Considerations on the Cyber Domain as the New Worldwide Battlefield

The convergence of telecommunication and computer technologies that has evolved in the field of information and communication technologies (ICT) in the last two decades has had very important effects on new war technologies and the ongoing process of battlefield digitisation. The Stuxnet worm, uncovered in 2010 and responsible for the sabotaging of a uranium enrichment infrastructure in Iran, is a clear example of a digital weapon. The incident shows what is meant by cyber war and what the particular features of this new warfare dimension are compared to the conventional domains of land, sea, air and space, with relevance both at the operational and strategic levels. But cyberspace also extends to the semantic level, within the complimentary field of information warfare involving the content of messages flowing through the Internet for the purposes of propaganda, information, disinformation, consensus building, etc. The overall cyber warfare domain needs to be put into perspective internationally as many countries are developing strong cyber capabilities and an ‘arms race’ is already taking place, showing that these technologies can potentially be used to undermine international stability and security. What is needed is a public debate on the topic and its impact on global stability, and some kind of regulation or international agreement on this new warfare domain, including an approach involving confidence building measures (CBMs).     

A social theory of war: Clausewitz and war reconsidered

This article presents a new theory of war that is grounded in the insights of Clausewitz on the social nature of conflict. Clausewitz had argued that war is a political process; he therefore distinguished between ‘war’—understood in political terms—and warfare—understood as fighting. He then created a typology covering a spectrum of war ranging from total to limited, the political stakes of a conflict determining where it would fall on the spectrum. I develop and modify this basic framework by arguing that the social organization of the actors has a determining role in predicting the stakes of war. I then show how this framework helps us understand some key problems in the political science literature on war and conflict. I attempt to show two main things: (1) that there are different types of wars (and that these differences are not necessarily related to the standing of the actors, i.e. the presence or absence of sovereignty); and (2) that how war and warfare are related is more complicated than previously understood and that this has implications for the political science literature on order, conflict and violence.     

The Northern Ireland crisis in perspective

Abstract

The urban guerrilla warfare that has been taking lives in Northern Ireland for the past sixteen years cannot be regarded as an anachronistic settling of scores between “papists” and “prods” in an inferior remake of Europe's seventeenth‐century wars of religion. It is a conflict of our time and its distinguishing features cannot quite conceal a problem common to most divided countries, especially those—like Cyprus and Lebanon—which are shaken by similar convulsions.     

Why has the United States not bombed Iran? The domestic politics of America's response to Iran's nuclear programme

Why has the United States (US), under both the Bush and Obama administrations, refrained from attacking Iran even though US officials have depicted the Iranian threat in all but apocalyptic terms and even though a loud chorus in Washington has been persistently calling for a preventive strike against Iran? I present an analysis—informed by Graham Allison's famous bureaucratic politics model—of the main political and bureaucratic forces in Washington acting to promote or impede a preventive attack on Iran's nuclear sites. I argue that America's abstention from attacking Iran should be understood not as a coherent national response to Iran's nuclear programme but rather as (in Allison's terms) an ‘intra-national political outcome’ resulting from the ‘pulling’ of ‘Iran Threat’ interests—primarily Vice President Cheney's camp in the Bush White House, members of Congress, and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)—and the countervailing ‘hauling’ of the Pentagon, the military's top brass, the intelligence community and the Department of State. The main reason why neither the Bush nor the Obama administration has opted for a military strike is that the ‘haulers’, who were led by a formidable bureaucratic-political player, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, have had the upper hand over the hawkish ‘pullers’.     

‘Hybrid Threats’: Neither Omnipotent Nor Unbeatable

Hybrid threats have now joined a growing suite of alternative concepts about the ever evolving character of modern conflict. Here and abroad, the hybrid threat construct has found traction in official policy circles despite its relative novelty. It has been cited by the U.S. Secretary of Defense in articles and speeches, and by policymakers now serving in the Pentagon. Heretofore, the rapidly growing hybrid threat literature has focused on the land warfare aspects of the threat. Modern hybrid threats, including Hezbollah and Iran, have demonstrated the ability to employ irregular tactics and advanced naval capabilities along with illegal or terrorist activity. Thus, the hybrid threat is applicable to naval forces and the U.S. Navy needs to dust off lessons learned from its last experience in the Persian Gulf in the late 1980s to better prepare for an even more challenging future.     

Iran,the GCC and the Implications of the Nuclear Deal: Rivalry versus Engagement

Abstract

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, also known as the Iran nuclear deal, is consequential for Middle East regional security. It has raised a number of concerns for Arab Gulf states in relation to an emboldened Iran after sanction relief and the perceived shift of the US away from supporting its traditional allies in the Gulf. The international recognition and incorporation of Iran into regional power constellations resulting from the deal will intensify Saudi-Iranian rivalry to assert dominance. This rivalry and competition will increase in the short run, however, regional crises are expected to highlight the need for dialogue and engagement on regional affairs.     

Revolutions without guerrillas

While most scholars and policy analysts have long focused on guerrilla warfare as the predominant model of revolution, it has actually been revolutions without guerrillas that have toppled regimes throughout the world in the past decade. The 1989 popular uprisings in Eastern Europe that marked the end of more than 40 years of Communist rule were only the latest manifestation of a trend that had seen governments fall from Iran to the Philippines. Among the key differences between traditional insurgencies and the growing phenomenon of revolutions without guerrillas is the sudden and explosive nature of the latter. Whereas it may take an insurgency years, or even decades, to reach a point of ‘crisis’, thereby allowing sufficient time to design policy, supply weapons, or create strategies, in this new situation governments can be toppled in a matter of weeks and countries can become paralyzed overnight. Popular uprisings also tend to be less ideological and usually less violent than guerrilla campaigns. This article, which is a policy‐oriented study, outlines the characteristics of this phenomenon and discusses its implications for US interests in the 1990s.     

A threat to Europe? Middle east ties with the Balkans and their impact upon terrorist activity throughout the region

The internecine warfare in the former Yugoslavia has radicalised many Islamic movements in the region and facilitated close links between local Balkan groups and Middle East states as well as terrorist organisations. This article examines the spread of militant Islamic fundamentalism in the Balkans as well as in Kosovo, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Albania. The scope of linkages between Balkan Islamic movements and Iran pose serious concern for Western governments as a long‐term threat to any stability and democratisation in the Balkan region as it has intensified illegal activity throughout the area and heightened irredentist claims.     

The Practice and Impacts of Russian-style Hybrid Warfare

The term hybrid warfare was first coined by US military scholars and later widely adopted in the West to refer to Russian military operations in the Ukrainian and Syrian crises.In Russia,it is called "Gerasimovism".Russia adapted the idea of hybrid warfare for its military operations in Ukraine and Syria into a Russian-style hybrid warfare that has seen successful results so far.This model is likely to impact future military developments.     

The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace

What are the dynamics of coercion in cyberspace? Can states use cyber means as independent tools of coercion to influence the behavior of adversaries? This article critically assesses traditional coercion theory in light of cyberspace's emergence as a domain in which states use force, or its threat, to achieve political objectives. First, we review the core tenets of coercion theory and identify the requisites of successful coercion: clearly communicated threats; a cost–benefit calculus; credibility; and reassurance. We subsequently explore the extent to which each of these is feasible for or applicable to the cyber domain, highlighting how the dynamics of coercion in cyberspace mimic versus diverge from traditional domains of warfare. We demonstrate that cyber power alone has limited effectiveness as a tool of coercion, although it has significant utility when coupled with other elements of national power. Second, this article assesses the viability and effectiveness of six prominent warfighting strategies in the traditional coercion literature as applied to the cyber domain: attrition, denial, decapitation, intimidation, punishment, and risk. We conclude that, based on the current technological state of the field, states are only likely to achieve desired objectives employing attrition, denial, or decapitation strategies. Our analysis also has unique implications for the conduct of warfare in cyberspace. Perhaps counterintuitively, the obstacles to coercion that our analysis identifies may prompt states to reevaluate norms against targeting civilian infrastructure.     

A Critical Perspective on Terrorism: Case Study of Jundallah and Jeish ul-Adl in Iran

ABSTRACT

An extensive body of traditional terrorism research exists where the focus is on Iran as a terrorist state and a terrorism sponsor. This article explores an alternative terrorism narrative by examining the non-state actors, Jundallah and Jeish ul-Adl. The deficiency of information in the literature is addressed by applying the first and second-order critique approach of Richard Jackson’s knowledge, power and politics theoretical framework in contrast with the traditional terrorism studies approach. A first-order critique seeks to destabilise the accepted knowledge that Iran is both a terrorist state and a terrorism sponsor. This provides the grounds to study other aspects of “knowing” in relation to the second-order critique, where a critical ground outside the discourse suggests that Iranian officials have declared that the non-state terrorist actors of Jundallah and Jeish ul-Adl constitute a threat to Iran’s political stability. The outcome of the analyses here bridges the gap between the new aspect of terrorism, the non-state actors, and critical terrorism studies in order to contest the traditional discussion of terrorism in Iran. The rationale behind new terrorism varies and necessitates that new meanings and strategies be adopted in relation to Iran.     

British nuclear non-proliferation policies towards Iran and the Middle East

The article argues that British non-proliferation policies towards the Middle East have had limited success because they are circumscribed by dependence on alliances and constrained by other factors such as Britain's historical legacy, its status as a nuclear weapons state and, especially through the European Union's engagement with the region, the communication of self-interest rather than credible pursuit of the declared objective of regional security-building. Despite promoting and implementing its own disarmament policies, Britain has been unable to overcome mistrust and perceptions of hypocrisy in the region in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. This is particularly evident in the dispute with Iran, which is examined in detail with the assistance of Adler's ‘double-damned dilemma’ model. The analysis argues that the Western coercive approach has facilitated the stalemate with Iran, because it has encouraged Iran's provocations and allowed it to respond with a strategy of denial. The analysis suggests that Britain and its allies adopt a defusing strategy which does not reduce the dispute to a proliferation problem, but treats Iran's behaviour as a quest for recognition. Britain has little influence on Iran, but might build on its relationship with Turkey to develop this approach in conjunction with its allies.     

Russo–Iranian Relations in the Post-Soviet Era

The West has shunned the Islamic Republic of Iran for most of the past 38 years. To neutralise the very negative impact that this situation has had on the country’s economy and political isolation, Iran has turned to the East, in particular to China and Russia, a change in orientation despite Iran’s traditional preference for the West. Since the Soviet Union’s demise, Iran and Russia have steadily been expanding co-operation in trade, regional security, nuclear technology, military issues, and oil and natural gas exploration and marketing. Yet both Powers have cautiously approached one other. The degree of expansion or contraction in co-operation has depended considerably on whether relations between the West and Russia have been amicable or hostile. Historically speaking, Great Power rivalry over Iran has worked better for Tehran than when these Powers have taken a unified policy, as in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.     

FRAMEWORKS FOR CONCEPTUALISING TERRORISM

Terrorism has been situated—and thereby implicitly also defined—in various contexts such as crime, politics, war, propaganda and religion. Depending on which framework one chooses, certain aspects of terrorism get exposed while others are placed ‘outside the picture’ if only one framework is utilised. In this article five conceptual lenses are utilised: 1. terrorism as/and crime; 2. terrorism as/and politics; 3. terrorism as/and warfare; 4. terrorism as/and communication; and 5. terrorism as/and religious fundamentalism.     

“Good Deeds Aren’t Enough”: Point Four in Iran, 1949–1953

Iran enjoyed some of the earliest fruits and efforts of the Point Four programme, an initiative borne out of President Harry Truman’s 1949 inaugural address. Over the last decade, a robust literature on development theory and American foreign policy has emerged. That research reveals complex motivations and agendas. Point Four in Iran, specifically, offers a discrete, early picture of America’s broader effort to utilise technical assistance to elevate poor peoples’ standards of living and inoculate poor states from communist appeals. It is one of the landmark programmes during this genesis period. The Iranian government was amongst the first that the State Department approached to establish technical aid under this initiative, and, indeed, American aid to Iran continued into the 1970s. By mid-1953, however, larger and more direct aid absorbed this specific assistance and development effort to bolster the shah’s government, which gained secure power after an American Central Intelligence Agency and British intelligence—MI6—backed coup that same year. Scholars have argued that Truman’s foreign aid innovations reshaped United States foreign policy. The Point Four programme in Iran, however, also reveals the limits of that revolution.     

To Prevent a Revolution: John F. Kennedy and the Promotion of Democracy in Iran

John F. Kennedy came to power in 1961 with Iran on the verge of revolution against the Shah's unpopular policies. To stabilise the situation, his Administration attempted to promote democracy through a development plan based on the precepts of modernisation theory. Backed by academic theorists who argued that promoting democracy was the best way to secure victory in the Cold War, Kennedy developed an ambitious plan to transform Iran. This policy was seen as essential to replace the inevitable uncontrollable revolution and subsequent loss of Iran, with one controlled and directed by Washington. This analysis provides the first comprehensive examination of this plan and its foundations that has heretofore been overlooked. Kennedy's policy towards Iran illuminates the role that external powers can have in manufacturing, supporting, and encouraging a country's transition to democracy. Its failure, and the absence of any replacement plan to ensure political reform, made inevitable the uncontrollable revolution which eventually came in 1978.     

Terrorism and the blind men's elephant

Terrorism is best understood as a form of warfare. Considerable division exists among researchers on the issue of defining terrorism. A minority propose that terrorism is a form of warfare, possibly identical to guerrilla warfare. However, the majority disagree with this position, instead viewing terrorism as a distinct and separate phenomenon. This divergence has been fuelled by the distinctive questions of morality which cloak any consideration of terrorism. The impact of this special morality dimension to the problem is examined, with the focus being directed to biases arising from the moral standpoint which has been adopted by most. It is argued that many of the so‐called distinctions between terrorism and warfare are illusionary. The article concludes that while there are solutions to the current conceptual deadlock these are unlikely to be realised in the near future.     

Bargaining,Fear, and Denial: Explaining Violence Against Civilians in Iraq 2004–2007

From mid-2004 to mid-2007, the Iraq war was distinguished from other comparable insurgencies by its high rates of civilian victimization. This has been attributed to a number of different factors, including the role of Islamic fundamentalist groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq as well as the regional ambitions of Iran and Syria. Using an unpublished dataset of violence in Iraq from 2003–2008 from the Iraq Body Count (IBC), this paper argues that the violence against civilians is best understood as a combination of three interacting logics—bargaining, fear, and denial—that are predominantly local in character. First, armed Iraqi actors bargained through violence both across and within sectarian communities, and were driven by mechanisms of outbidding and outflanking to escalate their attacks on civilians. Second, the pervasive fear about the future of the Iraqi state encouraged the “localization” of violence in Iraq, particularly in the emergence of a security dilemma and the proliferation of criminal and tribal actors. Finally, Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq played the spoiler in Iraq, using mass-casualty attacks to generate fear among the population and deny U.S. efforts to build a functioning state. Only by addressing each of these three logics as part of its counter-insurgency strategy can the U.S. put an end to violence against civilians and develop the Iraqi state into a credible competitor for the loyalties of the population.     

A Fine Balance: India Walks a Tightrope between Iran and the United States

India confronts the conflicting imperatives of Indian domestic politics and its strategic interests when dealing with Iran. As India's global profile has risen in recent years and its ties with the United States have strengthened, this conflict has come into sharper relief. India's traditionally close ties with Iran have become a major factor influencing how certain sections of U.S. policymakers evaluate a U.S.-India partnership. India has tried to balance carefully its relations with Iran and the United States; however, due to intense American pressure, especially after the signing of the U.S.-India civilian nuclear energy cooperation pact, India has moved closer to the United States concerning the Iranian nuclear program. But strong domestic constraints remain that will prevent India from completely abandoning its ties with Iran, even as a re-evaluation of India-Iran bilateral ties is long overdue.