The paradox of nationalism: The common denominator of radical right and radical left euroscepticism

What can explain the strong euroscepticism of radical parties of both the right and the left? This article argues that the answer lies in the paradoxical role of nationalism as a central element in both party families, motivating opposition towards European integration. Conventionally, the link between nationalism and euroscepticism is understood solely as a prerogative of radical right‐wing parties, whereas radical left‐wing euroscepticism is associated with opposition to the neoliberal character of the European Union. This article contests this view. It argues that nationalism cuts across party lines and constitutes the common denominator of both radical right‐wing and radical left‐wing euroscepticism. It adopts a mixed‐methods approach, combining intensive case study analysis with quantitative analysis of party manifestos. First, it traces the link between nationalism and euroscepticism in Greece and France in order to demonstrate the internal validity of the argument. It then undertakes a cross‐country statistical estimation to assess the external validity of the argument and its generalisability across Europe.     

The black radical tradition

Book reviews: Robinson, Cedric J., Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition (reviewed by Frederick Knight); Robinson, Cedric J., Black Movements in America (reviewed by Frederick Knight)     

Band-aid solutions

She has been a faculty member at Carnegie Mellon University; Director of the Division of Economic and Quantitative Analysis, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Department of Health and Human Services; and Director of the Office of Research in the Health Care Financing Administration. She is president of the Foundation for Health Services Research.     

Authoritarian attitudes and support for radical right populists

ABSTRACT

This paper examines which parties attract support from people with authoritarian attitudes by comparing multi-party systems to a pure two-party system (the US). It proposes reasons why radical right populist (RRP) parties may serve as outlets for illiberal sentiments in multiparty systems, and offers reasons why such attitudes could correspond with support for the US Republican Party. Some have raised concerns about democratic deconsolidation in liberal democracies. There is limited evidence here consistent with deconsolidation. Politically authoritarian attitudes do exist among a small but non-trivial proportion of electorates in established democracies. In multiparty systems people with such attitudes were more likely to be supporters of smaller RRP parties that generally do not join government, but not centre-left or centre-right parties. However, US Republicans had supporters who resembled European RRP supporters in their politically authoritarian attitudes, and authoritarian attitudes were a notable predictor of support for Donald Trump in 2016.     

Income inequality and voting for radical right-wing parties

Using a multilevel analysis method, this article tests different hypotheses for how income inequality affects voter support for radical right-wing parties (RRPs) in Western Europe. Specifically, the article shows how this ‘income inequality effect’ encourages poor people to vote for RRPs, while it concurrently discourages rich people from doing so. This finding supports the social identity hypothesis, which states that social identity (a micro-level factor) intermediates income inequality effect (a macro-level factor) on voter support for RRPs. The article's results suggest, further, that income inequality has different effects between the main supporters of RRPs with dissimilar occupations (e.g., manual workers and the petty bourgeoisie) because they belong to different income groups; and that country-level factors may have different effects on people regarding their support for RRPs.