Taking disability rights seriously

Doris Zames Fleischer and Frieda Zames, The Disability Rights Movement: From Charity to Confrontation, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001, xxix +278 pp. Ruth O'Brien, Crippled Justice: The History of Modern Disability Policy in the Workplace, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001, xiv +288 pp. Paul K. Longmore, Why I Burned My Book and Other Essays on Disability, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003, ix +278 pp. Mary Johnson, Make Them Go Away: Clint Eastwood, Christopher Reeve, and the Case against Disability Rights, Louisville: Avocado Press, 2003, xvii +296 pp. Old political science is characterized by exclusion: exclusion of people who “don't matter,” sometimes on account of where they live, on account of gender, on account of ethnicity, and sometimes on account of other factors. One such factor, disability, has too often been neglected by political scientists and our students.     

Taking dictatorship seriously: a reply to Quesada

Antonio Quesada (Public Choice 130:395–400, 2007) argues that a dictator has no more than two to three times the ‘average power’ of a non-dictatorial voter. If Quesada is correct, then his argument has major consequences for social choice theory; for instance, it warrants reconsidering the significance of Arrow’s Theorem. If Quesada is incorrect, however, then his position is dangerously misleading. This paper argues that Quesada is wrong. His argument depends on his own formal account of power, an account that is implausible because it disregards a basic insight common to the standard characterisations of voting power: the idea that one has power over an outcome to the extent that one is able to change that outcome. Claims about power have a counterfactual component; to assert that an individual actually has determined an outcome is also to make an assertion about what would have been the case had that individual acted differently. We can employ David Lewis’s influential account of counterfactuals to show, contra Quesada, that in a dictatorship, non-dictatorial individuals and groups cannot possibly determine a social preference. In short, Quesada is fundamentally mistaken about power, and thus also about the distribution of power in a dictatorship.     

Taking alleged dictatorship more seriously: Rejoinder to Fried

Fried (in Public Choise, this issue, 2013) claims that Quesada (in Public Choise 130:395–400, 2007) is wrong in showing that the dictator in a dictatorial social welfare function does not necessarily enjoy absolute decision power. This reply revisits, and illustrates by means of an example, the framework where Quesada’s result is obtained. It is argued that Fried’s counterfactual analysis conducted to invalidate Quesada’s conclusion relies on untenable presumptions: (i) that the rules to identify the values of a social welfare function say something about how these values must have been obtained; and (ii) that counterfactual analysis can be conducted in an environment where causes and effects cannot be unequivocally established.     

Proximity and directional theory compared: Taking discriminant positions seriously in multi-party systems

This paper tackles the problem of comparison between proximity and directional voting in 27 European multi-party systems. This is a previously unaddressed aspect of European spatial issue voting. We focus on the spatial voting theories as predictors of vote intention, evaluating the extent of proximity and directional voting. We describe the influence of identical predictions on the comparison of these theories. Our multilevel analysis of the 2009 European Election Study data shows more empirical support for proximity voting than directional voting in the countries analyzed. It does this by clearly differentiating between those cases where it is possible to compare proximity and directional voting and where this is impossible. Nevertheless, the prevalence of proximity theory decreases in more polarized party-systems.     

Representation as a median mandate: Taking cross‐national differences seriously

The extent and ways in which popular preferences influence government policy are absolutely central to our understanding of modern democracy. Paul Warwick's discussion of these in the European Journal of Political Research in 2010 puts itself at the heart of the debate with its critique of the median mandate theory of McDonald and Budge, proposing an alternative ‘bilateralist’ concept of representation. This article questions whether this concept has much to add to our theoretical understanding of representational processes. However, Warwick's further conceptual points deserve serious consideration. These concern the time horizons within which representative processes work, and the status of the median position given multi‐motivated voting. At the evidential level, Warwick argues that survey‐based measures of voter and party left–right positions fail to produce the correspondence between median and government policy positions that median mandate theory would have us expect. However, survey‐based measures of median voter and party placements obscure important cross‐national variation. Using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems ( CSES 2007 ), as Warwick does, this article shows that survey respondents norm their own and their country's party positions to their national context. The consequence is to make the political centre in all nations appear similar. Allowing for the relevant cross‐national differences brings the relationship between the median voter and government position back in line with expectations.     

From policy lessons to policy actions: motivation to take evaluation seriously

The purpose of this article is to analyse the institutional aspects of creating effective systems for monitoring and evaluations (M&E) in government‐led rural development efforts in developing countries. We argue that the ultimate challenge of creating effective M&E systems for public policy is not only related to the supply of information and the delivery of new knowledge to policy makers, but more importantly to their demand for lessons learnt about the effects of earlier policies. The challenge, then, is for governments to construct institutional arrangements that support the transformation of policy lessons into policy actions. This article shows that the likelihood of this transformation is closely related to the capacity of institutions to deliver mechanisms for downward accountability and processes for organisational learning. We add to earlier work in this area by considering the conditions under which such a transformation process is more or less likely, given the severe power and information asymmetries that characterise the institutional context of many developing countries' national governments. We use the tools of institutional analysis to examine the incentive structures of the actors involved in two concrete field settings, and assess to what extent these actors are likely to take evaluations seriously. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Performance targets,path dependence,and policy adoption: evidence from the adoption of pollutant emission control policies in Chinese provinces

Abstract

Although performance targets imposed by high levels of governments are an important vertical result-oriented influence on local governments’ policy adoption, no studies have examined the impacts of performance targets on policy processes. Using the adoption of atmospheric pollutant emission standards by Chinese provinces in the 2000 to 2015 period, this study runs spatial autoregression models to investigate the effects of mandatory performance targets on environmental policy adoption processes in China. The results show that top-down performance targets can drive the adoption of atmospheric pollutant emission standards in Chinese provinces. Furthermore, the influence of vertical environmental performance targets on the adoption of local atmospheric pollutant emission standards is stronger in Chinese provinces that have adopted more similar standards in the previous period. The results show that top-down performance management shapes the policy adoption processes and policy adoption of Chinese provinces under vertical result-oriented performance target pressure is path-dependent.     

Taking Time Seriously

Dramatic world change has stimulated interest in research questions about the dynamics of politics. We have seen increases in the number of time series data sets and the length of typical time series. But three shortcomings are prevalent in published time series analysis. First, analysts often estimate models without testing restrictions implied by their specification. Second, researchers link the theoretical concept of equilibrium with cointegration and error correction models. Third, analysts often do a poor job of interpreting results. The consequences include weak connections between theory and tests, biased estimates, and incorrect inferences. We outline techniques for estimating linear dynamic regressions with stationary data and weakly exogenous regressors. We recommend analysts (1) start with general dynamic models and test restrictions before adopting a particular specification and (2) use the wide array of information available from dynamic specifications. We illustrate this strategy with data on Congressional approval and tax rates across OECD countries.