Australia,New Zealand and the Pacific Islands Forum: a critical review

The relationship between the Pacific islands and the region’s ‘bigger brothers’ – Australia and New Zealand – is often seen in two-dimensional terms with the latter appearing to act in concert and in terms characterised by underlying neo-colonial attitudes and a determination to dominate the regional agenda. Given that both are former colonial powers with considerable political and economic resources and are the major aid donors in the region as well as being members of the powerful geopolitical entity known as ‘the West’, it is not difficult to sustain an image of neo-colonial dominance. But to do so also requires casting Pacific island countries in a certain role, not only lacking agency but also cohering around a common identity and set of interests. This article examines key aspects of regional relations as played out through the region’s premier organisation, the Pacific Islands Forum, and assesses the extent to which a simple political divide between Australia and New Zealand on the one hand, and the island states on the other, can be maintained.     

Fiji’s Foreign Relations: Retrospect and Prospect

Abstract

Of all the island states of the Southwest Pacific, Fiji’s foreign relations have been the most fraught since the advent of independence in the region, due largely to a succession of coups d'état. These have invariably precipitated adverse responses from major partners and aid donors, notably Australia, New Zealand, the United States and the European Union. The last coup in 2006 also unsettled relations in Fiji’s more immediate region, especially among some of its smaller Polynesian neighbours, contributing to Fiji’s unprecedented suspension from the Pacific Islands Forum. This article reviews Fiji’s foreign relations from the time of independence in 1970 through the period of successive coups to the 2014 elections. It also examines Bainimarama’s strategies in extending foreign relations in the broader international sphere as well as issues surrounding the ‘normalisation’ of relations with its traditional partners.     

Japan’s Diplomacy towards Member Countries of Pacific Islands Forum: Significance of Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM)

As an island country in the Pacific region, it is natural for Japan to have diplomatic relationships with neighboring island countries. By the early 1970s, Japan started to provide Official Development Assistance (ODA) to two individual island countries in the Pacific region, and, in the mid-1980s, when most of the island countries had achieved independence, Japan’s diplomacy expanded to additional countries. In 1985 then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone made an official visit to two of the island countries, and, in 1987, official policy expressing support for the Pacific island countries’ independence, regional cooperation, political stability, economic development, and people-to-people exchange was issued. In October 1997, the “Japan-SPF Summit Meeting” with participants of leaders from Japan and 14 South Pacific Forum member island countries/regions and government representatives of Australia and New Zealand was held in Tokyo. The 8^th Pacific Islands Leaders meeting held in May 2018 is symbolic of Japan’s diplomacy toward the Pacific Islands Forum member countries. This article is the author’s personal observation of Japan’s diplomacy toward Pacific Islands Forum member countries and the significance of Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting.     

Regionalism and Colonialism in Contemporary Oceania

Abstract

Regionalism in Oceania emerged in a context shaped both by the decolonisation movement as well as the Cold War, the dynamics of which are still being played out today. This article considers two cases of particular interest in current regional politics which illustrate a number of important contradictions in conventional approaches to the analysis of colonialism. The first involves the two larger French territories in the region – New Caledonia and French Polynesia – which have recently been admitted to full membership of the Pacific Islands Forum despite falling short of the technical requirements for such membership, namely independent status. The second concerns Indonesia’s claim to sovereignty over West Papua. Although this claim has been recognised in international law since 1969, its basis is highly suspect and Indonesia’s record from the start is arguably tantamount to a repressive form of colonialism enabled by the United Nations itself. Placed in comparative perspective, these cases invite us to reconsider just what colonialism on the one hand and self-determination on the other really mean in the contemporary period.     

The Shifting Tides of Pacific Regionalism

Abstract

The current state of Pacific regionalism is faced with a range of external and internal factors that are acting to reshape the region and which call for a rethinking of Pacific regionalism. Within this context a range of new and in some cases reinvigorated groupings of political actors have emerged, seeking to influence and shape the region. Interpretations of this plurality of political groupings differ, with some authors seeing it as a direct challenge to the previously existing regional order, while others argue it signals a return to a foundational Pacific voice in regional politics. This article suggests that the present plurality is more than resituating a ‘Pacific voice’ and is not necessarily a challenge to the existing order. Rather, the Pacific’s experience mirrors global trends in the evolution of regionalism as a practice, in which network diplomacy or coalition-building across the plethora of actors will become a predominant feature of new regionalism. Further, the authors argue that the Framework for Pacific Regionalism provides the platform for effectively navigating this new context through facilitating the politics of networks and coalitions to drive the shared interests of the region, and presents a shared platform to test paradigm-shifting ideas.     

Diplomatic Rivalries and Cultural One-upmanship: New Zealand’s Long Quest to Become More Pacific than Australia

Abstract

New Zealand’s governmental and non-governmental agencies, academic commentators and media have long framed the country as uniquely and favourably positioned on cultural grounds to be a strategic diplomatic actor in the South Pacific. Justifications for the framing stem from two linked complexes: the history of New Zealand’s colonial and post-colonial involvement in a number of Polynesian territories in the Pacific; and the related history of relations between settlers and indigenes in New Zealand itself. These different strands of the argument have increasingly been brought together by the growth in numbers of New Zealand-born and domiciled Pacific Islanders. They, along with Maori, have been recruited into the diplomatic service and overtly contribute to the use of Polynesian encounter rituals in New Zealand’s diplomatic outreach. Such histories are used to justify New Zealand’s role in the Pacific in its relations with other external powers, especially in diplomatic jostling with Australia. The claims to special insight and cultural capital are subjected to critical scrutiny.     

The Changing Paradigm of Pacific Regional Politics

Abstract

Analyses of recent developments in Pacific regional politics have emphasized the role of ideas and new thinking about how the Pacific should engage in global and regional diplomacy (the so-called ‘paradigm shift’). These ideas include the call for regional self-determination, the claim that Pacific island states need to engage more assertively in global diplomacy, the call for a ‘genuine Pacific voice’ to be heard in global forums, recognition that a ‘one region approach’ need not be the best approach, the reconfiguring of diplomatic alliances to leverage Pacific island positions better in global forums, and embracing non-state actors as equal partners. The importance of this paradigm shift is that it challenges many prevailing stereotypes and assumptions about Pacific islands diplomacy. It recognizes and facilitates choices and alternatives. It emphasizes the imperative of being proactive and of taking responsibility for the challenges facing the Pacific islands; and being creative in finding solutions. This is a fundamentally empowering transformation. But in order to understand where this might lead, it is necessary to explore where this transformation has so far played out. Case studies at the national, regional and global levels give insights into the impact and potential of the new Pacific diplomacy.     

Rescaling to the Indo-Pacific: From Economic to Security-Driven Regionalism in Asia

The ‘Indo-Pacific’ has emerged as the newest addition to the lexicon of Asian regionalism. Conceived of as the conjunction of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, it reflects the belief that maritime linkages require extending Asian regionalism westwards to include countries on the Indian Ocean rim. It also competes with the longstanding ‘Asia-Pacific’ conceptualisation of the region, and four governments—Australia, India, Japan and the USA—have adopted it into their foreign policies. Much of the debate on the Indo-Pacific focusses on how it institutionally ‘rescales’ Asian regionalism through the incorporation of Indian Ocean states. This article considers the functional rescaling that attends this process: namely, what kind of regionalism is implied by the Indo-Pacific concept? It argues that the Indo-Pacific is a security-focussed regional project, reflecting the desire of its proponents to form a quadrilateral bloc to resist China’s growing maritime assertiveness. This security region is radically different from the Asia-Pacific concept, where regionalism was primarily driven by economic integration and cooperation. The Indo-Pacific thus marks a more contested period in Asia’s international politics, where the functional purpose of regional cooperation is being reoriented from economic- to security-focussed agendas.     

China in Pacific Regional Politics

Abstract

Foreign aid from China to the island countries of the Pacific has grown rapidly over the last few decades and an expanding body of literature has examined various aspects of what this means for politics in the region generally. This article focuses on China’s impact on Pacific regional politics partly from the perspective of identity politics. It suggests that China has substantially increased its engagement with the Pacific island states by making use of its own identity as a South–South development partner in contrast to traditional (mainly Western) donors in the region. Unlike most traditional donors, however, China’s diplomacy and engagement are based largely on bilateralism, and this is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. This approach could continue to limit its impact on Pacific regionalism, regardless of how it projects its image.     

Australia and the Developing World under the Abbott Coalition Government

The Abbott Coalition government, elected to office in Australia in September 2013, has not had a major focus on the developing world. Nevertheless, in terms of substance this government has been engaged with a number of issues that relate to, or have implications for, the developing world. At a general level these issues concern development cooperation, refugees and asylum seekers, and climate change. At a regional level Australia has had particular concerns relating to Indonesia and the Pacific island countries; there has also been some focus on India and Indian Ocean regionalism. Beyond Australia’s immediate region there has been engagement in some issues relating to Southwest Asia and the Middle East, and Africa. The government’s approach to issues concerning the developing world reflects its pragmatism based on a perception of Australian interests and an identification with the countries of the developed world as led by the United States.     

Australia and the Secretive Exploitation of the Chatham Islands to 1842

The European discovery of the Chatham Islands in 1791 resulted in significant consequences for its indigenous Moriori people. The colonial Australian influence on the Chathams has received little scholarly attention. This article argues that the young colonies of New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land led the exploitation of the archipelago before its annexation to New Zealand in 1842. The Chathams became a secretive outpost of the colonial economy, especially the sealing trade. Colonial careering transformed the islands: environmental destruction accompanied economic exploitation, with deleterious results for the Moriori. When two Māori iwi (tribes) from New Zealand’s North Island invaded in 1835, Moriori struggled to respond as a consequence of the colonial encounter. Mobility and technology gained from the Australian colonies enabled and influenced the invasion itself, and derogatory colonial stereotypes about Aboriginal peoples informed the genocide that ensued. Hence this article writes the Chathams into Australian history and Australia into Chathams history, showing that discussions of the early colonial economy, environment, and genocide must consider the wider South Pacific context in conjunction with events internal to the colonies.     

Peacekeeping from Oceania: Perspectives from Australia,New Zealand and Fiji

Abstract

This article gives an overview of the involvement of Australia, New Zealand and Fiji in peacekeeping operations with attention to motives, experience and ‘lessons learnt’. Australia and New Zealand have been strongly influenced by regional considerations and an understanding of good international citizenship. Fiji’s contribution has been determined less by regional considerations and more by its position as a small developing country whose peacekeeping activities bring economic benefits, although it could be argued that by providing a basis for extending military forces they have contributed indirectly to political instability. Police contributions have been increasingly important to Australia and New Zealand and they have advocated a stronger role for police in other situations around the world.     

Communist China’s entry into the Korean hostilities and a U.S. proposal for a collective security arrangement in the Pacific offshore island chain

In late 1950, against the background of communist China’s full entry into the Korean War, the U.S. government put forward a Pacific Ocean Pact, which would comprise the United States, Japan, the Philippines, if possible Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand. This article, after tracing China’s intervention in the Korean War, discusses U.S. policy planning on the proposal for a Pacific Pact, and examines the precise objectives of the proposal. It is argued that the American proposal for a Pacific offshore island chain pact was basically intended to enhance U.S. security interests in Northeast Asia, particularly Japan. The Pacific Pact proposal therefore contained a scheme for committing formally substantial U.S. armed forces to the defense of the Pacific Ocean; the revitalization of Japanese power; and the welding of the resources of strength of Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines to the defense of Japan.     

The United States and South Pacific regionalism: Participation or subversion?

Abstract

Increasing political awareness in the Pacific island nations during the 1970s led them to adopt foreign and domestic policies that the metropolitan nations considered detrimental to their interests in the Pacific. The South Pacific Forum (SPF) stood at the center of much of the decision making. For the United States in particular it became imperative that it check the SPF's decision-making process. This led the United States to seek avenues through which it could effectively influence the decisions of the South Pacific's regional organizations. Such attempts were intended primarily to undermine the sovereignty and independence of the South Pacific Forum and affiliated regional organizations. This article discusses the rationale for and processes through which the United States has been trying to manipulate South Pacific regional institutions into serving its interests in the region.     

Representing China in the South Pacific

Chinese diplomacy, aid, economic interactions and manifestations of soft power have increased the country??s influence in the South Pacific region. By some accounts, China??s influence is already approaching that of traditional stakeholders Australia and New Zealand. In Africa and other regions state-led and private activities in established powers?? perceived spheres of influence has caused concern and inspired particular narratives about China??s motivations. In this article we examine how media discourses in Australia and New Zealand have represented China??s role in the South Pacific. We find that China??s role has been constructed using multiple negative frames, which seek to establish China as unequivocally ??different??. More than being unencumbered by the constraints of public opinion and a free press, China is portrayed as operating in a different moral universe, in which the cold hearted exploitation of vulnerable island nations (often in cahoots with venal island elites) is entirely normal. The article shows how such constructions reveal some of the complex issues involved in Australia and New Zealand??s relationships both with China and other South Pacific nations.     

Asia’s Security Triangles: Maritime Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific

Since the early years of the twenty-first century, a number of key regional governments have consciously chosen to alter the way they talk about the region, and have now largely shifted from using the ‘Asia-Pacific’ to the ‘Indo-Pacific’ construct. But after three decades of utilising the ‘Asia-Pacific’ concept, why has this been the case and how might this shift in geographical conceptualisation alter the strategic framework of the region? This paper argues that the ‘Indo-Pacific’ is a regional reconceptualisation utilised by Japan, Australia, India and the USA to address deficiencies in Asia’s maritime security and institutional architecture, which are being simultaneously influenced by a more assertive Chinese posture and waning U.S. influence. Additionally, the Indo-Pacific concept has developed in tandem with a transformation in the regional security architecture. The utilisation of maritime minilateralism between Japan, India, Australia and the USA supplements Asia’s bilateral American alliances, with an array of trilateral security dialogues or ‘security triangles’. The Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific shift is really an instance of an emerging minilateral security regionalism, rather than the predominant forms of bilateral and multilateral security and economic regionalism that have dominated Asia in recent decades.     

Australia and Brexit: Déjà Vu All Over Again?

Abstract

Recalling the debate about Britain’s applications to join the European Economic Community in the 1960s, Australians are now reacting to and assessing the implications of the Brexit vote for Australia. However, the contemporary situation is very different from that which prevailed in the 1960s. The article assesses Australian commentary and reactions to Brexit before and after the vote. Taking account of the various possible versions of Brexit, there is an assessment of the range of economic and political-strategic implications for Australia. Whatever the final form of Brexit, Australia will need to foster close relationships with both the UK and the post-Brexit European Union. In relation to immigration policy in a post-Brexit UK, Australia’s immigration system does not necessarily provide the ‘answer’; Australia’s relationship with New Zealand through the agreement on Closer Economic Relations might be relevant to Brexit in at least some respects as another model for how economic integration might develop in a regional context. If Brexit was at least in part a populist right-wing reaction to globalisation and neoliberalism, parallels in Australia can also be seen, such as Pauline Hanson’s One Nation; other parallels in Australia relating to Brexit include issues relating to political prudence and the manner of constitutional change.     

区域安全竞争中的东亚区域主义——基于对欧洲/北美区域主义的比较分析

区域主义的启动和深化受区域内外安全环境的影响。欧洲区域主义的启动和深化与其内外安全环境之间呈正相关关系,因而它得以历经冷战而不衰,并在冷战后进一步强化。比较而言,北美区域主义的深化与其内外安全环境总体上都是负相关关系,因而北美区域主义至今基本上仍仅限于经济领域。与北美区域主义类似,东亚区域主义的深化与东亚区域内外安全环境也基本上是负相关关系,但不同的是,由于东亚区域的内部安全环境是竞争性的,因此东亚区域的"共同体感觉"虽然呈日益强化之势,但总体上说是脆弱的。东亚区域主义的深化不仅受区域内部安全竞争的挑战,还受到区域外部的竞争性安全环境———区域间大国和全球大国安全竞争———的制约。     

“Developing a community soul”: A Comparative Assessment of the Australian Assistance Plan in Three Regions, 1973–1977

The Australian Assistance Plan (AAP) was an innovative yet largely forgotten social welfare program from the 1970s. A key platform of the Whitlam Labor government, which established a series of Regional Councils for Social Development across Australia, the AAP reframed citizens’ participation in their communities, stimulated voluntary organisations and volunteering and attempted to transform engagement among all levels of governments and the voluntary sector. Through an analysis of three Regional Council case studies in Victoria, New South Wales and South Australia, this article focuses on the themes of regionalism and regional distinctiveness in order to assess how questions of regional difference can impact on the development of policy practices.     

Australia’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper: Deconstruction and Critique

The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper identifies major themes and recommends preferred strategies in Australia’s engagement with the world. These themes and strategies relate to geopolitics, economics and the ‘new international agenda’; there is also a more specific focus on Australia’s Pacific island neighbours and Timor-Leste. There is a strong emphasis on perceived Australian national interests throughout the document. The geopolitical discussion is primarily ‘realist’; economically the document is pro-globalisation; the discussion of the ‘new international agenda’ involves an Australian-oriented pragmatism; there is an assertion of Australian leadership in the South Pacific. With some minor criticism, Labor has accepted the general direction advocated in the White Paper. The document is thus indicative of the likely future direction of Australian foreign policy. Lack of US response indicates declining US engagement with Australia and the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region. China, as the other major power highly significant for Australia, has been low-key in its criticisms.