Editor's Introduction: Understanding Regulatory Enforcement

This issue of Law & Policy adds to the growing body of empirical case studies of decision-making and enforcement in regulatory agencies. Summarizing that research, regulatory enforcement styles can be described in terms of two dimensions, one concerning the ways in which regulatory violations are defined and punished, the other concerning outcomes, described in policy-evaluative terms. In explaining variation in enforcement style, existing studies point to three sets of factors: characteristics of the regulatory "legal design"; features of agencies' "task environment"; and the regulatory "political environment." Weighting the relative importance of these factors, however, is difficult because of the number and fluidity of variables and the adaptiveness of regulatory agencies.     

VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE AND REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT

Enforcement strategies that encourage "voluntary compliance" can improve regulatory efficiency by reducing unnecessary enforcement and compliance costs associated with legal confrontation between firms and agencies. This article analyzes the enforcement dilemma that causes confrontation and describes a "Tit for Tat" strategy capable of increasing socially beneficial cooperation. The strategy requires agencies to be reasonable toward cooperative firms, vengeful toward cheaters, unrelenting in pursuit of chronic evaders, but conciliatory toward repentant firms. Reforms in this neglected and poorly understood part of the regulatory process could yield considerable social benefits.     

Regulatory Agencies and Interest Groups in Occupational Health and Safety in Great Britain and West Germany: A Perspective from West Germany*

In this paper, results are introduced of an empirical study which investigated the practice of occupational health and safety regulation in two countries, Great Britain and West Germany. The analysis concentrates on the specific relationship that regulatory agencies and the concerned interest groups, employers and trade unions, develop in the two stages of policy formulation and implementation of health and safety regulation. Results show that interest groups actively participate in the regulation-making systems in both countries. Their policy pursued in this process is influenced and mediated by their actual resources as well as by individual views and assessments of each side's representatives. In Germany, a strong fragmentation with numerous private and quasi-governmental bodies entitled to formulate standards makes it difficult for the interest groups to concentrate on the competent and important committees. In contrast, we find a clearer responsibility of bodies and committees in the case of Britain. In both countries, enforcement policy prefers an advisory and persuasive style even though the legal backgrounds are quite different.     

管制行业反垄断执法权配置分析——以管制度为视角

管制行业在不同程度上存在着反垄断执法问题,其执法权配置有多种模式可供选择,但从管制度的角度看,这一执法权配置应是从行业管制机构向反垄断专门执法机关逐步移转的过程,这也是大多数国家或地区立法与实践的发展趋向,因此,我国相关立法也应作相应完善.     

An Enforcement Taxonomy of Regulatory Agencies

A variety of multivariate techniques were used to develop a taxonomy of regulatory agencies from the first comprehensive study of the disparate enforcement strategies employed by business regulatory agencies in one country. Seven types of agencies were identified: Conciliators, Benign Big Guns, Diagnostic Inspectorates, Detached Token Enforcers, Detached Modest Enforcers, Token Enforcers and Modest Enforcers. Agencies were distinguished primarily according to their orientation to enforcement versus persuasion, according to their commitment to detached (or arms length) command and control regulation versus cooperative fostering of self-regulation, and according to their attachment to universalistic rulebook regulation versus particularistic regulation. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to view regulatory agencies as lying on a single continuum from particularistic non-enforcers who engage in cooperative fostering of self-regulation to rulebook enforcers whose policy is detached command and control. This approximates the suggestions of Hawkins and Reiss for distinguishing regulatory agencies according to a "sanctioning/deterrence" versus "compliance" dimension. The predominant regulatory style in Australia, however, is distant from both poles, being a perfunctory regulatory approach which is neither distinctively diagnostic and educative nor litigiously "going by the book"; rather it amounts to "going through the motions". The typology also partially conforms to Black's categorisation of social control as penal, therapeutic, conciliatory and compensatory.     

Applying game theory to the protection of public funds: Some introductory notes

Regulatory agencies responsible for preventing misuse of public funds do not all operate in the same fashion. Some carefully weigh the costs and benefits associated with various enforcement policies, but others do not. We use game theory to suggest that (1) regulatory agencies actually have a range of enforcement options at their disposal and (2) these enforcement options can have quite different cost-benefit ratios, depending on the resources of the enforcement agency, the nature of its connection to principals, and the strategies adopted by opportunistic actors. We conclude that enforcement organizations must be flexible in order to be effective.     

Cloud computing and its implications for cybercrime investigations in Australia

The advent of cloud computing has led to a dispersal of user data across international borders. More than ever before, law enforcement investigations into cybercrime and online criminal activity require cooperation between agencies from multiple countries. This paper examines recent changes to the law in Australia in relation to the power of law enforcement agencies to effectively investigate cybercrime insofar as individuals and organisations make use of cloud infrastructure in connection with criminal activity. It concludes that effective law enforcement operations in this area require harmonious laws across jurisdictions and streamlines procedures for granting assistance between law enforcement agencies. In conjunction with these mechanical developments, this paper posits that law enforcement officers require a systematised understanding of cloud infrastructure and its operation in order to effectively make use of their powers.     

Regulating transnational corporate bribery: Anti-bribery and corruption in the UK and Germany

Recent large-scale cases involving multi-national corporations such as the BAE Systems and Siemens bribery scandals illustrate the difficulties faced by the UK and German sovereign states in controlling complex trans-national and multi-jurisdictional crimes. This article analyses the mixture of enforcement, self-regulatory and hybrid mechanisms that are emerging as part of UK and German responses to controlling transnational corporate bribery. This regulatory landscape incorporates a diverse array of direct and indirect state and non-state ‘regulatory’ actors of varying levels of formality. Mechanisms of a self-regulatory nature vary in terms of their mandatory/voluntary requirements and manufactured/organic formation. However, there is an assumption that the emergence of a variety of enforcement, self-regulatory and innovative hybrid mechanisms is sufficient but in reality this is not the case. Instead, the key argument of the article is that while these mechanisms are aiding the response, they are likely to fail leading to the default position of accommodation by state agencies, even where the will to enforce the law is high.     

Greening Industry Without Enforcement? An Assessment of the World Bank's Pollution Regulation Model for Developing Countries

The best comparative and overview source now available for knowledge about pollution regulation in developing countries is the 2000 World Bank policy research report called Greening Industry . The World Bank finds that there is a new model for pollution regulation in lower- and middle-level income countries that is an alternative to "traditional" command and control regulation. The new model stresses flexible norms and nonstate pressures on regulated enterprises coming from communities and markets. This article presents an investigation into this new model. It finds that the prevalence of weak law enforcement may undermine the new model's potential to control pollution in developing countries. It also contends that social and market pressures only occur under certain circumstances often not found in lower- and middle-level income countries. Therefore, the article concludes that developing countries require smart mixes of various regulatory instruments appropriate in the given state and nonstate regulatory capacities, instead of contrasting state and nonstate regulation.     

Reorienting Regulation: Pollution Enforcement in Industrializing Countries

This special issue aims to set a course for future inquiry on regulatory enforcement in industrializing countries. With examples from major countries including Brazil, China, and Indonesia, the articles develop four cross-cutting themes: (1) how enforcement and its institutional context vary geographically and temporally, (2) how enforcement is affected by deficiencies in regulatory capacity and autonomy, (3) how civil liability regimes interact with enforcement, and (4) the relationship between enforcement and regulatory instrument choice.     

Assaults Against Inspectors: The Dangers in Enforcing Corporate Crime

This survey of regulatory inspectors reveals a surprising number of threats and assaults being made against inspectors in the course of enforcing regulatory provisions. Contrary to conventional images of regulatory enforcement, inspectors in some agencies face violent resistance from regulatory offenders that is similar to the violent resistance encountered by police officers. These findings provide support for the contention that regulatory enforcement and policing should be conceptualized as overlapping forms of law enforcement rather than as distinct governmental activities.     

Physician organizations: two years under the FTC/DOJ guidelines

The joint antitrust enforcement statement for physician networks was designed in part to dispel uncertainty in the physician community about antitrust agency law enforcement intentions. In the two years since its issuance, the antitrust agencies have generally, but not always, been consistent in applying the methodology and standards set forth in their enforcement statement. Even though agency pronouncements like the enforcement statement are not binding on private parties or the federal courts, both the statement and subsequent advisory opinions and business review letters have been exceptionally helpful, if not always encouraging, to health care providers in their antitrust planning efforts.     

From data to disruption

Organized crime groups and law enforcement agencies are caught in complex system similar to a continuous game of cat-and-mouse, in which the latter frequently remains two or more steps behind. Law enforcement agencies are therefore seeking for more proactive strategies in targeting these criminal network structures more effectively. This starts with a better understanding of the way they operate and adapt over time. A key element to developing this understanding remained largely unexploited: big data and big data analytics. This provides novel insight into how criminal cooperations on a micro- and meso level are embedded in small-world criminal macro-networks and how this fosters its resillience against disruption. This paper discusses the opportunities and the limitations of this data-driven approach and its implications for both law enforcement practice and scientific research.     

信用评级机构的法律定位及其国际监管改革研究

信用评级机构是金融市场日益专业化过程中不可或缺的一员,通过其专业化的评价体系,对解决投资者和证券发行人之间的信息不对称问题发挥了很大的作用。但是,随着评级机构日益深入地参与到金融证券化的过程中,不可避免的利益冲突使其中立性、客观性等在一定程度上有所缺失。次贷危机发生后,对信用评级机构加强监管的呼声日益高涨,各国金融监管机构开始对信用评级机构进行全面的严格的监管,但是,由于评级业本身的自然垄断属性以及评级业务的专业性,使其定位上存在模糊之处。在分析信用评级机构存在的缺陷基础之上,对其法律定位进行探讨,并预测国际监管改革与合作的发展趋势是十分必要的。     

The Dangers of Hanging Baskets: 'Regulatory Myths' and Media Representations of Health and Safety Regulation

The successful enforcement of health and safety regulation is reliant upon the ability of regulatory agencies to demonstrate the legitimacy of the system of regulatory controls. While 'big cases' are central to this process, there are also significant legitimatory implications associated with 'minor' cases, including media-reported tales of pettiness and heavy-handedness in the interpretation and enforcement of the law. The popular media regularly report stories of 'regulatory unreasonableness', and they can pass quickly into mainstream public knowledge. A story's appeal becomes more important than its factual veracity; they are a form of 'regulatory myth'. This paper discusses the implications of regulatory myths for health and safety regulators, and analyses their challenges for regulators, paying particular attention to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) which has made concerted efforts to address regulatory myths attaching to its activities. It will be shown that such stories constitute sustained normative challenges to the legitimacy of the regulator, and political challenges to the burgeoning regulatory state, because they reflect some of the key concerns of late-modern society.     

Regulatory alternatives for AI

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is enjoying another of its periodic surges in popularity. To the extent that the current promises are fulfilled, AI may deliver considerable benefits. Whether or not it does so, however, AI harbours substantial threats. The first article in this series examined those threats. The second article presented a set of Principles and a business process whereby organisations can approach AI in a responsible manner. Given how impactful AI is expected to be, and the very low likelihood that all organisations will act responsibly, it is essential that an appropriate regulatory regime be applied to AI.This article reviews key regulatory concepts, and considers each of the various forms that regulatory schemes can take. Given the technical and political complexities and the intensity of the threats, co-regulation is proposed as the most appropriate approach. This involves the establishment of a legislated framework with several key features. The parliament needs to declare the requirements, the enforcement processes and sanctions, and allocate the powers and responsibilities to appropriate regulatory agencies. In addition, it delegates the development and maintenance of the detailed obligations to an independent body, comprising representatives of all stakeholder groups, including the various categories of the affected public.     

International environmental agreements between developing countries only: learning from the Brazil–Uruguay case over the suspicion of acid rain

This article is about the process of negotiation and implementation of a bilateral environmental agreement between two developing countries. It analyzes the case of the Act of Jaguarão between Brazil and Uruguay on assessing the risk of transboundary air pollution by the President Medici (UTPM) coal-powered thermo-electrical facility in the Candiota region of southern Brazil. The article adds to the scarce literature on international environmental conflict resolution and negotiations between developing countries, especially in Latin America. First, it explains that even with the asymmetry of power between Brazil and Uruguay, negotiation was possible due to a series of factors, such as the interest of Brazilian environmental agencies in improving the monitoring of emissions from UTPM and the international scrutiny of Brazil prior to the upcoming Rio-92 Earth Summit. Both states obtained mutual gains from the agreement by developing ‘joint fact finding’ research and monitoring. Second, different from most of the mainstream literature, the research reveals that weaknesses in institutional agreements, such as a lack of sanctions or deadlines, were not an implementation impediment. In fact, the very weaknesses of the agreement actually enabled authorities in both countries to cooperate in the development of an acid rain monitoring program in the Candiota region, and as a result, to improve air monitoring capacities in both countries. Third, this research shows that the implementation process (1991–2003) produced different results and impacts: it helped to develop technical capacities of environmental agencies in both countries, increased the political power of Brazilian environmental agencies to control UTPM, and pushed for behavioral changes to enable UTPM to respond to the demands of both governments.     

The Criminal Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China: Recent Developments and Implications

This article systematically introduces and analyzes a number of aspects of the criminal enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) in China, focusing on recent trends and developments. China has been under tremendous pressure from the US to expand the criminalization of its IP infringement. The article first summarizes the substantive criminal law regarding IP offenses in China and describes the main enforcement agencies and judicial organs responsible for the investigation and processing of IP crimes. Analysis of the substantive criminal IP law and enforcement practices shows a steady pattern of rapid criminalization, not only on the books but also in action. Newly promulgated judicial interpretations and notices substantially expand criminalization of IP infringements. In addition, the enforcement rates of IP and related crimes have been rising consistently and rapidly. There have also been numerous joint meetings, information exchanges, issuance of provisions, collaborative “strike-hard” enforcement campaigns and other major efforts initiated by the police, the prosecutors, and administrative agencies to facilitate agency cooperation and strengthen the criminal enforcement of IPR. However, accompanying this rapid criminalization of IP infringement control are serious problems rooted in the Chinese criminal judicial system, including local protectionism, the lack of respect for procedural justice as well as the protection of defendants’ basic rights, and inadequate training, professional incompetence, misconduct, or corruption.