欧盟竞争法下的“关键设施原则”

随着我国社会主义市场经济的进一步发展,反垄断立法逐渐引起了社会的广泛关注。本文就欧盟竞争法下的“关键设施原则”进行了探讨,分析了“关键设施原则”的起源,它在欧盟竞争法下的发展,它被欧洲法院适用的情况,和“关键设施原则”与知识产权保护的关系。笔者希望对欧盟竞争法下的“关键设施原则”这一较新的理论的探讨能给我国的反垄断立法一定的启示作用。     

The doctrine of substantial performance: comparisons between English and Malaysian law

This article will consider the application of the doctrine of substantial performance from the perspective of English and Malaysian law. The analysis of the doctrine has focussed on the examination of cases on construction and building contracts. The paper explains the English approach to the doctrine by examining the factors considered judicially effecting the successful application of the doctrine. The article also compares the English approach with the Malaysian approach, where it was discovered that Malaysian courts, in some cases, consider reliance as an essential factor for the successful application of the doctrine.     

《反垄断法》中的基础设施条款探析

基础设施条款为竞争执法机构提供了一种强迫企业允许竞争对手利用其设施的手段,能够防止公用企业滥用市场支配地位行为的发生,促进市场竞争的发展。基础设施条款是对契约自由的限制,为企业设定不得拒绝其他企业以适当的条件进入自己的网络或其他基础设施的义务,科学界定其适用条件,这是正确适用反垄断法的重要条件。我国已颁布《反垄断法》,科学地引入这一制度可以推动企业的改革以及竞争秩序的建立。     

The 'Checks and Balances' Doctrine in Member States as a Rule of EC Law: The Cases of France and Germany

Abstract: Though the impact of EC law on the legal status of national powers has been fairly well examined, little attention has been paid to the overall evaluation of the relations developed between national authorities. The paper argues that the mutation of the Judiciary and the Executive role vis‐à‐vis the Legislature appears to be an application of an emerging doctrine in EC public law that conspicuously resembles the ‘Checks and Balances’ theory of American constitutionalism. The action of one public authority is—or must be—countered by the reaction of another for the benefit of EC law. Apart from identifying the features of this ‘principle’ in comparison to its equivalent American doctrine, the paper deals with the question of a possible coexistence of this new model of governance with the traditional one. The comparative perspective is necessary here. Whereas in Germany the constitutional model appears to cope with European demands, in France it seems largely opposed to such a dynamic conception of the separation of powers.     

A Doctrine at Risk: Content Neutrality in a Post-Reed Landscape

Although the Supreme Court of the United States has deployed the content-neutrality doctrine at least twenty-three times in the last decade, two recent cases — McCullen v. Coakley and Reed v. Town of Gilbert — demonstrate that disagreement among the justices over the meaning of the doctrine is endangering its utility for First Amendment jurisprudence. This article describes the manifestations of this disagreement and suggests that without further clarification about the doctrine's nature, purpose and application, the venerable First Amendment canon may soon either lose practical tenability or disintegrate into constitutional oblivion. Such an outcome, the article suggests, is both ill advised and avoidable. By taking several practical steps, the Supreme Court can go a long way toward preserving the doctrine's usefulness for upholding legitimate government interests and protecting the freedom of expression.     

The Contrived Defense and Deterrent Threat Doctrines: A Reply to Professors Finkelstein & Katz

What is the relationship between the permissibility/impermissibility of the part and the permissibility/impermissibility of the whole? Does the moral or legal status of a constituent part of an actor’s course of conduct govern the status of the actor’s whole course of conduct or, conversely, does the moral and legal status of the actor’s whole course of conduct govern the status of the constituent parts? This broader issue is examined in the more specific contexts of the contrived defense and deterrent threat doctrines. The latter doctrine concerns whether a prima facie impermissible act of carrying out a threatened action may be rendered permissible if embedded within an overall permissible course of action including the issuance of a deterrent threat that fails to induce compliance. The contrived defense doctrine addresses the permissibility of an actor who contrives or culpably causes the conditions of her own defense. This essay considers the claim—advanced by Claire Finkelstein and Leo Katz—that the contrived defense and deterrent threat doctrines are sufficiently related such that the preferable approach to each doctrine informs and supports the preferable approach to the other. In each, the permissible/impermissible status of the whole governs the status of the part. Regarding contrived defenses, the impermissibility of the actor’s whole course of conduct renders the otherwise permissible constituent part relating to the defense also impermissible. And regarding deterrent threats, the permissibility of the actor’s whole course of conduct renders the otherwise impermissible constituent parts also permissible. This essay challenges the claimed linkage between the contrived defense and deterrent threat doctrines by proposing hypothetical situations in which the claimed parallel doctrines collapse into each other. As a result, the application of the preferred approaches to each doctrine generates a contradiction.     

The Trial of Joseph Dotterweich: The Origins of the “Responsible Corporate Officer” Doctrine

This article analyzes the origins of the “responsible corporate officer” doctrine: the trial of Joseph Dotterweich. That doctrine holds that an officer may be personally liable for the criminal act of a subordinate if the officer was, in some indefinite way, able to prevent the violation. Applying this doctrine, the prosecution of Dotterweich entailed strict liability for a strict liability offense. The underlying offenses—the interstate sale of one misbranded and adulterated drug and one misbranded drug—were said to be strict liability offenses. And then, with respect to Dotterweich as the corporation’s general manager, the government argued that he was strictly liable because he stood in “responsible relation” to the company’s acts. The government never tried to prove that the company, Buffalo Pharmacal, was negligent, nor did it try to prove that Dotterweich was negligent in his supervision of the employees of Buffalo Pharmacal. The prosecutor and judge were candid about this theory throughout the trial, although the judge conceded that it seemed bizarre and unfair. The defense lawyer repeatedly sought to inject what became known throughout the trial as the “question of good faith,” but was circumvented at almost every turn. What would thus seem to be the crux of any criminal trial—the personal fault of the defendant—was carefully shorn from the jury’s consideration. The government’s theory was so at odds with intuitive notions of liability and blame that, as one probes into the case, and looks at the language used in the government’s appellate briefs, imputations of moral fault inevitably crept in. Yet the government was not entitled to make such accusations, as it had pruned moral considerations from the trial. The article argues that the responsible corporate officer doctrine can never enjoy a secure place in our legal system. First, the doctrine is at a minimum in tension with, and often in direct opposition to, basic principles of the criminal law; and second, the doctrine fails, when followed to its logical conclusions, to accord with basic notions of fair play. The article concludes that the responsible corporate officer doctrine is either unnecessary, in cases in which the evidence establishes personal fault, or unjust, in cases in which it creates liability in the absence of personal fault through the unspecified notion of “responsibility.” The Dotterweich case illustrates what is contemplated by the latter possibility, and why it is problematic in any judicial system that purports, in the words of the Model Penal Code, “to safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal.”     

论合宪性解释方法

虽然合宪性解释方法在概念上会存在些许差别,但其所遵循的合宪性推定逻辑是相通的,即都体现了司法权对立法权的谦抑。合宪性解释方法中所含括的单纯解释规则,如果不与冲突规则在学理上加以区分,则很容易对合宪性解释产生认识上的偏差。目前合宪性解释方法所模本的欧陆经验,从源流上来说,最早其实可溯及至早期美国合宪性推定的理论与实践,并与回避宪法方法一脉相承。通过合宪性推定可以发现,合宪性解释方法可以从宪法方法与法律方法两个层面展开。把握其内在理路及权力逻辑,方可使其具有本土可能性。     

A Criticism of M. Siderits and J. L. Garfield’s ‘Semantic Interpretation’ of Nāgārjuna’s Theory of Two Truths

This paper proposes a critical analysis of that interpretation of the Nāgārjunian doctrine of the two truths as summarized—by both Mark Siderits and Jay L. Garfield—in the formula: “the ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth”. This ‘semantic reading’ of Nāgārjuna’s theory, despite its importance as a criticism of the ‘metaphysical interpretations’, would in itself be defective and improbable. Indeed, firstly, semantic interpretation presents a formal defect: it fails to clearly and explicitly express that which it contains logically; the previously mentioned formula must necessarily be completed by: “the conventional truth is that nothing is conventional truth”. Secondly, after having recognized what Siderits’ and Garfield’s analyses contain implicitly, other logical and philological defects in their position emerge: the existence of the ‘conventional’ would appear—despite the efforts of semantic interpreters to demonstrate quite the contrary—definitively inconceivable without the presupposition of something ‘real’; moreover, the number of verses in Nāgārjuna that are in opposition to the semantic interpretation (even if we grant semantic interpreters that these verses do not justify a metaphysical reconstruction of Nagarjuna’s doctrine) would seem too great and significant to be ignored.     

Substituted consent: from lunatics to corpses

This analysis traces the origins and evolution of the doctrine of surrogate or substituted judgment, especially its application to medical treatment, including non-therapeutic sterilisation, decisions regarding life and death choices, and more recently, removal of sperm or eggs from incompetent, dying or dead males and females. It argues that the doctrine, which has been acknowledged to be a legal fiction, has an effect of devolving legal and moral responsibility for life and death choices, as well as non-consensual, non-beneficial intrusive procedures, from the competent decision-makers to the incompetent patient. It focuses on the subjective nature of the substituted judgment standard; the problematic nature of evidence propounded to establish the putative choices of the incompetent person; lack of transparency relating to the conflict of interest in the process of substituted judgment decision-making; and the absence of voluntariness, which is an essential element of a valid consent.     

二审和解后的法理逻辑:评第一批指导案例之“吴梅案”

二审和解后撤诉与撤回上诉皆有可能,但撤诉应受更多限制。一审判决生效后法院应依请求按法定条件立案执行,协议未履行不是立案条件。既判力"标准时"后达成的和解协议可变动判决确定的民事债权,但不能冻结或取消执行力,法院应依请求判决排除原判的部分执行力。和解协议具备成立要件和有效要件即为有效,与是否违约无关。法律已规定违约责任,不必也不应援用诚信原则。对债务人的实体异议应无选择地依实体审理程序处理。由于未能把握前述法理,"吴梅案"出现了多个问题:混同撤诉与撤回上诉,违法设置执行立案条件,错误理解生效判决和和解协议的关系,异议处理程序欠缺正当性,类推适用《民事诉讼法》第207条,裁判要点与裁判理由不符,案例名称不当。     

The “Discourse” of International Law and Humanitarian Intervention

This essay analyzes the doctrine of “humanitarian intervention” in the frame of international law in the second half of nineteenth century and identifies the ground of legitimation of this intervention in the violation of presumed universal laws of humanity. The analysis emphasizes the transformation of the paradigm of “humanitarian intervention” into the current doctrine of the “responsibility to protect,” which under the rubric of “responsibility” legitimizes limitations on a state's sovereignty in cases where the state fails to guarantee the protection of its own population. This reconstruction of the genealogy of “humanitarian intervention” illustrates the continual exceptions to the principle of nonintervention, which means that the Westphalian principle of sovereignty has always been violated. Both doctrines—humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect—can be considered “hegemonic techniques” that use so‐called universal concepts in order to legitimize unilateral power interests.     

Legal Aid,Social Workers,and the Redefinition of the Legal Profession in Chile, 1925–1960

This article examines the history of the Chilean Legal Aid Service (Servicio de Asistencia Judicial) from the 1920s until the 1960s. It argues that with the emergence of the “social question”—the concern for improving the lower classes' working and living conditions to promote the nation's modernization and prevent political radicalization—the Chilean legal profession committed to legal aid reform to escape a professional identity crisis. Legal aid allowed lawyers to claim they had a new “social function” advocating on behalf of the poor. However, within legal aid offices, lawyers interacted with female social workers who acted as gatekeepers, mediators, and translators between the lawyers and the poor. This gendered professional complementarity in legal aid offices helped lawyers to put limits on their new “social function”: it allowed them to maintain legal aid as a part‐time activity that did not challenge the structure of the legal system as a whole.     

The Responsibility Gap in Corporate Crime

In many cases of criminality within large corporations, senior management does not commit the operative offense—or conspire or assist in it—but nonetheless bears serious responsibility for the crime. That responsibility can derive from, among other things, management’s role in cultivating corporate culture, in failing to police effectively within the firm, and in accepting lavish compensation for taking the firm’s reins. Criminal law does not include any doctrinal means for transposing that form of responsibility into punishment. Arguments for expanding doctrine—including broadening of the presently narrow “responsible corporate officer” doctrine—so as to authorize such punishment do not fare well under the justificatory demands of criminal law theory. The principal obstacle to such arguments is the large industrial corporation itself, which necessarily entails kinds and degrees of delegation and risk-taking that do not fit well with settled concepts about mens rea and omission liability. Even the most egregious and harmful management failures must be addressed through design and regulation of the corporation rather than imposition of individual criminal liability.     

数字化作品与首次销售原则——以《著作权法》修改为背景

首次销售原则对数字化作品的适用,应依照数字化作品的不同类型以及移转、传播的不同方式来具体判断。通过网络传输的数字化作品原则上不应适用首次销售原则。在数字化作品复制件的有形占有发生移转,但伴有许可协议的情形,作品复制件的所有权是否移转,建议借鉴美国沃纳诉欧特克案确立的三步检测法来判断,只有作品复制件的所有权发生移转,才能适用首次销售原则。我国著作权法在修订之时,应将首次销售原则予以明确规定,并针对数字化作品细化适用规则。     

不方便法院说比较研究

“不方便法院”说是指一国法院认为某个涉外案件更适合在外国审理或者本国法院不适合审理 ,而拒不行使管辖权的一种自由裁量权。它起源于英格兰 ,后来逐渐发展成为英美国际私法上影响法院行使国际管辖权的一项重要制度。该说缺乏合理性 ,没有统一的适用标准 ,且赋予审理案件的法官过多自由裁量权 ,很容易被当事人或者法院操纵 ,往往导致适用结果的不一致。除一些普通法国家和地区外 ,其他国家都拒绝接受该说。我国法院在审理涉外案件中也不宜适用该说。     

The Public Trust as an Evolutionary Doctrine: How the Trust can be Used to Allege an Injury Under Standing

The public trust doctrine provides protection of public access to resources, such as navigable waterways, protected under the public trust. The doctrine has evolved over time to protect natural resources such as tidelands, submerged waterbeds, wildlife, and climate change. Juliana v. United States is a groundbreaking trust case that moves the application of the trust to the management of climate-change regimes. Although the doctrine has been criticized as a façade, forestalling real recourse for change, it can be used to show standing for current and future generations. Accordingly, Juliana outlines how this doctrine is not just evolutionary it is also revolutionary.     

Comparative vs. Transcendental Approaches to Justice: A Misleading Dichotomy in Sen's The Idea of Justice

This paper examines the distinction drawn by Amartya Sen between transcendental and comparative theories of justice, and its application to Rawls' doctrine. It then puts forward three arguments. First, it is argued that Sen offers a limited portrayal of Rawls' doctrine. This is the result of a rhetorical strategy that depicts Rawlsian doctrine as more “transcendental” than it really is. Although Sen deploys numerous quotations in support of his interpretation, it is possible to offer a less transcendental interpretation of Rawls. Second, the dichotomy between transcendental and comparative approaches to questions of justice is partly misleading, insofar as any plausible moral doctrine has both transcendental and comparative elements. Transcendental elements are necessary to avoid the confusion between the general acceptance of a norm, value or principle and its justification. A comparative view highlights the conditions of application of the doctrine to the real world, taking into account the possibility of moral dilemmas, evaluative disagreements and limited resources, while proposing possible provisos and caveats to the risk of the doctrine being self‐defeating. Third, although the transcendental approach is useful, it is argued that in elaborating this dichotomy Sen overlooks the merits of the third way between comparative and transcendental doctrines, what he calls “conglomerate theory,” and also the possibility that his doctrine (the capability approach) might be considered as an example of such a theory. The paper concludes with the argument that conglomerate theory does not aim to produce complete moral orderings, but rather a comparative approach with transcendental elements, as a form of weak transcendentalism.     

"法学"是什么?——比较法视域中的"法学"含义诠释

法学是什么?法学不只是一种知识谱系,它本质上是基于对法的具体场景运用的实践活动的回应。法学是一种知识、一种逻辑、一种学问,却更是一种实践、一种经验、一种解释。从比较法之视域对“法学”之原初含义进行解读,可把它概括为三个判断:法学是公平之学、法学是智识之学、法学是判断与解释之学。     

“Neutral reportage” and its second decade: A marketplace perspective

Since its inception in 1977, the neutral reportage libel defense has ridden a rocky road. While initially received optimistically by many as a sign that courts would reinforce the commitment to the wide‐open and robust debate of public issues, many courts—most notably the United States Supreme Court—have yet to adopt the doctrine. To reflect on the two decades since creation of neutral reportage, this article reviews its history—particularly over the past 10 years—and assesses its sporadic adoption from the perspective of the marketplace of ideas. It is posited that courts may be more apt to recognize and adopt the neutral reportage privilege when viewed from the position of its ability both to increase the public's knowledge of important issues and to enhance the debate surrounding those issues.