The appraisal remedy and merger premiums

The appraisal remedy affords corporate shareholders the optionto redeem their shares for cash in the event of certain transactions,including mergers. Access to appraisal for publicly traded shares,however, differs from state to state. We present the first large-sampleempirical study of the effect of appraisal rights on targetshareholder gains from acquisitions. We examine 1,350 mergersinvolving publicly held firms. We find some evidence that appraisalreduces average shareholder gains in transactions involvingself-interested managers. For the entire sample, however, wefind no evidence that appraisal has any effect, positive ornegative, on target shareholder gains from takeovers.     

新经济下的双层股权结构:理论证成、实践经验与中国有效治理路径

新世纪以来选择双层股权结构成为新经济公司的一种新趋势。坚持一股一票的传统公司治理理论主要从公司民主、最优表决权结构和代理成本三个方面反对双层股权结构,认为双层股权结构将降低上市公司价值。股东的共同目标是股东利益最大化而非公司民主;最优表决权治理结构是因公司而异多元化的,一股一票虽普遍然非最优;表决权监督机制非唯一治理成本的约束机制,双层股权结构比一股一票更有助于公司关注长期利益和科技创新。从经验研究来看,双层股权结构与上市公司价值并不存在确定的负相关关系,甚至存在正相关关系。契合新经济公司的双层股权结构有助于在“轻资产、重人力资本”的新经济公司中根据合同而非物质资本进行控制权分配,有助于激励创始股东/管理者进行专属人力资本投资,有助于满足新经济公司的特殊治理结构需要。我国科创板已经引入双层股权结构,为实现中国的有效治理,除目前科创板集中于事前治理外,还应强化事中治理和完善事后治理,最终对双层股权结构进行有效治理实现兴“利”除“弊”。     

The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate law

In corporate law the appraisal remedy gives shareholders the right to dissent from types of corporate transactions and to obtain payment for their shares from the corporation. While the remedy is typically viewed as a form of protection for minority shareholders, the author argues that it is best understood as an implied contractual term that increases the value of all shares.     

The Mandatory Bid Rule: Efficient,After All?

The mandatory bid rule has its origins in the UK and now applies throughout the EU and in many other jurisdictions. Under a mandatory bid, an acquirer of a controlling stake in a listed company has to offer to the remaining shareholders a buy‐out of their minority stakes at a price equal to the consideration received by the incumbent controller. While the rule warrants that no value‐destroying control transfers take place, it is often criticised for preventing value‐increasing transactions. This paper challenges some of the claims made by critics of mandatory bids. Highlighting the effects of synergy gains in private sale‐of‐control transactions, it is shown that mandatory bids prevent inefficient control transfers, where minority shareholder protection rules provide inadequate protection. Furthermore, mandatory bids help facilitate transfers to the most efficient bidders in multi‐bidder settings. The mandatory bid is justifiable, on economic grounds, in wider circumstances than is commonly assumed by law and economics scholars.     

论公司表意吸收争议及其法律救济

公司表意吸收是指公司股东会和董事会占多数表决权者以自己的意志取代少数表决权者的公司行为。公司表意吸收既可提高公司运作效率,也可使公司部分成员利用合法的表决程序转移公司利益。为了有效保护公司财产安全,对曲意运用公司表意吸收方法进行欺诈的法律救济措施是:运用现有法律资源限制决策层股东的表决额;建立有限公司股东对特定事项的否决权;建立异议股东的市值保全制度;将累积投票方式扩大至公司分红表决;建立异议股东的股份收购制度和完善股东的退出机制。     

股东出资义务的请求权主体研究——兼评《民法典》合伙合同、利他合同条款

确定股东出资义务的请求权主体存在请求权基础、公司法自创规则两条路径。前者有奠基性意义,在该路径下,应厘清出资义务的约定基础、法定基础,注重债法与公司法并用的系统思维。本源性的出资义务是约定的,表现为股东协议、公司章程,其区别于法定产生的出资义务衍生体。股东协议是组织性合同,依《中华人民共和国民法典》合伙合同、利他合同条款,出资义务请求权人应包括公司、其他股东,但公司法特殊价值会对出资义务抗辩权等产生抑制作用。章程性质依内容不同具有可分性,其出资条款应界定为组织性合同,请求权主体也包括公司、其他股东。其他股东对出资义务请求有独立利益,组织法不应排除其出资义务请求权。债权人取得出资义务请求权是法定的,须符合法定构成要件。公司法修订时,应明确公司、其他股东的出资义务请求权源于股东协议、公司章程。     

股东派生诉讼制度的构建与完善

股东派生诉讼是指当公司的正当权益受到他人侵害而公司又怠于行使诉权时,符合法定条件的一个或多个股东以自己名义提起诉讼,要求补救公司权益的行为。股东派生诉讼区别于股东直接诉讼,有其自身的特点。鉴于股东派生诉讼的特殊性,在其诉讼提起程序中对原告资格、诉讼适用范围、诉讼过程中公司和其他股东诉讼地位的确立等都应作特殊的规定。为实现设立股东派生诉讼制度的初衷,既要防止股东派生诉讼的滥用,又要对股东派生诉讼加以激励。     

透视美国公司法上的董事忠实义务——兼评我国《公司法》对董事忠实义务之规定

集中管理模式之下的公司董事具有相当大的权力,股东与董事之间难免会产生代理成本,为此法律规定了董事对公司和股东负有信托义务。信托义务主要包括注意义务和忠实义务。我国现行《公司法》对董事忠实义务的规定不够完善,建议我国《公司法》扩大董事忠实义务责任主体的范围,规定举证责任分配,归入权的具体行使主体、行使方式、行使期限等。     

Public bads and private firms: efficiency and sustainability with different allocations of voting rights

A number of authors have proposed that firms can internalize externalities through their shareholders. This paper investigates this proposition, focusing on public bads. Theoretically it is, indeed, possible that shareholders decide that the firm reduces its public bads at the cost of profits, thereby increasing Pareto-efficiency. One of the factors which help determine the size of the reduction is the number of shareholders with a (very) small stake in the firm. The greater this number, the greater the reduction will tend to be. It is shown that the reduction in public bads can be reversed by takeovers, but under special conditions only while takeover defences may also be used. Unfortunately, there are a number of factors which significantly limit the internalization of external effects in practice. The paper also discusses a change in the legal share-voting system whereby the direct owners of the shares (i.e., the shareholders) no longer possess, in their capacity of direct owners, the legal right to vote at the General Meetings of firm owners. Instead, these rights become the property of the beneficial owners of the shares (i.e., the people who ultimately provided the money to buy the shares), but on the condition that they delegate their voting rights to a proxy voting institution. This institutional innovation may significantly increase the internalization of external effects among other things because many beneficial owners have a tiny stake in the firm.     

股东表决权:公司所有与公司控制的连接点

美国学者Berle和Means于1932年系统地分析了在公众公司中存在的公司所有与公司经营相分离的现象后,在经济学和公司法学中都产生了重大的影响。根据该理论,在公众公司中的股东对经营层失去了控制,表决权也没有任何意义了。对此,基于所有权结构的有效性分析,本文认为股东对管理层并没有失去控制,而是由某一个或者几个大股东控制着公司。在两权分离过程中,表决权扮演着极为重要的角色,它是公司所有与公司经营的连接点。它不但维系和控制着公司所有者与经营者的关系,还是不同股东之间争夺公司控制权的工具,是控制股东对中小股东进行控制的工具。为了顺应这一工具主义趋势,表决权与股份之间出现了分离倾向的同时,表决权本身也出现了客体化趋势,在表决权的救济上也已经从损害赔偿为主的救济方式走向了撤销公司决议为主。     

论股东对公司对外诉讼裁判提起第三人撤销之诉——兼评最高人民法院指导案例148号

最高人民法院指导案例148号的裁判要点指出,对于公司与相对人之间的生效裁判,股东无权提起第三人撤销之诉。股东是否为公司对外诉讼的第三人,取决于股东就公司对外法律关系是否有一定的实体法地位。公司对外行为可能有越权、不当关联交易、恶意串通等瑕疵。只有在公司行为构成恶意串通无效时,股东在实体上才有权攻击公司与相对人之间的法律关系,相应地在程序上成为公司诉讼的有独立请求权第三人。若效力瑕疵在实体上仅能由公司主张,则股东因欠缺实体法权限而非为有独立请求权第三人,亦不能基于"代位"而成为无独立请求权第三人。承认股东的原告资格符合第三人撤销之诉的制度机理,且与公司的法人独立人格不矛盾,因为在恶意串通时不存在法人独立人格所保护的法益。股东第三人撤销之诉的效果亦非公司内部救济所能代替。未来应修正该指导案例的裁判规则,承认特定情形下股东的第三人撤销之诉原告资格。     

投票权信托的本土化方式探讨

肇端于英国的信托制度在美国获得了极大的发展,其弹性机制被运用于众多的领域,投票权信托就是信托制度在美国公司法中的一种发挥.它是享有投票权的股东根据协议将其股份转让给受托人,由受托人持有该股份并行使投票权.投票权信托的灵活机制在促进公司治理与保护中小股东利益方面有着独特的价值,故中国目前应着手引进该制度.     

Disputes about corporate expression absorption and their legal remedies

Corporate expression is the expression that a company gives to the outside in its capacity as a legal entity. Often referring to resolutions made by shareholder meetings and the board of directors, based on good faith and bound by contractual spirit, a company must be held liable for its expression. Corporate expression absorption refers to the corporate behaviors and situations wherein the majority voting shareholders and directors replace the will of the minority voting shareholders and directors within their own will. Among them, the majority voting shareholders at a shareholders’ meeting (shareholders’ general meeting) are decision-making shareholders, and directors, managers and other senior management staff that decide corporate affairs are called decision-making members. Corporate expression absorption consists of two sorts: absorption by shareholders’ meeting and absorption by the board of directors. Shareholders’ meeting is a company’s authoritative organization; when the voting rights of some shareholders exceed the statutory limit, they will be able to manipulate the expression of shareholders’ meetings and replace the will of other shareholders with that of their own. The expression absorption by the board of directors refers to the practice wherein the majority directors decide on important corporate matters in accordance with the majority rule. Thus, it can be seen that the corporate expression absorption is a double-edged sword, not only capable of uplifting operational efficiency but also likely to help decision-making shareholders achieve personal gains and transfer corporate interests. As for the disputes of corporate expression absorption, the following legal remedies might be adopted: (1) Limit the voting rights of decision-making shareholders. (2) Provide shareholders with veto power over specific events. (3) Ask the chambers of commerce (industry associations) to arbitrate specific events. (4) Preserve the market value of shares held by dissenting directors. (5) Expand cumulative voting; (6) Provide shareholders the right to exit. (7) Legal remedies for corporate deadlock. (8) Shareholders’ derivative lawsuits. __________ Translated from China Law, No. 4, 2005     

Assessing Market Power: The Trade-off Between Market Concentration and Multi-Market Participation

This analysis reveals that traditional market power measuresare biased under the conditions of multi-market participationand demand interdependence. Specifically, when complementary(substitutable) demands dominate, traditional market power measuresare biased upward (downward). A similar bias carries over tothe evaluation of mergers. To wit, mergers that simultaneouslyincrease market concentration and multi-market participationcan result in lower prices even in the absence of merger economies.It follows that merger guidelines that place undue emphasison market concentration can lead policymakers to block (approve)mergers that enhance (diminish) consumer welfare.     

公司IT化的若干法律问题

公司ＩＴ化是在现代电子技术的基础上发展起来的一种公司制度，得到了经济发达国家的高度重视；公司ＩＴ化的形式包括公司电子信息化服务、股东会议电子化、股东权行使的电子化等；在公司ＩＴ化过程中，公司电子文件的签名和传输、股东电子表决权等具有自己特殊的规则；我国尚没有公司ＩＴ化方面的规范性文件，应当在借鉴国外经验的基础上，确立公司ＩＴ化的法律规则。     

美国控制股东信义义务:本原厘定与移植回应

控制股东信义义务"移植论"存在方法论误用的缺陷,过度关注概念和规则的译介,而未深究其制度功能所关联的特定社会背景。信义义务根植于普通法特殊的历史土壤,以信托为"母体"并经归纳推理不断扩张泛化,"控制股东信义义务"是这种泛化现象的缩影,早期"受益人利益最大化"内涵已被"公平交易义务"取代。内涵演变的动因是对公司本质认知的进化以及因之发生的个人法向团体法逻辑的持续递进。我国控制股东滥权现象的主要成因并非规范资源不足,转轨时期"政企不分"的现实和公司法体系二元区隔的倾向亦不容忽视。美国关于交易公平性判断的程序性规则有助于克服法律行为评价系统的局限性,具有"复原"商业决策背景的功能,契合复杂的市场环境需求,是最具借鉴价值的部分。     

累积投票制的引入与实践——以上市公司为例的经验性观察

在学界和社会各界的呼吁下,2005年公司法修订时引入了任意性累积投票制。累积投票制作为公司董事、监事的选举制度,目的是为了保护少数股东的权利。虽然立法上采取了任意性累积投票制,但实践中绝大多数样本上市公司实施了累积投票制,这与监管机构和证券交易所对累积投票制倾向于采取强制主义的态度是分不开的。实证数据显示,一方面在目前的股权结构下累积投票制的实施有很强的现实意义,另一方面累积投票制在上市公司中未能得以有效实施。存在诸多有待解决的影响累积投票制有效实施的问题,包括等额选举、股东大会会议出席率低以及表决权的不当行使等实践层面的问题,也包括提名资格限制、当选原则、选举方法以及独立董事、非独立董事和监事分别选举等制度层面的问题。从数学的角度分析,累积投票制在我国上市公司中存在实施的空间和价值。     

中国加入世贸组织后公司法的修改前瞻

本文主张全面修改《公司法》 ,认为新《公司法》应在坚持公司法人性、营利性与社会性的同时 ,抛弃社团性 ,承认一人公司。建议扩张公司自治空间 ,废除公司经营范围制度 ,重视公司章程和股东协议的效力 ,对各类公司一律采行登记制为主、审批制为辅的设立原则 ,允许公司选择法定代表人的一元化或多元化。主张引入授权资本制 ,改进资本维持原则 ,放宽对股东出资形式的限制 ,适度调整资本减少限制原则 ,原则上废除法定最低注册资本原则。建议由公司章程选择单层制或双层制 ,从多角度完善股东大会运行规则 ,扩张董事会经营权限 ,健全董事会和独立董事制度 ,将监事会确定为董事会上位机关 ,经理职权不应由立法列举 ,控制股东的诚信义务应予确认。本文认为 ,外资企业立法应与公司立法并轨 ,并呼吁新《公司法》要求法院和仲裁机构积极受理公司法未作规定或规定不明的公司纠纷案件。     

中国企业赴美并购的法律风险及其防范对策

中国企业在赴美并购过程中总存在着各种各样的法律风险。中国国有企业赴美并购时应高度重视美国的国家安全审查机制,清晰地突出国有企业的商事主体性质。而美国外资委员会引入听证会程序,应充分听取中国投资者的意见,放弃投资保护主义。中国企业要熟悉美国的公司并购规则与治理规则,明确目标公司选择符合本公司及其股东利益最大化的收购要约而并非现金出价最多的要约,是美国公司并购的常态。中美双方加快双边投资保护协定的谈判进程,就企业的国有化条款而言,应采取充分的市场化补偿标准。我国政府鼓励企业赴美并购,可将核准制改为备案制。要加快建立健全海外投资纠纷的仲裁机制,提高我国仲裁机构的国际竞争力。     

设立全资子公司的法律规制

全资子公司的设立原是企业多元化发展的战略要求,却成为控股股东侵害公司及小股东的工具.个中原因不乏公司法律制度在预防机制上对全资子公司的忽视以及部门规章的效力等级不足,在救济机制上又集体失效.应将设立全资子公司的列为股东会特别决议事项,赋予公司登记审查机关以审查职责;穿越规则对公司法人格并无实质影响,可积极引入事先预防与事后救济.