The Iran-Israel Conflict: An Ultra-Ideological Explanation

Iran's enmity with Israel is ideological in the first place and strategic in the second. Iran intends through anti-Israel actions and messaging to internally mobilize its populace and, externally, to claim the leadership of the Muslim world and strike a balance against a regional nuclear power. This article uses a critique based on constructivism and realism to reveal how Iran's confrontation with Israel has evolved historically from “identity-ideological” to “politico-strategic.” I argue that Iran's adoption of this approach without taking its internal and external capacities into consideration has ironically bolstered the Israeli far right, increased global sympathies for Israel, escalated Iranophobia, aligned conservative Arab states with Israel, and marginalized the issue of Palestine. To preserve its national interests and regional security, Iran needs to overcome this politico-historical stage and replace conflict with competition.     

THE AMERICAN RESPONSE TO PAKISTANI AND IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: A STUDY IN PARADOX

This article explores the paradox in the reaction of the United States to the two different proliferation cases: Pakistan's proliferation and Iran's weaponization effort. The article tries to find answer to the following key question; why the United States, as one of the guardians of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) which would prefer to see a region that is entirely free of weapons of mass destruction, ultimately has accepted Pakistan's proliferation, while imposed considerable amount of pressure to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

The paper posits that number of factors explain such differences; first, and at the theoretical level, Pakistan was never considered an “irrational” and “messianic” state like Iran, but regarded as a country with a certain degree of cold-war type nuclear rationality. Second and at the applied level, while Pakistan was a US ally with not having a history of challenging the United States, Iran has been considered enemy and a threat toward the US interest.

Third, while Pakistan's nuclear arsenal was viewed as a defensive mean against overwhelming strength of India, Iran's possible nuclear arsenal considered to be for offensive uses against the United States and Israel. The fourth factor pertains to the consequences of proliferation, which is what happens when Iran's neighboring countries may feel threatened by Iranian nuclear weapon and proceed to develop their own arsenal. Fifth factor deals with the possible Iran's temptation to give some nuclear material to a terror group in which made the United States serious in preventing Iran's weaponization. Last but not least, Israel was not involved to pressure and agitate against Pakistan, while it was applied a tremendous pressure against Iran to prevent it from achieving nuclear weapons.     

The JCPOA: how Iran's grand strategy stifled the US

The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) provided a poignant example of how Iran successfully pursued a unique grand strategy that was established following, and had evolved since, the 1979 Revolution. As a result, Tehran was able to stifle attempts by Washington, DC to influence domestic Iranian affairs. In this context, this article argues that Iran's grand strategy juggled a commitment to the regime's revolutionary mantra, formed in 1979, and a pragmatic approach to pursuing national interests. This is accomplished by analyzing the foundation and evolution of Iran's grand strategy, and where the US fits in this dynamic. By focusing on the negotiations leading up to and the eventual signing of the JCPOA, this article sheds light on how Iran's grand strategy was formulated, what constitutes the main drivers and barriers to the strategy, and indeed how this manifested itself in the US–Iran relationship context.     

Beyond Countering Iran: A Political Economy of Azerbaijan-Israel Relations

In recent years, Azerbaijan–Israel relations have come to the foreground of politics in the Middle East and Caucasus region. Ties between Baku and Tel Aviv have been directly interlinked with their relations with Iran. The nature of the Azerbaijan–Israel partnership must be analysed in order to comprehend the balance of powers and energy security in the region. Even though there have been a number of works analysing the relationship by focusing on its role in regional military security, there is a gap in the discourse in terms of understanding the economic drivers of relations and the implications of the ties for regional energy security. Particular attention will be given to discussing Azerbaijan’s emerging role as a major energy producer that has already made a profound impact on the region as an ‘alternative’ to Iran in the aftermath of the recently imposed sanctions on Tehran's energy exports. It will be argued that the Azerbaijan–Israel relationship is built on solid economic grounds and it would be reasonable to expect the strength of the ties to be further intensified in the future. The article will also demonstrate that new developments in the energy security of the wider Middle Eastern region will affect the evolution of Azerbaijan–Israel ties and their rivalry with Iran in the next decade.     

IRAN’S STRUGGLE FOR STRATEGIC DOMINANCE IN A POST-ISIS IRAQ

Iran's influence and presence in Iraq have increased significantly in recent years. The collapse of the Saddam's dictatorship in 2003, after the US invasion, served to inflate Iran's influence in Iraq, particularly in the post-ISIS era. In this connection, Iran has used various means and tools to develop its strategy in Iraq. This article argues that Iran's current strategy in Iraq stems from a Realpolitik agenda rather than an ideological one, concerned more with political, economic, and security interests than pursuing revolutionary objectives per se. To this end, Tehran has largely relied on long-established relationships with several pro-Iranian political parties and militia groups. These relationships are often couched in religious ideological terms as a foundation and justification for its future strategy in post-ISIS Iraq. The questions that this paper will address are the following: what was Iran's role in defeating ISIS in Iraq? How has Tehran benefitted from its long-term relationships with Iraqi political parties and militia groups? What are the Iranian sources of power in Iraq and how do they help Iran gain strategic dominance in Iraq?     

Bargain and Barter: China's Oil Trade with Iran

The US withdrawal from the nuclear deal and its ratcheting up of sanctions aimed to cut Iran's oil revenues virtually to zero by reducing trade between Tehran and its top foreign customers, especially China. This article examines the dynamics of the Sino-Iranian oil business and finds that the Chinese have never terminated their imports; instead, when Beijing cannot deal with Tehran directly, it continues the flow through subterranean methods. This practice holds some benefits for both sides, but the Iranian economy has become highly dependent on bartering with the East Asian power: exporting crude and receiving part of the revenues in Chinese goods and services. The two countries have vowed to keep up the oil trade, as sanctions have led Iran toward a growing economic and technological orientation toward the East.     

THE IRAN NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS: ONE YEAR ON

This article, written by the former British Ambassador to Iran, starts with an overview from an insider's perspective of the 15 years of diplomacy leading up to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding Iran's Nuclear capabilities. It discusses the merits of the plan and its prospects for the future. It examines the development of international economic engagement, and in particular argues that the western powers need to do far more to deliver an economic quid pro quo for Iran's nuclear concessions: if the situation is not appreciably better soon, it will be impossible for the US and its partners to argue credibly that they are not in breach of the JCPOA. The article concludes with a discussion of Iran's economic and political prospects in the light of the nuclear deal.     

Tel Aviv and the question of separation from Jaffa 1921–1936

The ordinance granting Tel Aviv the status of local council was given in 1921. Immediately thereafter, the municipal council acted to amend the terms of the ordinance so as to free Tel Aviv entirely from the supervision of Jaffa municipality. Tel Aviv aimed for the status of an independent municipality, but still wished to safeguard its interests in Jaffa. Detachment from Jaffa was for long a central issue for Tel Aviv municipality. The article analyses the Jewish side's stance on Jaffa from 1921 until the outbreak of the disturbances in 1936, when Tel Aviv detached itself almost entirely from Jaffa. In the 1920s, the importance of Jaffa for the Jews was mainly economic, but in the 1930s, the addition of the demographic dimension reflected the growing status of the Jaffa Jewish community and was decisive in increasing the Jewish influence in Jaffa.     

A battle of principles: South Africa's relations with Iran

This paper provides a detailed case study and theoretical explanation for one of the least appreciated bilateral relationships of democratic South Africa. It analyses South Africa's post-apartheid relations with Iran as a case study to illustrate and discuss the contradictory principles that appear to guide South Africa's foreign policy. South Africa's tempered reaction to Iran's nuclear programme is in contradiction with its non-proliferation stance, but can be understood by looking into the ideology of the ruling African National Congress.     

Should South Korea go Nuclear?

A nuclear debate has arisen in South Korea following North Korea's nuclear tests and weapons program. Despite the US extended nuclear deterrence for its security, a sizable section of the people in South Korea have started debating if their country can revisit the nuclear option as a deterrent to North Korea's continued threats. Several law makers have started articulating such a view. Several opinion polls held recently also endorse such a view. However, the US is unlikely to allow South Korea to take the nuclear path as it would have serious consequences not only for the region but also the world. China would also not rejoice with the prospect of having another nuclear power in its neighborhood. If South Korea goes nuclear, Japan and Taiwan will find it difficult to resist having their own nuclear weapons. To stem such a trend, it becomes all the more necessary for the international community to address the issue of denuclearizing North Korea. The suspended Six-Party-Talks ought to restart soon and China has a great role in reigning in Pyongyang. Fortunately, the government in South Korea has not supported the view of the country going nuclear. But if the security situation deteriorates further, it might become irresistible for the government to have a rethink, with an inevitable domino effect in Japan and Taiwan soon.

This article makes an in-depth study of the prevailing trend in South Korea, the views of some influential law makers pleading for the country to go nuclear, various public opinions polls, possible US stance and implications that such a change in policy would have on the region's security situation and the author's assessment based on the critical examination of the above-mentioned factors. Many sources have been cited to analyze this issue before arriving at an objective assessment of the point raised in this essay.     

The nuclear option in India's security policy

Notwithstanding its good international citizenship on arms control, its low defense expenditures, and its democratic institutions that are largely taken for granted by the West, India's ambiguous nuclear posture is a self‐inflicted wound that will not heal so long as it neither acquires nor renounces nuclear weapons, says Ramesh Thakur. He argues that India has four options: to become an overt NWS, to reject the NPT but sign the CTBT, to renounce the nuclear option, or to maintain its present threshold status while keeping open the nuclear option. Thakur was head of the Peace Research Centre at the Australian National University and has been appointed as vice rector at the United Nations University, Tokyo.     

US Covert Operations toward Iran,February–November 1979: Was the CIA Trying to Overthrow the Islamic Regime?

This article examines US covert operations toward Iran from February until November 1979. It focuses especially on whether the CIA was trying to undermine or overthrow Iran's nascent Islamic regime, as many Iranians believed. The article details the extensive covert contacts the CIA and other US personnel established in this period with Iranian officials and various Iranian opposition factions. Its main conclusion is that US officials established these contacts for the purpose of gathering intelligence about the rapidly changing situation in Iran, rather than to undermine the Islamic regime. Indeed, US personnel never encouraged these Iranian contacts to plot against the regime and often explicitly discouraged them from doing so.     

US–India Nuclear Cooperation Accord: Implications for the Non-proliferation Regime

Members of the IAEA Board and of the Nuclear Suppliers Group may need to decide this year whether to go along with the US proposal to allow nuclear cooperation with India despite its non-NPT status. Permitting nuclear sales to India would have important geo-strategic benefits by strengthening its partnership with the US. Yet granting India an exception to nuclear supply guidelines would also have significant non-proliferation disadvantages by weakening the NPT. Whether it would assist India's nuclear weapons development is unclear. If India were to agree voluntarily to cap its production of fissile material, this would rectify the greatest lost opportunity of the US-India nuclear agreement. The non-proliferation benefits that the Bush Administration has claimed for the accord, such as that it brings India into consensus on the Iran nuclear issue, are neither guaranteed nor long-lasting. Perhaps the best that can be said is that the transparency the accord will bring to some aspects of the Indian nuclear program could contribute to arms control measures in the future.     

Intellectuals and Political Power in Social Movements: The Parallel Paths of Fadlallah and Hizbullah

This article examines the intellectual impact of Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah (1935–2010) on Hizbullah's political behaviour. Many depicted Fadlallah as the ‘spiritual guide’ and ‘oracle’ of Hizbullah, while others accentuated his socio-political independence and the potential he represented as an ‘alternative’ to Hizbullah and Iran. This study argues that Fadlallah directly influenced Hizbullah's political worldviews, but the Islamic movement's socialisation in Lebanon, its dependence on Iran and its war with Israel have led it to pursue a separate path from Fadlallah. But despite the separation, the Ayatollah shared a common world vision with Hizbullah and the Islamic Republic, and would not have formed an alternative. The article is divided into two sections. The first examines the socio-political origins of Fadlallah and Hizbullah as an intellectual and a political movement, respectively, and conceptualises the discursive and political fields that motivate the behaviour of the two actors. The second section assesses the impact of Fadlallah's ideas on Hizbullah by focusing on three main themes: (1) Islamic liberation and resistance against injustice; (2) the Islamic state and Lebanon; and (3) Wilayat al-Faqih and Islamic Iran.     

Thermidor in the Islamic republic of Iran: the rise of Muhammad Khatami

The following paper traces the course of elite factionalism in the Islamic Republic of Iran from the Islamic Republic Party's solidification of power beginning in 1981 to the present. With the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran has entered a period of economic and political Thermidor. Throughout the early part of his administration, President Rafsanjani engaged in a policy of rapproachment with conservative clerical factions. Thus the Rafsanjani era (1989–1997) was marked by a fundamental shift within the regime from the left to the right. Recently, there has been a falling out between centre groups and the right and this has resulted in the election of a moderate, Muhammad Khatami, to the presidency. A number of questions remain: What are the factors that facilitated Khatami's victory? And does this spell doom for Iran's conservative wing and mean an end to Thermidor?     

Iran and the SCO: The Quest For Legitimacy and Regime Preservation

At the 2021 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, the Russian- and Chinese-led bloc announced the approval of Iran's longstanding bid for membership. Iran has viewed its involvement in the organization as a means of bolstering external legitimacy, fostering security-oriented regionalism, and promoting the transition toward the so-called multipolar world order. The SCO has served as a regime-preservation network by providing Iran with a source of solidarity against external pressure. Tehran's commitment to the normative order, sustained by the SCO's discourse of noninterference, sovereignty, and countering the “three evils”—terrorism, extremism, and separatism—has galvanized the organization's role as a common front against the imposition of liberal norms and challenges to regime security.     

The Domestic Sources of Israel's Decision to Launch the 1956 Sinai Campaign

This article examines Israel's decision to launch the 1956 campaign against Egypt. While the current literature tends to argue that, in 1956, the campaign was a response by Israel to security threats, it is suggested here that, if so, these threats certainly did not predetermine any specific response. Israel could, for example, have responded by adopting a defensive posture. In reality, domestic factors were just as influential as external ones. The most important of these was the severe economic crisis caused by mass immigration to Israel during 1948–1951. This crisis in turn led to the creation in 1953–1956 of a war coalition whose three components—David Ben-Gurion (Prime Minister and Minister of Defence), MAPAI's party bosses and the army—had different interests but shared the idea of a war against Israel's Arab neighbours as a way in which each could advance its preferred aims.     

The Other from within: Pan-Turkist mythmaking and the expulsion of the Turkish left

The British sovereign bases on Cyprus, granted with the 1960 treaty establishing the Republic of Cyprus, played a key role in maintaining the fragile military structure of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Although Britain and the United States urged the alliance to play a more active role, CENTO degenerated into an organization with no assigned forces with the exception of RAF bombers carrying nuclear weapons, stationed on Cyprus. Thus, Britain's contribution in political and military terms became vital for CENTO's deterrence capability. The Shah of Iran, one of the key regional leaders, was interested in the RAF bombers on Cyprus; the FCO and the MoD were always cautious over how force restructuring would be presented to the Iranians. Eventually, the need for cutting defence spending for non-NATO purposes made Whitehall decide in 1975 to withdraw the bombers permanently based in Cyprus. Britain could not be the only power paying for this ‘alliance of the unwilling’, as CENTO could be called with the benefit of hindsight. In 1976, Whitehall started scaling down financial support of military exercises; by 1983 they had planned to spend nil on the alliance. The British disengagement policy proved the correct one since this alliance had only a few years of life left. After the fall of the Shah, CENTO collapsed in 1979.     

‘Decisive Victory’ and Israel's Quest For a New Military Strategy

In 2020, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced the development of a new operational concept called Decisive Victory that aimed to change the way Israel fights wars and to redefine victory on the battlefield. The root cause of this change was the evolution in nonstate threats from armed groups in Gaza and Lebanon. The concept was to drive major reforms of the IDF in training, interoperability among the services, weapons procurement, and civil-military relations. However, the efforts encountered significant challenges in terms of politics, financial resources, and the implications for the IDF's force structure. This article examines these developments to shed light on the evolving way of war in the Middle East and the struggle within the IDF to redefine its posture.     

Never Say Never: Considerations about the Possibility of Australia Acquiring Nuclear Weapons

Abstract

Australia's decision to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons was taken on medium-term strategic grounds. While similar circumstances prevail today, it is possible to identify three conditions for the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Australia to be a credible option: the existence of a major threat to Australia; a loss of confidence in US guarantees; and allied acquiescence to an Australian nuclear program. These conditions interact with Australia's relationship with Indonesia and the technological and industrial feasibility of “tactical” and “strategic” nuclear weapons postures, respectively. The only Australian nuclear posture that does not lack credibility in light of all these factors is the use of “tactical” weapons to deter major landings on the Australian mainland.