Principles, Values, and Rules in Legal Decision-Making and the Dimensions of Legal Rationality

Abstract. The author singles out various conceptions of rationality used in practical legal discourse: formal and substantive rationality, instrumental goal- and means-rationality, communicative rationality. Practical rationality is expressed in decisions justified by epistemic and axiological premises according to the rules of justificatory reasoning. Five levels of analysis of this justification are identified. Rules, principles and evaluations are used as justifying arguments and their characteristics determine the dimensions of rationality of decision depending on the features of rules, various conceptions of principles, and kinds of relativisation of evaluations. The dimensions of legal rationality depend mainly on three singled out conceptions of rationality, i.e., formal rationality dealing with the deep structure of justification, instrumentally oriented rationality as content of justifiability, and communicative rationality linked with the pragmatics of human interaction. Legitimacy, according to the presented analysis, appears as a subclass of external justification dealing with axiological premisses in terms of instrumental rationality and/or communicative rationality.     

Discourse Theory and Human Rights*

Abstract. The author's thesis is that human rights can be substantiated on the basis of discourse theory. The argument has two steps. The first step is the justification of the rules of discourse. The second step consists in the foundation of human rights.     

三段论推理在法律论证中的作用探讨

司法三段论这一近代以来占主导地位的法律推理模式,当今的法学家对其提出了诸多批判,法律方法论亦由此从总体上实现了向法律论证理论的转换。但是,三段论推理本身的合理价值依然应当予以承认。在法律论证中,形式方法仍然具有无可替代的作用。法律论证的逻辑有效性对于实际的论证活动依然是个比较重要的评价标准。足见三段论推理在法律论证理论中具有重要意义。可以说,演绎模式的说理规则表达了对于法律论证最低限度的理性要求。在事实与规范相互对应的法律适用观念下,三段论推理继续在法律论证,尤其是在内部证立当中发挥作用。     

On the Puzzle Surrounding Hans Kelsen's Basic Norm

Whereas fundamental norms in the juridico‐philosophical tradition serve to impose constraints, Kelsen's fundamental norm—or basic norm (Grundnorm)—purports to establish the normativist character of the law. But how is the basic norm itself established? Kelsen himself rules out the appeals that are familiar from the tradition—the appeal to fact, and to morality. What remains is a Kantian argument. I introduce and briefly evaluate the Kantian and neo‐Kantian positions, as applied to Kelsen's theory. The distinction between the two positions, I argue, is reflected in an ambiguity in the use of the term “regressive.”     

The Role of Panels in Enhancing Legal Predictability

This article considers the justification for using panels of judges to make decisions in common law systems. The usual argument is that panels are more likely than lone judges to make correct judgments. This article suggests an additional justification: panels increase the law's predictability, so potential litigants can anticipate correctly which legal rules will apply in their cases. Three models, each with a different conception of the legal process, are employed to demonstrate the predictability-enhancing effect of panels. Comparison of the models suggests the effect is strongest when precedent has a substantial impact on how judges make decisions.     

The Burden of Argumentation in Legal Disputes

Abstract. Juristic argumentation must in normal cases lead to a positive conclusion. The adoption of the rules of the burden of argumentation is, therefore, necessary. It is the task of the normative theory of juristic argumentation to formulate and to justify these rules., The rules of the burden of argumentation are constitutive rules. They do not impose duties or obligations to justify, but they state under what conditions a thesis counts as justified. The basic problem lies in the second-order justification, that is, in the justification of the rules of the burden of argumentation. Their rational justification is a precondition for rational juristic discourse.     

Critical Remarks on Robert Alexy's "Special-Case Thesis"*

Abstract
In this paper the author criticizes the way Robert Alexy reconstructs the relationship between legal and practical reasoning. The core of Alexy's argumentation (Alexy 1978) is considered the claim that legal argumentation is a "special case" of general practical discourse. In order to question this claim, the author analyzes three different types of argument: (1) that legal reasoning is needed by general practical discourse itself, (2) that there are similarities between legal argumentation and general practical discourse, (3) that there is a correspondence between certain types of argument in general practical discourse and in legal argumentation.**     

Why Reflective Equilibrium? II: Following Up on Rawls's Comparison of His Own Approach with a Kantian Approach

In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective equilibrium” is on a par with Kant's concept of “transcendental deduction.” Treating these two approaches to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification. My enquiry into this topic comprises three parts. In the first part (Eng 2014a), I raised the issue of the reflexivity of justification and questioned whether the reflexive challenge can be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice. In this second part, I shall outline a Kantian approach that represents a paradigmatic alternative to Rawls.     

法律论证理论中的证明证据和证成

法律论证理论是实践论辩理论的一个局域性的论证类型。法律论证的实质是论辩。法律论证中的证明和证据概念强调合法性。法律论证的一个重要概念是证成,它分为内部证成和外部证成两种证成形式,这些证成是由若干规则、公式和原则来构成的,用以在法律论证中获得健全的实践理性。     

Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality

Abstract.   The article begins with an outline of the balancing construction as developed by the German Federal Constitutional court since the Lüth decision in 1958. It then takes up two objections to this approach raised by Jürgen Habermas. The first maintains that balancing is both irrational and a danger for rights, depriving them of their normative power. The second is that balancing takes one out of the realm of right and wrong, correctness and incorrectness, and justification, and, thus, out of the realm of the law. The article attempts to counter these objections by showing that there exists a rational structure of balancing that can be made explicit by a "Law of Balancing" and a "Disproportionality Rule." These rules show, first, that balancing is not a danger for rights but, on the contrary, a necessary means of lending them protection, and second, that balancing is not an alternative to argumentation but an indispensable form of rational practical discourse.     

法律推理中的二阶证立

在司法裁决中,对于简易案件,法官可以运用演绎证立模式为裁决结果提供正当性证明。但是,对于疑难案件,法官如何在规则层面为裁决结果的正当性和可接受性提供一种实践理性的辩护呢？麦考密克在他的代表作《法律推理与法律理论》中首次提出并详细阐述了一种论证模式,即二阶证立。二阶证立从主客观两个方面,即从后果主义论证、融贯性论证和一致性论证方面,为裁决规则的正当性和可接受性提供证明。同时,在麦考密克看来,二阶证立作为一种论证模式既具有描述性,又具有规范性。     

The Special Case Thesis. An Assessment of R. Alexy's Discursive Theory of Law

Legal Argumentation Theories seek mainly to develop procedures, criteria and principles which can guarantee a proper justification of legal propositions within modern legal systems. In doing this, those theories solicit in general an interconnection between practical reasoning and legal reasoning. This paper refers mainly to what seems currently to be the most elaborate theory of legal argumentation, that is R. Alexy's Theorie der juristischen Argumentation. Although the discussion is mainly concentrated on critical points of R. Alexy's theory, this paper's scope is slightly broader; it attempts to present an overall view of the current discursive theory of law. This is mainly performed through the critical examination of R. Alexy's Special Case Thesis, which seems to raise a handful of counter arguments on behalf of the other proponents of Legal Argumentation. In the first part the special case thesis is presented, as well as the main objections to it. In the second part the validity of the special case thesis is checked against K. Günther's model of practical discourse, which proves to be more elaborate in certain points, when compared with the corresponding model of R. Alexy. In the third part it is shown that the special case thesis can be accepted consistently only if it is combined with a normative theory of law that advocates the interconnection of the concept of law with the idea of right morality. It is further suggested that legal discourse has to be perceived as a special case of a broader moral-political discourse that “explains” or “justifies” (morally) the various restrictions that the positive legal systems impose on the legal discourse.     

公法理论的创新与研究范式的突破——对统一公法学的证成性阐释

本文是对统一公法学的证成性研究.全文以统一公法学的现有研究成果为基础,从理论标识、认识论和方法论三个方面来进行证成性的阐释与研究,解读其理论内涵与脉络.并且认为,作为一种认识论,统一公法学的理论标识已经确立,其理论体系基本形成,是一种原始性的理论创新;作为一种方法论,统一公法学具有了自己的研究进路,其研究视野非常独特,是一种全新的研究范式.全文旨在最终表明:统一公法学不仅是一种理论上的凝练,而且是一种方法论的指导.     

Why Reflective Equilibrium? III: Reflective Equilibrium as a Heuristic Tool

In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective equilibrium” is on a par with Kant's concept of “transcendental deduction.” Treating these two approaches to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification. In the first part of this enquiry (Eng 2014a), I raised the issue of the reflexivity of justification and questioned whether the reflexive challenge can be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice. In the second part (Eng 2014b), I outlined a Kantian approach that represents a paradigmatic alternative to Rawls. In this third and final part, I shall argue that Rawls's reflective equilibrium cannot justify the choice of itself and that in the broader perspective thus necessitated, we cannot escape the metaphysical issues integral to the Kantian approach.     

The Limits of Institutionalised Legal Discourse*

Abstract. One of the most powerful accounts of the necessary connection between law and morality grounded on the openness of communication is provided by Robert Alexy, who builds a discourse theory of law on the basis of Habermas’ theory of general practical discourse. In this article I argue that the thesis based on the openness of legal discourse is problematic in that it does not provide a convincing account of the differentiation of legal discourse from other practical discourses. I offer an understanding of the institutionalisation of legal discourse as the tacit commitment of the participants to their shared normative experience and in particular in: 1) the possibility of containing normative force in space, 2) the possibility of transforming word into deed, 3) the possibility of grasping and controlling time and 4) the possibility of transforming deed into word. That commitment of participants in legal discourse is revealed as a set of fundamental assumptions embedded in all legal utterances, which provide the necessary bedrock that makes communication possible. It also provides a basis for the institution of legal discourse, to the effect that their problematisation signifies a departure from the latter.     

Women's Defences

ABSTRACT

This paper examines theoretical and practical problems surrounding the use of women's defences such as Battered Woman's Syndrome, Premenstrual Syndrome and Postpartum Depression. A framework for deconstructing women's defences which exposes power relationships preserved by legal discourse is offered. The central argument presented is that a contextual examination which links practice to theory reveals that women's defences are not necessarily harmful to women, but that specific feminist strategies must be developed to ensure that such defences do not replicate existing power-knowledge dynamics within legal discourse.     

行政权的正当性证成——控权—服务论理论合理性

正当性问题具有普遍性,行政权的正当性命题是行政法的根本命题。行政权需要为自身的正当性辩护,从目的和发生的进路证成自身存在和运行的合目的性及合规律性。控权-服务论认为,行政法兼具控权功能与服务导向,为行政权的正当性确立了政府有界、服务为魂、政府有责、过程可控四大正当性标准,从而推进行政权从强制到权威的转变,证成行政权的正当性,同时,也证明了控权-服务论的理论合理性。     

Democracy out of Reason? Comment on Rainer Forst's “The Rule of Reasons”

In my paper, I comment on Rainer Forst's paper in this issue. I raise doubts as to whether the justification of democracy emerges from a fundamental moral right to reciprocal and general justification, as Forst claims. His basic argument appears questionable because democracy is different from a "hypothetical-consent-conception" of moral legitimacy, which limits as well as enables democratic legitimacy. The former cannot, however, justify the latter through an argument centered on self-government: Such an argument relies heavily on the possibility of consensus, thus neglecting the crucial phenomenon of disagreement or dissent. As a result of not adequately dealing with this phenomenon, the argument is unable to account for the basic democratic principle of majority rule as the remedy at hand.     

Sovereignty,Power and Resistance

This article will analyse the three conceptualapproaches to sovereignty which prevail in thecontemporary discourse, and which can besummarily identified as follows: firstly,sovereignty is the notion which accounts forboth the form and the source of politicalpower, then sovereignty is a function of law,and lastly, sovereignty manifests itself as aform of resistance. This conceptual overview ofthe theoretical elaborations on sovereigntywill show that what is named as sovereignty infact indexes, above all, an oscillation betweenthe impossibility of self-presence and thedrive to achieve such self-presence, and that,in spite of, or maybe even by virtue of thisoscillation, it nonetheless succeeds insustaining the political discourse, if only inthe guise of a performative suspension of thenation as immanent community.     

司法裁决的后果主义论证

后果主义论证是法律论证的一种形式,是实现合理的司法裁判和证成裁决结论的重要要素。司法中后果主义论证关注不同裁判方式所带来的可能后果,通过评判不同的后果来选择裁决结论。与一般情境中的后果论不同,司法裁决的后果主义论证主要出现在法官为正当化案件裁判所进行的二次证明中,它是基于可欲后果的证立,这种可欲后果是裁决的逻辑后果或一般后果。