The Dynamics of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the Domestic Security Dilemma

This article argues that the concept of the “domestic security dilemma” can help us to better understand public opposition to government counterterrorism policies. It examines the concept of the “security dilemma” in international relations theory and argues that this concept can also be applied to the analysis of domestic security politics. The article explains that when the government takes actions intended to make people safer from terrorist threats, it often has the unintended consequence of heightening concerns about government oppression. Thus, counterterrorism represents a “domestic security dilemma”—a situation where security tradeoffs have consistently undermined anticipated security gains.     

Community Engagement for Counterterrorism in Britain: An Exploration of the Role of “Connectors” in Countering Takfiri Jihadist Terrorism

So far there has been little substantive research about how individuals engaged in counterterrorism initiatives, whether as community members or police officers or other professionals, negotiate this challenging terrain. This article suggests that community-based approaches to counterterrorism rely on the careful construction of certain forms of community engagement, rather than an all-encompassing claim that “communities defeat terrorism.” This article explores this issue further through analyzing and exploring the role that connectors, rather than communities per se, may play in counterterrorism.     

As a Fish Swims in the Sea: Relationships Between Factors Contributing to Support for Terrorist or Insurgent Groups

This article reviews and synthesizes social science knowledge on the connections between popular support and terrorist/insurgent sustainment. After distinguishing between “sympathetic of” and “supporting,” the author identifies support requirements of terrorists and insurgents, the range of sources of support, and motives for support. A scheme of relationships between factors contributing to strength of support is essayed. As a caveat to population-centered approaches to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, the article concludes that support is not “one size fits all,” and that certain factors, when present, are more amenable to policy influence than others. These conclusions suggest that it is imperative that practitioners of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency be mindful of the specifics of their case when seeking to undermine support.     

The Security Council's Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Regime: “Essential Tool” or Increasing Liability for the UN's Counterterrorism Efforts?

This article examines the UN Security Council's 1267 counterterrorism sanctions regime. Initially adopted in 1999, this sanctions regime targets individuals and entities suspected of associating with Al Qaeda and/or the Taliban and it requires UN Member States to freeze their assets and implement travel bans. Central to the operation of the sanctions regime is a “Consolidated List,” which is maintained by the so-called 1267 Committee, a sub-committee of the Security Council. This Committee possesses discretionary powers to list and de-list targeted individuals and entities that have been criticized as incompatible with internationally recognized due process guarantees. Reviewing recent developments, including a landmark decision by the European Court of Justice, the article addresses the need for additional safeguards and discusses reform options available to the Security Council. It examines the most recent reform efforts introduced by Security Council resolution 1904 (2009) and argues that a comprehensive review and reform of the 1267 sanctions is crucial if the regime is to provide an “essential tool” in the UN counterterrorism efforts.     

CONTEST as Strategy: Reassessing Britain's Counterterrorism Approach

The appropriateness of the United Kingdom's counterterrorism strategy, known as CONTEST, divides opinion. This article reassesses CONTEST as strategy rather than simply examining its effectiveness as policy, or critiquing its individual parts. Reviewing the development of CONTEST in the context of wider analytical discussions on what makes for good strategy, the authors argue that several important strands of CONTEST are either underdeveloped or not yet as “strategic” as some analysts and the U.K. government itself have professed them to be. Fresh thinking on aspects of counterterrorism is urgently needed to counter the challenge of contemporary and future terrorism.     

Terrorism: A strategic perspective

This paper compares the U.S. national security strategy's vision for counter‐terrorism missions to the political realm in which conventional military forces and terrorists operate. Terrorist acts and state responses are analyzed to demonstrate that they have differing political effects, which calls into question the political utility of a conventional military counterterrorist response. Terrorism is placed within context of the present era as, according to Martin van Creveld, evolving historical conditions are wrenching warfare out of the political realm in which Clausewitz's analysis originally posited warfare's extension of political activity based on state power. The article also discusses terrorism's nebulous placement within the levels of war to reveal another aspect of terrorism's different relationship to the political realm. Ultimately, this challenges the U.S. national security strategy's conclusion that conventional military force used in “punitive” or “counterterrorism” operations is an effective political response to terrorism.     

Pakistan's Approach to Countering Violent Extremism (CVE): Reframing the Policy Framework for Peacebuilding and Development Strategies

Countering violent extremism (CVE) is one of the central focuses of the government of Pakistan. This article examines the current CVE policy framework and questions the existing paradigm of CVE policies in Pakistan. The article employs R. Kim Cragin's model of “resisting violent extremism” to suggest the need for a paradigm change in Pakistan's CVE policy framework, especially after the launch of another military operation in 2017. After a decade of security-centric counterterrorism policies, such a change requires balancing security-, development-, and prevention-centric policies in order to redefine Pakistan's policy framework.     

Informal Countermessaging: The Potential and Perils of Informal Online Countermessaging

Abstract

Online countermessaging—communication that seeks to disrupt the online content disseminated by extremist groups and individuals—is a core component of contemporary counterterrorism strategies. Countermessaging has been heavily criticized, not least on the grounds of effectiveness. Whereas current debates are focused on the role of government and large organizations in developing and disseminating countermessages, this article argues that such approaches overlook the informal production of countermessages. Recognizing the appetite for “natural world” content among those engaged in countermessaging, this article highlights some of the potential benefits of informal approaches to countermessaging. At the same time, the article also acknowledges the risks that may result from closer working between countermessaging organizations and informal actors.     

End of the Lone Wolf: The Typology that Should Not Have Been

This research note argues that the “lone wolf” typology should be fundamentally reconsidered. Based on a three-year empirical research project, two key points are made to support this argument. First, the authors found that ties to online and offline radical milieus are critical to lone actors' adoption and maintenance of both the motive and capability to commit acts of terrorism. Second, in terms of pre-attack behaviors, the majority of lone actors are not the stealthy and highly capable terrorists the “lone wolf” moniker alludes to. These findings not only urge a reconsideration of the utility of the lone-wolf concept, they are also particularly relevant for counterterrorism professionals, whose conceptions of this threat may have closed off avenues for detection and interdiction that do, in fact, exist.     

“Purity of Arms,” “Preemptive War,” and “Selective Targeting” in the Context of Terrorism: General,Conceptual, and Legal Analyses

Selective targeting (or targeted killing) of terrorist leaders is a legitimate mode of operation and part of a state's counterterrorism, anticipatory, self-defense activities that are designed to prevent the continuation of terrorism. Paradoxically, this counterterrorism measure is the best way of preserving the military ethical conventions of “purity of arms.” The concept refers to moral rules advocating the exercise of restraint and compassion in the course of a confrontation with the enemy. The “purity of arms” concept is debated extensively in democracies. Selective targeting of terrorist activists is a measure designed to hurt the real enemy while minimizing civilian casualties. Terrorist leaders and planners are targeted and an attempt is made, trying to avoid so far as possible, “collateral damage” that often accompanies any general military offensive. Customary international law permits targeting the enemy, provided that the criteria of necessity and proportionality of the attack are maintained. The relationship between the threat of terrorist attacks and the actual attacks carried out is shown in this study. The results contribute to reinforcing the legality of selective targeting as a preemptive mode of operation because they show that one should relate to a threat of an attack as to an imminent danger.     

A Partnership to Counter International Terrorism: The UN Security Council and the UN Member States

Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolutions 1368 and 1373 and thereby created the basis of a global counterterrorism system. At the heart of this system lies a partnership between the Security Council and the UN member states—a partnership in which states have been given considerable, independent, operational responsibility. Unfortunately, this system has often been criticized and viewed pessimistically by scholars, who tend to focus primarily on UN bodies and offer little discussion of the key role of states. This article presents a different conceptualization of this counterterrorism system and suggests, through case studies, that it has attained some important objectives in the global struggle against terrorism.     

The Plots that Failed: Intelligence Lessons Learned from Unsuccessful Terrorist Attacks Against the United States

While much of the focus of terrorism research is on successful terrorist attacks, the most significant lessons for terrorism prevention may come from examination of terrorist plots and attacks that do not succeed. This article analyzes 176 terrorist plots against American targets that have been thwarted or otherwise failed during the past 25 years. It considers what kinds of intelligence and security measures are most useful in counterterrorism, and argues that the conventional wisdom about why intelligence fails—because analysts and agencies are unable to “connect the dots”—is wrong. Most plots, especially domestic terrorist plots, are not foiled through imaginative analysis, but through conventional law enforcement efforts and aggressive domestic intelligence collection that reveal to authorities just what the plotters are up to.     

Terrorism as Transnational Advocacy: An Organizational and Tactical Examination

This article attempts to shed light on the dynamics and machinations within terrorist organizations by incorporating a heretofore overlooked literature which is directly applicable, that of transnational advocacy networks (TANs). Terror networks have been described using every possible analogy, from multinational corporations to organized crime to the anthropomorphic classic “cut off the head, and the body will die.” In reality, terrorist organizations function in much the same way, and using many of the same techniques, as transnational advocacy networks concerned with issues like the environment or human rights. By describing these characteristics, and comparing TANs and Terror TANs (TTANs), this article aims to offer insight into the tactics and motivations that define modern, as well as the much heralded post-modern, terrorism.     

Trade,Development, and Nonproliferation: Multilevel Counterterrorism in Central Asia

This article was presented in its original form in October 2005 at the Conference on Central Asian Security in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. This article seeks to add to the discourse on counterterrorism by looking at the challenges posed by sub-state radicalism to development and regionalization. Specifically, adequate counterterror campaigns require addressing socioeconomic feeders of radicalism while simultaneously dealing with the threat of political violence itself. In terms of development, this means advocating increased trade volumes and export oriented growth while concurrently controlling for illicit trade (which often finances terrorist movements) and trade in strategic goods (which could serve to undermine the security of the state). The authors use the case study of Uzbekistan and Central Asian insecurity to illustrate the utility of customs modernization, border security, and export control legislation as integral components in wider counterterror campaigns. The study addresses circumstances specific to present day Central Asia but has wider implications in stymieing the relationship between “grey areas” and terrorist movements worldwide.     

How to Counter Radical Narratives: Dutch Deradicalization Policy in the Case of Moluccan and Islamic Radicals

This article deals with the role of government in encouraging the decline of radical movements. The question posed is: “Which story can the government tell to encourage the decline of radical groups and the disengagement of their members?” The article makes use of the survey of factors promoting decline and disengagement drawn up by Demant, Slootman, Buijs (? ^?Deceased. ) and Tillie in 2008, as well as the factor “official policy strategies” based on concepts taken from discourse analysis, adapted to counterterrorism and deradicalization strategies by De Graaf in 2009. The article will therefore not address the different practical measures in this field, but focus instead on the perception of these official measures by the radicals. It will illustrate this with two case studies: the deradicalization of South Moluccan youths in the 1970s and of jihadist radicals after 2001, both in the Netherlands.     

CONVERGING UNDER PRESSURE? COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES

This article analyses counterterrorism policy convergence among the 27 European Union (EU) member states between 2000 and 2006. While considerable academic interest has been devoted to the common European Union policy in response to terrorism after September 11, few studies have compared counterterrorism policy-making at the member state level. This gap raises the question whether the institutional framework of European counterterrorism policy-making has stimulated convergence of national policies. Data on five policy instruments for counterterrorism show that the aggregated implementation rate increased by almost 55 per cent in this period, which indicates a trend towards policy divergence within the EU as a whole. However, the findings also reveal significant variation in the level and pace of policy instrument implementation. One potentially important variable explaining national policy developments is the degree of political pressure from the EU on member states, while EU membership accession and national counterterrorism policy legacies were less important factors.     

The Dangers of Diplomatic Disengagement in Counterterrorism

This article assesses the utility of diplomatic sanctions in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Through an examination of the United States' use of diplomatic sanctions in Afghanistan and Sudan in the 1990s, the article argues that diplomatic disengagement runs the danger of being more costly than beneficial. The blowback from diplomatic disengagement in counterterrorism includes, but is not limited to, the loss of valuable intelligence, a diminished public diplomacy capability, and the potential radicalization of moderates in the target regime. The article also highlights some of the general benefits of diplomatic engagement with problematic regimes and closes with recommendations aimed at enhancing the role of diplomacy in both counterterrorism and non-proliferation foreign policies.     

The E-Marketing Strategy of Hamas

Operations to counterterrorism in the southern Philippines have resulted in the arrest and incarceration of a significant number of key militants. As a result, the Philippine government has expressed concern that these inmates may radicalize others and continue to operate while incarcerated. As a preventive measure, the government has considered a number of “soft” counterstrategies, including the development of a de-radicalization program. To study the feasibility of running such a program in the Philippine corrective system, this article examines two interrelated areas of enquiry concerning how terrorist inmates are housed and whether prison gangs foster or discourage radicalization in the Philippine prison system. Initial findings suggest that the integration of terrorist inmates with prison gangs may temporarily encourage disengagement and set the foundations for de-radicalization. However, without a specifically designed intervention strategy, the terrorist inmates may revert to militancy once they have returned to their original social settings.