrimony voting in Portugal's 2011 elections

This article contrasts three dimensions of economic voting, namely valence, positional and patrimony voting. Whereas the first two dimensions have been frequently explored, the patrimony variable has scarcely been tested as an explanatory variable of voting behaviour. It measures the electors' assets (both risky and non-risky), and seeks to capture the elector's wealth at election time. Using the 2011 post-election survey carried out in Portugal following the June elections, the data show that comparing of the three dimensions, valence is the most important. It was found that patrimony variables, although not significant in a comprehensive vote model, are important explanatory factors of party identification, itself a key variable of vote choice in Portugal.     

The three stages of the anti-incumbency vote: Retrospective economic voting in young and established democracies

Economic prosperity is the best recipe for an incumbent government to be re-elected. However, the financial crisis was significantly more consequential for governing parties in young rather than in established democracies. This article introduces the age of democracy as a contextual explanation which moderates the degree to which citizens vote retrospectively. It shows a curvilinear effect of the age of democracy on retrospective economic voting. In a first stage after the transition to democracy, reform governments suffer from a general anti-incumbency effect, unrelated to economic performance. In a second step, citizens in young democracies relate the legitimacy of democratic actors to their economic performance rather than to procedural rules, and connect economic outcomes closely to incumbent support. As democracies mature, actors profit from a reservoir of legitimacy, and retrospective voting declines. Empirically, these hypotheses are corroborated by data on vote change and economic performance in 59 democracies worldwide, over 25 years.     

An assessment of voting systems under the proximity and directional models of the vote

I evaluate five single-winner voting systems according to their tendency to elect Condorcet candidates under alternative models of issue voting derived from behavioral research. These behavioral models posit that voters have both issue and nonissue motivations; within this framework, I study the effects of both the directional and proximity voting models, with varying degrees of issue voting. Under the proximity metric, all voting systems are most efficient when voters attach little importance to issues, while the opposite is generally the case under directional voting. In contrast to previous results, voting systems tend to be more efficient for large than for small electorates. All voting systems – including the widely-criticized plurality method – are extremely efficient when voters in mass elections are inattentive to issues.     

Two types of economic voting: How economic conditions jointly affect vote choice and turnout

The economic voting literature mostly looks at vote choice, ignoring potential effects on turnout. Studies that do focus on the latter often ignore the former, and come to contradictory conclusions. I develop a model of economic voting that jointly incorporates vote choice and abstention due to alienation or indifference. Analyzing ten elections with validated turnout data and conducting empirically informed simulations, I make two contributions. First, I show that “turnout switching” accounts for up to one third of total economic voting. This second type of economic voting is more common when the number of parties is low and responsibility is dispersed. Second, I show that a bad economy moves some people to abstain while having the opposite effect on others. The aggregate effect is ambiguous and related to macro-conditions in a non-linear way. This explains contradictory findings in the literature.     

Mass voting behaviour: the factors that influenced the conservative vote during the 1981 Greek general election

Abstract. This paper examines voting preferences of Greeks during the 1981 general election, based on a public opinion survey. The sample (N = 598) includes three heterogeneous target groups (professionals, labourers and rurals) which represent a broad spectrum of the Greek society. It is hypothesized that Greece is undergoing social and political changes. These changes are measured with an empirical model constructed to employ three sets of indicators. The first set measured the degree and direction of influence on the 1981 conservative vote by objective conditions. The second set measured the degree and direction of the influence of subjective conditions on the same vote. The third set measured the degree and direction of influence of values and issues also on the same vote. The results indicate that both objective and subjective conditions were less important than values and issues. Thus, the influence of some objective factors (such as income or sex) on the conservative vote was either low or inverse. Similarly, the conservative influence of subjective factors (such as family and school) was weak. Instead, modern values and issues are becoming influential.     

Omens of an early winter: the proportional vote and the changing italian party system

The proportional arena has been designed as a buffer and corrective for the hard verdicts of the new Italian plurality system. However, the political impact of this arena is much deeper than its purely electoral role. It measures the loadings of single parties within coalitions and, subsequently, influences their interactions and bargaining tactics. The elections of April 1996 clearly show the effects of institutional learning by the different actors involved: voters, coalitions, candidates, etc. The analysis of electoral data shows the following main findings: (a) the remarkable equilibrium between left–wing and right–wing coalitions; (b) the gains made by the left thanks to its better ability to manage alliances with the centre and extreme left; (c) surprisingly little change in voter behaviour between 1994 and 1996, and most of what change there is deriving from vote nationalization. The main features of Italian electoral geography are also confirmed.     

The mobilization of the Swedish vote: An ecological analysis of the general elections of 1928, 1948 and 1968

Abstract. This paper focuses on the floating vote and the floating voter at three critical junctures in modern Swedish political history: the general elections of 1928, 1948, and 1968. The topic is in the mainstream of electoral research, but with one important proviso: it is a study of floating without the benefit of survey data. The analysis is based on Thomsen's (1987) method of ecological inference. The ecological estimates confirm the conventional wisdom that the Swedish elections of 1928, 1948 and 1968 were mobilizing elections, bringing large numbers of new voters to the polls, and marked by considerable mobility between the parties. They were also realigning in that they held out the possibility of a new status quo. In 1928 and 1948 the parties of the right were on the offensive; in 1968 the Social Democrats held the initiative. But the new coalitions were potentially unstable; it was the floating voters, particularly those with a previous history of non-voting, who spelled the difference between defeat and victory. The paper makes an important contribution to the validation of Thomsen's method.     

Your vote counts on account of the way it is counted: An institutional solution to the paradox of not voting

When we explicitly lay out all its steps, we find that the Paradox of Not Voting (since the chance of one vote's making a difference is about zero, why trouble to vote?) rests on a false but hitherto unremarked assumption about the institutional context of elections. My solution to the Paradox is more conservative than others that have been proposed, and it yields a rational-choice model of voting whose consequence accord well with empirical findings on turnout.     

Omens of an early winter: The proportional vote and the changing Italian party system

Abstract The proportional arena has been designed as a buffer and corrective for the hard verdicts of the new Italian plurality system. However, the political impact of this arena is much deeper than its purely electoral role. It measures the loadings of single parties within coalitions and, subsequently, influences their interactions and bargaining tactics. The elections of April 1996 clearly show the effects of institutional learning by the different actors involved: voters, coalitions, candidates, etc. The analysis of electoral data shows the following main findings: (a) the remarkable equilibrium between left–wing and right–wing coalitions; (b) the gains made by the left thanks to its better ability to manage alliances with the centre and extreme left; (c) surprisingly little change in voter behaviour between 1994 and 1996, and most of what change there is deriving from vote nationalization. The main features of Italian electoral geography are also confirmed.     

Beyond personal vote incentives: Dividing the vote in preferential electoral systems

Comparative studies of preferential electoral systems have paid much attention to the incentives for personalized instead of party-centered campaigns, but they have largely ignored how some of these systems allow “allocation errors” and so create incentives for parties to “manage” the vote and intraparty campaigns. We discuss how the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) and single transferable vote (STV) systems create these incentives, and we illustrate the degree to which they affect actual electoral results across seven preferential electoral systems. The analysis reveals statistically significant differences in the vote inequality among incumbent cohorts (members of the same party and district), indicating the strong influence of vote division incentives over candidate-centered electoral environments. The results also have important implications for comparative research on legislative turnover and the incumbency advantage.     

On referendum voting in Italy: YES, NO or non–vote? How Italian parties learned to control referendums

Abstract. National referendums progressively became a part of Italian political life in the last three decades of the twentieth century. The increased use made of them came as a genuine surprise. Some 53 issues were put before the electorate between 1970 and 2000, the majority following citizen petitions, with a smaller number promoted by regional councils. The so–called 'abrogative referendum,' conceived as a sort of modern–day veto, proved to be a multi–use political tool wielded predominantly by the Radical Party, a political movement largely outside the Italian party system. Parties were the main actors in referendums as far as the mobilisation of voters was concerned. Indeed, the parties gave birth to a variety of alignments, some supporting mobilisation and competition, while others encouraged abstension and effective demobilisation. By virtue mainly of the constitutional rule that requires 50 per cent turnout for the result to be valid, the vote on 18 issues was declared void. Many lessons can be learned from the Italian experience, and one in particular is of special interest to all who value the survival of liberal democracies: all electors are equal, but in referendums non–voters are more equal than the voters.     

Economic self-interest and the vote: Evidence and meaning

The issue of personal economic self-interest — people responding politically to changes in their financial well-being — has been a central focus in the economic voting literature. In a recent article, Kramer (1983) contended that people may be acting in a personally self-interested manner despite findings to the contrary from survey research analyses. In another article, Sears and Lau (1983) argued that findings of economic self-interest from survey data may be artifactual and that self-interested behavior may be even weaker than previously thought. In this paper I review the literature on economic self-interest and attempt to determine to what extent people do act on the basis of their financial well-being and under what conditions this is most likely.     

The European lavender vote: Sexuality,ideology and vote choice in Western Europe

In many European democracies, political punditry has highlighted the attempts of political parties on the left to court the ‘lavender vote’ of lesbian, gay and bisexual individuals. This article examines the presence of a gay vote in Western Europe with a focus on assessing the role of sexuality in shaping individuals’ political preferences and voting behaviour. Empirically, the effect of sexuality on both ideological identification as well as party vote choice is analysed. Using a cumulative dataset of eight rounds of the European Social Survey between 2002 and 2017, this article demonstrates that partnered lesbians and gay men are more likely than comparable heterosexuals to identify with the left, support leftist policy objectives and vote for left-of-centre political parties. The analysis represents the first empirical cross-national European study of the voting behaviour of homosexual individuals and sheds new light on the importance of sexuality as a predictor of political ideology and voting behaviour within the Western European context.     

Application of Theil group logit methods to district-level vote shares: tests of prospective and retrospective voting in the 1991, 1993, and 1997 Polish elections

Political scientists often wish to test hypotheses in the context of district-level vote-share models of elections involving more than two parties. Although a group logit framework for estimating such models was developed many years ago by Henri Theil, the complexity of its variance–covariance structure has prevented it from being widely applied. The authors demonstrate how data can be transformed to take account of the Theil variance–covariance structure so that seemingly unrelated regression can be used to estimate vote-share equations on either an intra- or inter-election basis. This method offers a simpler and more accessible way to analyze multiparty elections than the method proposed recently by Katz and King [Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 97 (1999) 15]. The demonstration involves testing hypotheses about incumbency (retrospective) and policy (prospective) voting in the 1991, 1993, and 1997 Polish elections. The authors find that the estimations favor the policy voting hypothesis.