Democracy and innovation: from institutions to agency and leadership

Democracies are, by definition, marked by a strong normative commitment to innovation and change, and all democratic regimes must seek to generate innovations both to keep their fundamental promise and to secure their own survival. In response to the latent crisis of representative democracy, recent political research has devoted eager attention to innovating democratic institutions, yet with conspicuously little regard for the likely effects of such reform proposals on the innovation-related performance and innovation capacity of democratic regimes. Indeed, some reform proposals, if implemented, would appear to reduce rather than increase the innovation capacity of representative democracies. Innovation-focused leadership may be able to fill that gap and provide what even the best institutions alone are unable to accomplish. In contrast to recent research on leadership and innovation in the public sector, which tends to centre on forms of collaborative leadership within networks, this article emphasizes the importance of individual leaders, and more specifically of political chief executives whose status and position in the governance process have been significantly enhanced by a combination of different factors. However, while leadership might be the key to democratic political innovation, innovative leadership and institutional engineering remain closely related to one another.     

发展型联盟与印度持续的经济改革

印度政府自20世纪80年代中后期到90年代初持续的经济改革,是由于支持改革的政治家、官僚机构与智囊团、商业集团之间形成了一种发展型联盟。这一联盟是在民主政治的竞争中形成并发挥作用。印度进行的经济改革经验在很大程度上证明了,民主国家可以在不改变其体制的情况下进行经济变革的可能性,并在一定程度上否定了经济自由化的改革必然需要一个强权政府的观念。     

Contradictions between economic liberalization and democratization: The case of South Korea

This article examines the relationships between economic liberalization and democratization in South Korea. The two processes are often correlated, but in Korea liberalization has been problematic for democratization. Domestic liberalization initially expanded space for labour organizations, but after they appeared to become too active, the process was so managed as to block political activity. This also resulted from pressures brought on by international liberalization, which made competitive wage costs increasingly important and raised the prospect of disinvestment by Korean and foreign firms. Liberalization has not reduced the power of business (the chaebol). Deregulation and privatization have encouraged a transfer of public economic power to the private sector. The increased political role of business is not necessarily beneficial, and the chaebol's economic power represents a threat to democratization in a variety of ways. In previous decades state power rested on economic controls; and the main impetus for democratization has come from the expansion of civil society through economic development, rather than from economic liberalization. State intervention in the economy may continue to be required to protect the position of certain civil society groups and to control business power, but domestic and international liberalization have challenged both of these functions and may increasingly curtail them in the future. Thus, close examination of the specifics of liberalization in South Korea show no automatic positive correlation can be made between economic and political reform without risking either reductionism or reification.     

The substance of EU democratic governance promotion via transgovernmental cooperation with the Eastern neighbourhood

Existing studies of the European Union’s (EU) democratic governance promotion via transgovernmental cooperation in the EU’s neighbourhood seem to take the substance of what is being promoted by the EU for granted. In filling this gap, this article examines the substance of EU democratic governance promotion by assessing (1) to what extent norms of democratic governance appear in EU Twinning projects implemented in the Eastern neighbourhood, and (2) what factors account for differences in the presence of democratic governance norms across those projects. To explain possible variation, the article hypothesizes that the democratic governance substance of Twinning projects will vary with the country’s political liberalization, sector politicization, sector technical complexity, and EU conditionality attached to reform progress in a given policy sector. Data are retrieved from a content analysis of 117 Twinning project fiches from the Eastern neighbourhood and analysed via standard multiple regression. The article finds that the EU mostly promotes moderate, mixed democratic governance substance, which varies across different projects. This variation may be best explained by the level of political liberalization of the beneficiary country and the politicization and technical complexity of the policy sectors and institutions involved in respective Twinning projects.     

蒙古“民主改革”十年述评

蒙古“民主改革”至今十年来,政治体制改革已经基本完成。多党存在和竞争的格局已经建立,政局发展将相对趋向平稳;经济上加速私有化,引发一系列社会矛盾,经济体制转轨步履维艰,经济复苏、发展充满荆棘;思想政治上推崇自由化,对蒙古人解放思想、放眼世界、更新观念起到一定作用,但各种意识形态泛滥,也造成民众无所适从,思想混乱。     

Frozen political liberalization in Jordan: The consequences for democracy

Prompted by serious economic difficulties, in 1989 the Jordanian government launched a series of political liberalization measures aimed at rejuvenating the country's parliament and party politics, and restoring freedom to the media. Despite much initial enthusiasm, the liberalization process has become frozen and there have been few substantive moves toward a meaningful transition to democracy. Two developments have combined to result in this democratization freeze. One is the reluctance of the state to give up many of its powers in relation to the forces of civil society. A second is the inability of professional associations and the emerging parliamentary opposition bloc to formulate and institute viable links within themselves and with other social actors in an attempt to pressure the monarchy for more political concessions. The hybrid, semi‐democratic, absolutist monarchy that has emerged in the process has enhanced its popular legitimacy by adopting certain democratic trappings, which, in the short run at least, appear detrimental to a more meaningful transition to democratic rule.     

A Paradox of Success? Determinants of Political Support for President Fujimori

To what extent does a government's success in resolving a deep political and economic crisis strengthen its popular support? The Fujimori administration in Peru, which tackled both profound economic problems and a powerful guerrilla threat, constitutes a useful test case for this important question. Most observers of Peru assume that both Fujimori's success in improving the economy and in combating insurrectionary forces contributed substantially to his high popularity and his reelection victory. Regression analyses of survey and electoral data suggest, however, that the successful counterinsurgency campaign had no significant medium or long-term impact on presidential approval and electoral support. These surprising findings seem to reflect a paradox of success: when a government effectively combats a severe threat, such as rampant guerrilla violence, the salience of the issue diminishes subsequently and people's high appreciation for the president's accomplishment has an ever lower impact on their political attitudes and behavior.     

Civil society activism and political parties in Malaysia: differences over local representation

Despite their importance to democratic consolidation, relationships between civil society activists and political parties have often been problematic following the downfall of authoritarian regimes. In challenging authoritarian rule in Malaysia, though, these forces have increased cooperation and jointly committed at the 2008 elections to local government reform. This was especially important for middle-class non-governmental organization (NGO) activists seeking a transformation in the political culture of parties. Moreover, state government victories by reformist Pakatan Rakyat (PR) coalitions included Selangor and Penang where these NGOs are concentrated. Yet while local government reform followed, NGOs and parties placed differing emphases on elections, transcending ethnic-based representation, and checks and balances on local government power. Lacking substantial social and organizational bases, NGOs were outflanked by more powerful interests inside and outside PR parties, including those aligned with ethnic-based ideologies of representation and economic development models opposed by NGOs. NGO activists also advanced various democratic and technocratic rationales for local representation, indicating a complex ideological mix underlying their reform push. The study highlights interrelated structural and ideational factors likely to more generally constrain the capacity of middle-class NGOs to play a vanguard role in democratically transforming Malaysian political culture.     

The lawless presidency: Economic crisis and democratic accountability in Mexico, 1970–94

The Mexican government has adopted policies of market‐oriented reform since 1982 which have for the most part been praised by professional economists. Mexico even joined the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1994. However the performance of the economy has been disappointing. Yet a failure to achieve any real per capita economic growth over an extended period is unusual among Latin American countries which have consistently pursued policies of market‐oriented economic reform. A large part of the explanation has to do with the character of Mexico's political institutions, most notably a lack of democratic accountability. The unmistakable trend toward greater democracy since 1982 has so far been expressed principally in terms of greater honesty and competitiveness in the electoral arena. But there has been no significant reform of the executive branch of government, which has for many years been run on authoritarian principles. This makes it difficult for the Mexican government to control corruption, limit the economic consequences of political shocks and prevent the shifts in political power which occur at the end of each sexenio from destabilising the economy.     

Long-term outlook for China’s political reform

China’s post-1978 economic reform is generally acclaimed as success, for the Chinese economy has expanded nine-fold in a matter of 25 years and the country rose from the world’s 34th largest trading nation in 1978 to the third largest in 2004 ahead of Japan. Interestingly, the Chinese experiment is often described in the West as “economic reform without political reform”. This begets the question: how could a politically un-reformed system be able to deliver such an economic miracle? In reality, China has conducted, by its own standards, major political reforms since 1978. Though far short of the Western expectations, the Chinese experience since 1978 should better be described as “great economic reforms with lesser political reforms”, without which China’s economic success would be inconceivable. China’s “lesser political reforms” have reduced country’s opportunities for greater political change, thus alienating many reform-minded intellectuals. Nevertheless, it may also have helped China avert the possible economic and social upheavals which could have resulted from rushing too fast into a radically different economic and political system. There is a strongly held belief, especially among the more ‘ideological’ observers of Chinese affairs that unless there were a radical political reform, perhaps tantamount to a revolution, to rid China of its “oppressive” Communist Party, the Chinese system would inevitably collapse just like what had happened in the USSR and Eastern Europe. As the party has been in power, China had been predicted to face collapse in the aftermath of the Tiananmen crisis of 1989, the Soviet Union’s disintegration of 1990, the death of Deng Xiaoping in 1996, and the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the 2003 outbreak of SARS. Yet all these forecasts turned out to be wrong and the track record of the China doomsayers over the past 20 years is indeed poor. Will China become a democracy through its political reform in 20 years? Indeed, a full democracy could be the best scenario for China, the region and beyond, but it is difficult to give a definitive answer, which will, to a great extent, depend on how to achieve democracy in China, i.e. the costs/risks involved, as well as what kind of ultimate shape such a democracy will take. If full-fledged democratisation will take more time, the pressure for a more accountable government and more democratic society is growing, and this trend will continue with the rise of China’s middle class and civil society. Therefore, the most likely scenario for China in the coming two decades is that China will continue its own approach to political reform, and the relative successful experience of China’s economic reform may well set a pattern for China’s political reform in the years to come. As part of Europe’s general approach towards China’s political change, it is in Europe’s interest to assist, in line with the view of most Chinese, gradual reform rather than revolution or ‘regime change’, which could produce hugely negative consequences for China itself, Sino–European relations and European interests in China and even East Asia.     

Two dimensions of democracy and the economy

Does democracy influence economic policymaking and outcomes? Our study investigates the implications of Dahl's two dimensions of democracy (‘polyarchy’): contestation/competition and inclusion/participation. We hypothesize that increases in democratic competition inspire policy incrementalism, thus lowering growth volatility and generating fewer deep crises. Meanwhile, increases in substantive democratic inclusion – genuine political voice, or democratic participation in the presence of a minimum of contestation – should increase the political weight of relatively poor voters, who have a differentially strong aversion to deep growth crises. A statistical analysis of 149 countries for 1961–98 finds greater democracy associated with fewer years of sharply negative growth (‘crisis’), with both democratic contestation and substantive inclusion contributing to this outcome. Our conclusions question the wisdom of designing economic policy institutions that are intentionally insulated from the democratic process.     

Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors: Federalism,Government Credibility,and Foreign Direct Investment

Political risk is an important factor in the decision to invest abroad. While the investment potential might be lucrative, there is always the risk that the host government will expropriate the profits and assets of the foreign investor. Political institutions, however, can serve as constraints on the actions of political actors in the host country. We argue that federal structures lower political risk. Joint-reputational accountability in overlapping political jurisdictions increases the likelihood that investment contracts will be honored. Empirical analyses of cross-sectional time-series data for 115 countries, from 1975–1995, are used to study how political institutions affect foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. After controlling for the effect of relevant economic and political variables, we find that both democratic and federal institutions help attract FDI, although the additive effect of democracy and federalism is small. This is not surprising; democratic systems already have low political risk; they do not need the additional credibility that the federal system provides to attract FDI. In contrast, we expect that federal structures significantly improve the trustworthiness of less democratic states. Empirically, we find that less democratic countries with federal political systems attract some of the highest levels of FDI.     

The re‐equilibration of democracy in inter‐war Ireland

This article examines the process of democratic stabilization in inter‐war Ireland. The Irish case is a classic example of what Linz calls re‐equilibration. Re‐equilibration is a political process that, following a crisis which has seriously endangered democratic institutions, results in their continued existence at the same or higher levels of effectiveness and legitimacy. The contention of the article is that the Fianna Fáil party's transformation of the democratic institutions of the Irish Free State in the 1930s constituted a case of democratic re‐equilibration, whereby the institutions of independent Ireland were given a greater degree of effectiveness and legitimacy. Indeed, since the main Irish parties had only recently been involved in a civil war, the Irish example could well be the classic case of re‐equilibration this century. The analysis of democratic re‐equilibration between 1922 and 1937 focuses on the Fianna Fáil party's transformation from being a semi‐loyal opposition party to being a party of government, emphasizing the impact on those political actors who remained hostile to the existence of the Free State.     

The National Dialogue,Collusive Transactions and Government Legitimacy in Tunisia

The Tunisian political crisis that started in July 2013 was resolved thanks to the National Dialogue hosted by the Quartet who were recently awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The ND was a collusive transaction that allowed Ennahdha to escape accountability for its political responsibility. Nevertheless, by resolving the crisis, it generated legitimacy. It also contributed significantly to the current configuration of alliances within the power circle by making possible the alliance between Ennahdha and Nidaa Tounes after the 2014 elections. The mechanisms of mutual recognition between Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes help ensure political stability by reinforcing the government’s position. However, this alliance appears to be a source of delegitimation now that the government is facing many challenges (economic crisis, security crisis and disputed political decisions). The critical situation, particularly at the security level, challenges the idea of compromise and undermines the government’s ability to make the people believe in its legitimacy.     

利比亚经济改革:背景、进程与效果

20世纪80年代末以来,由于计划经济体制的低效率、国际石油价格波动的冲击、国际社会制裁的损害,利比亚经济长期处于衰退之中,经济危机引起了政府的合法性危机。在此背景下,利比亚进行了广泛经济改革。改革的主要内容涉及经济体制的私有化和自由化,并使政府职能由石油收入的分配者向市场经济的调节者转变;同时,大力引进外资以推动石油工业的发展。利比亚经济改革取得了令人瞩目的成就,但也存在各种各样的问题和困难。     

The first initiatives

The Greek election of May 2012 failed to produce a government, resulting in repeat elections six weeks later. This shock outcome was a symptom of a broader delegitimation of the national political system. Over the past decade Eurobarometer data show a much more extensive loss of confidence in political institutions in Greece than in the European Union as a whole. In a first phase, rising political discontent was managed within the traditional political framework through alternation in power between the two major parties. In contrast, the second phase, following the outbreak of the Greek sovereign debt crisis, led to the dramatic fragmentation of the party system and changed the mode of government formation. This process is not reversible and entails serious democratic dangers.     

Prompting democratic transitions from abroad: International donors and multi‐partyism in Tanzania

It is generally accepted that the international donor community influences the politics of recipient states. In particular, donor calls for political liberalization are seen to have had, and continue to have, effects upon democratization in countries dependent upon international economic assistance. Such democratic contingency tied to aid suggests that the continuation of aid flows, and possibly an increase in aid transfer sums, occurs in response to political liberalization. It also implies the threat of decreases in, or even cessation of, foreign aid should the recipient state fail to implement political reform. This research assesses the role that the donor community plays in recipient states’ transition to democracy, focusing on Tanzania as a case study. Tanzania, a major recipient of foreign aid, underwent fundamental political reform in 1992. This study combines analysis of fluctuations in bilateral aid flows to Tanzania with interpretations of the causal role played by donor pressure from the perspectives of representatives of the donor community as well as from members of Tanzania's political elite. These perspectives are derived from original interviews conducted by the author. The findings indicate no correlation between fluctuations in aid transfers and Tanzania's implementation of multi‐party democracy. Rather, it was the perception among the Tanzanian leadership of a direct linkage between donor aid disbursements and political liberalization that prompted the political transition.     

日本金融体制的结构性缺陷与金融危机——对日本金融体制模式及其改革的重新审视

在 70年代后半期至 90年代初这一期间 ,日本对战后金融体制进行了以利率自由化和金融业务自由化为主要内容的改革 ,但这次改革并没有消除其金融体制中存在的多种结构性缺陷。进入90年代以后 ,随着日本泡沫经济走向崩溃和金融危机的爆发 ,这些结构性缺陷开始充分暴露。据此可以认为 ,70年代后半期至 90年代初的金融体制改革的不彻底即金融体制中存在的结构性缺陷 ,是导致金融危机的根本原因。     

2010年拉美和加勒比形势的思考与展望

2010年拉美和加勒比国家的民主机制进一步加强,经济诉求超越政治倾向,尊重民意、关注民生、深化民主、避免政策极端摇摆正逐渐成为拉美和加勒比地区政治演进的趋势。拉美经济正在出现新的变化,不同地区和国家的经济政策及其走势差异明显,政策调整的压力和风险都在加大,避免经济波动、增加就业将成为该地区多数国家的政策目标。拉美贫困和就业状况有所改善,但影响社会形势根本好转的不平等发展依然是该地区难以回避的严峻问题,局部地区的社会形势仍然令人担忧。拉美和加勒比国家社会发展面临的新挑战是如何稳定和扩大已有的社会保障政策,拓宽社会向上流动的渠道,实现平等发展。在对外关系上,实用主义成为该地区多数国家外交的特点,各国间不同政治和经济利益诉求难免会有冲突,由此引发的局部关系紧张难以避免;出于自身利益的考量,多数国家都在寻求拓宽各自的外交空间,而美国对拉关系的战略调整也逐渐清晰,其影响不容忽视。     

Democracy in China: a distant dream

Since the late 1970s, China has made enormous efforts to liberalize its markets and integrate itself into the world economy. Yet these developments have not been accompanied by any meaningful degree of liberalization of the political system. This paper attempts to account for the lack of democratization in China. In particular, it reviews the process of gradual economic liberalization initiated under Deng Xiao Ping and discusses the issue of corruption. Economic liberalization, it is shown, has provided new opportunities for the political elite to translate power into wealth, thereby making it more reluctant than ever to relax its grip on power. In a system of “autocratic capitalism,” the ruling elite both in business and government lack the incentives to introduce political liberalization. At this stage, dreams that the country’s economic liberalization will someday lead to democracy remain distant.

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