The Malaise of Federalism: Comparative Reflections on Commonwealth–State Relations

The High Court's decision in the ‘Work Choices’ case expanding further the scope of the Commonwealth's enumerated powers is the latest reminder of the highly centralised nature of Australian federalism. The division of powers traditionally forming the essence of a federal system has become increasingly difficult to discern and the roles and responsibilities of the two levels of government have become entangled. While for a good part of Australia's history divided jurisdiction was deplored as an obstacle to progress in government, today the decay of the system is most likely to be lamented. Discussion of options for reform presupposes an understanding of the forces that have led to the present condition. This article examines the Australian experience in a broader comparative and historical perspective and suggests that those forces are endemic and substantial.     

Cooperative Federalism?: The Case of the Ministerial Council on Education,Employment, Training and Youth Affairs

New Federalism reforms introduced in Australia in the early 1990s were expected to improve efficiency and reduce duplication through new cooperative intergovernmental arrangements. The reforms were also an attempt to reduce the continuing trend of Commonwealth intrusion in state powers. As well as establishing the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), the reforms created the Ministerial Council on Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs (MCEETYA) to promote a more coordinated and cooperative approach to the delivery of education. MCEETYA provides the quintessential example of the difficulties of establishing a national approach when the function, education, is squarely within the power of the states. This article investigates the operation of MCEETYA from its inception to 2006.     

Blowing Hot and Cold – Intergovernmental Relations Capacity in the Commonwealth Government

The role of the intergovernmental affairs specialist is to protect and extend the powers of the jurisdiction for which he works (Donald Smiley quoted in Warhurst 1987 ).     

Redistributive policies in decentralised systems: The effect of decentralisation on subnational social spending

This article uses cross‐national data to examine the effects of fiscal and political decentralisation on subnational governments’ social expenditures. It revisits the benefit competition hypothesis put forward by fiscal federalism research, which posits that subnational governments in decentralised countries match welfare benefit reductions by their peers to keep taxes low and avoid an in‐migration of welfare dependents. As a consequence, subnational social expenditures are assumed to plateau at similar and low levels. Using a new cross‐national dataset on social expenditures in 334 subnational units across 14 countries and 21 years, the author explores whether benefit competition causes subnational governments to converge on similar levels of social spending. The analysis reveals that as countries decentralise, subnational social spending levels begin to diverge rather than converge, with some subnational governments reducing their social expenditures and others increasing them. Furthermore, decentralisation is not likely to be associated with lowest common denominator social policies, but with more variability in social expenditure. The article also examines the effects of other macro‐level institutions and demonstrates that policy coordination influences the relationship between decentralisation and subnational social spending levels.     

Federalism Dreaming? Re‐imagining the Governance of Australian Landscapes

We propose a re‐imagining of Australian federalism in response to the White Paper on Reform of the Australian Federation. We acknowledge the unique nature and existing strengths and challenges confronting the Australian federation. In so doing we argue the value of listening to the history of the land in connection with its people and bringing landscape lessons into federation calculations moving forward. The distinctiveness of our federalism dreaming is distinguished from traditional calls for regionalism or regionalization.     

Pragmatic Federalism: Australian Federalism from Hawke to Howard

The article explores the nature of Australian federalism by examining four major themes in the period from Hawke to Howard. The investigation of these themes – Australian conceptions of federalism; the role of party in shaping federalism; the way problems and politics have influenced policy‐making and thereby federalism; and the nature of federal judicial review – suggests that Australian federalism can most accurately be characterised as pragmatic. It appears as a federalism shaped by pressing problems, specific policy agendas and the prevailing political dynamic, rather than by overarching conceptions of federalism derived from political theory or articulated in party ideology. This pragmatic federalism explains important aspects of Australian federalism, especially the trend towards centralisation of authority.     

The Federalism Debate

These papers examine current Australian federalism from the perspectives of an academic and a practitioner. Both acknowledge the opportunities arising from the current White Paper process, as well as challenges in the face of substantial cuts of proposed funding from the Commonwealth to the States. They insist upon the need for renewed commitment to the idea of federalism, and the importance of sustainable fiscal arrangements within the federation. Challenges in Reforming Australian federalism reminds us of the kind of federalism operative in Australia – concurrent, not coordinate – and develops reform proposals accordingly. Ten Steps to a Better Federation offers a range of ideas from a former state premier, drawing on his experience as both a participant at Council of Australian Government (COAG) and, later, Chair of the COAG Reform Council.     

How Europe Shapes the Nature of the Belgian Federation: Differentiated EU Impact Triggers Both Co-operation and Decentralization

This paper disentangles the impact of various dimensions of European integration on different aspects of the Belgian federal polity. We discern two opposite trends. While the institutional embeddedness of Belgium as an EU member state results in domestic centralizing tendencies and co-operative political practices, economic integration stimulates political pressures for regional autonomy, contributing to further divergence and hollowing out of the federal level. We conclude by arguing that the EU clearly affects territorial politics in Belgium, but, as the European causes are multidimensional, that also the effects, albeit substantial, will be diverse.     

Improving Federalism: Drivers of Change,Repair Options and Reform Scenarios

The Academy of Social Sciences in Australia (ASSA) and the Institute of Public Administration Australia (IPAA) hosted a ‘Policy Roundtable on Federalism’ on the 17–18 May 2007 at the University of Canberra. Around 50 attended the roundtable comprising politicians, Commonwealth and state public servants, and academics. The roundtable was provided with a number of background papers including the Hollander‐Patapan article and another produced by staff of the Commonwealth Grants Commission entitled ‘Trends in Commonwealth‐State Financial Relations: a Grants Commission Perspective’. The roundtable focused not only on issues and challenges but, more practically, on options and how to make federalism work better.     

Best Practice Environmental Impact Assessment: A Model Framework for Australia

Environmental impact assessment (EIA) is a process that involves the identification, prediction, evaluation and mitigation of the environmental and other impacts associated with development proposals and policies, plans and programs. Australian governments were amongst the first in the world to introduce EIA in the 1970s. Since then, the federal, state and territory EIA regimes have undergone multiple changes. In recent times, the push for EIA reform has intensified as governments have sought ways to improve the cost‐effectiveness of regulatory processes. In light of the impetus for change, this article outlines principles and a framework for best practice EIA in Australia. The intention is to inform the policy development processes at the federal, state and local levels.     

Gender Equality Architecture: The Intergovernmental Level in Federal Systems

This article provides a first overall account of the intergovernmental components of Australia's gender equality architecture in the period 1978–2014. From the 1990s this is largely a story of institutional fragility. In explaining this, factors identified by scholars of state feminism, such as lack of political will, partisan ideologies and discursive shifts, particularly the increased influence of neoliberal approaches to governance, are taken into account. The new factor introduced is that of executive federalism, characterised by decision‐making behind closed doors. When women's intergovernmental bodies attempted to open doors to community input this proved fruitless, particularly in the area of economic decision‐making. Repeated attempts to introduce gender‐disaggregated reporting on the outcomes of Commonwealth‐State agreements were also largely unsuccessful. The article concludes that the democratic deficits associated with executive federalism – lack of parliamentary oversight or accountability and lack of community consultation – are closely related to the deficits in gender mainstreaming.     

Federalism, Political Structure, and Public Policy in the United States and Canada

Two of the three large countries on the North American continent—the United States and Canada—share a number of similarities that often make it difficult for the untrained observer to differentiate between the two nations. On the surface, the two are structured similarly as federal systems that, by definition, exhibit shared power between the national government and provincial or state political entities.Although there are other important social and economic characteristics of the two countries that help explain differences in policy processes and outcomes, it is the contention of this article that one gets the clearest sense of what Elazar has called thinking federal by utilizing an analytical approach that joins questions related to federalism with some conceptual frameworks of the public policy field. Two frameworks undergird the argument in this article—the Lowi typology of different types of policies and Deil Wright's typology of different models that describe the American inter-governmental system.In both countries, policies must be sensitive to the greater interdependencies between units of government as well as to linkages between policy areas. The mechanisms or instrumentalities for dealing with policy issues are intrinsically complex. It is also clear that the intergovernmental networks that exist in both the U.S. and Canada are composed of an array of actors. The differing political structures of the systems do impact the types of intergovernmental policies that have emerged in the two countries. The executive dominance so imbedded in Canadian governments has contributed to their ability to adopt and implement certain controversial redistributive policies, such as a national health insurance program. By contrast, the fragmentation of the U.S. system makes redistributive policies more difficult.     

‘Let's Talk Cash’: Cantons' Interests and the Reform of Swiss Federalism

In 2004 the Swiss people accepted a new equalization scheme and a new distribution of competences between the federal state and the cantons. It was argued that the reform was successful because of the capacity of veto-players to overcome their interests and adopt a ‘problem-solving’ interaction mode. We propose a different interpretation and argue that distributive issues and the accommodation of actors' interests crucially mattered. We identify three mechanisms that contribute to a successful reform, i.e. package-deals, side-payments and the downsizing of the reform. Our in-depth, mainly qualitative study of both the content of the reform and related decision-making process supports the pertinence of these strategies for the explanation of the successful reform of Swiss federalism.     

Comparative Climate Change Policy and Federalism: An Overview

This commentary provides an overview of the four papers in this issue of Review of Policy Research on the politics of climate change. The papers all address in one way or another aspects of how federal‐type systems are dealing with the collective action and multilevel governance issues of climate change policy. The comparative study of federal systems provides insight into how domestic authority is so often overlapping and divided when dealing with greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. Federal arrangements offer a rich array of norms, institutions, and practices for tackling these problems. Federal systems grapple continuously with the kinds of issues that are the most intractable in the climate change case, such as overcoming interregional differences of interests and values. A common federal feature is competition among subnational governments and between them and national or federated governments over climate change policy, which has been especially significant in the United States and in Canada in the relative absence of national action––although soberingly, the whole is as yet nowhere near as great as the sum of the parts. More significant, but rarer is the achievement of tighter coordination in federal systems achieved through intergovernmental co‐decision, as seen in the European Community and Australia. This has been accomplished in large part due to a consensus among all intergovernmental parties on the nature of the problem and congruence with the existing international regime, characteristics missing in the North American context.