Political Scepticism: A Reply to the Critics

In a previous article in this journal ( Bufacchi, 2001 ) I argued that political scepticism is a defining characteristic of liberal democracy. I have been criticised for inadequately distinguishing political scepticism from fallibilism (Festenstein, 2001) and for failing to appreciate the role of moral autonomy within liberal democracy (Hyland, this issue). In this article I respond to my critics, first by clarifying the difference between political scepticism and fallibilism, and secondly by suggesting that political scepticism is a necessary condition for moral autonomy.     

Bürger und Demokratie im vereinigten Deutschland

Since the early 1990s, the future development of the political culture of unified Germany was a matter of debate. According to some scholars, a fit between political structure and political culture is a necessary condition of a well performing and stable democracy. At the same time it was doubted, whether such a configuration would develop in Germany in the near future. Generalized support of a democratic regime and of the particular type of democracy institutionalized in the nation under observation are regarded as particularly relevant elements of a democratic political culture. Regarding the distribution and development of these attitudes, there are no indications of an increasing congruence between political structure and political culture in unified Germany. In the Eastern part of the country, the democratic regime in general, but even more the German variant of democracy is facing considerable scepticism. The particularly strong scepticism of the East Germans towards the form of democracy institutionalized in Germany particularly rooted in a distant attitude to democracy as a type of political regime. Other relevant factors are dissatisfaction with the performance of democracy in Germany, a negative view of the responsiveness of political leaders, a persisting support of socialism and a negative perception of the prevailing economic conditions.     

A Defence of Sceptical Authoritarianism

Vittorio Bufacchi argued in this journal that democracy was under threat from two extreme philosophical positions: totalitarianism and nihilism. Sandwiched between these polarities is liberal democracy. Bufacchi believes that one of liberal democracy's distinctive properties is an endorsement of scepticism, which he then attempts to illuminate. In contrast, this article will argue that an authoritarian government bound by a constitution permitting civil liberties might also adopt political scepticism. This removes the aforementioned distinctiveness of liberal democracy in this regard and, in addition, leads us toward a rethinking of the possibility of a more plausible consideration of democracy.     

Liberal Democracy and Neoliberalism: A Critical Juxtaposition

In this essay I argue that neoliberalism is both an economic and a political doctrine and that its historical trajectory, both conceptual and political, especially in the United States, is better understood in relation to its complex relationship of affinity with liberal democracy. The intersection between liberal democracy and neoliberalism is thus better apprehended from the perspective of the separation of the economic and the political in capitalism and the relative autonomy that it structurally grants to each field of power. Liberal democracy has provided a depoliticized framework that nurtures neoliberalism, while providing it with a cloak of legitimacy. Stated somewhat differently, the historical trajectory of liberal democracy, as a theory and as a practice of power, betrays an anti-democratic tendency that leads to depoliticization and has quelled the democratic politics that once gave credence to it, thus paving the way for the rise of neoliberalism.     

Balancing Procedures and Outcomes Within Democratic Theory: Core Values and Judicial Review

Democratic theorists often distinguish between two views of democratic procedures. 'Outcomes theorists' emphasize the instrumental nature of these procedures and argue that they are only valuable because they tend to produce good outcomes. In contrast, 'proceduralists' emphasize the intrinsic value of democratic procedures, for instance, on the grounds that they are fair. In this paper. I argue that we should reject pure versions of these two theories in favor of an understanding of the democratic ideal that recognizes a commitment to both intrinsically valuable democratic procedures and democratic outcomes. In instances in which there is a conflict between these two commitments, I suggest they must be balanced. This balancing approach offers a justification of judicial review on the grounds that it potentially limits outcomes that undermine democracy. But judicial review is not justifiable in any instance in which a bad democratic outcome results from democratic procedures. When the loss that would result from overturning a democratic procedure is greater than the gain to democracy that would result from ensuring against an undemocratic outcome; judicial review is not justifiable. Loss or gain to democracy is defined by the negative or positive impact of each action on the core democratic values of equality and autonomy, aspects of the democratic ideal. Even when judicial review is justified, the fact that it overturns intrinsically valuable procedures suggests that such review is never ideal from the standpoint of democracy.     

Postmodernists,pragmatists and the justification of democracy

According to current wisdom, we have entered a new ‘age of democracy’. The new global popularity of the democratic ideal appears likely to pose new challenges to democratic theory, adding yet more formulations and nuances to existing categories. Just as some key questions about democracy–such as ‘why is it a good (or the best) political system?’ and 'precisely what does it demand of us, and owe to us, as citizens?' – become daily more urgent, some worry about the RESOurces of political theory to cope with them, given the apparent shift towards scepticism and a suspicion of large-scale, encompassing claims about politics. This article focuses of four arguments from postmodernist and pragmatist writers who have given democracy a prominent part in their work. It asks whether the writers examined provide convincing justifications for the democratic ideal.     

UTOPIA DEFENDED AGAINST THE LIBERALS

Abstract. The polarity between the Utopian form of thought and liberalism is analysed first with the unsatisfactory mediation of the idea of totalitarianism, then through a comparison of liberal empiricist epistemology with the necessarily rationalist, theoretical approach of Utopians. Incompatible world-views make utopianism anathema to liberals, whatever its content. Utopia is defended against charges of intolerance, unfreedom and coerciveness, partly through a critique of liberal concepts. The utopianism which liberals denigrate appears largely their own invention. Utopians conversely eschewed liberal democracy because, with some justification, they thought elites natural. Similarities between utopianism and radical democracy are elucidated. The apparent, surprising rapprochement between the Utopian outlook and that of pluralist democracy is analysed. Finally, the value of a Utopian approach to political theory is asserted.
Even with the best intentions of making heaven on earth [utopianism] only succeds in making it a hell—that hell which man alone prepares for his fellow-men.     

Local Autonomy, Local Democracy and the 'New Localism'

Most studies of local autonomy and local democracy fail to distinguish adequately between the two terms. As a consequence, there is an assumed bilateral relationship between them in which changes in one are always deemed to affect the other – particularly in policy formulations. This article develops a stronger analytical distinction between them by considering local autonomy in three separate ways: as freedom from central interference; as freedom to effect particular outcomes; and as the reflection of local identity . Each of these conceptualisations raises different challenges for local democracy and its relationship to broader forms of democratic practice. When used to analyse the recent emergence of the 'new localism' as a policy approach within Britain, this separation also shows significant limitations in current policies towards democratic renewal and central policies that are supposedly focused on outcomes rather than processes. Although localities are being afforded some autonomy, most initiatives are not supporting the enhancement of local democracy.     

Liberal Justifications for Local Government in Britain: The Triumph of Expediency over Ethics

It is shown in this article how theories justifying local government in Britain are largely based on the expedience of providing administrative efficiency or stable democracy for the central state rather than ethical grounds that justify local government as an independent entity in its own right. The article critically reviews the development of theories justifying local government within Britain and argues that it is possible on the basis of Mill's arguments within On Liberty to establish a strong ethical justification for local government. It is shown how Mill did not develop this line of thought but established substantive arguments concerning the value of local government for securing a stable liberal democracy and how successive mainstream theorists have modified but not substantially departed from this approach.     

Transnational partisanship: idea and practice

That parties might successfully organize transnationally is an idea often met with scepticism. This article argues that while certain favourable conditions are indeed absent in the transnational domain, this implies not that partisanship is impossible but that it is likely to be marked by certain traits. Specifically, it will tend to be episodic, structured as a low-density network and delocalized in its ideational content. These tendencies affect the normative expectations one can attach to it. Transnational partisanship should be valued as a transitional phenomenon, e.g. as a pathway to transnational democracy, more than as a desirable thing in itself.     

Sustaining democracy: folk epistemology and social conflict

When political philosophers ask whether there is a philosophical justification for democracy, they are most frequently concerned with one of two queries. The first has to do with the relative merits of democracy as compared with other regimes. The second query has to do with the moral bindingness of democratic outcomes. But there is a third query we may be engaging when we are looking for a philosophical justification of democracy: what reason can be given to democratic citizens to pursue democratic means of social change when they are confronted with a democratic result that seems to them seriously objectionable or morally intolerable? In this paper I develop an epistemological response to the third query. The thesis is that we have sufficient epistemological reasons to be democrats. The epistemological norms that we take ourselves to be governed by can be satisfied only under certain social conditions, and these social conditions are best secured under democracy.     

略论西方民主政治的理论基础

根据西方的民主理论,民主政治应当体现为多数人的统治。但是,如果多数的权力不受制约,多数人进行统治并不一定带来真正的民主政治,因为集体的智慧是有限的,多数的无限权威容易导致权力的滥用,多数的交易规则对少数人具有强制作用,这样常常会产生多数人忽视少数人权益的现象。因此,要使多数人的民主成为多数善政,要使民主政治具有适当的制度基础,就要对多数投票决定问题的范围加以限定,少教人应当被给予更大程度的自治,司法体系和社会力量要充分利用起来对多数的权力加以制衡。     

The political budget cycle across varying degrees of democracy

The political budget cycle (PBC) is a well-known theory claiming that leaders manipulate the economy in proximity to elections to improve their chances of re-election. While the existence of the phenomenon in democracies has been thoroughly discussed, little attention has been given to the theoretical justification and empirical evidence of its existence in autocracies. In this article, I present a hypothesis of the magnitude of the PBC in both autocracies and democracies, claiming that as the democracy level increases, the incentive of leaders to manipulate the economy rises, but their ability to do so is more limited. Therefore, I expect the magnitude of the PBC to be the lowest in states that are strongly autocratic (due to a lack of incentives) and in states that are strongly democratic (due to a lack of ability). The effect should be the strongest in weakly autocratic or weakly democratic states. The empirical analysis presented in the article supports the hypothesis of a non-linear correlation between the PBC and levels of democracy.     

浅谈村民自治中的若干问题

村民自治是基层民主自治在农村的主要表现形式。自基层民主自治制度确定为我国基本政治制度以来,我国基层民主自治在农村迅速发展,为广大农村地区的政治经济发展提供了强大的制度支持。但是,村民自治的发展并不是完美的,其中也存在着不少问题。只有发现这些问题,才能让村民自治得到健康发展。     

Why are highly informed citizens sceptical of referenda?

Past work on attitudes toward the use of referenda finds that the most politically informed citizens are more sceptical of its use than their less informed counterparts. An intriguing tension presents itself in that those citizens who may be best equipped for referendum voting, the highly informed and politically sophisticated, are the least likely to support the use of this tool of direct democracy. Using data from Canadian Election Studies, we consider three explanations for relative referenda scepticism among political sophisticates. Our analyses provide evidence to support a confidence in government explanation and a concern for minority rights explanation, but not an incompetent public explanation – a curious finding considering the centrality of citizen competence in the theoretical literature on referenda.     

Laski on Rights and the Problem of Liberal Democratic Theory

From 1919 until the mid-1920s Laski developed a cogent egalitarian theory of democratic rights. In the 1930s he turned his attention to the conflict between such rights and the capitalist property rights of liberal theory. His defence of democratic rights is significant in the context of contemporary discussions of rights, autonomy and democracy.     

Norway: Madisonianism Reborn

This article discusses citizen control in Norwegian parliamentary democracy, and specifically the changes that have recently taken place. Around 1960 Norway had reached a constitutional form that, apart from the consequences of proportional representation, looked much like a Westminster system. From that point on, however, Norwegian democracy has generally moved away from this model. A series of minority governments has given rise to parliamentary reassertion. The Norwegian party system has fragmented, and the individual parties have atrophied as mass membership organizations. A wave of corporatism and later a heightened assertiveness on the part of the judiciary have helped to contain parliamentary power. Two critical European Union membership referendums in 1972 and 1994 have firmly established the role of direct democracy in critical political decisions. And despite the results of these two popular consultations, international constraints have become ever more significant. Compared with most others in Europe, however, Norway is a relatively unconstrained polity. There are few important ways in which the citizenry is partitioned into multiple democratic principals, and the country is a reasonable fit to the parliamentary ideal type of an unfettered hierarchy controlled by the median voter. At the same time, the trend is unmistakably one towards greater policy‐making complexity and increasing constraints on policy makers. Norway's reluctant but seemingly inevitable incorporation into a larger Europe is the greatest and most decisive of these constraints, but it is not the only one. Judicial institutions are likely to play an increasingly important political role, and direct democracy perhaps likewise. And although central bank independence has met with greater scepticism than in most other European countries, it is not likely to be reversed. All in all, it seems that Norwegian parliamentary governance is becoming at least a little more Madisonian and a little less Westminsterian.     

Economic development and democracy: An electoral connection

Scholars continue to debate whether economic development affects regime type. This article argues that a clear relationship exists between development and the electoral component of democracy, but not – or at least less so – between development and other components of broader understandings of democracy. This is so because development enhances the power resources of citizens and elections provide a focal point for collective action. The theory is tested with two new datasets – Varieties of Democracy and Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy – that allow us to disaggregate the concept of democracy into meso- and micro-level indicators. Results of these tests corroborate the theory: only election-centred indicators are robustly associated with economic development. This may help to account for apparent inconsistencies across extant studies and shed light on the mechanisms at work in a much-studied relationship. Further analysis shows that development affects electoral democracy by reducing electoral fraud, election violence and vote buying.     

Hobbes on Democracy

Hobbes is often cited as a precursor of modern liberalism, both on the grounds of his individualism and of his endorsement of intellectual and moral autonomy. Yet Hobbes supports absolutist government rather than democracy. This is partly explained by his rejection of autonomy understood as self-government. But Hobbes's case against democracy is more comprehensive than this. This article considers Hobbes's case against democracy.     

Democracy or Good Governance? Globalization,Transnational Capital,and Georgia's Neo-liberal Revolution

Western aid donors merge democracy and good governance in theory and practice. Yet, since the 2003 Rose Revolution, Georgia's governance indicators have soared while its democracy scores have plummeted. The good governance–democracy merger constitutes an attempt by the transnational capitalist class to cultivate consent for its hegemonic project of neo-liberal globalization. This article highlights the personal and institutional networks connecting Georgian elites with the organizations involved in globalizing governance and democracy. It shows how these organizations are dominated by the representatives of transnational capital. Finally, it shows that Georgia, as an undemocratic but effective ‘governance state’, is not an exception.