Why societies need public goods

The most distinctive features of public goods are usually understood to be the difficulty of excluding potential beneficiaries and the fact that one appropriator’s benefits do not diminish the amount of benefits left for others. Yet, because of these properties (non-excludability and non-rivalry), public goods cause market failures and contribute to problems of collective action. This article aims to portray public goods in a different light. Following a recent reassessment of public goods in political philosophy, this contribution argues that public goods are particularly suitable for sustaining a well-ordered society. Public goods contribute to social inclusion, they support the generation of the public, and they strengthen a shared sense of citizenship. This article scrutinizes these functions of public goods and offers a discussion of the interventionist thesis which states that governments should sustain public goods.     

论中国县级政府在公共物品提供中的职能定位

中国政府职能划分普遍存在“职责同构”现象,地方政府与中央政府在公共物品提供上存在职责不清现象。作为与居民联系最密切的县级政府,在职能划分上存在诸多困境。本文在分析了中国县级政府的职能困境和比较国外县级政府在公共物品提供方面的经验作法後,提出了县级政府在公共物品的供给土应准确进行职能定位。     

Fresh pipes with dirty water: How quality of government shapes the provision of public goods in democracies

A large strand of research holds that democracy with its broad representation and electoral accountability is beneficial for the provision of public goods. Yet, there is a large variation in how democracies perform, indicating that democratic institutions alone do not suffice for securing citizens’ wellbeing. Recent studies have stressed the equal importance of state capacity for public goods delivery. These studies, however, rarely investigate how the lack of state capacity mutes the effects of democratic institutions on public goods provision. This article addresses this gap by using a mixed methods design. First, the conditional effects of democracy and quality of government (QoG) are tested on the previously under-researched domain of the provision of clean water. The results show that democracy is associated with higher water quality only in countries where QoG is high. If QoG is low, more democracy is even related to lower water quality. The second stage of the analysis proceeds by examining how poor QoG disrupts the effects of democracy on public access to safe drinking water using interview data from a typical case of Moldova. The analysis illustrates that democracy has a number of positive effects and incentivises politicians to focus on the visible aspects of water provision, including the expansion of the water pipe network. However, low QoG hampers adoption and implementation of long-term policies necessary for securing an aspect of water provision that is harder to achieve – namely water quality. This leaves the fresh pipes with dirty water.     

Childhood bads,parenting goods,and the right to procreate

Abstract

Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, together with many other philosophers, think that adults’ interests in raising a child can give them a moral right to parent when they will be adequate parents. We consider whether the same interest could give such adults a moral right to procreate, as a means of acquiring a child to raise. We argue that the interest in parenting cannot support a right to procreate, because the features of childhood that make parenting uniquely valuable for adults are bad for children. Adults may have a right to procreate, but they do not have that right due to their interest in a parent–child relationship.     

Innovations in the provision of public goods and services

Current efforts at administrative reform in both developed and developing countries have invariably focused on the critical issue of provision of public goods and services. The accumulated experience and attendant innovations are therefore vast. Few attempts have been made to pull this experience together and draw salient features which might be of use to newcomers to the task of improving provision of public goods and services. This article draws on a panel of experts and government officials convened by the author who have reflected and/or experimented with innovative approaches to public good and service provision. After discussing the role of the state, market and civil society relative to public goods and services, the article lays out a set of basic institutional options for innovations in provision. The article concludes with some strategic considerations on the sequencing of steps to achieve successful market-based innovations in the provision of public goods and services in the context of the minimalist and the strong but restrained state. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why Solidarity Matters: The Political Strategy of Welfare Design

Reporting on our recent book, The Solidarity Society, this article explores the way in which the design of welfare programmes interacts with and shapes the underlying quality of social relations between members of society—and, through this, public attitudes to welfare. Given that sustaining generous welfare over long timescales requires the support of electorates, this ‘relational’ dimension of welfare policy is crucial for the long‐term strategy of tackling poverty and inequality. The article looks in particular at the ‘welfare dilemmas’ that can arise from tensions between targeting and universalism and between need and entitlement, where the distributional and relational elements of welfare policy work against one another. We conclude that entrenching a generous welfare settlement will require strong elements of both universalism and reciprocity in the design of welfare.     

Efficiency in the provision of pure public goods by private citizens

This paper raises an old question and proposes a new answer. The question is, “Must public goods be produced by governments?” The consensus answer is “Yes,” on the grounds that transaction costs related to group size prevent all potential consumers of a public good from entering into voluntary arrangements to produce efficient levels of that good. Government intervention thus is required to achieve efficiency. Yet many obvious examples of public goods are not financed or even subsidized by government. Conspicuous examples of this phenomenon include the development of important innovations in technique in fields such as music (Bach and Beethoven), literature (Defoe, Dickens and Shakespeare, not excepting Homer or Adam Smith), and the visual arts (Cezanne), not to mention many crucial scientific discoveries. Indeed, the obvious public-good aspects of scientific knowledge induced many private societies to offer prizes for particular innovations. Two questions are raised by the private, voluntary provision of nonrival outputs or inputs: (1) what conditions contribute to this phenomenon, and (2) can voluntary provision come “close” to efficient provision? We suggest in this paper that, under certain conditions, the gains from many public goods whose benefits reach nationwide populations are largely realized at group sizes far smaller than even county or municipal jurisdictions.     

Do government subsidies increase the private supply of public goods?

Public Choice - We study three different models in which public goods are supplied by private contributions. In one of these models, tax-financed government subsidies to private contributions will...     

On Who matters: extending the scope of luck egalitarianism to groups

Abstract

What is the scope of principles of egalitarian justice? This is the question that Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen addresses in Chapter 6 of his Luck Egalitarianism, where he comprehensively considers the different dimensions along which the issue of the scope can be articulated (e.g. with respect to time, to the boundaries of states, etc.). For all the dimensions taken into account he defends a broad understanding of the scope of equality, except for one. He thinks that the principle of luck egalitarianism can only apply to individuals and not to groups. In this paper, we show that Lippert-Rasmussen’s reasons for caring only about inequality between individuals are unsatisfactory, and we provide an argument that justifies extending the application of the luck egalitarian principle also to groups.     

Poor versus rich countries: a gap in public attitudes towards fiscal solidarity in the EU

Abstract

Existing research has primarily focused on the role of utility and identity in shaping individuals’ European Union (EU) preferences. This article argues that macroeconomic context is a crucial predictor of attitudes towards transnational financial assistance, which has been omitted from previous analyses. Using data from the 2014 European Election Studies (EES) Voter Study for 28 EU member states, this article demonstrates that citizens living in poorer EU countries are less willing to support fiscal solidarity than their counterparts in more affluent countries. Country affluence serves as a heuristic, moderating the relationship between individual-level utility and identity considerations and willingness to show solidarity to member states with economic difficulties. When a country does not fare well economically, citizens’ views on providing help to others remain negative, irrespective of individual-level utilitarian and identity considerations. Our findings have implications for understanding the decision-making calculus underlying preference formation.