Implementing management tools in Turkish public hospitals: the impact of culture,politics and role status

The government of Turkey has attempted to substantially improve the management of its public hospitals. However, an analysis of the performance of the quality certified hospitals finds only minor improvements. This study seeks to explain these disappointing results by interviewing 46 hospital managers and employees about the successes and failures of the management reform effort. The interviews suggest that traditional Turkish organisational culture often hinders attempts to decrease hierarchy, but, more positively, it also encourages the use of frontline teams and group rewards. Moreover, Turkey's hybrid system of allowing public doctors to maintain private practices has provided doctors with both the resources and the incentives to fight management reform efforts. Finally, organisational decentralisation in Turkey has evoked fierce political opposition, ironically even from many pro‐modernising forces that fear it could increase the power of Islamic fundamentalists. Turkey's experience suggests a number of broader points about management reform in non‐western societies. It suggests that decentralisation can often impede, rather than strengthen the other aspects of management reform; that a hybrid market organisation is often harder to move toward market efficiencies than a purely governmental one; and that national cultures should help guide the order in which reform tools are implemented. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ethnic politics and public sector management in Trinidad and Guyana

Representativeness and diversity in public institutions are among the principles of good and democratic governance, but a commitment to achieving ‘balance’ is far easier said than done, particularly in the context of small, ethnically divided societies in which political mobilization is based on ethnic identity. Trinidad and Guyana are two such societies in which political power was held for a long time by a dominant ethnic group and has recently been transferred to the former ‘out group’. Specifically, politics in both territories was dominated by parties that are identified with the urban African populations, whereas the main opposition parties drew their electoral support almost exclusively from rural Indian groups. In both cases the Indian ‘out group’ accused the African ‘in group’ of favouring members of the latter group—and, conversely, of discriminating against the Indians—in the allocation of resources which are in the gift of the state. Also in both countries, democratic elections have resulted in regime changes after three decades of near one‐party rule. The issue of employment in the public service has become critical as the two groups battle for scarce resources, and the public service is described as a ‘theatre of inter‐ethnic drama’. The article takes the view that managing ethnic and cultural diversity is tantamount to managing unproductive tensions that threaten to undermine confidence and morale among public officials. This impacts negatively on their levels of job satisfaction, the quality of the work environment and, ultimately, on performance and output. It breeds suspicion among co‐workers and has the potential to degenerate into ethnic strife that can cripple the public sector and affect the overall goal of national development. The article examines existing legal/constitutional and institutional provisions for conflict management and resolution, but ultimately suggests the need for well‐conceived confidence‐building measures such as public scrutiny of the personnel function and the reintroduction of ethnicity as a category on official government personnel records. The main theoretical conclusion is that while equality of opportunity must be guaranteed, the notion of a representative bureaucracy has many practical limitations that make it unworkable in Trinidad and Guyana. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Waste,weapons, and resolve: Defense posture and politics in the defense budget

The defense budget poses many problems to the student of budgetary behavior and its ever-changing structure makes it difficult to identify patterns and trends in allocation. This study examines defense budget requests from the Eisenhower through the Reagan administrations. An analysis of changes in allocation to the 54 appropriation categories suggests that the defense budget responds to new doctrines and management introduced by each administration. Shifts in allocation among the services are greatest in the first two budgets of an administration and reversals of previous program priorities also occur early in each administration. After three or four budget requests, year-to-year continuity in allocation to winners and losers finally begins to emerge. Two other findings also shed light on the politics of defense budgeting. First, the degree of variation in allocation is least when the defense budget increase is large. Second, low presidential popularity leads to less variation. The identification of such trends should permit future budget requests to be evaluated in the context of the long-term evolution of defense politics.     

The courts,politics, and the ACLU

She is co-director of the Arthur Garfield Civil Liberties Program where she teaches and writes in the areas of family law, constutional law, and health law.     

Occupations,mediations, subjectifications: fabricating politics

The revolutions and protests that have spread across the globe since 2008 have been seen as a watershed moment. In this article we examine the relationships between urban space and politics that have emerged across these events. We draw upon the political philosophy of Jacques Rancière to provide a framework to understand some events of this period as political moments and, in addition, attempt to build upon Rancière's work to trace out the geographical dimensions of politics. The paper concludes with a consideration of the counter-revolutionary projects enacted by current social orders.     

Campfire decision-making and strategic management: A politics and leadership approach to economic development

Privatization is recommended unconditionally by some scholars as the optimal means for achieving economic development. While privatization can be helpful medicine, it provides no universal cure for all the ills associated with low economic growth. A country's economic and political institutions are intertwined. Mandating privatization without being mindful of both political and economic consequences to such a policy can bring undesirable consequences during and after policy implementation. This paper proposes that to enhance the likelihood of economic growth a leader should blend economics with politics. Sensitive political leadership can stimulate a bonding among citizens, a bonding which can generate the commitment to risk by investing personal savings, to work the long hours which much precede the rewards, and often to be satisfied by a job well done rather than with material reward. Analogous to the chief executive officer of a successful corporation, the effective political leader involves stakeholders, steers decision processes, takes reasonable risks, encourages private investment, and rations public resources according to national priorities. Collective decision-making guided by the political leader, who also acts as a strategic manager during implementation, is offered as a model for development.     

论提高思想政治理论课中学生主体能动性的对策

高校思想政治理论课教学历来受到党中央和各校的重视，但思想政治理论课教学过程中却存在许多问题，究其原因，学生主体能动性的缺乏是制约其效果的重要因素。本文通过介绍主体能动性教学的理论基础，分析影响思想政治理论课教学中学生主体能动性发挥的因素，结合建构主义的理论提出了如何调动学生的主体能动性，解决思想政治理论课效果不强的具体对策。     

When politics prevails: Parties,elections and loyalty in the European Parliament

In many political systems, legislators serve multiple principals who compete for their loyalty in legislative votes. This article explores the political conditions under which legislators choose between their competing principals in multilevel systems, with a focus on how election proximity shapes legislative behaviour across democratic arenas. Empirically, the effect of electoral cycles on national party delegations’ ‘collective disloyalty’ with their political groups in the European Parliament (EP) is analysed. It is argued that election proximity changes the time horizons, political incentives and risk perceptions of both delegations and their principals, ‘punctuating’ cost‐benefit calculations around defection as well as around controlling, sanctioning and accommodating. Under the shadow of elections, national delegations’ collective disloyalty with their transnational groups should, therefore, increase. Using a new dataset with roll‐call votes cast under legislative codecision by delegations between July 1999 and July 2014, the article shows that the proximity of planned national and European elections drives up disloyalty in the EP, particularly by delegations from member states with party‐centred electoral rules. The results also support a ‘politicisation’ effect: overall, delegations become more loyal over time, but the impact of election proximity as a driver of disloyalty is strongest in the latest parliament analysed (i.e., 2009–2014). Furthermore, disloyalty is more likely in votes on contested and salient legislation, and under conditions of Euroscepticism; by contrast, disloyalty is less likely in votes on codification files, when a delegation holds the rapporteurship and when the national party participates in government. The analysis sheds new light on electoral politics as a determinant of legislative choice under competing principals, and on the conditions under which politics ‘travels’ across democratic arenas in the European Union's multilevel polity.     

Risk,politics, and development: Lessons from the UK's democracy aid

Political risks are inescapable in development. Donors keep them in check with a range of tools, but existing options provide little guidance about how political forms of risk can—or should—shape programme design. This paper presents a novel framework that offers practical guidance on how to think about and manage some of these risks. This is based on a review of programmes delivered by the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, which provides a specific type of aid: democracy assistance. Political forms of risk have a strong influence on that aid, so it provides a valuable example. Our framework centres on two trade‐offs inherent in the provision of aid for democracy support. The first relates to the type of approach employed in a programme; should it focus on a thematic issue or a specific event, or should it focus primarily on an institution and its processes? The second concerns the scope of a programme in terms of who it includes. Understanding the costs and benefits of these trade‐offs will help development practitioners to make decisions about political risks in a more rigorous and transparent way and, potentially, to shift from a culture of risk aversion, to one of informed risk‐taking.