阿富汗主要反叛团伙及其关联

活动于阿、巴两国的、与美国阿富汗战争密切相关的主要反叛团伙之间存在复杂关联,其中"基地"组织与哈卡尼网络在各团伙网络中发挥了"中介"与"桥梁"作用。此外,外部力量对部分反叛团伙予以支持。本文认为,互为支持的反叛团伙网络及其外部支持是阿富汗反叛运动剿而不灭的重要原因。     

国内武装冲突的域外情境: 策略互动视角

内战中的反政府武装跨越国境开展抵抗行动将威胁区域安全。内部冲突的外部化成为目前国际安全领域研究的热点。针对与之相关的内战的域外情境,此文建立博弈模型分析内战当事国、跨境行动的反政府武装及其接收国之间的策略互动模式。当越境散逸的武装分子与接收国之间的实际关系存在信息不对称时,策略互动将给当事国内部武装冲突局势和两国关系带来多种可能的结果。当事国内部冲突风险和国家间冲突风险至少受到三方面影响。第一,接收国影响武装分子行动的能力。第二,当事国阻止叛乱受到接收国资助的行动强度。第三,两国之间的相互依赖程度等方面影响。一国内部冲突与政府间摩擦之间的关联性将为区域安全机制的调停或维和举措带来额外挑战。国际社会在应对冲突威胁的行动中需要精确识别内战外部化问题的具体策略环境,从而为推动各方达成长效和平方案做出实际贡献。     

内战反对派武装的联盟构建与内部冲突——以叙利亚内战为例

在内战进程中,不同的反对派武装组织有时会构建起联盟共同反抗政府军,而有时则会相互袭击引发内部冲突。对于此现象的解释已是当前内战研究理论的重点。通过回顾既有研究对此问题提出的物质因素和理念因素解释,文章认为单纯的理念因素和物质因素均无法解释反对派联盟的形式与瓦解。因此,文章提出了一个将物质因素和理念因素进行整合的分析框架,分析理念因素与物质因素交互影响反对派联盟形成和内部冲突。在政府军实力较强的情况下,理念因素无法起作用,而反对派内部实力均衡与否也将使得理念因素对联盟构建产生不同的影响,并且外部支持则会加强理念在反对派联盟形成中的影响作用。文章以叙利亚内战作为阐释性案例,采取案例内比较的方式,对提出的逻辑进行分析。     

伊朗与也门胡塞武装组织的关系探析

也门内战发生以来,伊朗与胡塞武装组织的关系成为国际政治中的热点问题.胡塞武装组织是2004年也门北方兴起的一支反政府力量.2011年“也门革命”后,它借权力真空之机,迅速扩张其势力范围.2014年9月胡塞武装组织挥师南下,数月内占领也门全境,哈迪政府被迫逃亡沙特.2015年3月27日,沙特联合十个逊尼派国家组成联盟空袭也门,打击胡塞武装组织,试图将哈迪政府送回也门.     

叙利亚反对派武装组织

2011年叙利亚内战爆发三年多来,其战场上逐渐形成1000多支反对派武装组织,总规模约为10万-12万人,其中有近万名外籍战士。另据美国卡特中心统计,叙战场上出现的大小反对派武装组织共计近6000支。这些反对派武装组织之间矛盾丛生,规模、实力、目标大相径庭,亦不乏极端势力掺杂其中,对叙利亚乱局走向以及中东等地区安全影响甚大。     

一九八七年的斯里兰卡形势

斯里兰卡因种族矛盾而爆发的内战到1987年已进入第五个年头。1987年斯里兰卡政府为早日结束内战而进行了更艰苦的斗争,先对泰米尔武装组织占据的贾夫纳半岛实施经济封锁和军事攻势,以迫使其回到谈判桌上来,后又作出极大让步与印度就早日结束内战达成协议,换取印度的合作。虽然印度——斯里兰卡和平协议的实施困难重重,动乱的局势还望不到尽头,但是协议的鉴署和执行,总算给斯里兰卡的内战局面带来了转机,已向结束内战和恢复和平的目标迈出了一步。     

伊拉克主要反政府武装组织

2003年伊拉克战争以来,伊拉克由治到乱,各种反叛武装组织层出不穷,使该国成为中东动荡的新震源。2011年中东剧变引发地区大乱局,其地区外溢效应使本就脆弱不堪的伊拉克局势乱上加乱。尤其是2014年6月异军突起的伊斯兰极端组织“伊斯兰国”,搅得伊拉克政府焦头烂额,使伊局势濒临失控。在这一大背景下,对伊拉克主要反政府武装组织进行简要梳理,显得十分必要。     

阿米巴经营与市场型企业

京瓷公司阿米巴经营取得了极大的成功,其原因在于构建了独特的组织形式与运行机制,即在阿米巴的组织基础上,通过核算机制引入了市场价格,再利用其独特的权威机制来克服企业内部价格机制的不足。这样,使得企业的外部激励内部化,低能激励高能化,从而提高了企业对市场的反应速度与企业的竞争力。我们称这种引入市场机制的企业为市场型企业,但我们也发现,随着企业的增大,企业内部的价格机制就越难以发挥作用,故阿米巴经营也有它的局限性。     

俄罗斯国家治理模式的演进及其对中国的启示

俄罗斯于20世纪90年代初启动的制度转型,彻底改变了原苏联高度集权的全能主义国家治理模式,并促使政府、市场与社会各自内部的制度结构以及三者之间的耦合关系发生了剧烈重构。全能主义国家治理模式虽然一度对其社会经济发展有过积极作用,但随着社会经济发展的深入推进其固有的弊端凸现出来。当全能主义国家治理模式解体之后,现代国家治理模式的构建就提上议事日程。虽然俄罗斯的国家治理模式进行了长时间的边际性调整,但只有到普京执政以后,俄罗斯的国家治理模式的重大调整才取得显著成效。     

关于公共关系学若干基本问题的国际对话

公共关系是一个组织与其公众之间的传播管理, 其目的是建立一种与这 些公众互相信任的关系。公共关系管理是传播的管理。公共关系管理包括组织内部 和外部的所有传播管理, 涉及组织的公众信息管理、组织的公众舆论管理、组织的公 众关系管理和组织的公众形象管理等内容。公共关系学不同于整合营销传播和企业 识别系统概念, 且有着比它们更为丰富的内涵     

Battlefield Outcomes and Rebel Cohesion: Lessons From the Eritrean Independence War

This article uses data from the Eritrean war for independence to refine existing theories of rebel fragmentation. The author argues organizational performance affects the emergence of factional infighting within rebel organizations in unique and novel ways. While battlefield losses increase the likelihood of internal fragmentation, so do battlefield gains. The implication is battlefield stalemates possess unique properties that promote organizational cohesion in war, a relationship this study refers to as “cohesive stalemates.” The article extends an emerging literature on the internal politics of insurgent groups that has linked the coherence of rebel organizations to rebel losses.     

“Any press is good press?” Rebel political wings,media freedom,and terrorism in civil wars

As part of a recent effort to bridge the studies of terrorism and civil war, new research has begun to emerge on the use of terrorism by rebel groups as a strategy of war. Building on these findings, we examine the role of affiliated political wings in shaping the use of terrorism by rebel groups during civil wars. We contend that the presence of an affiliated political wing during the civil war should increase the use of terrorism by rebel groups only in countries where there are relatively few restrictions on the freedom of the press. As political wings are often designed to engage with the civilian population through the dissemination of information, these apparatuses are in a key position to frame the use of terrorism as part of the rebel’s broader war effort. To test this proposition, we examine the use of terrorism by all rebel groups from 1970 to 2011. The results from the analysis provide strong support for our argument that political wings increase the use of terrorism by rebel groups only when the press is allowed to independently cover terrorist attacks.     

Political party formation by former armed opposition groups after civil war

ABSTRACT

Under what conditions are rebel groups successfully incorporated into democratic politics when civil war ends? Using an original cross-national, longitudinal dataset, we examine political party formation by armed opposition groups over a 20-year period, from 1990 to 2009. We find that former armed opposition groups form parties in more than half of our observations. A rebel group’s pre-war political experience, characteristics of the war and how it ended outweigh factors such as the country’s political and economic traits and history. We advance a theoretical framework based on rebel leaders’ expectations of success in post-war politics, and we argue that high rates of party formation by former armed opposition groups are likely a reflection of democratic weakness rather than democratic robustness in countries emerging from conflict.     

From victorious rebels to strong authoritarian parties: prospects for post-war democratization

ABSTRACT

In a number of cases, rebel movements that won civil wars transformed into powerful authoritarian political parties that dominated post-war politics. Parties whose origins are as victorious insurgent groups have different legacies and hence different institutional structures and patterns of behaviour than those that originated in breakaway factions of ruling parties, labour unions, non-violent social movements, or identity groups. Unlike classic definitions of political parties, post-rebel parties are not created around the need to win elections but rather as military organizations focused on winning an armed struggle. Key attributes of victorious rebel movements, such as cohesive leadership, discipline, hierarchy, and patterns of military administration of liberated territory, shape post-insurgent political parties and help explain why post-insurgent parties are often strong and authoritarian. This article seeks to identify the mechanisms that link rebel victory in three East African countries (Uganda, Ethiopia, and Rwanda) to post-war authoritarian rule. These processes suggest that how a civil war ends changes the potential for post-war democratization.     

“Survival Mode”: Rebel Resilience and the Lord’s Resistance Army

ABSTRACT

To date, scholarly work on armed groups has seldom considered the notion of rebel resilience, or the factors that enable these groups to survive despite time, military pressure, and the myriad contingent events of civil war. In an effort to develop an explanatory framework for resilience as a distinct outcome of civil war and rebellion, this article examines the conditions under which the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has persisted for nearly three decades. Based on fieldwork and original research, the article explains the LRA’s resilience in light of the group’s organizational structure and resource self-sufficiency, which have been well suited for the borderlands of East and Central Africa. The LRA is a key case of rebel resilience. It is important because it sheds light on the organizational foundations of armed groups, the relationship between resources and rebellion, and the broader study of conflict duration and termination. Understanding the sources of the LRA’s resilience can inform efforts to end such insurgencies.     

Rebel-to-political and back? Hamas as a security provider in Gaza between rebellion,politics and governance

ABSTRACT

After winning the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections and subsequently taking control of the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2007, the Palestinian Hamas – a hybrid political, social and military actor – undertook a complex process to ascertain authority and control over Gaza. The article focuses on understanding Hamas’s performance as a political party and a “rebel government” as well as the impact of this newly acquired role on the group’s strategy. Relying on primary sources, field-work and interviews with members of the Hamas government and its security sector, the study looks at Hamas’s role as a security provider and analyses the complex relationship between the institutionalized security sector and the group’s insurgent armed wing. Examining Hamas’s logic as a security provider and exploring the inherent tensions between political and insurgent logics allows for a better understanding of both the rebel group’s role as a political actor and the broader challenges behind the successful rebel-to-political transformations of non-state armed organizations. In doing so it contributes to the emerging literature on non-state actors’ shifts between ballots and bullets and on their potential role as alternative governance providers.     

Turning off the Taps: The Termination of State Sponsorship

ABSTRACT

Why do some states terminate their sponsorship of rebel movements while others are persistent in their provision of support? In the past, most research on external support to insurgents has focused on why states choose to sponsor rebel groups and particularly how this affects conflict duration. However, we know little about the termination of such support. This is surprising given that support has been shown to make armed conflicts more intractable and tremendous efforts are made in condemning and sanctioning such behavior. This study constitutes the first large-N analysis of support termination, employing survival analysis on global data of state support to rebel movements between 1975–2009. Surprisingly, the findings indicate that only some of the factors that explain support provision can offer insights into its termination. In particular, support is more likely to be terminated when no ethnic kinship bonds exist between the rebel movement and the government of the supporting state. Many decisions to withdraw support also seem to coincide with the transition from the Cold War. Threats and sanctions from other states appear largely ineffective. The study contributes to our understanding of the international dimensions of civil war and the role and motives of third parties.     

Does political inclusion of rebel parties promote peace after civil conflict?

ABSTRACT

Does the inclusion of rebel parties into the post-conflict political process help contribute to peace after the end of conflict? In this article we examine whether the transformation of rebel groups into political parties actually leads to the development of a durable peace after a civil war. Examining the likelihood of recurrence of civil wars in a country and recurrence of conflict in government–rebel group dyads after a settlement, we find that the inclusion and participation of former rebel parties in national government has an important impact on the likelihood of a durable post-settlement peace. Most importantly, not excluding major rebel parties from access to governing institutions is the most important factor in promoting post-conflict peace.     

Bargaining Between Rebel Groups and the Outside Option of Violence

Although military cooperation among rebel groups in multi-party civil wars could help rebels defeat or extract concessions from an incumbent government, violent conflict among rebel groups is empirically prevalent. Why do rebel groups in multi-party civil wars choose to fight one another? This article models the strategic dilemma facing rebel groups in multi-party civil wars as an alternating-offer bargaining game of incomplete information with an outside option. The game-theoretic model explores the relationship between the status quo distribution of power among rebel groups, the costs of fighting, and the likelihood that one rebel group will opt to unilaterally end bargaining over a set of goods, such as access to supply routes, natural resources, and control over civilian populations. We show that the likelihood of violent conflict between rebel groups is lowest when the status quo distribution of benefits reflects the existing distribution of power.     

Battle Losses and Rebel Violence: Raising the Costs for Fighting

In many armed conflicts, rebel groups deliberately target civilians. This article examines whether such violence is related to the performance of the rebels on the battlefield. It is proposed that rebel groups who are losing battles target civilians in order to impose extra costs on the government. When rebels attack civilians, the government may incur both political and military costs. Violence against civilians is thus used as an alternative conflict strategy aimed at pressuring the government into concessions. The argument is evaluated by using monthly data for rebel groups involved in armed conflict from January 2002 to December 2004.