俄当局招安车臣反叛领导人见效

近期,车臣非法武装领导人、流亡政府“副总统”扎卡耶夫在与车臣议长阿布杜拉赫莫诺夫举行秘密谈判后表示,同意停止在车臣境内的武装行动,他所领导的“伊奇克里亚”武装组织拟将放下武器,向政府投诚。在其感召下,车臣其他武装团伙也有望停止武装斗争,     

叙利亚反对派武装组织

2011年叙利亚内战爆发三年多来,其战场上逐渐形成1000多支反对派武装组织,总规模约为10万-12万人,其中有近万名外籍战士。另据美国卡特中心统计,叙战场上出现的大小反对派武装组织共计近6000支。这些反对派武装组织之间矛盾丛生,规模、实力、目标大相径庭,亦不乏极端势力掺杂其中,对叙利亚乱局走向以及中东等地区安全影响甚大。     

利比亚民兵武装组织

2011年利比亚战争爆发以来,利民兵武装组织日益滋生坐大,已逐渐成为左右利安全局势和政治过渡的关键势力。2014年5月以来,利政治危机加剧,民兵武装火并频仍。尤其是利比亚战争后,其国内长期掩盖的教俗矛盾、地区矛盾和族群矛盾迅速爆发,成为引发利民兵武装冲突的温床。同时,地区国家插手利比亚事务,进一步加剧了利冲突烈度并拖长了冲突周期。     

伊拉克主要反政府武装组织

2003年伊拉克战争以来,伊拉克由治到乱,各种反叛武装组织层出不穷,使该国成为中东动荡的新震源。2011年中东剧变引发地区大乱局,其地区外溢效应使本就脆弱不堪的伊拉克局势乱上加乱。尤其是2014年6月异军突起的伊斯兰极端组织“伊斯兰国”,搅得伊拉克政府焦头烂额,使伊局势濒临失控。在这一大背景下,对伊拉克主要反政府武装组织进行简要梳理,显得十分必要。     

不丹反政府组织及武装：现状、趋势及影响

近年来,随着越来越多的反政府组织及武装力量不断发展壮大,发生在不丹境内的暴力活动越来越多。虽然这些反政府组织及武装规模不大,但对不丹安全仍然造成了一定影响。从发展趋势看,不丹反政府组织及武装的活动呈现上升趋势。     

内战反对派武装的联盟构建与内部冲突——以叙利亚内战为例

在内战进程中,不同的反对派武装组织有时会构建起联盟共同反抗政府军,而有时则会相互袭击引发内部冲突。对于此现象的解释已是当前内战研究理论的重点。通过回顾既有研究对此问题提出的物质因素和理念因素解释,文章认为单纯的理念因素和物质因素均无法解释反对派联盟的形式与瓦解。因此,文章提出了一个将物质因素和理念因素进行整合的分析框架,分析理念因素与物质因素交互影响反对派联盟形成和内部冲突。在政府军实力较强的情况下,理念因素无法起作用,而反对派内部实力均衡与否也将使得理念因素对联盟构建产生不同的影响,并且外部支持则会加强理念在反对派联盟形成中的影响作用。文章以叙利亚内战作为阐释性案例,采取案例内比较的方式,对提出的逻辑进行分析。     

试析印度东北部地区反政府武装组织及其活动的性质界定

由于历史、宗教、民族等原因,印度东北部地区存在多支反政府武装组织,这些组织过去主要以从事民族分裂活动受到人们的关注,但近年来这些组织逐渐向恐怖主义组织转型,越来越依赖恐怖主义的手段表达其主张,它们的活动对印度的国家安全造成了巨大影响。印度东北部地区的反政府武装组织是带有浓厚民族分裂主义性质的恐怖主义,或民族分裂主义型的恐怖主义,而不能简单地界定为单纯的恐怖主义或者民族分裂主义。     

联合国与非政府组织间的治理模式

全球化和全球性问题催生了全球治理。联合国与非政府组织在解决全球性问题中相互配合、协调, 形成了新的联合国———非政府组织治理模式, 这种模式中存在一定的结构性矛盾,因此需要妥善处理联合国与非政府组织的关系。     

全球治理中联合国与非政府组织的关系

随着全球化的深入发展,全球治理的轮廓日益显现.在全球治理中,联合国与非政府组织都是重要的行为主体.联合国重视非政府组织在国际事务中的重要作用,与非政府组织的关系越来越密切.联合国正在着力改进其与非政府组织的关系.从长远看,非政府组织是联合国重要的合作伙伴,但不可能全面参与联合国的决策.     

全球治理与国际组织

一、全球治理成为可能的几种治理因素“全球治理”这一命题自20世纪90年代以来,在国际关系学界逐步受到重视(罗西瑙在其著名的《没有政府的治理》中最早提出了“治理”的学术意义,在学界产生了广泛的影响。赫尔德主编的《全球治理》更深入地发展了全球治理的     

Fragile Proxies: Explaining Rebel Defection Against Their State Sponsors

Foreign governments frequently intervene in armed conflicts by sponsoring rebels against their adversaries. A sponsorship is less costly than a direct military intervention, but rebels often defy orders, desert fighting, or turn guns against their sponsors. Under what conditions do rebels defect against their sponsors? Drawing on organizational theory, I argue that as rebel organizations become less centralized and formalized, the rebels are likely to defect against their sponsors. This occurs because non-centralized organizations have weak central leadership and allow for dispersed decision-making, both of which narrow the manipulative capacity of sponsors. Due to these disadvantages, non-centralized rebel movements are less accountable to their sponsors, cannot credibly commit to rapidly change their policies in response to changes in the sponsor’s demands, and suffer from frequent and destructive quarrels between the top and lower echelons. Using multilevel logistic models for panel data, I test my argument on a novel dataset. My quantitative analysis shows that rebel structure is a robust predictor of defection.     

Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in Peace Accords and Durable Peace

Is peace more likely to prevail when the peace accord includes civil society actors such as religious groups, women's organizations, and human rights groups? This is the first statistical study that explores this issue. The article develops key claims in previous research regarding the role of civil society actors and durable peace, and proposes a set of hypotheses that focus on legitimacy in this process. The hypotheses are examined by employing unique data on the inclusion of civil society actors in all peace agreements in the post–Cold War period. The statistical analysis shows that inclusion of civil society actors in the peace settlement increases the durability of peace. The results further demonstrate that peace accords with involvement from civil society actors and political parties in combination are more likely to see peace prevail. The findings also suggest that inclusion of civil society has a particularly profound effect on the prospects for overall peace in nondemocratic societies.     

Conflict Dynamics and Feedback: Explaining Change in Violence against Civilians within Conflicts

Conflicts are complex, dynamic processes wherein the frequency and intensity of violence changes throughout the contest. In this article, we explore the temporal dynamics of two long-term civil wars—DR-Congo and Sudan—to identify systematic and random conditions that lead to changes in civilian targeting. Violence committed by rival political actors, territorial exchange, and the number and addition of violent agents strongly shape the likelihood that civilian targeting events and casualties increase or decrease over time. General and country differences emerge from vector autoregression analysis to suggest that (1) three types of violent agents—rebels, militias, and the government—are locked in spirals of violence where violence against civilians by one actor leads to subsequent violence by another actor; (2) rebels and government forces respond to the other side’s acquisition of contested territory by increasing counterattacks on civilians, specifically in DR-Congo; and (3) increasing numbers of active nonstate agents lead to higher violence rates in the following months. Among these, civilian targeting by rival actors triggers the most follow-on violent events against civilians.     

More Combatant Groups,More Terror?: Empirical Tests of an Outbidding Logic

We examine and test the logic that outbidding among insurgent groups results in more suicide terrorism specifically and more terrorism of any type, which has become a popular argument in recent years. A global analysis of terrorism from 1970–2004 provides scant support for the notion that outbidding increases suicide terrorism. An extension of the argument to all types of terrorist attacks provides even less support. The logic of outbidding has received considerable attention in academic and policy circles in recent years. ¹ Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International Security 31 (2006): 49–80. Similar to the argument that democratic occupation increases suicide terror, ² Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terror (New York: Random House, 2005). our lack of empirical support suggests that considerable cross-national work is still needed to understand suicide terror adequately. We suggest some reasons why this may be the case, drawing particular attention to the problem of overgeneralizing from a limited set of cases.