Cotton dust regulation: An OSHA success story?

In 1978, OSHA took a major step in attempting to promote the health of workers in the textile industry, tightening its standard on cotton dust levels in textile plants. Because the OSHA cotton dust standard was widely believed to be ineffective, it became the target of a major political debate and a fundamental U.S. Supreme Court decision. The evidence indicates that the standard has had the expected beneficial effect on worker health, and at a cost much lower than originally anticipated. Nevertheless, the costs still remain very high, far higher than estimates of the value of the results they achieve or of the value that workers place on them. Moreover, much more efficient ways of achieving comparable results are available. Nevertheless, large firms in the industry now appear to have a vested interest in maintaining the standard in its original form and are unlikely to constitute a force for change.     

The role of inspection sequence in compliance with the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) standards: Interpretations and implications

We examined the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) inspections in the US to identify the effects of repeated inspections and the time between inspections on non-compliance. Our sample included 549,398 inspections conducted from 1972 through 2006 in manufacturing plants in the 29 states where federal OSHA enforces the law. We controlled for inspection type, industry, establishment size, and year. The number of total violations cited fell by 28%–48% from the first to the second inspection; after that, the numbers declined much more slowly. These effects were found in every one of the four sub-periods examined. The number of violations cited increased with each additional year since the prior inspection after controlling for other variables; however, the increases were small, totaling approximately 15% over five years. OSHA should probably give higher priority to first time inspections than to repeated inspections. The current requirement that at least two years elapse between planned inspections should probably be lengthened.     

The status of OSHA reform: A comment on mendeloff's proposals

Since its inception, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has been the target of regulatory reform proposals. OSHA has attracted this continued critical attention both because of inadequacies in the design of OSHA regulation and shortcomings in its implementation. John Mendeloff's critique and program of reform for OSHA focus primarily on inadequacies in the structure of OSHA policy rather than its implementation. Within that class of issues, Mendeloff provides a thoughtful analysis of OSHA policy. His regulatory proposals also address what appear to be the principal shortcomings of OSHA. However, the specific aspects of his proposal raise new problems with respect to the stability of regulatory policy and its unintended role in establishing barriers to entry in industry.     

On the accuracy of regulatory cost estimates

This study compares ex ante estimates of the direct costs of individual regulations to ex post assessments of the same regulations. For total costs the results support conventional wisdom, namely that the costs of regulations tend to be overestimated. This is true for 14 of the 28 rules in the data set discussed, while for only 3 rules were the ex ante estimates too low. For unit costs, however, the story is quite different. At least for EPA and OSHA rules, unit cost estimates are often accurate, and even when they are not, overestimation of abatement costs occurs about as often as underestimation. In contrast, for those rules that use economic incentives, unit costs are consistently overestimated. The difference between the total‐cost and the unit‐cost results is caused by frequent errors in estimates of the effects of individual rules, which suggests, in turn, that the rule's benefits may also be overestimated. The quantity errors are driven both by difficulties in determining the baseline and by incomplete compliance. In cases of unit‐cost overestimation, unanticipated technological innovation appears to be an important factor — especially for economic incentive rules, although procedural and methodological explanations may also apply. © 2000 by the Association for Public Policy and Management.     

THE WELFARE COSTS OF SUPPLY RESTRICTIONS IN THE GENERAL PRACTICE LABOUR MARKET

Abstract: This paper examines policy arguments for further restricting supply to the Australian General Practice profession by immigration and medical school policies. It uses economic analysis to assess the costs and benefits of supply restrictions. The effects of Medicare and GP income-targeting on policy design are analysed. Restrictions are shown to impose net costs on the community as a whole and on government. Even with Medicare subsidies, the inefficiency costs of the current health system are minimised with liberal policies for accepting foreign- trained GPs.     

Transaction costs and inter‐jurisdictional cooperation: an application to land use collaboration

• The costs and benefits of inter‐jurisdictional cooperation and how these impede strategic alliances among jurisdictions is an issue of growing importance worldwide. The reason is the potential cost savings, efficiency increase and economic development benefits that can be realized through cooperation. The literature has increasingly mentioned transaction costs as obstacles that mitigate cooperation and as a key component of cooperation costs, which must be outweighed by cooperation benefits in order for communities to perceive advantageous strategic alliances. However, a framework is lacking in the literature for evaluating the implications of transaction costs for inter‐jurisdictional cooperation. This paper develops a framework for evaluating the nature and dynamics of transaction costs and their implications for inter‐jurisdictional cooperation, with an application to land use. A simple cost function model is used to explain the costs and challenges associated with managing coordinated, cooperative or consolidated relationships, and the dynamics of such costs. The analysis highlights the importance of such things as degree of complexity, inter‐party diversity and the relative sizes of collaborating partners. An application to land use cooperation in Michigan suggests that policies to eliminate transaction costs could help reduce the barriers to cooperation of various types.

Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Promise and peril

The size of the federal budget tells only one part of the tale of government's presence in the market economy. The enormous amounts of non-tax dollars government requires to be spent on regulation – estimated at $647 billion per year – powerfully argue for some sort of regulatory scorekeeping. Regulatory costs are equivalent to over one-third of the level of government spending. A regulatory budget can be an effective tool both for spurring reform and monitoring regulatory activity.At bottom, today's rulemaking process is plagued by the fact that agency bureaucrats are not accountable to voters. And Congress – though responsible for the underlying statutes that usually propel those unanswerable agencies – nevertheless can conveniently blame agencies for regulatory excesses. Indeed, Americans live under a regime of Regulation Without Representation.A regulatory budget could promote greater accountability by limiting the regulatory costs agencies could impose on the private sector. Congress could either specify a limit on compliance costs for each newly enacted law or reauthorization of existing law, or Congress could enact a more ambitious full-scale budget paralleling the fiscal budget, a riskier approach. A comprehensive budget would require Congress to divide to a total budget among agencies. Agencies' responsibility would be to rank hazards serially, from most to least severe, and address them within their budget constraint. In either version of a regulatory budget, any agency desiring to exceed its budget would need to seek congressional approval.Regulatory costs imposed on the private sector by federal agencies can never be precisely measured, and a budget cannot achieve absolute precision. Nonetheless, a regulatory budget is a valuable tool. The real innovation of regulatory budgeting is its potential to impose the consequences of regulatory decisionmaking on agencies rather than on the regulated parties alone. Agencies that today rarely admit a rule provides negligible benefit would be forced to compete for the right to regulate. While agencies would be free to regulate as unwisely as they do now, the consequences could be transfer of the squandered budgetary allocation to a rival agency that saves more lives.Budgeting could fundamentally change incentives. Under a budget, adopting a costly, but marginally beneficial, regulation will suddenly be irrational. Congress would weigh an agency's claimed benefits against alternative means of protecting public health and safety, giving agencies incentives to compete and expose one another's bogus benefits. Budgeting could encourage greater recognition of the fact that some risks are far more remote than those we undertake daily. In the long run, a regulatory budget would force agencies to compete with one another on the most important bottom line of all: that their least-effective rules save more lives per dollar spent (or correct some alleged market imperfection better) than those of other agencies.There are clear benefits to regulatory budgeting, but there are also pitfalls. For instance, under a budget, agencies have incentives to underestimate compliance costs while regulated parties have the opposite incentive. Self-correcting techniques that may force opposing cost calculations to converge are only at the thought- experiment stage. However, limitations on the delegation of regulatory power and enhancing congressional accountability can help.Certain principles and antecedents can help ensure that a regulatory budgeting effort succeeds. Explicitly recognizing that an agency's basic impulse is to overstate the benefits of its activities, a budget would relieve agencies of benefit calculation responsibilities altogether. Agencies would concentrate on properly assessing only the costs of their initiatives. Since an agency must try to maximize benefits within its budget constraint or risk losing its budget allocation, it would be rational for agencies to monitor benefits, but Congress need not require it.Other ways to promote the success of a budget are to: establish an incremental rather than total budget; collect and summarize annual report card data on the numbers of regulations in each agency; establish a regulatory cost freeze; implement a Regulatory Reduction Commission; employ separate budgets for economic and environmental/social regulation; and control indirect costs by limiting the regulatory methods that most often generate them.A regulatory budget is not a magic device alone capable of reducing the current $647 billion regulatory burden. Yet a cautious one deserve consideration. Having good information is an aid in grappling with the regulatory state just as compiling the federal fiscal budget is indispensable to any effort to plan and control government spending.     

How Weak Recognition and Measurement in the Federal Budget Encouraged Costly Policy: The Case of "Supervisory Goodwill"

The budget process is the primary means by which federal policymakers allocate resources. The failure of the budget to recognize and measure the full cost of federal programs encourages the Congress and president to skew resource allocation toward policies whose budgetary costs are underestimated. These "low-cost" policies often increase costs to taxpayers without providing taxpayers with benefits. Recent examples of this phenomenon are found in the "supervisory goodwill" cases. This article reviews these cases, the budgetary weaknesses they identify, the influence these weaknesses had on legislators, and the unnecessary costs for taxpayers that result from the supervisory goodwill policy. Specifically, the federal budget did not recognize the cost that would result from encouraging financial institutions to assume the assets and liabilities of insolvent savings and loans. The budget's recognition of costs failed a second time by not recording expenditures when the government abrogated its contracts with acquirers. Both actions raised costs to taxpayers unnecessarily. In addition to analyzing budgetary weaknesses and their potential costs, this article also reviews two proposed budgetary reforms that could address the budgetary failures highlighted by the supervisory goodwill cases.     

Are people who cooperate ‘rational altruists’?

In experimental games, as in natural situations, people are often observed acting to the benefit of others even at considerable cost to themselves. Such behavior is contrary to the assumption of selfish behavior, but it is not necessarily contrary to the assumption of rationality: People cooperating under these circumstances could be ‘rational altruists’ who base their decision on the magnitude of the external benefit, as well as on the costs to themselves. We test that proposition using a prisoners' dilemma experimental paradigm. If it is correct, we should observe higher levels of cooperation as the external benefit in such games increases. But we do not — whether external benefit is measured in terms of number of individuals benefiting from a cooperative choice or the total dollar benefit produced. Cooperation must be explained otherwise.     

Toward a Regulatory Budget

A regulatory budget would require the federal government to treat compliance costs incurred by the private sector as if they were incurred by the government, without requiring the government to actually assume those costs. For example, EPA could be given a regulatory compliance budget of say $80 billion in FY98. A regulatory budget would provoke an annual debate in Congress on the size of EPA's or OSHA's budget. Such a debate would force the proponents to weigh the benefits and costs of various regulatory programs, something now lacking in the political process.
Interest in a regulatory budget reflects the slight gains in the quality of regulatory decision making resulting from mandatory regulatory review. It is now apparent that better information about the costs, benefits, and distributional consequences of regulation will not automatically improve regulatory decision making-although it would not hurt.     

Institutional constraints,annexation and municipal efficiency in the 1960s

A sample of cities from 43 states is used to analyze how changes in institutions influence municipal expenditures and employment. Per capita costs and municipal employment are not found to be significantly influenced by a shift from restrictive to non-restrictive annexation laws. Municipalities operating under municipal-determination annexation laws are not found to experience significantly different growth rates in costs and employment per resident from that of cities operating under annexation laws which imposed a greater number of barriers to annexation.     

The net effects of the Project NetWork return-to-work case management experiment on participant earnings, benefit receipt, and other outcomes

The Social Security Administration (SSA) initiated Project NetWork in 1991 to test case management as a means of promoting employment among persons with disabilities. The demonstration, which targeted Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) beneficiaries and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) applicants and recipients, offered intensive outreach, work-incentive waivers, and case management/referral services. Participation in Project NetWork was voluntary. Volunteers were randomly assigned to the "treatment" group or the "control" group. Those assigned to the treatment group met individually with a case or referral manager who arranged for rehabilitation and employment services, helped clients develop an individual employment plan, and provided direct employment counseling services. Volunteers assigned to the control group could not receive services from Project NetWork but remained eligible for any employment assistance already available in their communities. For both treatment and control groups, the demonstration waived specific DI and SSI program rules considered to be work disincentives. The experimental impact study thus measures the incremental effects of case and referral management services. The eight demonstration sites were successful in implementing the experimental design roughly as planned. Project NetWork staff were able to recruit large numbers of participants and to provide rehabilitation and employment services on a substantial scale. Most of the sites easily reached their enrollment targets and were able to attract volunteers with demographic characteristics similar to those of the entire SSI and DI caseload and a broad range of moderate and severe disabilities. However, by many measures, volunteers were generally more "work-ready" than project eligible in the demonstration areas who did not volunteer to receive NetWork services. Project NetWork case management increased average annual earnings by $220 per year over the first 2 years following random assignment. This statistically significant impact, an approximate 11-percent increase in earnings, is based on administrative data on earnings. For about 70 percent of sample members, a third year of followup data was available. For this limited sample, the estimated effect of Project NetWork on annual earnings declined to roughly zero in the third followup year. The findings suggest that the increase in earnings may have been short-lived and may have disappeared by the time Project NetWork services ended. Project NetWork did not reduce reliance on SSI or DI benefits by statistically significant amounts over the 30-42 month followup period. The services provided by Project NetWork thus did not reduce overall SSI and DI caseloads or benefits by substantial amounts, especially given that only about 5 percent of the eligible caseload volunteered to participate in Project NetWork. Project NetWork produced modest net benefits to persons with disabilities and net costs to taxpayers. Persons with disabilities gained mainly because the increases in their earnings easily outweighed the small (if any) reduction in average SSI and DI benefits. For SSA and the federal government as a whole, the costs of Project NetWork were not sufficiently offset by increases in tax receipts resulting from increased earnings or reductions in average SSI and DI benefits. The modest net benefits of Project NetWork to persons with disabilities are encouraging. How such benefits of an experimental intervention should be weighed against costs of taxpayers depends on value judgments of policymakers. Because different case management projects involve different kinds of services, these results cannot be directly generalized to other case management interventions. They are nevertheless instructive for planning new initiatives. Combining case and referral management services with various other interventions, such as longer term financial support for work or altered provider incentives, could produc     

Using feedback simulation to test educational finance policies

A system dynamics model of the dynamics of special education reimbursement policies, based upon work completed in Massachusetts, is presented. The model is used to analyze the causes of unstable growth in special education costs and to propose policy options for controlling such costs. Because of an elaborated ability to represent the behaviors of local school districts, the system dynamics technology was found to be ideally suited to this type of policy analysis. However, the existence of the elaborated feedback structure would make it extremely cumbersome to use the system dynamics model to project annual costs on a locality-by-locality basis, such projections being the principal strength of traditional education finance models. This trade-off between two modeling technologies suggests that analysts must carefully match their audience, purpose, and modeling technology to attain best analyses.     

Prison or Voluntary Cooperation? The Possibility of Withdrawal from the European Union

Can a Member State choose to leave the European Union (EU)? Are there provisions in the Treaties that establish a right to withdraw? What would the political and economic implications be? In this article, these questions are addressed. In a first step, the Treaties of the EU and the provisions of international law are consulted in order to clarify if a legal right to withdraw exists. The conclusion is that there is no guaranteed legal right to withdraw in the current situation, but the entering into force of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe would create such a right. However, a formal right to withdraw does not necessarily mean that leaving the EU is a real option, and therefore the political and economic sides of the issue are also examined. From the literature on secession and Europeanization, a number of issues that could arise in a case of withdrawal are identified – namely ‘fear of fragmentation’, ‘lost investment’, ‘costs’ and ‘the effects of Europeanization’. The extent to which these issues were of importance is examined in the only existing case of withdrawal: Greenland. Subsequently, an assessment is made of the extent to which these issues could form obstacles for a Member State that wishes to withdraw in the current situation. The main conclusion is that large economic costs and the constitutional changes that follow from EU membership could rule out withdrawal as a realistic option.     

Assessing OSHA Performance: New Evidence from the Construction Industry

The determinants of OSHA performance can be examined by breaking the regulatory process into three elements relating to enforcement, compliance behavior, and the adequacy of standards in addressing safety outcomes. This paper develops and applies this framework to the U.S. construction industry during the period 1987 to 1993. Enforcement activity among the firms in the sample was substantial, with firms facing a high probability of annual inspection. But, despite this significant enforcement effort, inspections have a modest effect on firm compliance with OSHA standards. Finally, the health and safety standards cited most frequently diverge from the major sources of fatalities and injuries on construction projects. These results suggest that historic enforcement policies toward construction make less sense as OSHA moves into its fourth decade of operation. More generally, the paper illustrates the problem of focusing enforcement resources on large, high‐profile companies even though they often are not the major source of regulatory problems in an established area of public policy intervention. © 2001 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Privately informed seekers of an uncertain rent

Two departures from antecedent rent-seeking models are invoked: a rent of unknown size is sought, and rent seekers obtain private imperfect estimates of this size. A symmetric equilibrium for a fixed number of rent seekers is characterized, and shown to underdissipate the rent. Then a model of the decision to obtain private information and participate in the rent-seeking contest is built. The symmetric equilibrium participation probability equates expected profit to participation costs. A simple formula for underdissipation results: dissipation is incomplete precisely by the expected aggregate participation costs. If an award mechanism can attain a lower level of dissipation for a fixed number of seekers, then it will raise the endogenous probability of participation, and as a result will dissipate less rent in the equilibrium with an endogenous number of seekers.     

Preventing construction deaths: The role of public policies

Are stronger direct financial incentives or regulatory enforcement effective in reducing fatalities in the construction industry? We examine two important policies—state workers' compensation (WC) programs and federal and state Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) activities—which embody those strategies. We examine their impact by looking at state-level fatality rates in the construction industry from 1992 to 2016. Setting aside highway crashes and violence, the majority of employee deaths occur in construction. We find that states which exempt small firms from the requirement to buy WC insurance have higher fatality rates. When eligibility for compensation is restricted by longer waiting periods, fatality rates are substantially higher. More frequent federal or state OSHA inspections and, especially, consultation visits are associated with lower fatality rates, but higher average penalties are not. Limited variation in these policies over our sample period, especially for WC, makes these results suggestive rather than definitively causal.     

Outsourcing: Uncovering the Complexity of the Decision

ABSTRACT

Outsourcing is a phenomenon that, on the surface, is used to reduce costs and enable an organization to focus on its core competencies. In researching into outsourcing and whether this assumption holds true, this article focuses on public health organizations where outsourcing has been applied to both clinical and non-clinical services. In the cases observed, public sector managers assumed contracting would lower production costs for peripheral services whose outcomes could be easily measured and monitored. Clinical services were not usually outsourced because these core services were more difficult to measure. In implementing contracts for non-core services, decision makers' political and ideological objectives overshadowed management imperatives that are necessary for effective contract design and implementation, leading to poor service outcomes and little cost savings. Choosing the “right” services to contract does guarantee good outcomes such as lower costs and improved labor flexibility, but it is necessary to understand that optimum outcomes are only achievable if the service is clearly non-core, has measurable outcomes, and has low transaction frequency. It is also clear that outsourcing will not remove management problems; it simply adds another layer of complexity on top of managing staff who still provide the service.     

The Role of Procedural Controls in OSHA's Ergonomics Rulemaking

Few, if any, regulations over the past decade have received as much publicity or engendered such controversy as the ergonomics regulation of the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA). Some may see the ergonomics rule as the paradigmatic instance of procedural hurdles holding up and eventually destroying a regulation. This article examines the role that procedure played in the ergonomics rulemaking. Lessons are drawn from an analysis of the four publicly available versions of the regulation and interviews with seven high-ranking officials at OSHA and the Small Business Administration. Of the procedural hurdles faced by OSHA, the notice-and-comment requirement had the largest impact on the final rule. OMB review and requirements to conduct a cost-benefit analysis served largely as a fire alarm to political overseers, and the required small business panel had largely symbolic effects. The more traditional control of congressional budgetary oversight had the greatest effect by delaying the rule for three years, and thus eventually doomed OSHA's attempts to regulate.